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Abstract 
 
 
A decade of political unrest over the question of parliamentary taxation resulted in the 
development of  an alternate political structure of committees and congresses in the province 
of New York. By 1776, a revolutionary government led by the Provincial Congress controlled the 
province.  Upon learning of the Declaration of Independence, the New York Provincial Congress 
declared independence from the British. Within months of this declaration, southern New York 
was occupied by British troops, and remained under British control for the duration of the 
Revolutionary War. The area was under martial law for the duration. Britain’s loss of the 
Saratoga Campaign brought French entry into the war, and a major strategic reassessment as 
the American colonies became to the British but one front—and  not even the most 
important—in a world war with France (and later others).  A peace commission led by the Earl 
of Carlisle was sent to America, spending time in Philadelphia and New York, but its proposals 
were met with contempt. Partially as a result of the failed mission, a new strategy was 
developed for fighting the war by the British. A major part of this new strategy was the 
restoration of civilian government to the province of New York. It was hoped that, among other 
things, this would showcase Britain’s desire to, rather than impose a tyranny, restore free 
government to the colonies. General James Robertson was chosen to be the new governor, 
arriving in 1780, but was unable to implement the strategy because of opposition by Sir Henry 
Clinton, the commander of Britain’s forces in America.  
The dissertation examines the developing break with Britain, the occupation, and the 
failure of the attempt to restore civilian government it. The dissertation examines the effect 
that various appalling, violent or  questionable acts by British troops or officers had on the 
people of New York, and discusses briefly how British military actions and the occupation 
affected the developing independent New York government. It contrasts events in Georgia, 
where civilian government, complete with an assembly was created, with events in New York. 
Lastly, the dissertation examines the question of whether the restoration of civilian government 
was just too late in 1780 to have been an effective strategy to win back the loyalties of New 
Yorkers and Americans, even if civilian government had been restored. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
I. Basic Statement of Question 
 
 
 A decade-long constitutional dispute between Britain and her colonies in the Western 
hemisphere culminated with thirteen of her mainland colonies declaring independence in July 
of 1776. The triggering cause was the question of the right of Parliament to tax the colonies. 
The colonies were represented in London by agents, the functional equivalent of lobbyists, but 
they had no members in Parliament. The colonies rejected the assertions of some members of 
Parliament that they were “virtually represented” in Parliament; they did not see how the 
interests of, for example, New York could be represented or even understood by a Member of 
Parliament from Cornwall or Newcastle.  The colonists believed that they were thus 
unrepresented in Parliament and that there could be no taxation without some form of 
representation. Taxes were supposed to be free gifts from the commons, the ordinary people, 
through their members of Parliament in the House of Commons to the king, and the colonists 
had no representatives in Parliament.
1
    
                                                           
1
 William Pitt the Elder during the Stamp Act Crisis argued that Americans were “the sons, not the bastards, of 
England. Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the 
Commons alone…When therefore, in this House we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own. But in an 
American tax, what do we do?...we give and grant to your Majesty, the property of your Majesty’s commons of 
America. It is an absurdity in terms.” He continued by attacking the idea that the colonies were virtually 
represented in the Commons. Parliamentary History, XVI, 97-108. See Edmund S. Morgan, ed. Prologue to 
Revolution, Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764-1766, (University of North Carolina Press : 
Chapel Hill), 1959, 136. See also Edmund S.  Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in 
England and America, (W. W. Norton: New York) 1988, 239.   Perhaps the most famous of the colonial agents was 
Benjamin Franklin, who served as the Pennsylvania Assembly’s agent from 1757 to 1762.    
  Put in these terms, this seems like a fairly easy problem to solve. The colonies, after all, 
all accepted George III as their rightful ruler. Their governments were modeled in most respects 
on Britain’s, with a governor representing and usually c
upper house, high court, and body of advisors for the governor, and an assembly representing 
the people (or at least free white males who owned property).  The colonists respected 
Parliament, just rejected its right to impose certain taxes on them
own assemblies. A few representatives in Parliament for the colonies, or some kind of 
continental assembly with a delaying power or veto over Parliamentary actions concerning the 
colonies, would probably have satisfied the vast majority of Americans, and maintained British 
rule over the  Americans.
2
 
 But for various reasons, the problem, the “Imperial Question”, proved unsolvable. A 
structure of committees designed for a protest movement morphed in
second government, and eventually the legal government was replaced by a new revolutionary 
structure. Fighting broke out in Massachusetts, and throughout the thirteen colonies, 
preparations were made for war. Yet the colonists still clu
though they were fighting bloody battles with His Majesty’s troops. The decision to become 
independent, to become independent republics, was not taken lightly. It occurred only when it 
became clear that there was no co
was not on their side. This realization was a devastating psychological blow to many. Patriots 
                                                          
2
 The latter was proposed by Joseph Galloway in his 1774 Plan of Union. 
Continental Congress, 1:49—51; The Founders' Constitution
Volume 1, Chapter 7, Document 3 http://press
The University of Chicago Press. 
hosen by the King, a Council acting as an 
—that was a task for their 
 each colony into a 
ng to their loyalty to the king, even 
mpromise, no choice but war or surrender, and that the king 
28 Sept. 1774 Journals 
, 
-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch7s3.html
2 
of the 
 
3 
 
and Loyalists
3
 were in the beginning both loyal to the king; indeed, one British officer opined 
that “So far were [the Americans] in 1767 from thinking of a Form of Gouvernent without a 
king, that the People believed the King would take their Part if he was rightly informed.”
4
   The 
King was considered the protector of their liberties. His name was inscribed on flags placed on 
liberty poles, and there was no intentional irony in the playing of “God Save the King” when 
these poles were raised.  
 But the decision to declare independence was finally made, and New York—rather 
reluctantly—accepted the Declaration of Independence. New York and the other colonies 
began the process of becoming independent states, while simultaneously joining with other 
states to fight a war of independence.  The ad hoc structure of committees and provincial 
congresses that had brought the states to independence began to be replaced by more 
permanent constitutions and institutions. In New York, this process was disrupted several times 
by British military action. The most important of these actions was the occupation of southern, 
“downstate” New York by the British. This was completed by November, 1776.  Behind British 
lines for the duration of the war was the colonial capital of New York City (then consisting of 
about one square-mile at the southern tip of Manhattan), the rest of the island of Manhattan, 
Staten Island, Long Island, the modern Bronx, and portions of southern Westchester. The last 
British troops did not leave until November 25, 1783.  This long occupation, in addition to its 
effects on the people “behind the lines”, may have had a significant effect on the government 
                                                           
3
 This work will generally refer to the faction which opposed British policies (and eventually supported 
independence) as “Patriots”, not “Whigs”, since most of the political actors of the time were Whigs of one form or 
another. In New York, many Loyalists had been members of the Patriot movement, before leaving it when it began 
to head in a direction that could, and did, end in armed conflict between Britain and America. A Whig may defined 
as a believer in the complex of ideas that would become liberalism, in constitutionalism, and generally the ideals of 
the 1688-9 Glorious Revolution.    
4
 Apollo Morris to Germain, November 1775, Sackville-Germain Papers, Vol. IV, Clement Library 
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of independent New York in the Revolution and early years of the Republic, as will be discussed 
below. 
 The occupation presented an opportunity to the British. The area had a sizable number 
of Loyalists, and more arrived each day as Loyalist refugees entered the region. While subject to 
raids from across the Long Island Sound or from New Jersey, the area was relatively secure, and 
the Patriot presence within the area was for the most part cowed. The occupation presented 
the British with a golden opportunity to contrast British-ruled America with the America ruled 
by “the Usurpers”.  An attempt to do this was made, but it would not be implemented for 
various reasons detailed in text. The failure to restore civilian government meant that the area 
was under seven years of martial law. 
 Instead of a glittering example of British rule, southern New York was faced with raids, 
pillage, plunder and corruption. Sacred places were desecrated, at times seemingly maliciously. 
Loyalists and their property were often treated no better than Patriots.  Women were raped, 
and people kidnapped. The British were often unable to protect the residents from these 
actions; sometimes, they were the perpetrators. Because under martial law the courts did not 
operate, there was little recourse for property damage, theft, or conversion. Many Loyalists 
became disaffected, and a few even became active spies for the Americans. What was 
seemingly a golden opportunity for the British seems to have been wasted. It is this occupation 
of southern New York by the British, and the abortive attempt to restore civilian government to 
the occupied region, that is the main subject of this dissertation. 
 
 
5 
 
This work will first study the Revolution in New York, and then the occupation 
that followed.  It examines the development of the idea of establishing civilian 
government in New York as a means of winning back the “hearts and minds”, the love 
and loyalty, of New Yorkers and other Americans. It studies the attempt to establish 
civilian government, its failure, the reasons for the failure, the substitutes for civilian 
government that were tried, and the final abortive attempt to restore civilian 
government. The work also compares events in New York with events in another colony 
(Georgia) where civilian government was restored.  It will seek to determine if the 
restoration of civilian government in New York was truly a glittering opportunity that 
should have been tried by the British, or if it was not such an opportunity. The British 
hoped to showcase through restoring civilian government that they aimed at freedom 
within empire, not tyranny for their colonies.  They hoped this would win back the 
loyalties, within New York and without, of many individuals, if not whole counties, 
colonies, or regions. The ultimate question of this work may be stated thusly: 
 
Would the restoration by the British of full civilian government have had the 
beneficial effects the British desired from it? Would it have returned large 
numbers of individuals, counties, colonies, or regions back to British allegiance, or 
was the attempt too late to have any such effect? If the latter, at what point was 
reconciliation not possible, and what factors made this failure to achieve 
reconciliation more likely? 
 
 By 1780, when the attempt to restore civilian government was made, was it too late? 
Would an earlier successful attempt to restore civilian government have succeeded in the 
purpose of showcasing British intentions to restore liberty within the empire and thus bring 
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many back to their former allegiance? How much earlier?  Did the specific persons and 
personalities involved negatively impact the result?  If the British occupation had been not as 
harsh as it actually was, with greater respect and protection for the rights, persons, and 
property of the occupied, would that have helped  win back—and retain—the loyalties of the 
occupied?  These and other questions must be asked if we are to determine whether the 
restoring of civilian government would have had the beneficial results for the British they 
hoped it would have. 
The British occupation in many ways seems like a wasted opportunity. A golden 
opportunity to win back hearts and minds was arguably thrown away by poor administration, 
numerous unpleasant incidents, and the failure to restore civilian government, which arguably 
could have drawn disillusioned individual Americans—and  perhaps entire regions or 
provinces—back  into the British fold.   At the very least, it seems apparent that an opportunity 
was wasted to make the occupation more tolerable for the people of southern New York, and it 
also seems apparent that there was a wasted propaganda opportunity. The reasons for the 
British failure to take full advantage of this opportunity are discussed in the main section of the 
work.  But even if the occupation was  a mild one,, with far greater security for life and 
property, with the rights of the occupied population properly respected, would it have 
mattered? If, in 1780, southern New York had been declared at the King’s Peace and full civilian 
government restored, would it have really mattered? Was willing reconciliation with Britain 
possible by this time, or had the time when the hearts and minds, the love and loyalty, of the 
population could be regained passed?  In short, could a gentler  occupation have helped the 
British cause by winning back hearts and minds—or was the time when that could have 
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happened passed?  And if so, when was the last time that New Yorkers and Americans could 
have reconciled?      
As will be argued in the text, reconciliation was possible, but the attempt in New York was 
made too late. Options that would have satisfied both Britain and America, and kept the 
colonies willingly in the British Empire, existed. But the time for that soon disappeared. A 
crushing military victory might have brought the colonies back into the fold, albeit reluctantly, 
but that option  became less and less likely.  The rather harsh occupation did not help the 
British cause as well. The idea of restoring civilian government was not a bad idea, but it was 
made too late in the day to have any benefits for the British.  
    
 
II. Subsidiary questions 
 
 
 
 The Imperial Crisis which culminated in American independence was a decade-long 
affair. While there were many areas of dispute and tension between the colonies and the 
mother country, the main issue, the trigger for the crisis, was a constitutional question.  The 
colonists wanted a say in the taxes and laws that would govern them, justifying this belief on 
various grounds. They objected, often violently as in the case of the Stamp Act, to the 
imposition of taxes by the British without their consent. The slogan of “No taxation without 
representation!” was a call, at least in the beginning, for a reworking of the British Empire’s 
constitution so that the colonists would have a say in the taxes they paid the empire.  But in 
addition, Americans in the 18
th
 century believed that unjust taxes threatened property rights 
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which in turn threatened liberty.  Property allowed one a kind of independence---liberty. The 
evidence is that the great majority wanted to remain in the empire, but wanted a greater say in 
how they were governed. They wanted both liberty and empire. If Britain could have found a 
way to give the Americans a place at the table, they could have retained America in the empire. 
But Britain never found a method that retained a suitable amount of British control while giving 
America a satisfactory say. Indeed, they seemed to ignore what the Americans saw as 
reasonable and rightful concerns. When Britain backed down on the Stamp Act, Britain coupled 
this with the Declaratory Act, declaring that Parliament had the right to issue the taxes the 
colonists believed they did not.  Some Britons even argued that the Americans were virtually 
represented already, so that the colonists’ arguments as to “no taxation without 
representation” had no merit. 
 The failure of Britain to reach a satisfactory arrangement with America resulted in new 
factions and a developing structure of protest organizations. Britain in the years following the 
end of the Stamp Act Crisis could perhaps have come to some solution that would have 
satisfied all but the most radical American.  But they did not. In the early 1770s, there was a 
continuing series of incidents, such as the Battle of Golden Hill in New York and the Boston 
Massacre.  The 1773 Boston Tea Party brought the crisis to a head. Organizations formed 
originally to manage a protest movement began to take on governmental powers and supplant 
and eventually replace the official governments. But even at this stage, even after blood was 
shed at Lexington-Concord, there is much evidence the Americans desired reconciliation. This 
was particularly true of New York, which had many economic and other ties to Britain. A 
gesture of reconciliation, a proposal which gave even a minimal say to the Americans, could 
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perhaps have helped defuse the crisis and left America within the Empire.  But no such gesture 
came; instead the king declared the Americans to be in rebellion.   
The Americans finally declared independence. For the Americans, independence seems 
to have changed everything. After independence, the Americans rejected proposals that 
possibly would have defused the crisis in an earlier time. In 1766, Britain had many 
opportunities to retain the hearts and minds of the colonists. Even after the events of 1770, of 
1773, even after Lexington-Concord and the clear state of war between the colonies and 
Britain, reconciliation still seemed possible. But by 1778, as will be described in more detail in 
Chapter IV, proposals that would have been greeted with joy in 1775 or even early 1776 were 
treated with contempt. The attempt in 1780 to restore civilian government in southern New 
York may also have been too late. The passage of time closed off many opportunities for the 
British—what would have been acceptable then was no longer acceptable now. This question of 
timing will be examined to help answer the basic question.   
 Personality is also an important factor that should be examined.  The war was waged by 
distinct persons with distinct abilities, flaws, and personality quirks. It is conceivable that 
different personnel could have handled things better, and changed the course of history.  If the 
king had been more flexible in his reaction to the demands of the colonists, then America may 
have reconciled itself with Britain. Lord Germain, Secretary of State for the American Colonies, 
and de facto minister of war during the “American War”, had been suspected of cowardice 
during the Battle of Minden during the Seven Years War, and had been publicly disgraced for 
his actions there by King George II. He may not have been the best person to give orders to 
battle-tested generals. In Georgia, by contrast, there was much cooperation between the 
10 
 
military and civilian policies, and British civilian government was restored for a brief time. In 
New York, General Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief, refused to grant his needed consent to 
civilian government. A major factor in this refusal—perhaps the main factor—was his difficulty 
in working with and sharing authority with others. Another general without this flaw may have 
granted his consent. The interplay of the different personalities and how their various flaws, 
quirks, and virtues affected events will be among the questions examined. 
 Another important question is the question of the power relations between the various 
groups of Whigs. One cannot truly understand the events of the time without understanding 
the various factions and their inter-relationships during the Revolution.  This has been an area 
of much historical discussion over the years. Carl Becker, in 1909’s The History of Political 
Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776
5
, argued that there were three levels of society 
in colonial New York: an aristocracy of great landlord and merchant families, the independent 
freeholders and freemen, and the unenfranchised mechanics and tenant farmers. The 
aristocracy alternately aligned itself with the assembly or governor to guard its privileges. In 
their struggles, they used the language of natural rights and general welfare, which the 
unenfranchised began to use in their demands for political power. After 1760, fearing for their 
own power, they tried to “shut the open-door” to power of the “extra-legal mass activities” of 
ordinary New Yorkers. In a memorable phase that has enormously influenced much 
Revolutionary historiography, the Revolution became not only a struggle for home rule, but 
“also about—who was to rule at home.” 
                                                           
5
 Madison, WI 1909, 1960 
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 Becker’s analysis dominated discussions for decades, but by the early 1960s, there 
began to be disagreement with his picture of a struggle between the privileged and 
unprivileged. Rather than a rather monolithic monopoly of the privileged in a struggle with the 
unprivileged, the historian Roger Champagne in 1963 argued that the struggle over who ruled 
New York in 1765 was actually between two aristocratic factions, the Livingstons and 
Delanceys, who exploited “popular agitation” over the “imperial question” for local political 
purposes, with little concern for the constitutional principles raised.
6
 
 In 1971, the historian Patricia Bonomi tried to make sense of the factional alliances of 
New York’s colonial history by setting out an economic base underlying the factions.  According 
to Bonomi, commerce and agriculture were of nearly equal importance to the prosperity of the 
colony, and there had developed a merchant interest and a landed or country interest. These 
two were often at odds with each other over political or economic advantage. Thus, both 
Champagne and Bonomi challenged Becker’s view of a privileged monolithic aristocracy in a 
struggle with the under-privileged. 
7
 
 However, in 1981, Edward Countryman in his history of Revolutionary New York argued 
that the factions were mainly based on narrow groups, based at least in part on kinship, rather 
than class, region, or other interest. The main concern of the factions was not ideology or 
economic interest, but holding power for themselves, or controlling those who held it. He thus 
                                                           
6
 Roger Champagne “Family Politics versus Constitutional Principles: The New York Assembly Elections of 1768 and 
1769,” WMQ, 3d Ser., XX (Jan, 1963), 57-79, 58-9. 
7
 Patricia Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York (Columbia University:New York) 
1971, 2-5, 56, 60, 69, 81.  
12 
 
disagrees with Bonomi’s argument that there was a real economic basis underlying the 
factions.
8
 
 Marc Egnall in 1988 basically agreed with Bonomi as to the existence of the factions, but 
rather than calling them merchant or landed, he emphasized their attitudes towards expansion 
and military action against France and the Indians. His expansionist faction roughly coincides 
with the landed faction, while his non-expansionist faction coincides with the merchant 
faction.
9
  
 This work in general will use Bonomi’s analysis and designation of the factions, as it 
seems the most accurate and useful analysis.  New York’s factions would align themselves with 
other interests, such as lesser merchants or those “mechanicks” who had the vote—basically, 
the working class—as they jockeyed for power. Both of the landed and the merchant factions 
may be considered Whig factions, in general agreement with the complex of ideas that would 
become liberalism, in constitutionalism, and generally the ideals of the 1688-9 Glorious 
Revolution. This is not surprising; by the time of the American Revolution, most political figures 
in the Empire were Whigs of one sort or another, and even those who called themselves Tories 
had adopted many Whig ideas.  
 The merchant faction, known as the Delanceys in the 1760s and 70s, had many ties with 
Britain. They engaged in much trade with Britain, and feared the economic harm that boycotts 
or a rupture with Britain would cause. While they shared the concerns of the other groups 
concerning the actions of the British government, they thus tended to moderation in their 
                                                           
8
 Edward Countryman, A People in Revolution: The American Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760-
1790, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.) 1981, 77-78. 
9
 Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 1988,  
51-54. 
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response. Many became Loyalists as the rupture approached. The landed, or Livingston faction, 
had less direct ties with Britain. Many of them also seem to have belonged to a more radical 
branch of the Whigs, the “Real Whigs”. Real Whigs thought that those in authority would 
constantly try to expand their power beyond its lawful limits, and that therefore there must be 
constant vigilance against any action that seemed an abuse of power.
10
 This ideological 
predilection to seeing incipient tyranny in the actions of the government, combined with the 
fact that they would suffer much less direct economic harm from boycotts or more radical 
measures than the merchants would, made the Livingstons far more likely to support boycotts 
and eventually independence than the great merchants. Many Livingstons would become 
Patriots and be numbered among the leaders of the new state. Hence, the landed interest, 
which in many societies is often the most conservative of interests (in the sense of trying to 
keep things unchanged as much as possible), in New York were among the those who led the 
state to independence. 
 But a third Whig grouping arose during the Revolution, complicating what had once 
been a rather straight-forward two-faction system.
11
  The Sons of Liberty emerged during the 
Stamp Act Crisis. They formed over the question of Britain’s ability to tax the colonists, and 
were the most strident and radical of the factions. They were the faction most likely to engage 
in violence or property damage in their protests. All three factions opposed Britain’s actions; 
they mainly differed in stridency and preferred tactics. The Sons of Liberty differed in a 
fundamental way from the other factions. The Delanceys and Livingstons both represented 
                                                           
10
 Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to 
Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 1972, 43.   
11
  While the factions are sometimes referred to as “parties”, this work will generally use the term “faction.”  The 
term “party” implies a much greater amount of formal political organization than existed at the time. 
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New York’s elites: its great merchants and great landowners. The Sons of Liberty were led by 
men who a few years earlier been part of the working class; their leaders tended to be newly-
rich merchants who had made a fortune (often by privateering) during the French and Indian 
War. They maintained close contact with New York’s  workers, and many of these filled out the 
rank and file of the “Liberty Boys”. The Sons of Liberty were interested in a more meritocratic 
society and represented a more democratic point of view than the other factions.  They were 
among the “new men” that the historian Richard Ryerson and other historians, such as Gary 
Nash, have noted began to be raised to positions of power by the Revolution.
12
 The shifting 
alliances and maneuvering between these groups, and the development of a new factional 
divide, that between Patriots and Loyalists, will be examined.   
One very important question to be examined is the effect of mistaken British 
assumptions as to the loyalty of the Americans in general and local populations in particular.  
The British had very erroneous assumptions on these, and decision-makers at all levels were 
fed a constant stream of questionable data from spies, Loyalists, and “experts” as to the  
number of Loyalists in America as a whole, as well as in particular regions. The British were 
convinced that they were faced with a small group of usurpers who had seized power. They 
were convinced that the majority of the population supported them. There actually were fewer 
Loyalists and more Patriots than the British thought there were.  From the very beginning of the 
war, the British strategies were based on a very skewed and inaccurate picture of the loyalties 
of the Americans. Even the new strategy of the later war was based on a misreading of the 
                                                           
12
 See Ryerson, Richard Alan, The Revolution is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776  
(University of Pennsylvania) 1978, and Nash, Gary B., The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness 
and the Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1979, as well as The 
Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy (New York: Viking) 2005.  
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amount of Loyalists in the country.  This constant misunderstanding by the British of the 
loyalties of the population, indeed of the very nature of the enemy, needs to be understood if 
one is to answer the ultimate question of this work.  
 An entire chapter will be devoted to the fifth question: the  regrettable and at times 
appalling actions of the British.  These ranged from rape to petty pilferage, from kidnapping to 
not paying for seized goods. There was vandalism, corruption, and insensitivity to the 
sensibilities of Loyalists and others. Churches were damaged, and the churches and burying 
grounds of some denominations seem to have been deliberately targeted for mistreatment (if 
not desecration). Towns were even destroyed. In addition, there were few opportunities to get 
satisfaction for claims against the British. And the British were unable to give Long Islanders and 
others protection against raids. These actions made reconciliation far more difficult. 
 
 
III. Specific Contributions 
 
 
The story of America’s revolution and break from Britain is an oft-told tale; the tale of 
New York’s break with Britain is a tale less told, but still an area that has received much 
attention, especially in recent years.  These recent works have tended to concentrate on the 
events in New York City and ignore for the most part the surrounding counties.  Other works 
have concentrated on individual areas. This work will make a close examination of events in 
New York City but also integrate events on Long Island, Westchester, and Staten Island into this 
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story. Thus, a fuller picture of the processes and events of the Revolution in southern New York 
will be produced.  
The process of revolution will be rather closely examined. The formation of various 
committees at town, city, and eventually provincial level, will be examined, as will the 
production of documents and declarations both Patriot and Loyalist. While many of the 
significant events of the Revolution occurred in New York City, many significant events occurred 
in the surrounding counties, and this work will integrate the “suburban” and urban stories. This 
will hopefully provide a fuller picture of the revolutionary process than a New York City-centric 
history would. Most importantly, the process by which loyal subjects of the Crown became 
revolutionaries will be examined, because if one is to understand the failure of an effort to 
restore loyalty, then it is helpful to understand how that loyalty was lost in the first place. The 
discussion of the process of revolution and loss of loyalty is vital to the main topic of the work, 
the failed attempt to restore civilian government in the colony.  In this, the work goes beyond 
and differs from many of the recent histories, which emphasized the process of breaking with 
Britain, but not the occupation period or the restoration attempt. Those that discuss the 
occupation have ignored for the most part the attempt at restoration of civilian government, or 
failed to emphasize it. However, a few articles have discussed the loss of loyalty or other effects 
of occupation at the local level (most notably Joseph Tiedemann’s “Patriots by Default”, which 
discussed Queens County, and Sung Bok Kim’s discussion of Westchester.)
13
 The main focus of 
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this work is not the ever-fascinating tale of revolution, but the occupation of southern New 
York by the British for seven long years, and the attempt to restore civilian government 
Arguably, this occupation was a glittering opportunity for the British to convince southern New 
Yorkers and others of the benevolence of their intentions and win back hearts and minds. 
Whether it actually was such an opportunity is a question that the work will examine, but by 
the late 1770s, the possibilities the occupation might offer began to be recognized by the 
highest authorities in Britain. An attempt to restore civilian government was attempted, but 
failed.  
This work will closely examine the genesis of the attempt to restore civilian government, 
its failure, and the substitutes for civilian government that were attempted after the failure. 
The evolving views of Lord Germain, the de facto Minister of War for the “American War”, as 
the British call the Revolutionary War, and other important actors such as the members of the 
Carlisle Commission will be examined as they begin to lean to a new strategy. An important part 
of this strategy would involve the restoration of civilian government in the occupied part of 
New York.      
The work will take a close look at the life and career of General James Robertson, the 
civilian governor chosen to implement the strategy, only to be stymied by the opposition of 
General Sir Henry Clinton. Robertson is a much-neglected figure in the American Revolution. 
For many years, he had a very poor historical reputation. He was rehabilitated somewhat when 
his letterbook was discovered and published in 1983. However, despite this important new 
source, very little has been written about him in the intervening years, and this work will 
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hopefully at least begin the process of repairing the neglect.  This work will also examine the 
failure of the attempt to achieve civilian government in New York by comparing New York with 
Georgia, where a similar attempt was tried, and where civilian government was restored.  
This work will look at the various regrettable and appalling acts by the occupiers and 
breakdowns of law and order that made life in the occupied area miserable, if not intolerable. 
From petty theft to corruption, rape, and an inability to protect against raiders, these all made a 
mockery of the promise of good government. These actions harmed the British effort to regain 
the loyalties of Patriots and the non-aligned, and helped them lose the loyalty of  the Loyalists. 
Many escaped into an apolitical privatism, and some Loyalists even became Patriot spies. Lastly, 
this work will look at whether or not a restoration of civilian government would have had for 
the British any of the beneficial effects that were desired. Was it too late to restore love and 
loyalty?  Had the rejection of loyalty to Britain and the King ended all possibility of 
reconciliation? Was independence a psychological “Rubicon” which once crossed could not be 
uncrossed?  In a round-about way, by examining this question, light is thus shed on what is 
perhaps the most basic question of any student of the American Revolution: Why did the 
Americans abandon their loyalty to the British and declare independence? By studying an 
attempt to restore loyalty, light can be shed on the abandonment of loyalty.   
While the work’s focus is on the occupation, it also deals to some extent with the events 
and the process of the Revolution in New York.  Some very important things occurred because 
of the peculiar circumstances New York was under.  New York, city and state, was a prime 
target of the British military in 1776, and this, it is argued, had a long-lasting effect on the 
development of New York State.  One of these circumstances was what I have called the 
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“Evaporation of New York”. As the British threatened New York City, much of the city’s 
population “evaporated”, fleeing to safety, and the revolutionary government fled as well to a 
series of small towns on the Hudson. By the time the British entered, only a few hundred New 
Yorkers remained. It will be argued that the occupation of New York City had a very important 
effect on the development of New York State’s government. The exile of the Convention and 
the disappearance of much of the Patriot population from New York City removed the pressure 
that democratically-inclined elements of the population such as the “mechanics” had been 
exerting and would most likely have continued to exert on the leadership of New York to 
produce a democratic constitution. Relieved of this pressure, the Constitution that was 
produced was much less democratic than the mechanics would have preferred, and it was not 
submitted to the people for ratification, as the mechanics had desired.  
 
 To summarize, the specific contributions made by the dissertation are: 
 
 
1. A greater integration of the revolutionary incidents of Long Island, Staten 
Island, and Westchester into the usually New York City-centric narrative of the 
American Revolution in New York. 
 
2. An analysis of the question as to whether restoring civilian government to 
occupied New York would have had any beneficial effects from the British point 
of view.  
 
3. A close examination of the British occupation of southern New York, 
concentrating on the attempt to restore civilian government to New York and its 
failure. 
 
4. A highlighting of the career of General James Robertson, the man selected to 
implement the restoration strategy, and whose career has been largely 
neglected. 
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5. The effects of the “Evaporation of New York” on the development of government in 
Revolutionary and Early Republic New York. 
 
 
IV. Outline of the Work 
 
The dissertation will consist of seven chapters, plus this introduction and conclusion, 
and a few appendices and bibliography. The first chapter will be “A Brief History of Colonial 
New York, 1609-1774”.   The chapter will briefly describe the colonial background of New York 
so as to “set the stage” for the story of the Revolution and the occupation that followed, then 
look at the early days of the American Revolution. After a brief look at the American Indian 
presence in New York, it will turn to the near simultaneous settlement by Dutch and Puritans, 
the early days of English rule, and the factional disputes that arose in the wake of the Glorious 
Revolution. There will be a long look at the factional system that developed in the eighteenth 
century, and at the economic, ethnic, and religious system, as well as the governing system.                           
The early phases of the American Revolution, from the end of the French and Indian 
War to 1774, will be examined, in order to understand why the colonists in general and New 
Yorkers in particular revolted against the British, and in order to understand the difficulties and 
possibilities faced by the British in restoring hearts and minds, as well as the question of timing 
alluded to above. Among the items stressed by the chapter will be the broad consensus among 
most New Yorkers that British policy was wrong and needed to be changed, and the emergence 
of a structure of extra-constitutional committees and congresses that by the end of 1774 had 
begun to assume governmental power. 
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The next chapter, “The American Revolution in New York” will follow the events in New 
York City in 1775. It will continue the story of how the protest against British policy continued 
to move in the direction of armed confrontation with Britain, and how an increasingly elaborate 
and powerful revolutionary structure of committees and congresses was formed to coordinate 
the resistance. These structures took on an increasing quasi-governmental function. By the end 
of 1775, much of the actual government in the province was in the hands of these revolutionary 
organizations, and the official governor of the colony was attempting to govern from a ship in 
the harbor. The colonies would also be engaged in warfare with Britain, although still professing 
loyalty to the king. In addition to the events in New York City in 1775, this chapter will also 
examine the progress of the Revolution from 1773 to 1775 in the small rural counties that 
surrounded the capital.  
Chapter III, “The Final Break with Great Britain and the Capture of New York”, will first 
look at the final break by the colonies in general and New York in particular. By examining how 
and why the colonists revolted, the difficulties and opportunities the British faced when they 
occupied New York can be better understood.  Late 1775 and early 1776 was a period of dual 
government, with the new governments in the ascendency. Nonetheless, it will be argued, the 
colonies were still possibly amenable to reconciliation. However, no offer of reconciliation was 
offered by the British. Instead, the British made no attempt at compromise and proclaimed the 
colonists in rebellion.  The colonists finally declared independence. In New York, many had 
strong ties to Britain, and many had become Loyalists. New York was quite reluctant to declare 
independence, but eventually it did so. It was then attacked by the British. The population of 
New York City virtually “evaporated” under the threat of invasion. This may have had an 
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influence on the state constitution that was eventually written. The chapter then describes the 
conquest of southern New York.  
The fourth and fifth chapters are in many ways the heart of the work, as the fourth 
examines the origins of the attempt to restore civilian government in occupied New York, and 
the fifth the failure of this attempt. The fourth chapter, “The New Strategy”, will first examine 
the disastrous (for the British) 1777 campaign, which led to French intervention and the need 
for a strategic reassessment. The role of George Germain, de facto Minister of War, will be 
examined. The Carlisle Commission, its mission and instructions, and its failure will be 
discussed. The private observations of Lord Carlisle as to the sentiments of the “common 
people” will be noted. The new strategy that was at least in part developed by the committee 
will be discussed. This strategy included as one of its elements the restoration of civilian 
government in New York. 
The fifth chapter, “The Failure to Restore Civilian Government”, will discuss the attempt 
to restore civilian government and the failure of the attempt. The career of General James 
Robertson and his selection to be governor will be discussed.   The role of General Sir Henry 
Clinton in this failure will be examined, and the reasons why Clinton, whose consent was 
required to restore civilian government, did not give his consent will be discussed. The attempt 
to restore a semblance of civilian government by instituting “Police Courts” will finish the 
chapter.   
The sixth chapter, “The Military Occupation of Southern New York”, unlike the rest, will 
be mainly topical, examining British rule in southern New York mainly from “the ground level”. 
Its main focus will be the various hardships, indignities, and dangers that the people of 
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occupied New York faced. The purpose of this will be to show that the situation in southern 
New York was not conducive to winning back or retaining the hearts and minds, the love and 
loyalty of the people. Indeed, it had for many the opposite result, driving many towards 
Patriotism and even espionage. This will help show some of the difficulties that the attempt to 
restore civilian government and achieve reconciliation faced. The chapter will end with an 
incident from late 1782, the building of Fort Golgotha in the burying ground at Huntington, 
Long Island. In many ways, this incident symbolizes and summarizes the mistakes and lost 
opportunity that the long occupation of southern New York by the British represented. 
The seventh chapter, “The Fading of British Rule”, continues the chronological 
discussion of Robertson’s governorship, and the final attempt to restore civilian government to 
New York.  Several important events, such as Robertson’s involvement in the aftermath of 
Benedict Arnold’s defection and the events surrounding Yorktown, are discussed. After 
describing the final failed attempt, the entire question of restoring civilian government and its 
failure is examined. In order to contrast the situation in New York with a region where civilian 
government was restored, the situation in Georgia, where full civilian government was 
restored, is examined as well. The last days of British rule are then discussed. Lastly, the post-
war fate of many of the participants and institutions discussed in the work will be briefly looked 
at, as will the role the Loyalists played in the British Empire (especially Canada). 
In “Conclusions”, the final thoughts and conclusions of the work will be presented. 
 
 
 
24 
 
V. Some Notes on Historiography and Sources  
 
 
Prior to the 1970s, much military history had concentrated on strategy and tactics, on 
the operations and movements of armies and fleets.  In the 1970s, there was a shift in the focus 
of much scholarly military history from “battlefields to military institutions, society, and 
thought, and how they fit in the currents of their times, together with the willingness to use 
social scientific techniques”. This, it is argued, gave not only “a more balanced image of the 
military, but also, in some instances, new perspectives in the civilian areas.”  One of the areas 
which saw much scholarship was the Revolutionary War.
14
  An early precursor of this “New 
Military History” was the work of the British historian Piers Mackesy, who in The War for 
America, 1775-1783 (1964), described the Revolutionary War from the British perspective. He 
stressed the importance of British administration in the prosecution of the war, and how, from 
the British perspective, the war became after 1778 merely a theatre in a world war. 
The Bicentennial and its approach resulted in much writing about the Revolutionary 
War. The Vietnam War, whose final act was in the spring of 1975, shed a long shadow over 
these histories, as many historians saw parallels between the two wars. The parallels were in 
many ways apt, as both wars featured a long revolutionary struggle in which a militarily 
superior power, arguably the most militarily powerful country in the world, was defeated by a 
much weaker power. The need to win “hearts and minds” was often spoken of during Vietnam, 
and the phrase, used by John Adams in an early nineteenth century discussion of the American 
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The other period which saw much interest was the 1880 to 1914 period. 
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Revolution, found its way into many of the histories written during the Bicentennial era.
15
 Don 
Higginbotham in The War for American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 
1763-1789 (1971) argued that the military was a projection of society. To study the military, he 
argued, was to learn about the society that “projected” it. The historian John Shy in his writings, 
while he discussed questions of strategy, also discussed such subjects as the importance and 
use of the militia, loyalists and other Revolutionary War subjects, as well as the important 
questions of why people fight, and who actually does the fighting. Shy considered the 
Revolutionary War to be a “’social process’ of political education for the majority of Americans, 
or a struggle for hearts and minds.”
16
  He believed that as the war continued, many apathetic 
Americans became patriotic citizens of the United States, having been politicized and 
nationalized by British military actions and by experience in the militia. The historian Sung Bok 
Kim, drawing partially on his personal experience of the Korean War, respectfully disagreed (at 
least in regards to Westchester).
17
   All of these discussions took military history far away from 
the discussion of strategies and tactics that had dominated the field, and reintegrated it into 
the mainstreams of academic history.  
Local studies of the effect of the war may also be considered part of the New Military 
History.  Thus, Robert A. Gross can be considered a New Military historian, as his book the 
Minutemen and Their World (1976) describes the impact of war on the people of Concord, and 
how such a war meant change for them. Discussions of the effect of war and its aftermath on 
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occupied territories and frontline regions may also be considered part of this new movement. 
The present work draws in part on some of this scholarship, and examines the effect of war on 
an occupied region, and its aftermath.  This dissertation, it is submitted, is at least in part an 
heir or part of the New Military History.
18
  
  
 Here is a quick note on spelling before discussing the sources. Historians working in eras 
before English spelling was standardized, such as the Revolutionary era, are faced with the 
question of how to handle this: should spelling in quotes from the sources be modernized for 
clarity, or should it be left alone? In this work, spelling has been left as I found it in my sources. 
This, it is believed, helps give a feel for the time and the speakers, and hopefully rarely detracts 
from understanding.  
 
Perhaps the two most important sources for the American Revolution in New York and 
the occupation of southern New York are the History of New York during the Revolutionary War 
by Thomas Jones, and the Historical Memoirs of William Smith, Jr. Smith is an invaluable source; 
as a member of the Governor’s Council and Chief Justice of New York, he had the ear of many 
of the main actors of New York, including General Clinton and Governor Robertson, and in 
many ways was a major actor himself. Jones, however, has to be read with great care; he had 
very strong opinions, and was bitter about the turn of events. He tended to ascribe the basest 
motives to people’s actions. He hated Scots and Presbyterians, and was predisposed to despise 
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the Scottish-born Robertson.  Nonetheless, his history is full of many important incidents and 
events. While it may have to be read with care, the author’s biases are at least readily 
apparent. Jones overall is still an extremely useful and important source. 
 Less commonly used by historians but absolutely vital for this work was The New York 
Letter Book of General James Robertson, 1780-83. The letters, reports, and proclamations 
contained within give a rather complete picture of the governorship of Robertson, and 
Robertson’s conflicts with Clinton. They are well-edited by historians Milton M. Klein and 
Ronald W. Howard, and the book contains an invaluable biographical essay on Robertson.  
The American Journal of Ambrose Serle, while only referenced in this work a few times, 
gives a very good picture of British views toward America in the early days of the American 
Revolution, and how they began to alter by 1778. The book is rewarding reading for anyone 
interested in the British view of the Revolution. The various papers of Lord Carlisle were 
invaluable in understanding the Carlisle Commission. The papers of Lord Germain, found at the 
Clements Library at the University of Michigan, were invaluable in understanding the actions 
and plans of the British government, and the views of many Loyalists and Britons.  The same 
may be said for the papers of King George III. The David Library in Washington Crossing, 
Pennsylvania contains many microfilmed records from Britain, such as the Colonial Office 
records, as well as many books and other items relating to the Revolutionary era, and its 
resources were invaluable in the research for this work. Governor Tryon’s report may be found 
amongst the Colonial Office records found at the David Library. 
The three most important sources for Long Island were the Huntington Town Records, 
and Henry Onderdonck’s two mid-nineteenth century collections of newspaper articles and 
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other documents from the Revolution: The Revolutionary Incidents of Queens, and the 
Revolutionary Incidents of Kings and Suffolk. Generations of local and academic historians have 
drawn upon these collections when they discussed the American Revolution on Long Island, 
and the present author has as well. Journeys on Old Long Island, edited by Natalie A. Naylor, 
contains several valuable sources relating to the Revolution, including the memoirs of 
Femmetie Leggerts, who gives an invaluable glimpse into life during the occupation.   
Lastly, perhaps the ultimate primary source is the ground and places where events have 
occurred. While not always possible, if a historian can visit the places of which he speaks, that 
can only help his or her understanding of the events. I have endeavored to do this.  I have 
walked in Raynham Hall in Oyster Bay, where British officers and American spies both dwelled. I 
have seen the Union Jack still flying as part of a weather vane over Caroline Church in Setauket, 
and virtually every day of my college career at Columbia I passed the plaque commemorating 
the Battle of Harlem Heights which had been fought on the site of the campus.  And I have also 
climbed to the top of the Old Burial Ground in Huntington, where once stood Fort Golgotha.  
 
 
 
Frank P. Mann 
Farmingdale, NY 
Feb 28, 2013 
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Chapter I 
 
A Brief History of Colonial New York, 1609-1774 
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 Colonial New York had a rather unique history that marked it out as quite different from 
its neighbors in New England. In some features, such as its ethnic diversity, it did resemble its 
Middle Atlantic neighbor Pennsylvania.  While New England was nearly purely English and 
Puritan in its origins, New York had multiple origins: Dutch, New England Puritan, and Anglican 
English. While New England was dominated by small, independent farmers, New York became 
the home of great land-owners and tenants, and of great merchants and “mechanicks”.  It 
would develop a factional, “fractious” political system. This chapter will examine New York 
society and politics at the dawn of the Revolution, and then the first stages of the Revolution in 
New York.  But before doing that, it will briefly look at the early days of colonial New York and 
its rather diverse origins.  
 
I 
 
 
 Colonial New York had a dual or triple founding, being founded by Dutch settlers, by 
English Puritans and by Anglicans. Southern New York was occupied by Algonquin tribes at the 
time of Henry Hudson’s exploration in 1609. The names of many of these tribes are preserved 
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in place names such as Massapequa and Montauk. The Dutch rather rapidly followed up 
Hudson’s explorations by, in the period 1614-1623, establishing trading posts in the Albany 
area, and a trading post on what is now Governor’s Island near Manhattan in 1624. The famous 
Manhattan Purchase occurred in 1626.  A small Dutch community was established on 
Manhattan to help facilitate the trade with the Indians, and there was also a major population 
center in the Albany area known as Beverwyck. This upriver community was mainly Dutch-
speaking. In contrast to Beverwyck, at a very early date, New Amsterdam (later known as New 
York City) was already a very cosmopolitan city.  In the early 1640s, according to a Jesuit priest 
who visited the town, it was a city of about four or five hundred persons speaking about 18 
different languages.
1
  It also was the home of many different faith communities. In 1686, about 
40 years after Father Jogues’s visit (and about twenty after the English conquest), Governor 
Thomas Dongan noted   that the city contained  “Dutch Calvinists, Anglicans, French Calvinists, 
Dutch Lutherans, and ordinary Quakers, the city also contained ‘Singing Quakers, Ranting 
Quakers; Sabbatarians; Antisabbatarians; Some Anabaptists some Independents; some Jews.”
2
   
The Dutch also settled Long Island, mainly in present day Brooklyn and Queens, and Staten 
Island. 
In 1640, Puritans from Lynn, Massachusetts founded Southampton on the South Fork of 
eastern Long Island, in what is now Suffolk County. This settlement was soon followed by the 
founding of Southold on the North Fork. For many years, the two communities argued over 
which had been founded first. While geographically separated from New England by the Long 
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Island Sound, colonial Suffolk County was in many ways culturally part of New England. There 
was much cross-Sound trade and travel, and the ministers of most Suffolk County churches 
were trained in New England. This relationship was not only cultural, but for a long-time 
political as well.  Before the English conquered neighboring New Netherlands, much of eastern 
Long Island was politically connected with Connecticut. After the English conquered New 
Netherlands in 1664, the region was politically attached to New York, as the English renamed 
New Netherlands.  This New England character remained for a long time; as in New England, 
many residents of Suffolk County were Patriots at the time of the Revolution. Even today, 
traces of a New England accent can be heard on the North Fork of Long Island.
3
  
Puritans also founded Hempstead on Long Island in 1644, and lived there under Dutch 
rule for several decades. On Long Island, the international boundary between the Dutch and 
English settlements was approximately the present border between Nassau and Suffolk 
counties, though Oyster Bay (in the east of Nassau County) was mainly outside New 
Netherlands. North of Manhattan, both before and after the English conquest in 1664, New 
Englanders began to move into the Hudson River region. After the conquest, officials and others 
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from England began arriving. In addition, Huguenots and, at a later date, Germans from the 
Palatine began to settle the Hudson River Valley. 
4
  
As the above indicates, New York State had a dual, if not triple founding. It was founded 
by the Dutch, by New England Puritans, and by officials and other emigrants from England. Its 
main city, New York City, was very cosmopolitan. There was a large Puritan (and later, post-
Puritan) element in New York, and one county was virtually an outpost of New England. The 
Dutch remained an important feature of New York life for many years, and Dutch was still 
spoken in parts of New York well into the nineteenth century. They left a legacy of words, place 
names, and culture. For example,  the words “stoop” and “boss” are of Dutch origin, as are 
place names such as Catskill, Arthur van Kill, Flushing and Brooklyn (“kill” is Dutch for stream). 
And of course, Santa Claus has his origins in the Dutch Sinterklaas.  
In 1664, the English conquered New Netherlands. The area was renamed New York, 
after its new proprietor, James, the Duke of York. The most distinctive feature of the 
government of early New York was the lack of a colonial assembly; the colony was governed 
without a legislature until the 1680s. In 1683, not only was a seventeen member assembly 
formed, but the twelve original counties of New York were formed. These included Queens 
(which then included present-day Nassau County), Suffolk, Kings, and Albany, among others. 
Albany County, now a small region about the state capitol, then included much of northern and 
western New York. A “Charter of Liberties” was proclaimed by the new legislature, which 
among other items proclaimed that the consent of those taxed was needed for taxation.
 5
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 In 1685, New York became a royal colony when its proprietor became King James II.  
James was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution in 1688. When news reached New York in the 
spring of 1689, it created a power vacuum, and a wealthy merchant and soldier named Jacob 
Leisler seized power. His support came mainly from radical Calvinists. After a stormy seventeen 
month rule, he was removed from office and he and several associates were hanged. For 
several decades after that, New York politics were divided between pro and anti-Leislerite 
factions. In 1710 Governor Robert Hunter defused the tension between the two factions by 
judiciously distributing offices to both Leislerites and anti-Leislerites.  This did not end the 
existence of faction in New York; they remained a feature of New York political life. Shortly 
after Hunter defused the Leislerite/anti-Leislerite dispute, a new political faction system arose, 
based mainly on economic interests and attitudes toward settlement and defense. While the 
factions over the years were known by different names (the names were based on the leading 
families of the factions), the system would continue intact into the Revolutionary era.
6
   
    
 
As the historian Richard R. Beeman notes, “the cultural geography of the colony as a 
whole tended to fracture any sense of a single, organic society.”
7
  Perhaps as a result of the 
diversity of ethnic, economic, regional, religious, and other interests in New York, New York’s 
colonial politics were driven by fierce factionalism and the “aggressive pursuit and defense of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Assembly.” This pre-Glorious Revolution document thus firmly grounded rights in a grant from the King, not in 
natural rights. The belief of the American colonists that they could not be taxed without their consent was a major 
factor in the revolutionary crisis of the 1760s and 1770s. 
6
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interests, which frequently cut across lines of court and country or aristocracy and 
commoners.” 
8
  
New York’s society was hierarchical and deferential, dominated by an “aristocracy” of 
great landed lords and great merchants. This aristocracy was not monolithic, but divided into 
factions that originally formed around economic issues. One faction represented the great 
landed interests, and the other the great merchants. They were usually in direct political 
competition, with taxation a major issue. The merchants favored a land tax, and the landed 
interest preferred a tax on commerce. Eventually, other issues began to overshadow the 
economic debate, and many merchants became great landowners.
9
 However, the economic 
split was still at the core of the factional split in the 1760s. The factions were usually known by 
family names. In the 1760s, the landed faction was known as the Livingstons, and the merchant 
faction was known as the Delanceys.  The factions would align with various interests as they 
jockeyed for power.  The infighting and shifting alliances of the Assembly are called by Beeman 
very English, reminiscent of the Whig-dominated eighteenth-century English Parliament. 
10
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Edward Countryman, a historian of revolutionary New York, stresses the fact that the 
factions were known by family names.     He argues that the faction members identified with 
narrow groups, based on consideration of kinship “as much as anything”, rather than “groups 
based on class or region or policy”.  Indeed, Countryman says that the factions in New York 
were not like later policy-based parties, such as the Anti-Federalists. He argues that the 
“Parties, in other words, were small groups of men whose main concern was to hold office 
themselves or control the men holding it.” The factions of colonial New York, he argues, lacked 
mass organization or even cohesive principles. In this he differs with historian Patricia Bonomi, 
who argues that the factions were organized around economic interests.
11
   
 Whichever interpretation of the faction structure one prefers,
12
 the Revolutionary era 
would see the addition of a third faction, the Sons of Liberty, as discussed below.  It would also 
see the replacement s of the landed/merchant (or expansionist/non-expansionist) faction 
system by the Patriot/Tory system.   
 
 
 II 
 
 
In 1763, New York consisted of the counties of Suffolk, Queens, Kings, Richmond, 
Orange, Ulster, Dutchess, and Albany, New York City, and Westchester Borough.  Tryon County, 
west of Albany, was organized out of Albany County in 1772, and about the same time 
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Charlotte, Gloucester, and Cumberland counties were organized in what is now mainly 
Vermont.  Not counting the frontier, the main settled area of New York was roughly L-shaped, 
running east along Long Island and north along the Hudson, and consisted of two main regions: 
the southern, “downstate” region of New York City, Long Island, and Staten Island, and the 
Hudson Valley region, or “upstate” region, for short. The government of New York was similar 
to the governments of the other colonies which would soon declare independence. It was led 
by a governor chosen by the King. He was usually a well-connected Englishman, often 
experienced in governing other colonies. The governor was advised by a seven to twelve 
member Governor’s Council. The Governor’s Council was appointed by the Crown, and had 
multiple roles, acting as a privy council, the upper house of the legislature, and as a high court 
of appeal. The lower house of the legislature, the General Assembly, was popularly elected. The 
suffrage was limited to propertied males. This limited suffrage was in accordance with classical 
republican notions that citizens should have a stake in society. It was believed that property, in 
addition to giving one a stake, also gave independence.  Since unpropertied people, or people 
without much wealth, were considered to have no stake in society and no independence (and 
were thus susceptible to having their vote controlled by employers or others), as a corollary the 
lower classes were often disenfranchised. In New York, those adult males with an 
unencumbered freehold worth 40 pounds and tenants with lifetime leases could vote. In the 
cities of Albany and New York City, those who could pay a modest fee became “freemen” and 
also became eligible to vote. Thus, the franchise was a little larger and wider than it appeared 
at first glance. Voting was “open”, by voice or show of hands. The Assembly was quite small, 
reaching the number of 27 shortly before independence, and elections were rarely held. 
38 
 
Elections were only held about once every 5 years after 1743. Before that, they were held only 
upon the death of the king. By contrast, the average for the other colonies was every two years, 
and in neighboring Pennsylvania annually. The representatives were fairly evenly distributed, 
though the Hudson River Valley was slightly overrepresented. 
13
   
While its government was somewhat similar to that of the other colonies, New York was 
in many ways unique. It was a very diverse colony with many competing ethnic, economic, 
religious, and other interests. Only Pennsylvania approached its diversity.  Perhaps the most 
notable component of its diversity was its large Dutch population.  A century after the English 
conquest, a sizable  number of New York’s population was still Dutch in religion, culture, and 
language. New York City was the most diverse city in the colonies (with the possible exception 
of Philadelphia). Its ethnic groups included English, Dutch, French, Germans, Scots, Swedes, 
Irish, Scots-Irish, Jews and Africans (the latter, about fifteen percent of the population, were for 
the most part slaves). A 1776 map of New York City shows thirteen places of worship, ranging 
from Anglican and Dutch churches to a Moravian meeting and a synagogue.
14
  
Economically, as one historian relates, “New York presented a greater mixture of 
agrarian and mercantile interests than any of the other colonies.”
15
 Writing in 1774, Governor 
William Tryon stated that the province carried on “a considerable Trade with the British 
Settlements on the Continent of North America, supplying some of them with the produce of 
the Colony, others with British Manufactures and West India Goods.”  Trade with the British 
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West Indies was extensive, since they had “a Constant demand for provisions and Lumber of all 
kinds, which Articles are the Natural Produce of this province.”
16
    
   New York City was the main port, commercial center, and capital of the colony, and 
the second largest city in the colonies, after Philadelphia. In 1771, its population was about 
22,000. As late as 1790, as the historian Linda DePauw notes, the entire population would have 
fit easily into Yankee Stadium, with room left over for the populations of Philadelphia and 
Boston. The city was cosmopolitan and sophisticated (at least in comparison with “upstate”), 
with access to many books, newspapers, and coffeehouses. The population ranged from 
wealthy merchants to slaves, with many laborers.  New York City in 1776 consisted of about 
4000 wood and brick buildings covering less than a square mile at the southern tip of the island 
of Manhattan. The city ended just north of Chambers Street (the current location of an 
important courthouse) in marshes and farms. To the east of the marsh, the city extended north 
a few blocks along Bowery Lane, then became farms. A few blocks to the southeast of the end 
of Broadway (which was just beyond Chambers Street) were located the Common, the jail, a 
soldier’s barracks and a powder magazine.  According to a map prepared in 1776 by Major 
Holland,  British Surveyor General, there were about a dozen major buildings, such as the Fort 
on the Battery, the military hospital, the Governor’s House (in the fort), the Custom House, the 
Exchange, several markets, City Hall (then on Wall Street) and the Dutch Free School.   Most of 
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these were clustered within a third of a mile from the tip of Manhattan. In addition to these 
governmental and commercial buildings, and several wharfs, Holland’s map listed thirteen 
churches of various denominations, plus a synagogue (and it probably did not include all the 
city’s congregations).   In addition, the map also noted the location near the Common of the 
“Engine which suplies the City with Fresh Water”.
17
   
The province’s population in 1771 was approximately 168 thousand, with about twenty 
thousand of that number African American (the 1774 population was estimated by Tryon as 
being 182,251).   The city was heavily engaged in trade, much of it with Britain or the Old World 
(as well as trade with the West Indies, not all of it legal). According to Tryon, more than eleven-
twelfths of the province’s population was clothed in British manufactures, and the homes were 
filled to a similar proportion with British manufactures, except for a few locally-manufactured 
products such as cabinets. Many goods such as gunpowder, lead, tin, and East India goods such 
as spices were also imported into the colony. 
18
 
The southern region, or “downstate” (New York, Richmond, Kings, Queens, and Suffolk), 
was the wealthiest part of the state, representing about three-fifths of the total wealth of the 
province. Richmond and Kings were mainly Dutch and mainly agricultural. Queens County, in 
the center of Long Island, had been settled by both Dutch and English, and had many Anglicans, 
as well as a sizable Quaker minority. Suffolk, settled by New England Puritans in the 1640s, was 
mainly Presbyterian in religion. Suffolk’s ties with New England remained strong in the 1760s 
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and 1770s, and there was much cross-Sound traffic, with most of Suffolk’s ministers trained in 
New England.
19
 
The largest upstate city was Albany, located two to five days journey north of the City. It 
was located near the confluence of the Mohawk and Hudson. Founded by the Dutch and 
renamed by the English, much of its wealth had come from the fur trade and trade with the 
Indians. The city was mainly Dutch, and the population was about a tenth of New York’s. To the 
west of Albany could be found the Iroquois (Haudenosaunee), an extremely powerful group of 
Indian tribes. Fort Stanwix, located in present-day Rome, New York, represented the limit of 
European settlement. To the northeast was the disputed Green Mountain region (disputed 
between New York, New Hampshire, and for a while Massachusetts). Though awarded by the 
British to New York in 1764, the residents resisted becoming part of New York (mainly because 
they feared becoming tenants), and the region eventually became the state of Vermont.
20
 
The most distinctive feature of the Hudson Valley was the great manors, some of which 
were comparable in size to a small downstate county. Some of these were the result of the 
great patroonships granted by the Dutch during their control of the province, others of grants 
by early English or British governors to favorites. Among the major manors were those of the 
Livingstons, the Schuylers, and the Van Rensellaers. The manor lords modeled their lifestyles 
and control of the tenants after the English gentry. Many but not all of their tenants were Dutch 
or German. Some historians believe that the manor system kept New York’s population down, 
as potential settlers went to colonies where they could have freeholds and not be tenants. 
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Resentment against the conditions of tenancy resulted in a series of revolts. There was much 
unrest in the manors during the 1750s and 1760s, possibly caused by an influx of New 
Englanders who were used to land-ownership, not being tenants on the land.
21
      
New York’s politics was marked by factionalism between factions broadly representing 
economic interests. While both factions were Whig factions, there were some notable 
differences between the two. The Delanceys
22
, the merchant faction, according to the historian 
Joseph Tiedemann thought of themselves as Anglo-Americans and had built fortunes trading 
with the British Empire. They saw the Empire as a vast trading and commercial network, and 
their interests and livelihoods were threatened by a break with Britain.  They rejected 
characterization of the Empire as a tyranny.  Many would eventually become Loyalists. The 
Delanceys, while believing in the rule of the elite, would mix with the non-elite and even 
frequent their taverns.  They were thus less “elitist” than the landed Livingston faction, many of 
whom sought to duplicate as much as possible the lifestyle of an English gentleman. Yet their 
direct connections with Britain were slight, far slighter than that of the merchants, whose 
wealth was tied to the British connection.  Many Livingstons would become Patriots. 
23
   
The Livingstons, the landed faction, like the Delanceys were Whigs, committed to 
defending constitutional liberty and the peoples’ right to resist tyranny.  Many were what the 
historian Pauline Maier calls “Real Whigs,” and it is in this that we can see a real difference 
between the two factions (indeed, here is a real ideological divide within the Whig movement). 
Real Whigs saw politics as an unrelenting struggle of liberty against power. They believed that 
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any man entrusted with authority would seek to expand his power beyond its lawful limits. 
Constant vigilance against this was required, and resistance was necessary against the “first 
abuses of power”. Corruption, which in its broadest sense meant pursing private interest “at 
public cost,” was the “most important indication of danger”. In addition to this belief in 
vigilance against overreaching government power, the Livingstons’ vision of America’s future 
also differed from that of the DeLanceys. The Livingstons envisioned America’s future not so 
much in terms of trade and empire, but of peopling the North American continent. In other 
words, they were in Egnal’s terms “Expansionist.”
24
 
 Both of the main parties represented the interests of different parts of the elite. Both 
wanted to protect their position and property. The Delanceys, as great merchants, however, 
had many ties to Britain, and saw themselves as Anglo-Americans. They wanted the imperial 
dispute over taxation resolved in a way that kept the great commercial empire of Britain intact 
and operating. Independence threatened their self-identification as members of a vast trans-
Atlantic trading empire, and the disruption, alteration, and possible destruction of the British 
commercial network directly threatened their positions and fortunes. While the Livingstons 
modeled themselves on the English gentry, their ties to Britain were weaker. It was easier for 
them to see Britain as a tyranny trying to steal their property without their consent, through 
taxation without representation. In such a case, they could preserve their positions and wealth 
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by leaving the Empire, and many became Patriots. It was actually a way to preserve the status 
quo—as long as America achieved independence.
25
      
A third group would soon emerge in the wake of the Stamp Act, which will be discussed 
in the next chapter. These were the Sons of Liberty. Led by lesser merchants who had done well 
in the Seven Years War, they craved a society based on merit, not rank. They called for self-
determination in the empire and equal treatment at home. Tiedemann argues that they 
coveted elite status (which they were disqualified from because of their modest birth).  Having 
risen from the lower classes, they were often popular leaders, becoming crowd leaders during 
the Stamp Act crisis. In the 1770s, they would support independence, republicanism, and the 
“removal of all artificial restraints based on rank, estate or privilege.” They were the most 
radical, and most democratic, of the three groups. Countryman describes them as the 
“successful children of oyster catchers, milkmen, and indentured servants,” and as having more 
“affinity” with the concerns of the people than “did the gentlemen, the merchants, and the 
lawyers who dominated established politics.” He asserts that their emergence helped begin an 
internal revolution. At the very least, these nouveau-riche lesser merchants represented some 
of the “new men” that the Revolution was beginning to bring to the forefront of politics. 
26
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Two important politicians in late colonial New York were outside these factions and 
represented the interests and outlook of British imperialists. Perhaps the most important was 
Cadwallader Colden. Colden had been born in Scotland and moved to New York in 1718, where 
he gained a series of important positions, culminating in being the lieutenant-governor. Since 
the governor was frequently absent from the province, Colden would often act as governor. He 
was a strong supporter of British rule, and of expansion under British control.  In the Stamp Act 
and later crises, he constantly upheld the desires and rule of Britain.
27
  
Sir William Johnson, born in Ireland, had come to New York in 1738, and eventually 
settled on the frontier west of Albany. He became a prominent landowner and by 1756 
Superintendant for Indian Affairs (and a baronet). He was also a strong supporter of British 
policies after 1763, especially the policy of keeping colonists from settling beyond the 
Appalachians.
28
  He died in 1774 , and Colden in September, 1776, thus denying the Loyalist 
community of New York two people who might have become important Loyalist leaders. 
Religious tensions also became enmeshed with the political faction system.  The British 
had granted the Dutch the freedom to worship as they pleased, and religious toleration was a 
feature of British rule over New York. However, while there was religious toleration, the 
Anglican Church was the preferred church, and it was also the church  of many of the elite. 
While only ten percent of New York’s population were Anglicans, many of the political elite, 
such as the great merchants and landowners, the Governor and lieutenant governor, and much 
of the Council and Assembly were Anglicans.  In the 1740s, many non-Anglican groups, such as 
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Scottish immigrants or Dutch Reformed, supported Presbyterian efforts to limit Anglican power. 
Many of those involved in these efforts would soon become important figures in the 
Revolutionary crisis of the 1760s and 1770s. 
 A Presbyterian “triumvirate”, led by William Livingston, William Smith Jr., and John 
Morin Scott, opposed the attempts of the Anglican Church to expand its power.   The landed-
merchant battle became enmeshed in the struggle between the Anglicans and Presbyterians. 
Much of the battle in the 1750s revolved around Presbyterian opposition to the Anglican 
attempt to appoint a bishop for the colonies, and for the control of King’s College (now known 
as Columbia University). While no bishop was appointed, the struggle over the college would 
eventually end in Presbyterian defeat, as the Anglicans managed to gain control of the school’s 
leadership and religious services. The “triumvirate” launched the Independent Reflector, which 
attacked corruption and enunciated an early version of the ideas and values that would 
dominate the Revolutionary era. It folded under political pressure from its opponents.  A feud 
developed between Smith, then still in his teens and a graduate of Yale, and Cadwallader 
Colden. Colden wanted a reference to a land claim that he had an interest in left out of a 
compendium of New York’s law, and he threatened Smith’s pay if he did not. The enmity that 
arose from this incident would be life-long. Smith, it should be noted, was the son of William 
Smith Senior, who had helped defend John Peter Zenger in the historic libel case of 1735.
29
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While politics were rather contentious in New York City, politics were much less 
contentious on Long Island in the pre-Revolutionary era than in New York City.  However, the 
island also had tensions which would come to the forefront during the Revolution. On Long 
Island, town government resembled New England town government, with annual town 
meetings, usually in April. Here, among other things, town officials would be selected.  Several 
families would virtually monopolize town office and would often possess a disproportionate 
amount of the wealth of the towns.  The same family names appear, year-after-year, in the 
town records of many towns as holding important office. In the aptly-named Smithtown, for 
example, most major positions went to a member of the Smith family. In Huntington, to the 
west of Smithtown, between 1690 and 1770, government was “of the many by the privileged 
few.” Here six families monopolized town office and amassed a disproportionate share of town 
wealth. Between 1688 and 1770, the town clerk was either a Platt or a Ketcham. There tended 
to be electoral deference to descendants of founding families, much plural office holding, and 
long tenure in governmental service. An increase in population, with its concurrent 
geographical spread of population, resulted in an increase in offices, with minor ones stepping 
stones to more important ones. These minor offices would often go to people outside the 
oligarchy.  One of the effects of the Revolution was a break in the hold of the old families and 
the end to plural office holding, as well as a more equal distribution of wealth, at least in 
Huntington.
30
  
New York’s governmental structure allowed some popular participation, probably more 
than traditionally thought. But New York was a colony of both great landed estates and great 
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commercial fortunes, and it must be concluded that maintaining and enhancing the position of 
the great landowners and merchants was a dominant feature and aim of the political system. 
The prevailing classical republican political philosophy, while it nobly encouraged public service 
by the elite, also limited the franchise, and the tiny Assembly undoubtedly reduced the number 
of voices that could be heard. Tenants were dominated by their landlords, and many of the 
urban workers had no vote at all. The manor lords consciously tried to emulate English country 
gentlemen. As in England, wealth in late-colonial New York did not always bring status. The 
various elements of the elite aligned with other interests in an attempt to improve or maintain 
their position. In many respects, the social and governmental system resembled the English 
system. It emulated some of its worst features, including “pocket boroughs.”
31
  
New York was an ethnically, religiously, and economically diverse colony. It was ruled by 
great landlords and great merchants; it was also inhabited by tenants and mechanics and 
freeholders, among others. Its great merchants had strong trans-Atlantic ties and an Anglo-
American identity. Its landlords modeled themselves on the English gentry, but had fewer 
connections to Britain than the merchants. The political and social structure was inherently 
conservative (in the sense of trying to maintain the status quo). There were cracks and tensions 
in the structure. Nouveau-riche merchants craved a meritocracy, tenants would on occasion 
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revolt, and mechanics would soon form violent mobs during the Stamp Act Crisis.
 32
 But, in 
general, the system was conservative and stable, designed to maintain the elites in power.  
It is not surprising that such a conservative system would be reluctant to revolt. 
Landlords and wealthy merchants would be reluctant to encourage revolution, fearing that a 
revolution against Britain could become a revolution against them.  New York would not be in 
the forefront of the Patriot movement in the 1770s, and the leaders of New York’s revolution 
have been called “reluctant revolutionaries.”
33
  It is not surprising that New York had to be 
“dragged” into revolution, or that much of the Revolution’s leadership would come from “new 
men” outside the traditional elite, such as the lesser merchants or freeholders. It is therefore 
not surprising that New York had many Loyalists. What is surprising is that New York was briefly 
in the forefront of the Patriot movement, during the Stamp Act Crisis.  The Stamp Act Crisis, and 
the development of the Revolution in New York, will be discussed below. 
 
III 
 
In 1764, Parliament’s attempt to tax the American colonies sparked a decade-long 
dispute which eventually resulted in American independence. The “imperial question” would 
add itself to the mainly local or provincial questions that animated the colonial politics of New 
York. The Delanceys and Livingstons would be faced with a new faction, the Sons of Liberty 
                                                           
32
 The “tradition” of popular uprising, as Pauline Maier calls it, which was actually considered to at times contribute 
to the public welfare, will be discussed further in Chapter II. See Maier, 3.   
33
 Joseph Tiedemann entitled his 1997 book on the Revolution in New York City “Reluctant Revolutionaries.” 
50 
 
(often called the “Liberty Boys”), that represented both a more democratic viewpoint and a 
rising economic interest.  In New York and other colonies, the dispute with Britain over 
Parliament’s right to tax the colonies led to the formation of various committees at local levels. 
These committees formed to coordinate and lead the protests against British policies. 
Eventually, these committees would lead to the formation of congresses at the provincial and 
continental level. This committee system would eventually begin to take on quasi-
governmental and then governmental powers. It would supersede the traditional colonial 
structure described above and lead New York out of the British Empire. It would also lead to the 
collapse of New York’s political system and the rise of a more open system, although much of 
the old elite still retained much power in the new republic.   
The American Revolution, at least in part, arose out of the aftermath of the Seven Years 
War—most particularly, the post-war attempt of Britain to tax the colonists. The Seven Years 
War in New York benefited the local economy, ending a depression that had lasted from 1750 
to 1755. New York City was a major supply center for British forces, and many New Yorkers 
made their fortunes (or increased already existing fortunes) with war contracts or with 
privateering. Many artisans gained work from war contracts. Provincial forces were mustered 
to fight in the war. Upstate New York was a major front in the war.  But New York was again 
faced with economic difficulties as peace-time returned. In fact, the post-war downturn began 
in 1760, as the war shifted to the West Indies.
34
 
 The war had been very expensive. In order to raise revenue (and, it has been argued by 
many, to increase control over the colonies), Britain passed several acts shortly after the war 
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ended. The acts included the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act. While many Americans were 
troubled by aspects of the Sugar Act, particularly its court provisions
35
, it was the Stamp Act 
that caused the most concern. The Stamp Act was the first direct tax Parliament had imposed 
on the colonies, taxing most printed materials, from newspapers to playing cards and legal 
documents. Many in the colonies questioned the constitutionality of the Act, fearing that they 
were being taxed without representation.
36
  The Stamp Act, as most New Yorkers saw it, not 
only represented a political threat to the liberties of New Yorkers, but an economic threat, as it 
threatened to increase the costs of nearly all business. This was especially grievous during an 
economic downturn. All constituencies in New York City united against it.  Concerned with 
rumors of new revenue measures, as early as January 27, 1764, New York merchants had met 
at Burns’ Tavern to frame a protest to Parliament and establish a permanent committee on 
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trade. 
37
 The Assembly sent petitions in October 1764 to Parliament protesting the Sugar and 
Stamp Acts, respectfully arguing that Parliament had no right to tax the colony. The petitions 
were never delivered, since the colony’s agent in London considered them too inflammatory to 
be presented to Parliament. New Yorkers were uncertain as to what steps to take next. A Stamp 
Act Congress, proposed by Massachusetts during the summer of 1765, was scheduled to meet 
in early October of 1765. The Assembly, however, was not in session to formally pick 
candidates, and would not be in session until about a week after the Stamp Act Congress was 
due to start. Showing the pragmatism (or disregard for obeying the legal niceties) that 
characterized many New York actions during the Revolution, the House’s Committee of 
Correspondence informally selected its own members as delegates. The Stamp Act Congress 
met on October 19
th
 in New York City and formally condemned taxation without 
representation. 
38
 
Before the Stamp Act Congress met, the first and only issue of The Constitutional 
Courant appeared in New York. In it, “Philoleutherus” (friend of freedom) argued that while the 
British Parliament should be treated with respect, if they transgressed constitutionally set 
boundaries, infringed American liberties, and pursued “such measures as will infallibly end in a 
Turkish despotism”, then this usurped jurisdiction should be denied, as “we owe them no more 
subjection, in this respect, than the Divan of Constantinople.” “Philo Patriae” (friend of the 
country—literally, “friend of the fatherland”) argued that if the British could impose the Stamp 
Tax on the colonists, it could take all of the colonist’s property from them, sell them into 
slavery, or even put them to death, and that it would be better for the colonists to die in 
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defense of their rights.  The paper also reproduced the famous “Join or Die”   cartoon first 
produced in 1754 by Benjamin Franklin, which featured a divided snake representing the 
various colonies. The radical nature of these views shocked many, and Colden attempted to 
discover the authorship. To this day, that is disputed, but it is clear that the paper was printed 
in New Jersey, and then carried to New York. The most likely responsible party was the Sons of 
Liberty, though they may not have yet taken on that name or considered themselves a formal 
organization at that point.
39
   
The Sons of Liberty formed in New York and several other colonies in response to the 
Stamp Act, though the actual date of formation of the New York group is unknown. The New 
York group is generally considered to have most likely formed in October of 1765, though a 
September or even earlier date is also possible (and the biographer of one of their leaders, 
Isaac Sears, believes they did not formalize the association until January, 1766). The name 
referred to a debate in Parliament between Isaac Barré and Charles Townshend. Townshend 
argued that the colonists, in their opposition to taxes, were biting the hand that had planted 
and nurtured them in the New World.  Barré countered that England’s “Oppressions planted 
‘em in America”, and called the Americans “Sons of Liberty.”  The group was originally 
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secretive, and this secrecy is one of the reasons why historians are unclear about when the 
group formed. Among the leaders of the New York “Liberty Boys”, as they were also known, 
were Isaac Sears, Alexander McDougall, John Lamb, and Marinus Willett. Their supporters were 
not just middle class artisans, but those poorer white males who were denied the vote. Many of 
these would soon show their dislike of British policy through violent street action.
40
    The  
Stamp Act was to become effective on November 1, 1765.  In the days before that, broadsides  
signed  Vox Populi  (the voice of the people) were put up all over New York City threatening 
property damage (and death) to anyone who attempted to use the stamps. A more moderate 
response was made by the merchants on October 31. Meeting at Burns Tavern, the former 
home of James De Lancey, Sr., the merchants agreed to boycott all British imports until the 
Stamp Act was repealed.  Captain James De Lancey emerged here as “a first-class political 
leader and organizer of men.”  The De Lancey family excelled in bold, dramatic, flamboyant 
actions, and a boycott was such an action.  However, bolder and far more dramatic action was 
about to be executed in New York City.
41
 
  In November of 1765, violent riots against the Stamp Act broke out in New York City. 
The actions of the mob horrified the elite. Contemporaries called November 1 through 4 the 
“General Terror of November 1-4”. However, their attacks were confined mainly to symbolic 
government targets.  A movable gallows was erected on which was hung an effigy of 
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Lieutenant–Governor Cadwalladar Colden.
42
  The Governor’s coach house was broken open, 
Colden’s carriage dragged out, and another effigy of Colden was driven in it. The mob marched 
to Fort George. Placards announced that “the sons of Neptune”, that is, mariners, would lead a 
new demonstration.  The crowd approached the wall, throwing rocks and stones over the walls. 
Some seemed ready to enter the fort, which would probably have provoked fire from the 
soldiers. Fortunately, they pulled back and regrouped at the Bowling Green, where they burned 
the effigy of Colden, the gallows—and Colden’s carriage. All of these were for the most part 
symbolic targets.  But then a group destroyed the mansion of Major Thomas James, who had 
bragged about forcing the colonials to use the stamps. This was similar to what had happened 
in August to Massachusetts Lt. Gov. Thomas Hutchinson’s house in August, which had been 
destroyed by a Boston mob.  About the same time, there had been similar riots in Newport. 
Arguably, the destruction of James’ house was also the destruction of a symbolic target, but still 
the actions frightened the elites.  However, despite the property damage, no one had been 
killed, and a Boston “Massacre” (or even a Bastille) was avoided.  Still, it was clear that the 
more “respectable” members of the Sons of Liberty had at least temporaily lost control over 
the artisans and sailors, and whether they could retain control over them was questionable.    
Sears and others, mainly in the Sons of Liberty, did seem to exert a steadying influence on the  
“mob.”  The Sons of Liberty’s leaders had started at the bottom or near the bottom of the 
economic ladder, and had improved their economic position during the recent war. They were 
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not members of the elite; at best, they could be characterized as nouveau-riche.  They were 
closer in mindset and attitude to the lower economic ranks than the elite were, and had 
influence with and respect from the “lower” classes. Sears had been a privateer during the 
French and Indian War and his actions had won him a small fortune and a reputation for 
bravery. Well-liked by sailors and artisans, he could mobilize the common people, and the 
“aristocrats” dubbed him “King Sears.”
43
 
   Following the riots, the city was still in an uproar, and leading members of all three 
factions patrolled the streets, trying to restore order.  One of these leaders was William Smith 
Jr., formally of the “Triumvirate.” Smith had become a successful lawyer during the 1750s and 
1760s, clashing occasionally with Colden as Smith defended the province’s landowners clients 
against suits for rents the Crown claimed it was owed under the terms of land grants.  By 1763, 
he was the highest paid lawyer in the province and lived in a mansion on Broadway that had 
once belonged to the earlier acting governor James Delancey (who had been acting governor in 
the 1750s).  Despite the long-standing enmity between Colden and Smith , Smith now helped 
local leaders negotiate with Colden. The lieutenant governor, in an effort to defuse tensions, 
transferred the stamps to a waiting ship of war.  Full-scale revolt was averted, and the crisis 
would end when the Stamp Act was repealed.
44
  
The next decade saw continued attempts by Britain to tax the colonies (and assert their 
right to do so), and continued resistance. In January of 1766, during the Stamp Act Crisis, the 
Sons of Liberty formed a “committee of correspondence” to communicate with other Sons of 
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Liberty groups in other colonies. The Sons of Liberty borrowed this technique from the 
Presbyterians and Congregationalists, who had used it in their struggle against the appointment 
of an Anglican bishop for America. The creation of the committee of correspondence was the 
beginning of a system of committees that would eventually rise to assume governmental 
power. After the Coercive or Intolerable Acts were passed in 1774, in New York City and its 
environs various committees were formed to organize and coordinate the various resistance 
efforts (such as boycotts). The committees in the City were known by names such as the 
Committee of Fifty-one or the Committee of One Hundred. Much of the membership of these 
committees came from “new men”, such as the lesser merchants or the freeholders, though 
members of both of the traditional factions jockeyed for positions on these committees. The 
committees existed at all levels of government, and most were formed by or with the 
cooperation of preexisting local governments, such as town meetings. However, in areas with 
many Loyalists, such as parts of Queens, committees were sometimes formed by extra-legal 
meetings. But, as one historian notes (speaking of the City committees) the “committee system 
in itself was revolutionary because it was extra-legal, since no provision was made for it in the 
city charter.”
45
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IV 
 
On Long Island, the last decades of the British era were a time of stability and growth. 
The population of Huntington rose from about 500 in the 1690s to between 1500 and 1800 in 
1775, and spread out from present-day Huntington “village” on the North Shore south through 
central Long Island to Babylon on the Atlantic.
 46
  The Anglican Church made inroads in 
Presbyterian Suffolk. The first Anglican church in the county was Caroline Church in Setauket 
(approximately modern Stony Brook), founded in 1730.  Huntington organized an Anglican 
Church in 1745 under the Reverend Samuel Seabury, later an important Loyalist and, after the 
Revolution, the first bishop of the Episcopalian Church.    Brookhaven Presbyterians would 
reportedly listen to Anglican prayers if a Presbyterian minister was unavailable.
47
 The New Light 
controversy that disturbed religious congregations in New England also troubled Long Island 
churchgoers, as Mary Cooper of Oyster Bay reported in her diary.
48
  
The town records of Long Island  from the period are generally concerned with the 
delineation and demarcation  of property rights and recording town meetings and rulings, 
though other items (such as choosing delegates to committees and congresses, emancipations 
from slavery and entries into indentured servitude ) would occasionally find their way into 
them—especially as the dispute with Britain deepened. While the limits of landed property 
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were often set out in the records, movable property was also recorded.  “Ear marks”—generally 
small distinguishing cuts in the ears of animals—would be recorded so that all would know who 
owned an animal. 
49
  
Connections with Connecticut were kept up by such things as the establishment of a 
ferry service to Norwalk by Huntington in 1765. On a 1757 trip to New London, Connecticut, 
George Washington stopped at Greenport (in Southold on the North Fork of Long Island). Horse 
racing was a common amusement. Mary Cooper of Oyster Bay went to races in the late 1760s 
at a place called “Seder Swamp”, and races were also held in New Hyde Park and Jamaica.
50
    
Town meetings were generally held in April, though it was not uncommon for town 
meetings to be held in May. There are few echoes of the great dispute over taxation in the 
records until 1774. At the 1773 Huntington Town meeting, besides the election of officers, the 
most important thing discussed was the sale of land to help build a new parsonage house for 
the Presbyterian Church. It was also voted that the trustees should have the power to prohibit 
“any stranger or furrener from hunting in the Township of Huntington the ensuing year.”  By 
1774, however, Long Island was heavily involved in the great events of the day. And by 1775, a 
low-level civil war occurred in parts of Long Island.
51
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Westchester’s population in 1771 was approximately 18,315 whites, and 3430 slaves.   
The population was diverse, coming from Dutch, English, German, Scandinavian, Jewish, 
American Indian and Huguenot backgrounds.   The most notable feature of Westchester in the 
1760 and 1770s was the great manors discussed earlier.  These manors had been the scene of 
several landlord-tenant clashes in the 1750s and 1760s. The Imperial Question sharpened 
factional disputes, and a Delanceyite (John Delancey) defeated Lewis Morris of the Livingston 
faction by only 3 votes in a 1768 Assembly election.  The leading families of the county were 
involved in both New York City and provincial affairs, and the Morris families and Van Cortlandt 
families in the 1760s and later generally opposed the Delancey and Philipse families. 
52
  
Religiously, as with the Presbyterians of Brookhaven, the Huguenots of New Rochelle, 
while preferring ministers of the French Reformed Church, would accept an Anglican minister 
when a minister of their faith was not available. Tarrytown was a Dutch Reformed town, while 
Yonkers, Rye, and the Borough of West Chester were Anglican.  Itinerant ministers could also be 
found.  The Anglican ministers were strong proponents of the King and Parliament, and at least 
one Anglican minister was pleased to report that he had prevented his flock from opposing the 
Stamp Act. The Anglican ministers support for the British was from both personal conviction 
(the King was, it should be noted, the ultimate leader of the Church of England) and at least in 
part because much of their income relied on a continued attachment to Britain. 
53
 
The county before 1775 was “notably indifferent to continental and imperial politics.” 
The essayist J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur lived on a large farm in Orange County, across the 
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Hudson from Westchester.  He reported that the constitutional controversy with Britain that so 
exercised the urban population interested neither him nor his neighbors.  Sung Bok Kim, a 
historian of revolutionary Westchester, argues that the population was mainly apolitical before 
the war. Indeed, interest in local politics was minimal, and Kim says that elections were mainly 
social occasions, and that the people of Westchester gave much deference in political matters 
to the great families of the county (which included great families such as the Van Cortlandts, 
Morrises, Philipses, and De Lanceys.) Despite this, because of its strategic position,   
Westchester would become greatly involved in the great events of the day by the spring of 
1775. Much of Westchester would be a borderland between the American and British forces, 
and White Plains would be the scene of a major battle during Washington’s retreat from New 
York in 1776, as well as the place where New York’s independence was proclaimed. The county 
would soon be faced with what can only be called civil war.
54
  
“That ever loyal island,” Staten Island (Richmond County), was then, as now, the least 
populated of the counties that would eventually constitute modern New York City, with a 
population of about 3000 at the time of the Revolution.  Ethnically, the island was about one 
quarter African, one half Dutch or French (with Dutch predominating), with the rest British in 
ethnicity, though determining these divisions is difficult and the best study is for 1706. Slavery 
was common; the average farm had at the most three slaves, though some had as many as ten. 
The island was populated mainly by middle-class farmers, who grew wheat, corn, and other 
crops, as well as fruit orchards and woodlots and salt meadows. Many engaged in the oyster 
trade and fishing. The island traded its products with both New York and New Jersey (which it is 
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actually geographically closer to). A natural spring called “The Watering Place” provided fresh 
water for ships sailing from New York, so they would often stop at the island.
55
   
In the late colonial period Anglicans dominated the island politically, and most   free 
Staten Islanders would become Loyalists. Four leading families—the Billopps, Dongans, 
Micheaus, and Seamans—dominated the government of the island through intermarriage and 
deference.  Religion, as in other parts of New York, had a clear influence on Richmond’s political 
opinions.  Historian Phillip Papas argues that Presbyterians and members of the Dutch 
Reformed Church often became Patriots at least in part as a way to break the Anglican political 
hold and disestablish the Church of England.  Conversely, there had been tensions between the 
Moravians and the Reformed congregations, so many Moravians became Loyalists, fearing the 
new Presbyterian-Dutch Reformed political and social order that would arise from a Patriot 
victory. 
56
  
In 1774-76, Staten Island would oppose the Continental Association and many other 
measures supported by the Patriots. The island was mostly Loyalist, and would welcome the 
British troops that arrived in the summer of 1776 with open arms.
 57
  The island was used as the 
staging area for the invasion of Long Island and Manhattan in August and September of that 
year. During the war, it would guard New York harbor from attack. During the long occupation 
it would be the scene of attacks and raids into New Jersey—and of raids from New Jersey. 
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 V 
 
The end of the Stamp Act crisis was not the end of tensions in New York; ironically, the 
celebrations surrounding the repeal of the Stamp Act led to a series of violent clashes. News of 
the Parliament’s repeal of the Stamp Act reached New York on May 20, 1766.  The Assembly 
voted to have statues of the king and William Pitt, who had argued for the act’s repeal, erected. 
The Sons of Liberty erected a “liberty pole” on the Common, using an old ship mast. The liberty 
pole was an ancient Roman symbol, and it has been argued that the liberty pole was fused with 
the maypole in the popular mind. The pole was inscribed “George III, Pitt and Liberty.”
58
  
In June of 1766, two British regiments were quartered near the Common. The soldiers of 
the regiments began to supplement their incomes by moonlighting, thus arguably taking jobs 
away from New Yorkers. To those who resented paying taxes to support the soldiers, this was 
adding insult to injury. The soldiers, annoyed at what they saw as ingratitude and disrespect, 
responded by cutting down the Liberty Pole on August 10, 1766. Rioting broke out the next day 
between New Yorkers and British regulars. Fortunately, no one was killed, but this was the first 
time American colonists had clashed openly with British regulars. Several more liberty poles 
would be erected (and torn down) in the next few years, and more violence would surround 
some of these poles, as discussed below.
59
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While Parliament had defused a crisis by ending an unpopular tax, it did not give up its 
belief that it had a right to tax the colonies. Concurrent with repeal of the Stamp Act, it passed 
a Declaratory Act, declaring its right to tax the colonies “in all cases whatsoever”, and in the 
summer of 1767, it passed the Townshend duties. These included duties on lead, glass, tea, and 
other items shipped to America.  In New York, the Assembly protested these duties, and was 
soon dissolved by the governor. A new election was called for 1768. In this election, believing 
that the Livingstons had been too moderate in their protests, the Sons of Liberty supported the 
Delanceys.  Over the years, James Delancey had cultivated a radical image for his faction. This 
radical image helped his party to do well in the election, as did the Livingston-controlled 
Assembly passing an unpopular bill in 1767 to quarter British troops. The Delanceys also 
exploited popular distaste for the legal profession (many Livingstons were lawyers.)   When the 
votes were finally counted, the Delanceys gained seats in the Assembly but remained a 
minority. In the meantime, Massachusetts had instituted nonimportation as a tactic, and sent a 
circular letter urging all the colonies to join. Further agitation by the Delanceys for the Assembly 
to formally join the boycott led to a new election in 1769, where they gained the votes of many 
working class and middle-class New Yorkers and won a majority in the Assembly.
60
   
It should be noted that all three of New York’s parties were opposed to British policies, 
holding what would soon be called a “Patriot” position. The factions on this important issue 
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basically differed on tactics and the stridency of their protests.  As Patriot tactics began to turn 
towards armed resistance and eventually independence, many who opposed British policies 
would find themselves unable to follow along, and despite their opposition to many British 
policies would find themselves on the Loyalist side.  
Once in office, the Delanceyites made an alliance with Colden (who was acting governor 
after Governor Moore’s unexpected death in 1769). In exchange for offices and the issuance of 
more paper money by the province
61
, the Delanceyites agreed in November, 1769 to pay for 
the quartering of British troops in the province. An earlier failure by New York and other 
colonies to do this had resulted in the “Mutiny” Act, which required the veto of legislation until 
funds had been appropriated. 
62
 Many New Yorkers felt betrayed by the agreement with 
Colden, and an anonymous broadside attacked the Delanceys and said that the troops were 
sent to “enslave” New Yorkers.  Former Triumvirate member William Smith Jr. (henceforth 
Smith), a Livingstonite who had been appointed to the Council in 1767, denounced the 
Assembly’s actions loudly and attempted to realign the Liberty Boys with his faction. The Sons 
of Liberty held large rallies in January, 1770 in front of the Liberty Pole against what they 
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considered a corrupt bargain by the Delancey faction. In response, British soldiers in the dead 
of the night destroyed the pole.
63
 
Another broadside complained of having to pay for quartering the soldiers and 
supporting the poor whose jobs, it alleged, they stole, and of the need to pay a poor tax to 
maintain the soldiers’ “whores and bastards.” Not surprisingly, many soldiers were incensed, 
and printed up their own broadside calling the Americans ingrates, and making fun of the Sons 
of Liberty, who, the broadside claimed, defended the Liberty Pole as if “their freedom 
depended on a piece of wood.” On January 19, 1770, Isaac Sears, a leader of the Liberty Boys, 
forcibly prevented some soldiers from posting the broadside, which he considered libelous. This 
led to an armed clash between a New York mob and the redcoats, known as the “Battle of 
Golden Hill” after the wheat field where it occurred. The British reportedly used bayonets 
against the mob, while the mob responded with halberds (long poles with ax blades and a steel 
spike at the end). There were some serious wounds, and many cuts and bruises. Fortunately, no 
one was killed, but the incident has been called the “first blood-shed of the Revolution.” Six 
weeks later, Golden Hill was eclipsed by the incident commonly called the “Boston Massacre”, 
where a clash between Bostonians and soldiers sent to ensure compliance with British policy 
resulted in four deaths.
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The Liberty Pole had become an important symbol of the struggle against the British, 
and a fifth pole was erected on a plot (owned by Sears) near the Common in February, 1770.  
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Standing forty-six feet above the ground, it bore a weather-vane that spelled out the word 
“Liberty”, and would last six years. “God Save the King” was played as it was installed.
65
 At this 
point in the Revolution, despite their opposition to British policy, the Patriots were also 
Loyalists.  
In 1770, the British dropped all duties except that on tea. The Delanceys, who 
represented merchant interests, wanted to end the economic boycott on all items except tea. 
The other two factions wanted the boycott to continue. On July 7, 1770, the Liberty Boys and 
their new allies the Livingstons clashed with representatives of the Delanceys in what became 
known as the Battle of Wall Street.
66
 The breach between the factions on the trade and tax 
issue had been made clear in March, when competing annual banquets were held 
commemorating the Stamp Act’s repeal. A group calling itself the “Friends of Liberty and Trade” 
reserved Montaigne’s Tavern for March 18, the date of the annual banquet. This tavern had 
been the unofficial meeting place and headquarters of the Liberty Boys.
67
 Undeterred, several 
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Taverns (also known as public houses) were then, as now, important sites of interaction in American cities, and 
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leaders of the Sons of Liberty (such as Isaac Sears, Alexander McDougall, and John Morin Scott), 
bought a building near the Liberty Pole, named it Hampden Hall, and held their banquet. The 
Friends of Liberty and Trade toasted “Trade and navigation and a speedy removal of their 
embarrassments” and appeared to be members of the Delancey faction. 
68
    
Shortly after the “Battle of Wall Street”, the nonimportation agreement collapsed in 
New York. For the next few years after the collapse of the agreement, political disputes in New 
York would be mainly about patronage, not matters of high principle. The crisis was had been 
defused.  Symbolic of the seeming return to normality, in August of 1770, an equestrian statue 
of King George, ordered after the repeal of the Stamp Act, was unveiled in New York City. This 
and the statue of William Pitt were the first statues ever erected in Manhattan.
 69
 But the 
“Imperial Crisis” was merely defused, not over. The fundamental questions remained. In less 
than six years, the statue of King George would be destroyed by crowds celebrating 
independence. 
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 VI 
 
 
After Moore and Colden’s acting governorship, Lord Dunmore was briefly the governor 
of New York. In July, 1771, he was succeeded by William Tryon, who remained the official 
British governor of the province until 1780. Tryon was well-connected, with titled relatives and 
a marriage to the daughter of a wealthy merchant of the East India Company.  The Earl of 
Hillsborough, who was president of the Board of Trade and Plantations from 1763 to 1769 and 
from 1768 to 1772 Secretary of State for the colonies, was a family friend.  Tryon joined the 
army and was nearly killed during the Seven Years War, but survived. In 1764, he used his 
connections with Hillsborough to become lieutenant-governor of North Carolina, and became 
governor the next year. In many ways, his governorship was moderate. He supported the 
colonial demands for paper money, and was sympathetic to colonial demands in the Stamp Act 
crisis.
70
   
However, Tryon’s term as North Carolina governor is remembered for two things. The 
first was the erection of a new governor’s mansion at New Bern. The Assembly appropriated 
£15,000 for the mansion. Many considered this excessive, and dubbed the mansion “Tryon’s 
Palace”. Far more importantly was his treatment of the Regulators. For years, the people of 
western North Carolina had tried to get greater representation in the colonial assembly.  They 
also had other grievances, such as the economic depression, with the debts and foreclosures it 
caused (and what they believed was corruption by lawyers and the politically-connected). They 
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also had had little desire to pay for the “Palace”. Tryon had attempted to alleviate their 
demands, but the eastern “establishment” of North Carolina (mainly wealthy commercial 
farmers) had resisted increasing representation.   The westerners eventually revolted in what 
became known as the “Regulator Revolt”.  About 80 percent of the white males of the North 
Carolina backcountry were involved in the Regulator movement. Tryon put together a small 
militia and routed the Regulators at the Battle of Alamance in May, 1771, killing at least 25 and 
wounding 160 more.  Loyalty oaths were imposed by Tryon and his forces on the people of 
west North Carolina, with 6000 former Regulators repudiating their actions.  Seven Regulator 
leaders were hung shortly before Tryon left for New York.
71
 
As New York governor, Tryon tried to be neutral, and above politics. Sometimes, he 
leaned towards the Delanceys, sometimes to the Livingstons. He tried to counter democratic 
tendencies in the province by commissioning only well-born gentlemen as officers in the militia, 
and by granting huge tracts of land to not only colonial aristocrats but to himself as well. This 
practice raised a few eyebrows in London.
72
   
The Imperial Crisis was merely in hiatus during the early years of Tryon’s administration, 
and a convoluted chain of events would end the seeming normality of the time. War in India, 
famine in Bengal, and a financial crash in 1772 nearly ruined the British East India Company.  
The company, while it received bail-out loans from the government, needed to increase tea 
sales to improve its balance sheet.  To help out the company, an act was passed by Parliament 
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giving the company a monopoly on the tea trade with America. While the prior heavy tariff on 
tea was eliminated, the Townshend duty remained at the insistence of the Prime Minister, Lord 
North. The end result of these changes was that the price of legal tea was less than that for 
smuggled Dutch tea. It seems that the Ministry was mainly interested in raising revenue and 
helping out the Company by increasing the sales of legal (as opposed to smuggled) tea. 
However, whether intentional or not, a trap had been laid: should the colonials buy the 
suddenly cheap tea, then, as Schecter argues, “they would have effectively agreed to 
parliamentary taxation.” Sears and McDougall began a broadside and pamphlet campaign to 
unite all New Yorkers, regardless of class or political affiliation, against the Tea Act. In some of 
these, not only Parliament’s power to tax, but its claim to pass any law or have any sovereignty 
over the colonies began to be questioned. 
73
   
On December 16, 1773, the Boston Tea Party occurred, as men disguised as Mohawks 
(some or most were probably members of the local Sons of Liberty) boarded a ship full of tea in 
Boston Harbor and dumped the tea into the Harbor.  News of the tea party was sent to New 
York by an express rider, a Boston silversmith named Paul Revere. About 16 months later, 
Revere would make a more famous ride, but now his report helped inspire the radical faction in 
New York. On April 22, 1774, a group of men on the New York wharves boarded a ship called 
the London and threw eighteen chests full of tea into New York harbor. This was the New York 
Tea Party.  A second ship, the Nancy, also laden with tea, was at Sandy Hook on the approaches 
to the harbor.  On learning of the Tea Party, it pulled up anchor and headed back to England.
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The British Parliament, on learning of the Boston Tea Party, was shocked at the 
destruction of property, the lawlessness, and the implicit attack on what it saw as its rights and 
powers, and passed a series of acts it called the Coercive Acts but the colonists called the 
Intolerable Acts. The Acts shut down Boston harbor, made many Massachusetts offices 
appointed by the king or governor (thus making major changes to Massachusetts government 
without the consent of the Massachusetts population), and limited Massachusetts town 
meetings to once a year, among other provisions.  News of these acts reached New York two 
weeks after the New York Tea Party.
75
 Since New York had done the same as Boston, many 
must have worried that these acts could be extended to New York. This undoubtedly gave an 
incentive to join with other colonies in opposition, and to respond favorably to the Boston 
Committee of Correspondence’s appeal for help, unity, and resistance.  
Sears and McDougall urged that the colonies agree not to export to, or import from, 
Britain. However, they urged that such an agreement be formed under regulations agreed upon 
by “Committees from the Principal towns on the Continent, to meet in a general Congress to be 
held here for that Purpose.” This was in many ways the genesis of the Continental Congress.
76
  
A meeting was held at the Exchange on May 16 to discuss New York’s response to the 
Intolerable Acts. Regardless of faction, most New Yorkers, including the Delanceys, were 
shocked at the strong British response.   While the meeting was advertised to be for merchants 
only, many of the Sons of Liberty also attended.  So many showed up at the Queen’s Head 
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Tavern, the advertised site, that the meeting had to be moved to the Exchange.  About 300 
people attended the meeting.
77
  
While shocked by the British actions, the merchants did not want a disruption of trade if 
possible, and the Delancey leaders argued that Boston should just pay for the tea, thereby 
ending the crisis. They urged that nonimportation not be adopted until there had been 
consultation with other colonies.  A committee of correspondence was formed; the Delanceys 
insisted on a large committee of 50, (which soon became 51) and carried the day. They also 
achieved a majority on the Committee; only about 14 members of the Livingston-Sons of 
Liberty alliance were on the committee. 
78
 
 Judge Thomas Jones, an important if biased Loyalist historian of Revolutionary New 
York, noted in his history that the majority of the Committee of 51, as it became known, were 
“real friends of Government.” 
79
  The committee was dominated by merchants, by respectable 
citizens, and was in character moderate, if not conservative (in the sense of wishing to maintain 
as much as possible the status quo). It was dominated by people with strong ties to Britain and 
its trade, who would seek to repair the breach with Britain.  The majority of the committee 
members, while no doubt concerned with British actions, wanted trade. Thus, a little more than 
two years before independence, the most important Revolutionary committee in New York was 
quite conservative. To borrow an oft-used phrase, if they were revolutionaries, they were 
“reluctant” revolutionaries. 
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 Jones’ language is interesting. Many Loyalists or Britons would often use “friend of 
government” for Loyalists or “enemy of government” for the rebels.
80
  In calling their foes 
“enemies of government”, rather than “enemies of the government”, it seems they were calling 
them anarchists
81
; that in opposing the King and Parliament’s rule, they were opposed to any 
government at all. This fits in well with the characterization of the Patriots as usurpers
82
, mob 
rulers, and tyrants—though perhaps too much is being made here of a missing definitive article.     
Despite its conservative nature, the Committee did contain a sizable number of radicals, 
and meetings were often quite fractious. It began to act “as a legal body, legally chosen, and 
fined, imprisoned, robbed, and banished his Majesty’s loyal subjects with a vengeance.” 
83
 In 
short, even this most-moderate body began to act as a revolutionary committee, taking on 
quasi-governmental functions. Similar events have occurred in other revolutions, as 
committees, elected or self-chosen, begin to act as a government. Perhaps the most famous 
instance of this was the soviets in revolutionary Russia, and the historian Edward Countryman, 
rather provocatively, noted this similarity between the two revolutions in the 1980s. Similar 
activities occurred in other colonies; for example, developments in Philadelphia and 
Pennsylvania are detailed in Richard Ryerson’s The Revolution Has Now Begun.
84
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The proposed Continental Congress met in Philadelphia in September and October, 
1774 (though unlike Sears and McDougall’s suggestion, the delegates represented colonies, not 
towns). It was here that Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania presented his Plan of Union. Under 
this plan, a continental parliament called the General Council would be formed, and a 
President-General would represent the Crown’s interests. The Council could veto British 
decisions relating to the colonies, and the British Parliament could veto American decisions. 
This would have given the colonies a greater say and retained British control.  Many moderates 
at the Congress found the plan quite attractive. It is possible the British might have found it, or 
something like it, an acceptable compromise.  Had Galloway’s plan, or something like it, been 
adopted, war and independence would probably have been avoided, as it would have satisfied 
all but the most radical Americans in 1774. How the British would have reacted to such a plan is 
an open question; having adopted a hard-line policy, they may have rejected any plan that 
reduced what they saw as their power over America.   After the Suffolk Resolves arrived in 
Philadelphia, discussion swung in a more radical direction, and Galloway’s plan was narrowly 
defeated. Galloway would later become a leading Loyalist.
85
  
The Congress passed the Continental Association. This was an agreement for 
nonimportation, and set up means to enforce this agreement. In New York, there was much 
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consternation among the Delanceyites, who had hoped for resolution of the crisis, not its 
intensification and continuation.  Jones reports that the Loyalists in New York had hoped for a 
“redress of grievances, and a firm union between Great Britain and America upon constitutional 
principles.” Now, totally disappointed, at a public meeting they resolved to oppose sending 
delegates to a future Congress.
86
  
Many members of the Committee of 51, being merchants, were reluctant to enforce the 
Association. After much maneuvering, Isaac Low, the Committee’s chairman (and a leading 
merchant of New York), reached an agreement with Daniel Dunscomb, the head of the 
Mechanics Committee, to form a new Committee of 60 to enforce the Association. This new 
committee formed on November 17, 1774, and included more Sons of Liberty and 
Livingstonites than before. 
87
 
The Committee of 60 set up a subcommittee known as the Committee of Inspection to 
inspect ships and send them back before they could unload their cargo.
88
 One of the powers of 
a government is to control and regulate trade. This will sometimes entail embargoing some or 
all cargoes. What the Committee of Inspection was doing was more than a boycott, where 
private citizens voluntarily choose to not purchase “offensive” items. The Committee was 
preventing these items from reaching the stores. Perhaps without quite realizing what they 
were doing, the Committee of Inspection had taken on a governmental function. Thus began a 
period of “dual government”, which, as discussed above, often occurs in revolutions. The 
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committees of New York would soon form a Provincial Congress which would compete with and 
supersede the old Assembly. 
Of course, governments need police to enforce their rules and ruling. In a revolutionary 
situation, the police role is frequently played by informal actors, who will often draw their 
legitimacy from a sense of accordance with the will of the people or from the ideals of the 
revolution. In New York, the Committee of Inspection used mobs to enforce their decisions. On 
February 9, 1775, at the same wharf where the New York Tea Party had been held, the mob 
jeered the captain of the James, a British trading vessel.  The James did not land its cargo. The 
owner of the wharf, Robert Murray, more from economic motives than any political motive, 
tried several times to land cargo either at his wharf or elsewhere.  Alexander McDougall and 
the other inspectors wanted to exile him from the city, but his wife’s ardent appeals prevented 
that. However, the British could not land cargo in New York. The embargo held.
 89
 
 
New York at the dawn of the Revolution was a colony with a varied past and present.  
The long domination by two factions representing the interests of major economic interests 
was disrupted by the crisis, as a new faction, representing both a more strident outlook on the 
issues of the day and a rising economic interest arose.    The dispute with Britain was fought by 
formal protests, petitions, pamphlets, and on occasion riots.   The Boston Tea Party and the 
British response to it raised tensions between Britain and America to an all- time high. By 1775, 
open warfare would break out between America and Britain.  News of the Battle of Lexington-
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Concord would galvanize not just the people of New York City but those of the rural counties 
surrounding the city. The rural communities would begin to put their views on record, and 
begin seizing weapons or otherwise putting under suspicion their neighbors.  Control of the 
province would increasingly pass from the organs of the official government and more and 
more into the hands of various committees. By the end of 1775, Governor Tryon would have 
fled New York  City for the safety of British ships in the harbor.   
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Chapter II 
 The American Revolution in New York 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
1775 was a year in which the Imperial Crisis deepened in New York and the thirteen 
colonies in general. Resistance to British policy and the “Intolerable Acts” would lead to open 
warfare at Lexington and Concord near Boston. This escalation of the conflict would galvanize 
the anti-British movement. The structure of committees and congresses that had been slowly 
developing began to take over the province of New York.  The governor would flee by year’s 
end to a ship protected in New York harbor by the British navy.  From here, he would attempt 
to govern. The old political divisions of New York were being replaced by a new division of 
Loyalists and Patriots.  
Outside of the city, the towns and counties were faced with the question of whether to 
participate in the Provincial Congress. Those who opposed the Patriot position would 
memorialize their opposition in various statements.  But peaceful opposition was being seen as 
impermissible, and this would lead to confiscations of weapons and a low-level but very real 
civil war, which in some regions was in full-swing before 1776 began.  Hopes for reconciliation 
with Britain were dimming. While the next logical step may have been independence, many as 
the year ended were reluctant to take that step. 
 
I 
 
In 1775, the first of a series of Provincial Congresses was elected in New York to 
coordinate the anti-British movement and the actions of the local committees. The Second 
Continental Congress was scheduled for May. The Patriot leaders believed that to give New 
York’s delegation more legitimacy, it should represent the whole state, not just New York City. 
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A provincial congress or convention should be selected to make what had mainly been an urban 
movement into one that encompassed the other parts of the province—and perhaps supplant 
the Assembly, controlled by the Delanceys.  The Delancey faction had been moving more and 
more into a position that was beginning to be called Loyalist. This was not surprising. As one 
scholar argues, “the De Lancey party’s long-term commitment to the empire, Anglicanism, 
elitism, and commercial growth had by now made it impossible for many of its members to 
accept…the path that patriots were taking.”
1
 Many of the great merchants who eventually 
became Loyalists did not have deep roots in New York (Isaac Low was a notable exception.)  
Many were immigrants from Britain or her possessions. They had family, partners and trading 
connections in Britain. In one way of putting it, they had East-West connections. The 
connections of the Sons of Liberty and other traders who chose independence were more 
North-South—they traded with the other colonies, or with the West Indies (including the 
French and Spanish possessions.) 
2
  
Merchants, which many of the Delanceys were, could only support short stoppages of 
trade with their main trading partner. Long stoppages would be economically harmful, if not 
ruinous. Merchants whose trade was less-dependent on Britain, such as many of the nouveau-
riche Liberty Boys, were far less economically vulnerable to a trade stoppage.
3
  Since much of 
their wealth did not come from trade, the great landlords (many of whom were Livingstons), 
also were fairly immune to the direct effects of an embargo.
4
    It must also be noted that the 
                                                           
1
 Tiedemann, 214-7. 
2
 Countryman, 113-116 
3
 Ibid.  
4
 For various reasons, many of the great landlords were not in political favor in London. Some of them had gained 
their estates through questionable means, or the estates had not been obtained through British favor, but in spite 
of it.  For example, the first Robert Livingston had built his manor on “gall and fraud”, while in contrast William 
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creation of a rival center of power to challenge the Delancey-dominated assembly may also 
have been partially a maneuver in the old factional strife.    
As an example of their conservatism on the Imperial Question, the Delancey-dominated 
Assembly in March passed several resolutions which affirmed loyalty to the crown, and stated 
that all laws that were not “inconsistent with the essential rights and liberties” of Englishmen 
were binding on the colonies.  However, to these rather unobjectionable statements they also 
argued that taxation by parliament was unconstitutional, and petitioned the King and 
Parliament for a redress of grievances.  It is again apparent that, while all three factions were in 
general agreement in their opposition to British policy, and even on the reasons the policies 
were wrong, they differed on method. The Delanceyites saw the parliament’s actions as 
unconstitutional, but their strategy was to petition through the legal assembly for a redress of 
grievances; the Livingston-Liberty Boy alliance wanted to boycott and enforce the boycott 
through the committees.
 5
    
 In many ways, within a few weeks, the De Lancey/Livingston divide, indeed, the entire 
faction system that had governed New York for decades would be an anachronism. The 
question of American-British relations would dominate all questions and supplant all prior 
alignments.  The new factional divide would be that between the Tories or Loyalists (mainly 
composed of members of the Delancey faction, though some Livingstons would become 
Loyalists) and the Whigs or Patriots (mainly Livingstons and Sons of Liberty).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Johnson had been given secure title to hundreds of thousands of acres for his services to the Crown, and was a 
great support to Britain until his death. Some of the landlords had political connections in Britain that were now in 
the proverbial political “wilderness.” These landlords were more likely to choose independency. Those like Johnson 
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As the crisis deepened, the committees had begun to move from coordination and 
organization to enforcement of boycotts and other quasi-governmental activity. This process 
was similar to events occurring in many other colonies.  With rare exceptions, such as 
Cadwallader Colden, the majority of New Yorkers wanted to resist what they saw as a British 
attempt to extinguish their liberties, but they also wanted to remain in the Empire. As the 
historian JosephTiedemann phrased it, they wanted “both empire and liberty.” A solution to 
the Imperial Crisis that kept New York (and the other colonies) solidly within the Empire (with 
all its commercial benefits), yet respected—and solved—Patriot concerns regarding taxation 
without representation was desired.   Judge Jones reported in his history that what many 
desired was both a redress of grievances, and a firm union.  Galloway’s Plan, which might have 
led to such a solution, had been rejected, and a series of resolutions which clearly pointed at 
armed resistance had been adopted instead by the Continental Congress.  While many, 
probably most, New Yorkers desired to remain within the Empire, many truly feared that the 
British sought a tyranny over the colonies. To prevent this, Patriots in New York and the other 
colonies began taking actions that leaned not towards reconciliation, but towards active 
resistance and independence.
6
  
As the above occurred, or before, some members of the elite (many of them Delanceys) 
began to leave the Patriot movement, fearing the direction they saw it moving in.  Wishing for 
some kind of reconciliation with Britain that also addressed the legitimate grievances of the 
colonies, they saw—some sooner than later—that the colonies were instead moving towards 
independence.  James Delancey left for Britain in May, 1775, and never returned. Isaac Low left 
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the Patriot cause in November, 1775, after he was named by the Provincial Congress to a 
committee to purchase gunpowder. John Alsop, a prominent merchant, remained in the 
Provincial Congress until July 16, 1776, resigning only after the Declaration of Independence 
“closed the door of reconciliation,” as he put it in his letter of resignation.   A few, like 
Cadwallader Colden, actively opposed the Patriots.
 
 Perhaps 15 percent of New Yorkers 
became—or remained—Loyalists.
7
  
William Smith Jr.’s journey from youthful radicalism to Loyalism is intriguing. 
8
 His 
father, William Smith Sr., had represented John Peter Zenger in the famous 1735 trial, and 
incurred the enmity of the Delancey family during this trial. Young William Smith Jr., born in 
1725, hence naturally moved politically into the Livingston orbit, and with William Livingston 
and John Morin Scott, formed part of the “Triumvirate”   discussed above. Smith was probably 
the author of nine of the articles in the Independent Reflector. The Reflector supported “truth 
and liberty”, and opposed the control of the proposed King’s College (the modern Columbia 
University) by Anglicans. This was a cause dear to many Presbyterians, such as Smith, 
Livingston, and Morin. Smith wrote a history of New York, became a prominent lawyer, and 
helped keep the calm after the Stamp Act riots. Eventually, in 1767, he became a member of 
the Governor’s Council, where he would often clash with the Delanceys, and would attempt to 
align the Sons of Liberty with the Livingston faction. In 1774, Alexander McDougall introduced 
John Adams to Smith. Adams described Smith as having “the character of a great lawyer, a 
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sensible and learned man, and yet a consistent, unshaken friend to his country, and her 
liberties.” In short, Adams considered Smith in 1774 to be a Patriot.
9
  
As a member of the Council, in late 1775 and early 1776, Smith would attend meetings 
on board the Dutchess of Gordon, a British vessel Governor Tryon had taken refuge on (see 
below), and strive to achieve compromise on his return. Communication between the ship and 
the city was stopped by April 1776, so Smith left the city with his family, and went to his 
country home at Haverstraw on the Hudson, where his brothers Thomas and Joshua also lived. 
Two trunks of documents were left in his New York City home, and he never recovered them. 
His home was used by George Washington as a headquarters for a while, and was destroyed in 
the great fire of September 1776.  Hence, Smith, a member of the governing Council of British 
New York, lived for several years in the unoccupied portion of independent New York.  Smith 
was placed on a list of suspect people in June 1776, and summoned to appear before a 
committee. He had several friends on the committee, and they allowed him to avoid an 
appearance and move to Livingston Manor. In June 1777, the Committee of Safety asked him if 
he considered himself a citizen of the independent state of New York. He “declined to answer”, 
and was put on parole in Livingston Manor. This was basically house arrest. Livingston Manor 
was quite large, covering about 200,000 acres, so it was not an unpleasant house arrest, but it 
was still house arrest. The Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in July 1778 
banished Smith to British-held New York, but did not strip him of his estates. This and other 
actions, such as continued correspondence with leading rebels, aroused suspicions by Thomas 
Jones and the British secret service as to his loyalties. However, the more likely explanation was 
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that he was a fence-sitter; that while he agreed with many of the Patriot arguments, he could 
not shake his loyalties to Britain. Anyone who has read even a portion of his Memoirs will 
consider him a Loyalist, though perhaps one with some sympathy for the American cause. 
When he finally had to make a choice, he chose Britain. The youthful crusader against privilege 
and Anglican domination chose in his middle age to stay with Great Britain. Like many New 
Yorkers, he wanted liberty, but he also wanted empire.   He was awarded by the Crown with, 
among other distinctions, being made Chief Justice of New York in 1780.
10
  
Why did people become Loyalists? As several have pointed out, the question is 
somewhat backwards. Arguably, loyalty was the “default state”; a better question is to ask why 
people became rebels. However, in the northern colonies at least, it seems that the default 
state was only achieved by much effort.  The colonists may have been, as Pitt proclaimed, the 
“sons of England”, but they were often the disliked sons of England, at least in the North. New 
England was settled by Pilgrims and Puritans, as was much of Long Island. The Puritans wished 
to purify the Church of England of what they saw as Catholic remnants, and feared what they 
saw as Catholic leanings by the kings. The Pilgrims had actually separated from the Church.   
The seventeenth-century Puritan New Englanders and Long Islanders may have respected the 
king as lawful authority, but most probably did not have great fondness or devotion to him.  
Indeed, their co-religionists in England actually killed a king of England, and until 1828 would be 
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a suspect group (the “Dissenters”) in Britain, prohibited from many offices.  Even after 1828, 
they were for a long time social outsiders in Britain.  
But, at least the Puritans and Pilgrims were English. New York was a conquered Dutch 
province, and was run without an assembly for about twenty years after the conquest, at least 
in part for this reason.  Pennsylvania, founded in 1681, and much of New Jersey would be 
populated largely by another group of religious dissidents, the Society of Friends—generally 
referred to as Quakers. The Stuart kings after the Restoration began a process to anglicize—
that is, make more like English norms—the  laws, governments, and customs of America as 
much as possible. Governor Edmund Andros of the Dominion of New England in the 1670s 
introduced oaths to legal procedures, which many Puritans saw as a form of idolatry. The King’s 
arms were placed in town courthouses. Imperial holidays such as the King’s birthday were 
celebrated—and some of these fell on the Sabbath. Flags flew St. George’s cross—another idol 
in Puritan eyes. Before the Restoration, ties with England had been tenuous, and some of the 
Puritan colonies could be said to be virtually self-governing. The Stuarts’ effort to assert their 
authority and rule over the Americas even prompted one historian of seventeenth century 
America to call 1676 (the year of Bacon’s Rebellion and King Philip’s War)  the “End of American 
Independence.”
11
 
After the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, the later Stuarts and then the Hanovers 
continued this process of rationalization and royalization, but with more success in New 
England and the Middle Colonies than the earlier Stuarts.  The kings were now Protestants, 
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often at war with Catholic powers, and far more acceptable to American Calvinists.  The 
Glorious Revolution, the overthrow of a Catholic monarch and the establishment of a 
Protestant monarchy, was seen as an important event in God’s plan for history in the almanacs 
of the day. The day of the defeat of the Catholic dissident Guy Fawkes’ plot to destroy 
Parliament, November the 5
th
, became a holiday as early as 1665 in Massachusetts.  Royal 
birthdays were celebrated as early as 1710 in New York. As many New Yorkers were Anglicans, 
and the King was the ultimate leader of the Church of England, it is not surprising that many 
New Yorkers felt strongly for the king. There are many reports of cheers of “God save the King,” 
drinking the King’s health, and the like from eighteenth-century colonial America.  By the 
eighteenth century, historian Brendan McConville argues, “The evidence points to deep and 
real affections for the British monarchy among provincials.”
12
 But this affection did not include 
the Parliament. The king ruled them, and this was accepted, but the right of the Parliament to 
rule them was not so accepted and by the 1770s was being explicitly rejected.  
Not only was the king by the late colonial era loved or at least deeply respected, but he 
was seen as the guarantor of the people’s liberties.  Liberty poles would be raised to the tune of 
God Save the King. Flags would be placed on these poles with both the words “Liberty” and 
“George III” on them, symbolically equating the king with liberty (see below). And, as one 
British officer wrote the Colonial Secretary, George Germain:  
 
So far were they in 1767 from thinking of a Form of Gouvernent without a king, 
that the People believed the King would take their Part if he was rightly 
informed.  If any convulsion at home had made it necesasary for em to think of 
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Gouverning emselves I am convinced that most of the provinces would have 
asked for a Prince of the House of Hanover. I am not saying there was no 
Republican amongst em. But no man professed it, or would have been popular 
for it.
13
   
 
 
By the mid-eighteenth century, if not earlier, the King was respected, perhaps loved, 
and seen as the guarantor of the people’s liberties.  What shook this faith in the King and the 
British Constitution among so many Americans? The Intolerable Acts and the Quebec Act, it has 
been suggested, may have been the tipping point for many. The Intolerable Acts seemed an 
overreaction to an act of political vandalism and reduced the freedoms and liberties of the 
people of Massachusetts. The Quebec Act, which established the Catholic Church in Quebec 
and extended that province’s boundaries, seemed to many to be the act of a tyrant; Catholicism 
had long been associated with not just  a heretical  religion but with tyranny in Protestant 
minds. The hiring in 1775 of Hessian mercenaries—foreigners
14
— whose likely use would be to 
attack British subjects, was also seen as tyrannical.  The influence of Opposition theory, of a 
classical republicanism which saw tyranny as an eternal temptation for those in power which 
had to be zealously guarded against, was also an important factor. And it became more and 
more clear that the King was as much the colonists’ enemy as the Parliament.  The King, the 
protector of their liberties, had become in the eyes of many freedom’s enemy. And, as so often 
happens, love can turn to hate when the object of one’s love seems to betray one.  By January 
1776, when Tom Paine’s Common Sense denounced and ridiculed the very notion of monarchy, 
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many Americans were ready to accept the arguments.
15
 Still, not all had their faith shaken. For 
example, while the settlers of the Caribbean and Bermuda shared many of the same concerns, 
and had close economic ties with the colonies, they remained loyal.  Fear of the French was 
probably a major factor; the British fleet was their protection against foreign conquest.  Revolt 
would have been senseless; a few ships could overawe any possible resistance an island could 
mount.  Even a large island with some “strategic depth”, like Jamaica, would probably have 
been defeated by a few regiments backed by the British Navy. And fighting on these islands was 
something to be avoided for financial reasons. Fighting would cause great damage to the sugar 
cane fields, the main source of the island’s wealth.  This would take some years to repair, and 
was therefore to be avoided. The islands had huge slave populations, and fear of a servile revolt 
probably was another factor. Many of the ruling class of the West Indies had very strong ties 
with London, and were often absentees, spending much time not on the island.  Their ties to 
the islands, their sense of being Jamaican or Barbadian, were not strong. As one commentator 
told the Secretary of State for America: 
 
The Subjects of those islands must at all times depend upon the Parent State for 
protection, & and for every Essential resourse. The mart of their Produce will 
ever be at home; & the Public credit is security for their acquired Wealth if 
established in our Bank or Funds. Their aim is only to get Fortunes & return to 
their native Land.  
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 Thus, while Bermuda actually sent a delegation to the Second Continental Congress, neither 
Bermuda nor any of the islands of the Caribbean left the empire.
16
  
People became (or remained) Loyalists for many reasons. Loyalists came from every 
economic class and background. While many were wealthy and learned, others were poor and 
illiterate.  For example, tenants of the great estates of the Hudson had many grievances against 
their mainly Patriot landlords, and would have preferred to have been freeholders. The British 
were told in 1777 that a promise to make the tenants freeholders would bring thousands of 
Loyalist farmers to their side. Once war began, tenants of Patriot landlords in Albany County,  
were “actively Tory or at best indifferent to the patriot cause.”   Many New York Loyalists 
believed that prosperity and unity were brought to the colonies by the British tie; that it was 
good to be part of a trans-Atlantic empire. Britain was associated with liberty and prosperity; 
maybe some adjustments in its relations with the colonies needed to be made, but not in the 
manner the Patriots were seeking it (and certainly not through severing the tie by declaring 
independence.) The diverse nature of New York province may have made some fear the 
changes that could occur once the steadying hand of Britain was removed.
17
 
Religious and ethnic minorities could also link the British connection with liberty. Since 
Britain desired peace and unity, it could act as a neutral party and protector of minorities. 
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Baptists in Massachusetts, for example, were often at odds with their Congregationalist 
neighbors. The British connection was the “final line of defense” against the majority, and many 
Baptists in Massachusetts became Loyalists.
18
 Similarly, the Dutch in New York no doubt saw 
the British as a protection against being overwhelmed by their English-speaking neighbors. 
Moravians on Staten Island, as discussed above, became Loyalist to protect themselves from a 
feared alliance of the Dutch Reformed Church and the Presbyterians’ against them.
19
 
 Like the West Indians, those who lived near the borders also enjoyed British protection.   
The British not only protected upstate New Yorkers from the Iroquois, but the British Empire 
was allied with the Iroquois. The British could and did protect the Iroquois from land-hungry 
Americans. The Proclamation of 1763 was an attempt to protect Indian territories from settlers. 
While a few tribes supported the Americans, most of the Iroquois continued in their alliance 
when the Revolution occurred.  The restriction on expansion onto Indian lands, as well as 
British moves in the 1760s to challenge some of the titles acquired by the landlords, could have 
helped swing some landlords (and settlers) into the Patriot camp: remove the British, remove 
the check on westward expansion. 
20
 After the Revolution, the British government in Canada 
would keep a tighter rein on and control westward expansion much more than the American 
government did. 
A final point should be noted. Loyalists considered the committees and congresses to be 
illegal bodies that were imposing their will on others. They were imposing a “democratic 
tyranny” on the colonies. Loyalists in Jamaica Queens, for example, responded to the 
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December, 1774 meeting which produced the Jamaica Resolves by calling the meeting 
“unlawful”. (See below). Soon, the committees would seize arms and prevent merchants from 
trading. The Revolution was believed by some Loyalists to be the work of a small cabal. Thomas 
Jones, for example, had thought that the Triumvirate wished to overthrow Anglicanism and the 
king with Presbyterianism and a republic, or throw the entire province into anarchy.  Loyalists 
believed that the losers in many of the factional disputes of each colony were attempting to 
overthrow the winners by stirring up the people; the Patriots were really motivated by 
ambition, envy, and spite. The impassioned discussions of natural rights and constitutional 
principles were merely means of stirring up the populace in service of those who would usurp 
power in each colony. The British, as detailed below, would often refer to the rebel leaders as 
the “Usurpers”.
21
 All of these beliefs were reported by many Loyalists to the British, with the 
result that the British tended to underestimate the size and depth of feeling of the Patriots.   
 Patriots in Queens County and elsewhere in America would soon begin forcibly 
disarming those who refused to sign documents stating their loyalty to the Patriot cause. (See 
below). Loyalists were subject to mob action such as being run out of town on a rail or tar and 
feathering.  In other words, at least arguably they were being persecuted for holding a political 
opinion differing from the majority—and the “majority” was probably not even a majority. 
Revolutionary committees, not the official governments, would call men to militia service. It is 
unsurprising that many Loyalists thought that there was a real danger of tyranny in America—
but the danger came from the Patriots, not the British.  
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Turning from individual motives for Loyalism, let us now look at the counties of New 
York to see which could be considered Patriot, Loyalist, or mixed or neutral. The prevailing 
attitude of the inhabitants of the various counties as the crisis deepened was divided. Views 
differed from county to county, from locality to locality, from house to house (and many houses 
and families were divided).  Neither upstate nor downstate could be considered a Patriot, 
Loyalist, or undecided region. In downstate New York, Suffolk, with its strong New England ties, 
was mainly Patriot, while Kings and Richmond were mainly Loyalist. Queens was split between 
the political tendencies, as was Manhattan. In upstate New York, Ulster and Orange were 
Patriot, while Westchester, Dutchess, Albany, and Tryon were split. The frontier and Green 
Mountain regions were mainly Patriot.  Albany County had a sizable Loyalist minority. Thus, 
after the occupation of downstate New York began, one overwhelmingly Patriot county 
(Suffolk) was “behind” the lines, while independent New York had sizable Loyalist minorities. 
Indeed, Albany, New York’s second largest city—and the largest population center in 
unoccupied New York—was located in a county with a large Loyalist minority. 
22
 
 Why counties leaned one way or another depended much on local circumstances.  For 
example, Suffolk on Long Island had a New England character, and was heavily influenced by 
Patriot-leaning ministers with New England roots.  Countryman notes that all of the Patriot 
counties were growing at a higher rate than the Loyalist counties.New York City had many 
citizens who were tied strongly to Britain, through economic trading ties, or recent 
immigration, and counties near the City were tied to the City economically and by other 
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matters. The Dutch in Kings tended towards Loyalism. Dutch areas may have felt more 
culturally and ethnically secure under British than independent rule. Many of the Dutch in Kings 
owned slaves, who were vital to the agricultural economy of the county. This has been 
suggested as a reason for not desiring to upset “the status quo, least of all in the cause of 
liberty.” 
23
    It is possible that this explanation could explain other examples of Loyalism among 
non-Dutch slave owners.  
 
II 
 
On Sunday morning, April 23, 1775, a messenger from Boston (not, this time, Paul 
Revere) arrived in New York City.  Riding on horseback, he loudly blew on a trumpet, urging 
New Yorkers to gather at the Liberty Pole. Here he announced the Battle of Lexington-Concord, 
which had occurred a few days earlier, and that American blood had been shed by the British. 
There was great animation and consternation at the news.  What occurred next was called by 
one Patriot leader “a general insurrection of the populace.” Isaac Sears and other Liberty Boys 
formed a parade with drums beating and flags flying, urging that arms be taken up in defense of 
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had (he considers Queens a mainly Loyalist county—it seems to have been more mixed). These counties were 
prosperous; the Patriot counties, while growing , could better be described as places of modest comfort, with 
lower land values than the counties that bordered New York City.   Hence, they had less to lose from a breach with 
Britain, and would be more amenable to Patriot and independence arguments. Countryman, 105-7. 
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the rights of America. According to Judge Jones, the “posts were stopped, the mails opened, 
and the letters read.” A ship loaded with supplies for the British in Boston were seized by mobs 
and the cargo removed. The Arsenal at City Hall (then at Wall and Nassau Streets) was broken 
into and 600 muskets were seized, as well as ammunition and bayonets. More gunpowder was 
seized at the Fresh Water Pond. The large brick house of Isaac Sears on Queen Street became 
the de facto seat of government and headquarters of the militia. 
24
  
Attempts to control the situation by the official government were ineffective. As 
Governor Tryon was then in England, it fell to the hapless Lieutenant-Governor Cadwalladar 
Colden to deal with the situation. He called an emergency meeting of the Council and city 
officials. Thomas Jones urged that the militia be called out; “the Loyal Whig”, William Smith, 
opposed the plan, stating that the insurrection was a result of Britain’s attempt to enslave the 
colonies. If the people’s grievances were redressed, the ferment would subside. He urged no 
action. Smith’s biographer L.F.S. Upton notes that Jones’ suggestion was absurd. Most of the 
militia were members of the Liberty Boys; they were with the rioters—some of them may have 
been rioters. Jones records that no one replied to Smith’s suggestion, and that the Council 
meeting ended with no decision made. Colden soon left New York City for the relative safety of 
his home on Long Island. 
25
  
New York City was in an effective state of anarchy, with armed citizens parading around 
the city, and with British troops huddling in their barracks. To restore order, a meeting was held 
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at the Merchant’s Coffee House on April 29. Here a “General Association” was signed. 
Signatories agreed to obey the Continental Congress, New York’s Provincial Congress, and the 
Committee of Sixty.  Many on the old committee, such as Isaac Low and Philip Livingston, did 
not want additional powers such as raising militias. Enforcing a boycott was one thing, and was 
what they had been elected to do, but now they were being asked to run a city in revolt. In such 
a case, it was not unreasonable to ask for a new election. This election occurred on May 1. 
There was much maneuvering over the membership of the Committee of One Hundred, with 
Sears objecting that the original list of candidates included too many Loyalists. Some of the 
more objectionable names were removed, and the Committee of One Hundred began to 
govern New York. This new committee, while a revolutionary body, included many who wanted 
a rapprochement between America and Britain.
26
  
A few days later, New York hosted enthusiastically the Massachusetts and Connecticut 
delegations to the Second Continental Congress. New Yorkers also began actively seeking out 
Loyalists. Alexander Hamilton helped Miles Cooper, president of King’s College, escape from a 
mob intent on doing him harm. And worries turned to the large Loyalist population of Queens. 
The citizens of New York began to drill intently. On May 23, the British man-of war Asia, 
equipped with sixty-four guns and loaded with guns and ammunition, arrived in the harbor and 
anchored off the Battery. The Committee of One Hundred and the Provincial Congress now had 
to operate under the possible threat of bombardment. To appease the British, local merchants 
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were authorized by the Congress to supply the Asia with food and other necessary items. Many 
still hoped for reconciliation.
27
 
The new Provincial Congress convened on May 22, and assumed control of the anti-
British opposition, and more and more the colony. Its members had to sign a General 
Association pledging allegiance to the Congress, and the Provincial Congress decreed that all 
New Yorkers needed to do this as well. There was no official punishment for failing to do this, 
but obviously those who failed to do so were under suspicion by their Patriot neighbors. There 
was becoming little room for opinions that dissented too far from the Patriot viewpoint. 
Nonetheless, while it prepared fortifications and organized militia and Continental Army units, 
the Congress’s members held out hope for a settlement. The Assembly still existed; New York 
City had an official mayor in addition to the Committee of One Hundred. New York was in a 
period of dual government.
28
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One of the more amusing incidents of the early Revolution in New York occurred on 
June 25, 1775, and it shows the strange nature of dual government and of professing loyalty to 
a government that you were engaged in hostilities with. New York still had a royal governor, 
William Tryon, but he had been away in England for an extended period. On June 25, George 
Washington, newly appointed to his position as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, 
arrived in Northern New Jersey on his way to Boston. He was also accompanied by Generals Lee 
and Schuyler. The Provincial Congress sent a delegation to escort the visitors into New York 
City.  Washington entered the city “towards evening” and received a lavish reception.  
Governor Tryon that same day arrived at Sandy Hook.  Tryon landed at the Exchange about 9 
PM, and also received a lavish reception—by many of the same people who a few hours earlier 
had been feting Washington. Jones commented: 
 
I must again say, strange to relate! these very men, who had been not five hours 
before pouring out their adulation and flattery, or more probably the real 
sentiments of their souls, to the three rebel Generals, now one and all joined in 
the Governor’s train…wished him joy of his safe arrival, hoped he might remain 
long in his Government, enjoy peace and quietness, and be a blessing to the 
inhabitants under his control. What a farce! What cursed hypocrisy!
29
    
 
 
 
The needs of resisting the British and preparing for possible full-scale war were many. 
While many American families had some kind of firearm, the Americans were deficient in 
artillery. This had been one of the needs that drove Ethan Allen’s attack on Fort Ticonderoga in 
May of 1775, and the cannon seized there would help force the British evacuation of Boston in 
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March, 1776. The Provincial Congress planned a fort in the Highlands (see Chapter IV for a 
discussion of the military importance of the Highlands).  Forts need cannons, and the Congress 
authorized the removal of some cannon from the Battery. The operation took place at midnight 
of August 22, 1775, under the command of Isaac Sears and John Lamb, but the Asia shelled the 
American troops. Several Americans were killed, but twenty-one cannons were removed by 
Sears’ forces.
30
    
This shelling had two contrasting effects; increased defiance among some, while others 
(some Loyalists, some just afraid of war) chose to leave the city. This evacuation by many New 
Yorkers reached the highest levels of government and society. In October 1775, Governor Tryon 
of New York received information that he was to be apprehended as “an enemy to America,” 
made a prisoner, and transported to Connecticut and confined for the duration of the war.  
Tryon informed Mayor Whitehead Hicks of his fear that he would be captured, citing 
“undoubted authority from the City of Philadelphia.”  According to Thomas Jones, the source 
was a member of the Provincial Congress, and Tryon told Dartmouth that a Continental 
Congress resolve that he and other Crown officers should be arrested had agitated the town.   
Hicks began discussions with the City Committee, which he described as “a very numerous body 
consisting of reputable inhabitants elected at a convention of the whole Town” regarding 
Tryon’s fears. The New York Committee, chaired by Isaac Low, informed Mayor Hicks in a 
written answer on Oct. 17, 1775 that Tryon could “rest assured of all that Protection from us 
and our fellow citizens, which will be consistent with the great principle of our safety and 
preservation…” (italics mine). Hicks sent the Committee’s written answer to Tryon. Not 
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surprisingly, Tryon’s next communication with Mayor Hicks was addressed from “On Board the 
Halifax Packet”, and  stated that he found  Hicks’ “letter of yesterday insufficient for that 
security I requested from the corporation & Citizens…my duty directed me for the present 
instant to remove on board this ship….”
31
 
Tryon would spend the next few months on board the HMS Dutchess of Gordon. From 
here he acted as governor, and met with his Council.  Council members such as William Smith 
would be rowed to and from the ship for the meetings. The Assembly had held its last meeting 
in January, and was continuously prorogued. The Provincial Congress slowly took over the 
management of the Province, while the official government was literally “at sea”.
32
   
 
 
III 
 
 
Long Island had been little touched by “the excitement of the capital.”  The factional 
strife seemed far away.
33
 Government on the island was stable, each town being run by a small 
group of families generally recognized as the natural leadership. Long Island was not isolated, 
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however. Undoubtedly, in the homes and taverns of Long Island, the great issues of the day 
were discussed, and opinions, however tentative, were formed.  Most of the ministers in the 
Presbyterian churches that dominated Suffolk County had been trained in New England, and 
like the ministers of New England, used their influence to shape opinion in a Patriot direction.
34
 
Long Island had a long tradition of resistance to arbitrary government. Hempstead, for example, 
had been settled in 1643 by Stamford, Connecticut men who complained they had no vote, no 
liberties and no justice because New Haven men made their laws and laid down the tax rate.  
Suffolk County had peacefully resisted incorporation into New York in the 1660s, and its 
inhabitants resented having to pay for title to land they had possessed before 1664. In 1689, in 
response to news of the Glorious Revolution, the town meeting of Huntington gave “full power 
to ackt as sivell and milletery head officer” to its militia captain, Epenetus Platt (in effect, it 
declared martial law), and with Southold sent some men to join Jacob Leisler in his taking of the 
fort in New York.   Relations began to turn rocky with the rather high-handed Leisler, and the 
eastern towns favored annexation with Connecticut, but eventually supported the new 
governor, Henry Sloughter, who replaced Leisler.
35
 
It was the Boston Tea Party, or more accurately, the British response to it, that finally 
forced Long Island into the controversies of the time.  News of the Intolerable Acts reached 
New York City on about May 12, 1774 (see above) and soon spread to Long Island.  By this time, 
the towns of Long Island had already held their annual meetings.
36
  Beginning in June many 
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Long Island towns, sometimes at special town meetings, began to condemn the Intolerable 
Acts.
37
 
Huntington in Suffolk was one of the first to respond.  At a special town meeting held on 
or about June 21, the town adopted the “Declaration of Rights.” Here, they argued that “every 
freemans property is absolutely his own, and no man has a right to take it from him without his 
consent, expressed either by himself or his representatives” and that therefore “all taxes and 
duties imposed on His Majesties subjects in the American colonies by the authority of Parliment 
are wholly unconstitutional and a plain violation of the most essential rights of British subjects.” 
The Declaration condemned the Parliament’s closing of the port of Boston as subversive of “just 
and constitutional liberty”, and urged a breaking off of “all commercial intercourse with Great 
Britain, Ireland, and the English West India colonies.” They considered that the people of 
Boston were suffering in the “common cause of British America.” They expressed their 
willingness to enter into such measures as a general congress of the colonies might agree to, 
and formed a three-man committee to join with the other committees of the other towns of 
Suffolk as a general committee for the county to correspond with the New York committee.
 38
 
Huntington had joined the great debate with a brief but elegant statement of the issues 
involved, and identified the cause of Boston as their own, as would many communities and 
colonies from New Hampshire to Georgia. Lastly, though operating through the ordinary 
methods of government, they had formed a committee that would soon become part of the 
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dual, revolutionary government that would form as the official government of the province 
collapsed and lost its power. 
A few days earlier, East Hampton had also voted to form a committee, and Huntington’s 
eastern neighbor Smithtown adopted the Declaration of Rights and formed a committee.  The 
Committees of Correspondence for the County of Suffolk met on November 14 and 
recommended a subscription for the Boston poor and a ship to collect and deliver them. 
39
 
The towns of Queens took a little longer to join in, but here, even some of those areas 
that would later show reluctance and even hostility to the Patriot cause joined in the general 
disapproval of the Intolerable Acts and support for non-intercourse with Britain.   The 
Continental Congress had urged every town and county to form an association to enforce the 
boycott.  At least partially in response to this call, many towns on Long Island met.  
The town of Jamaica was located in the southern part of western Queens. On December 
6
th
, 1774, many of Jamaica’s freeholders gathered at the Court House.  After some discussion, 
they produced what became known as the Jamaica Resolutions.   After asserting their 
allegiance to the king and “their intention to maintain the dependency of the Colonies upon the 
Crown of Great Britain,” they resolved that it was their “undoubted right to be taxed only by 
our own consent” and that the taxes imposed by the Parliament were “unjust and 
unconstitutional”.  They argued that they were one people with the “Mother Country, 
connected by the strongest ties of duty, interest, and religion.”  They expressed sympathy with 
Boston and approved the measures taken by the First Continental Congress, and appointed an 
eight man Committee of Correspondence.  Not all approved, and 136 Jamaicans signed a 
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statement stating that they had never given their consent to choosing that committee, “as we 
disapprove of all unlawful meetings, and all tyrannical proceeding whatsoever.”
40
 
A meeting of a large number of freeholders in the town of Newtown in northwest 
Queens
41
  met on December 10, listened to the Jamaica Resolutions, and formed a committee.  
This committee issued a set of resolutions, known as the Newtown Resolves, on December 29, 
1774. The first resolution expressed allegiance to the king, and stated that “we consider it our 
greatest happiness and glory to be governed by the illustrious House of Hanover.” The 
resolution stated that they considered the British and American people one people, under the 
same Constitution, and regretted anything which had a tendency to “destroy the mutual 
confidence which the mother countries and her colonies should repose in each other.” The 
second stated that it was a “fundamental part of the British constitution that a man shall have 
the disposal of his own property, either by himself or representatives.” It reiterated the 
argument that as they were not represented in Parliament, Parliamentary taxation was 
“subversive” of the English constitution, and that it had “a direct tendency to alienate the 
affections of the colonists from their parent state.” Lastly, the resolutions approved of “the 
wise, prudent, and constitutional mode of opposition, adopted by our worthy delegates in 
general congresses, to the several late tyrannical and oppressive acts of the British Parliament.” 
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After thanking the delegates for their “patriotic spirit”, they hoped that their liberties and 
privileges would be restored, as well as “harmony and confidence” throughout the Empire.
42
 
Despite the protestations, no doubt sincere, of loyalty, the resolutions were strongly 
worded, calling Parliament’s actions not only unconstitutional but tyrannical.   Not all in 
Newtown were in agreement with the committee or the resolves, which were published a few 
days later.  On January 12, 1775, a little less than sixty Newtown inhabitants signed a letter, 
published in Rivington’s Gazette, stating that they were not involved in any way with the 
resolves and that they did not acknowledge any other representatives but the “general 
assembly of the province.”
43
   Such letters and statements, such as the earlier one from 
Jamaica, would become rather common in New York, as Loyalists (and probably some neutral 
parties) tried to dissociate themselves from the actions of the Patriots. It is apparent they 
feared that the protest movement was spiraling towards armed rebellion, and feared possible 
retribution by the British. By formally stating their opposition, they hoped to put their loyalty 
and opposition to the Patriots on record. Three of the signatories of the Newtown letter were 
justices of the peace, and reflecting the ethnic composition of the town and the general 
conservatism of the Dutch population as to the imperial dispute, at least thirty names were of 
Dutch derivation.
44
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The day after the Newtown Resolutions (December 30, 1774), ninety freeholders of the 
town of Oyster Bay (in eastern Queens, wedged between Hempstead and Huntington in 
Suffolk) met. However, so many of those who attended seemed, according to one 
correspondent, to be “friends to our happy, regular and established government” that the 
meeting was deemed illegal, and that no business could be properly done.
45
  So Oyster Bay did 
not go on record on the great questions of the day, as apparently those who opposed the 
congresses and committees were in the majority at the meeting. Thomas Jones does not 
mention this meeting in his history, but as a resident of the Town of Oyster Bay, he may very 
well have been one of those decrying the meeting as illegal.  
In Kings County, a countywide meeting was called to elect delegates to the first 
Continental Congress in the summer of 1774, but only two people showed up.  No response 
was made to the Congress’s call to form an association.  However, in April 1775, five of Kings 
County’s six towns sent delegates to the County Hall in Flatbush to choose delegates to the 
second Continental Congress.  Flatlands failed to send delegates. After the news arrived of 
Lexington-Concord, the British action was denounced by the “magistrates and freeholders” of 
the village of Brooklyn, and Kings sent eight delegates to the First Provincial Congress. However, 
the general trend of the county was Loyalist and this Loyalist tendency was increased by an 
influx of refugees from Manhattan in the summer and fall of 1775. Many Loyalists found refuge 
in Kings County from the turmoil in Manhattan, including Governor Tryon and Chief Justice 
                                                           
45
 Peter Force, American Archives,  Series IV., Vol. 1, (Washington, 1837) 1076-7; Flint 348. 
108 
 
Daniel Horsmanden. However, in Flatbush, the church pulpit was shared by the outspoken 
Loyalist Johannes Rubel and the outspoken Patriot Ulpianus van Sinderen.
46
  
 
As discussed above, the news of Lexington-Concord had led to a “general insurrection of 
the people” in New York City, and the ascendency of such extra-constitutional bodies as the 
Committee of One Hundred and the Provincial Congress. The first congress would soon give 
way to a second in November. Long Island and other southern New York communities had to 
decide whether to send delegates to the congresses.  
The towns and county of Suffolk responded   with sending delegates to both congresses.  
Kings did as well. Queens also sent delegates to both congresses, but the large number of 
Loyalists and “neutrals” made this an altogether different proposition.  One study, based on 
active declarations of Loyalty or Whiggism, concludes that only 12 percent of the county was 
Whig. However, only 26.8 percent of the population were Loyalist. The majority, 60.3 per cent, 
were neutral. 
47
 On March 31, 1775, the motion to send delegates from Queens County to the 
convention (to choose delegates to the Continental Congress) failed 94 to 82. In Hempstead the 
freeholders met on April 4 and issued what is known as the “Confession of Faith”, or the 
“Hempstead Resolves”. These declared for the King and unity with Britain, that choosing 
delegates to a provincial congress was “highly disrespectful” to their legal representatives, that 
in other provinces it had resulted in “destroying the authority of constitutional assemblies”, and 
concluded that 
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We are utterly averse to all mobs, riots and illegal proceeding by which the lives, peace, 
and property of our fellow subjects are endangered, and that we, to the utmost of our 
power, will support our legal magistrates in suppressing all riots and preserving the 
peace of our liege sovereign. 
48
 
 
Hempstead thus rejected the institutions of the embryonic revolutionary government. 
The authors of the document recognized that a rival government was in the process of forming, 
and announced their preference for the old government. The legitimacy of these new 
institutions was not accepted by Hempstead. Expressions of Loyalism such as the above, and 
the rejection of congresses and committees—the arising revolutionary government—would 
soon result in Patriots from outside Queens feeling compelled to attempt to subdue the county 
through the use of force.
49
 
Patriots in Hempstead were concentrated in the northern “necks” of the town, while 
the southern parts were far more Loyalist. The people of the north had long resented the 
political domination of the southern parts of the town. It was difficult for the northerners to go 
to town meetings in the South. The north was more prosperous, sending much of its 
agricultural produce to New York City. In September of 1775, following the Provincial 
Congresses direction that militia companies be formed, residents of the north met and declared 
that they could not support “the common cause” as long as they were part of Hempstead. They 
resolved that for the duration they would considers themselves a separate entity, and 
established their own committee and militia company.  This division was not simply the result 
of a difference of opinions, but a result of long-standing differences between the parts of the 
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town. In 1784, the town was permanently divided into the Towns of Hempstead and North 
Hempstead.
50
  
In Oyster Bay’s town meeting on the first Tuesday of April, 1775, “it was Objected by 
many Against haveing anything to do with Deputies or Congresses.” The vote was 205 to 42 
against choosing deputies. Announcements began to be posted in Oyster Bay after Lexington-
Concord and the “insurrection” in the capital for a meeting at Jamaica to elect deputies to the 
Convention.  On May 19, 1775, the three justices of the peace of Oyster Bay stated in a 
document entered into the town records that they paid “NO Regard to Anonimous 
Advertisemnts Nor to Any other matter, Contrary to the Sacred Oath we have taken to Keep the 
peace of the Country as far as we are able.” The history of this protest is rather interesting. The 
town clerk, Samuel Townsend, entered the document in the Town Records, with the note that 
if there was no approval at the next Town Meeting, it was to be erased. At the April 2, 1776 
town meeting, the majority of voters ordered that the protest be erased. The protest was 
crossed out. At the next town meeting, in April, 1777, things had changed. The British were 
firmly in control of Long Island in general and Oyster Bay in particular. Thomas Smith, one of 
the protestors, was elected Moderator of the meeting.  The protest was re-entered into the 
Town Records, which continued: 
 
When the Freedom of Election was destroyed the Congressional Party Came into 
this Township of Oysterbay With an Armed Force and took Great Numbers of the 
Loyal Freeholders & Inhabitants Prisoners Sum few they Carryed of[f] Prisoner 
the others they Disarmed and Carried of [f] there Arms and Obliged them to Sine 
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there Paper Not to Oppose there Measures, this ye Congressional Party Did 
Some Months Before the Anuel Town Meeting April 1776.
51
  
 
The Loyalists stated at the 1778 Town Meeting that they had wanted the protest back in 
so that “Disstant Ages” would know the large  number of Loyalists that Oyster Bay contained, 
and that they had not changed their mind in 1776—but had that year been unable to vote or 
afraid of the “Congressional” party.
52
 This was probably not “trimming”; the 5 to 1 “anti-
Congressional” vote, and the failure of the December 30, 1774 meeting to make any statement 
protesting British actions, all indicated that the rather tiny town was Loyalist.
53
 The locals 
wanted the British (as well as distant “Ages”) to know that the town was Loyal, and should be 
treated so. 
The five-to-one defeat of the motion to select delegates was not the end of the matter 
in Oyster Bay, nor in Queens. Having been defeated at the Town Meeting, the Patriots of the 
town held their own meeting, appointing one Zebulon Williams as their delegate. Forty three 
delegates signed the statement of appointment—one with a mark.
54
    
The members of the First Provincial Congress were mainly chosen by town meetings, or 
by committees chosen by town meetings. In other words, despite its extra-constitutional (if not 
revolutionary) character, the Congress drew its legitimacy, its claim to represent the people of 
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New York, from within the pre-existing system as much as possible. Its membership consisted 
of representatives chosen by the towns and counties of New York, and therefore arguably had 
as much claim to legitimately represent the people of New York as the Assembly—arguably 
more, as the Congress had been chosen far more recently than the Assembly, and in direct 
response to a set of circumstances that had not existed when the Assembly had been elected in 
1769. Zebulon Williams, however, presented a problem to the Congress.  Williams had not been 
elected by a town meeting, but by a self-selected group of Patriots. He could not be said to 
represent the entire town; he represented at best a faction.  Unlike those chosen by town 
meetings or committees selected by such meetings, he lacked democratic legitimacy.  In fact, 
the town he purported to represent had overwhelmingly voted to have “nothing to do with 
Congresses.” He represented, if anything, the opposite of the town’s opinion.  
Oyster Bay was not the only Queens town to send a questionable delegate.  The 
Congress was faced with 4 delegates from Queens (Zebulon Williams, Joseph Talman, Joseph 
Robinson, and Col. Jacob Blackwell) with questionable credentials. The decision was made to 
give these delegates from Queens “observer status”. That is, the questionable Queens 
delegates could be present at the deliberations, make their opinions known, could speak, but 
could not vote. The delegates were satisfied with this, and even expressed the opinion that 
“they do not think themselves entitled to vote.”
55
 Apparently, they too were conscious of their 
questionable status and unrepresentative nature.  And it was also apparent that a major 
downstate county, or at least a large portion of it, seemed remarkably unenthusiastic towards 
the Patriot movement. This was noted both at the Provincial Congress and soon by the 
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Continental Congress. In any event, after Lexington-Concord, five delegates were selected from 
Queens for the Provincial Congress, but two were dissuaded by Loyalists from serving.
56
 
One sign of Loyalist feelings was an anonymous poem (attributed to “NO YANKEE”) that 
circulated in their circles in Queens about this time: 
 
O Tempora! O Mores!... 
…True Sons of Catiline! Like his your cause— 
Insult the Government! despise its laws!... 
Thy venal priests inflame the peoples’ breasts 
These holy cheats! A nuisance and a pest!... 
P.S.  I fret, I storm, I spit, I spew 
At sound of YANKEE DOODLE DOO!
57
   
 
 
The Suffolk towns began to prepare for the possibility of armed resistance to the 
“Ministerial” troops.  The May 2d, 1775 Town Meeting in Huntington voted that 80 men should 
be chosen to exercise and to be ready to march. In the summer, Brookhaven formed a 
Committee of Observation and began keeping a close eye on several Loyalists, who had 
declared that they would furnish British ships with provisions. Brookhaven apologized on June 
27 for being rather slow to respond to “Congressional measures”. The town had perhaps the 
largest concentration of Loyalists in the county.  Several large landholders were Loyalists, and 
held important offices. James Lyon, the Anglican preacher for the town, had organized, spoke, 
written, and used his influence to become the “Mainspring” of the Loyalists of the region.
58
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During the summer, American troops continued besieging Boston, and a major battle 
was fought near Bunker Hill.   The colonies were at war with Britain, and while most still hoped 
for reconciliation, they continued preparing for possible warfare in New York. The western 
towns of Suffolk County met at Smithtown in early September to nominate officers for a 
regiment.  The preparation for war soon involved more than building forts, drilling militia and 
forming regiments. It also involved keeping an active eye on suspected Loyalists. And soon, it 
involved more than just keeping an eye on them.   In August, Parson Lyon was arrested by the 
committees of Brookhaven and Smithtown and transported to Connecticut. On September 16, 
1775, the Provincial Congress, alarmed at reports it had heard of Loyalists in Queens and 
elsewhere, ordered that every New Yorker who had not signed the Continental Association be 
disarmed.  The Third Regiment of New York, stationed in Suffolk, was ordered into Queens to 
disarm Loyalists.  Three weeks later, on October 6, the Continental Congress recommended 
that the provincial assemblies and Committees of Safety of the provinces arrest and secure 
every person who “in their opinion endanger the safety of the Colonies or the liberties of the 
people.”
59
  
As discussed above, opposition to British policy was widespread; the main difference 
seemed to be over tactics, whether to use boycotts supported and enforced through a new 
structure of committees and congresses, or to protest through more traditional methods such 
as petitions by the colonial assemblies. But as the Patriots moved in the direction of armed 
conflict, some began to drop away from the movement and oppose the Patriots. Though many 
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of these still opposed British policies, they believed that the movement was moving from 
opposition to British policies to opposition to Britain and the British connection; that was a 
bridge too far for them to take.  By the fall of 1775, the colonies, while still professing loyalty to 
the king, were at war with the King’s troops (while still clinging to the fiction that their enemy 
was the Parliament, not the King.)  There were credible reports that Loyalists were being 
supplied with weapons from the Asia. And, as many colonial homes possessed firearms, it was 
likely that many of the Loyalists were armed, even without British supplies.
60
 
Now the Congresses were ordering or urging arrests, and seizing weapons from 
Loyalists. Another way of describing this is that they were disarming those who disagreed with 
the Patriot movement. The arrest and disarming of political opponents is something we 
associate more with the French or Russian Revolutions than with the American. The Patriots 
tried to make clear that the arrests were not for having the wrong opinion, but were for those 
they believed to be dangerous to the “safety of the Colonies.”  Still, though they even promised 
to pay for the seized arms (which would be used to arm the Patriot troops), it certainly did 
seem that any who opposed the Patriots were having their property seized. To the Loyalists, 
they were being arrested by illegal bodies “unknown to the British Constitution”. Their Patriot 
neighbors, who wished to protect American property from being taxed without consent, had 
engaged in property damage in Boston and New York, and were now seizing the weapons of 
Loyalists. Hence, many Loyalists believed that their liberties were under assault by the Patriots, 
and that the Patriots were hypocrites.  The situation had now reached the level of armed 
conflict; the ordinary give and take of the political system could not function; the profession of 
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certain opinions now was beyond the pale, and could result in being placed under suspicion or 
worse.   
          The effort in the fall of 1775 to disarm the Loyalists in Queens failed.  Loyalists began 
concealing their weapons and refused to obey the orders of an extralegal congress. Some of 
them were drilling in military formations (in short, forming or preparing to form Loyalist 
militias). Cadwallader Colden was urging resistance. In Hempstead, a militia officer, Captain 
Richard Hewlett, was boasting that he was prepared to do battle with the Patriots. Troops 
would be needed to disarm the Loyalists, and the Provincial Congress did not have them to 
spare.
61
 
Loyalist strength was again shown in November when an election to choose delegates 
to Congress was held. The polls were open from Tuesday to Saturday in Jamaica. Over a 
thousand ballots were cast, but the results were 778 to 221 against representation. Queens 
Loyalists issued a declaration on December 6 that they only wished to live in peace, yet were 
being treated as enemies of the country.  Therefore, they were arming themselves (with 
weapons provided by the Asia) and were prepared to resist any “Acts of Violence.” The 
Congress soon reacted by ordering over 700 people to appear before it, and declaring that all 
those who had voted against deputies in November were guilty of a breach of the General 
Association. Punishing people for voting “incorrectly” is a clear breach of democratic norms, but 
New York—or Queens at least—was in a state of civil war or incipient civil war at this point.  
Differences of opinion were still being debated with words, but those who held differing 
opinions were arming  themselves and threatening to use them—or were using them to disarm 
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their opponents.  Under such circumstances, many governments have turned to much harsher 
measures than were adopted in Queens. The Provincial Congress next requested help from the 
Continental Congress, which would send troops in the New Year to arrest Loyalists. 1775 ended 
on Long Island with incipient civil war.
62
    
 
In Westchester, there was a center of Patriot activity at Rye on the Sound. A group 
calling itself the “Freeholders and Inhabitants of Rye” urged the other towns to send 
representatives to White Plains (near the center of the southern part of the county) to select 
delegates to the first Continental Congress. The meeting was held on August 22, 1774. The 
Borough of West Chester, where the Morris family dominated, sent representatives to the 
meeting and also adopted a set of resolutions, arguing that the imposition of taxes without 
consent was arbitrary and oppressive. The meeting chose to accept the delegates already 
elected by New York City (John Alsop, James Duane, John Jay, Philip Livingston, and Isaac 
Low.)
63
 The White Plains meeting was probably not well attended, as it was held during “the 
busiest season of the agricultural year”. 
64
  The White Plains meeting was “the first time the 
county linked itself to the mainstream of the revolutionary movement.” It also was met with a 
concurrent mass rally at White Plains, attended by about 400 people, organized by Loyalists to 
denounce the Continental Congress and the actions of the Patriots of New York.  They resolved 
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to form a Loyalist Association to oppose the Whigs.
65
 The White Plains Patriot meeting, as had 
similar meetings on Long Island, resulted  about a month later in a statement by 83 “Inhabitants 
and Freeholders” of Rye stating that they had nothing to do with  these resolutions and 
measures.  Fourteen more Rye residents objected to the objections.
66
    
A general meeting held in White Plains on April 11, 1775 to elect delegates to the 
Second Continental Congress was well-attended by Loyalists, but they did not participate in 
discussions, nor did they vote. After a delegate (Lewis Morris) had been selected, a Loyalist 
spokesman, Isaac Wilkins, rose to declare his “abhorrence of all unlawful congresses and 
committees.”  This explained his group’s non-participation in the meeting; they did not wish to 
participate or vote in a meeting to elect delegates to an illegal congress. The group then retired 
to a nearby tavern, where a protest was signed by over 300 county residents, most prominently   
Assemblyman Frederick Phillipse, the great landowner and merchant. Lewis Morris rejected the 
protest, alleging that 170 of the signatories were not voters and other signatories were too 
young to vote.
67
 
 The response to the Battle of Lexington-Concord had swung the pendulum towards the 
Patriots in Westchester. A Committee of 90 for the county was formed by the Patriots of 
Westchester on May 8, and eleven deputies were selected for the Provincial Congress.   The 
county committee was set up three weeks before the Provincial Congress recommended doing 
so.   County militia organizations were established from June to September. Some militia 
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officers had not signed the Continental Association until their selection. In August of 1775, the 
Westchester Committee of Safety (which met when the full committee could not) declared that 
tea buyers or sellers would be considered “inimical” to the liberties to the country.
68
 
In the fall of 1775, Loyalists began organizing themselves into military units and arming 
themselves for self-defense.  Activity was particularly intense in Philipsburg and in Cortland 
Manor (near Peekskill in the northwest part of the county).  The Loyalists hoped to acquire 
arms and ammunition from the British. Their plans were discovered, and in November there 
was a clash between armed opponents that lasted three days. The Loyalists numbered about 
250, and the county committee sent to Connecticut for troops. However, the Whigs managed 
to disperse the Loyalists and arrest their leaders before the Connecticut forces arrived.   1775 
had ended in New York City with the Patriots in control, and the governor a refugee on a 
warship. On Long Island it had ended with the beginnings of civil war. In Westchester, civil war 
had already begun. 
69
   
The three thousand residents of Staten Island, like those of Westchester, had been fairly 
apolitical, deferring to a few respected leaders. The most prominent of these were Christopher 
Billopp, a member of the 1769 Assembly (the Thirty First and last-sitting of the colony of New 
York)
70
 and a member of a family with many ties to the governments of both New York and 
New Jersey. His father- in-law Benjamin Seaman was a justice of the county surrogate court and 
had been in the Assembly since 1756. Both were Anglicans, and tended to vote in the Assembly 
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against the measures of the “Congressional” party. The people of Richmond County opposed 
the Continental Association and the committee system that sought to enforce it, fearing the 
harm it threatened to transatlantic trade; there was a rather lucrative export trade from Staten 
Island.    Staten Island evaded the Association through smuggling, of which there was a long 
history on the island.
71
 
Staten Island is quite close to New Jersey, and had an extensive trade with the Garden 
State. It was hence susceptible to economic coercion from New Jersey. In February, 1775, two 
local New Jersey committees from towns where Staten Island sold its goods (Elizabeth and 
Woodbridge) banned or threatened to ban all trade with the island until the people of 
Richmond signed the Association.  By July of 1775, most had signed the Association. 
72
 
On April 11, a meeting was held on Staten Island to select delegates for the upcoming 
Provincial Convention. The meeting was convinced by Billopp that they should repudiate the 
Congress, as it made reconciliation more difficult to achieve. Staten Island sent no delegates to 
the Convention and thus played no part in choosing New York’s delegation to the Second 
Continental Congress (the main purpose of the Provincial Convention).  When news reached 
Staten Island of Lexington-Concord, the islanders were stunned—both by the actions of Britain 
and the mob violence which occurred in New York City.  The majority wanted reconciliation. 
Billop and Seaman joined twelve other Assemblymen in sending a message to Britain’s 
commander in Massachusetts, Thomas Gage, asking for a ceasefire and negotiated    
settlement. 
73
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A few weeks after rejecting sending delegates to a Provincial Congress, Staten Island 
sent delegates to the Congress after news of Lexington-Concord.  A moderate to conservative 
delegation was sent.  The desire to achieve a peaceful reconciliation had probably not been 
altered by the news of bloodshed. One contemporary wrote in a letter that the people of the 
island had wanted little to do with the Congress, but the threat of armed force had compelled 
them to send delegates. At the Congress, the Staten Island delegation voted for Benjamin 
Kissam’s resolution calling for reconciliation on Constitutional principles. 
74
  
Staten Island was one of five counties which failed to hold elections for delegates to the 
Provincial Congress which convened on November 14, 1775, after the Provincial Congress 
ordered the counties to hold elections for these delegates. The other four counties were the 
northeast counties of Charlotte, Cumberland, and Gloucester (later to become the core of 
Vermont), and Queens. The three northern counties eventually sent delegates 
(communications had been a problem for the distant counties) while in Queens, the Loyalists 
defeated the Whigs electorally. In Richmond, the Richmond County Committee stated that they 
did not have a quorum, so they did not think they were empowered to act. This infuriated the 
members of the Congress—this, plus the trade that Staten Islanders was continuing with British 
warships in the harbor (in violation of Congressional regulations). The Congress ordered Staten 
Island to hold an election immediately, and hinted that failure to do so would result in military 
intervention.  Two weeks later, Staten Island voted overwhelmingly against sending delegates 
to the Congress. The Provincial Congress announced on December 21 that Staten Island was 
“guilty of a breach of the General Association” and in contempt of the Congress’ authority.  
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Congress ordered a list of the “delinquents to the common cause” be sent under threat of 
interdicting all commerce. When the new year opened, no such list was sent. Staten Island’s 
majority did not want to participate in what had become an armed conflict with the mother 
country. However, they succumbed to the commercial pressure in early January and elected 
delegates on January 19, 1776.
75
 
Thus, by the end of 1775, the governor of the state was a refugee on a ship in the 
harbor, protected by British warships. Staten Island was under commercial and military 
pressure to participate in Patriot-controlled activities, such as sending delegates to the 
Provincial Congress. Open warfare between Patriots and Loyalists had broken out in  several 
places.. To the northeast, Boston was besieged by colonial troops, and there had been pitched 
battles between colonial troops and British regulars. Despite all this, many, in New York and 
elsewhere, still yearned for reconciliation and compromise. New York and America were on a 
precipice, the precipice of independence, but many were reluctant to take that final, 
irrevocable step. In the next few months, decisions were made in New York and elsewhere that 
led to war and the occupation of southern New York.  
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Chapter III 
The Final Break with Britain and the Capture of Southern New York 
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I 
 
In 1763, Britain had won a resounding victory over the French, and New Yorkers and 
Americans had rejoiced and toasted the King. By the end of 1775, British troops in the city of 
Boston were besieged by an army of colonists, and the governor of New York, fearing for his 
safety, was conducting his government from on board a British warship. Britain was preparing 
for a major military campaign to suppress what they saw as rebellion.
1
 While still professing 
loyalty to the king, the colonists were besieging Boston and Quebec, and an American assault 
was made on Quebec on December 31. It failed. Most of the colonies were no longer being run 
by their royal governors, though some, like Tryon and Virginia’s Lord Dunmore, were doing 
whatever governing could be done from British warships. The colonies were instead run by 
extra-legal congresses, province-wide outgrowths of the committee movements.  The official 
assemblies, while still existing, were being superseded by the provincial congresses.  A new 
election would even be held for the New York Assembly in January, but it would never meet (as 
it was overwhelmingly Whig in composition, Governor Tryon prorogued it).
2
  And the possibility 
of independence was being discussed, at least by its enemies. As early as August, 1775, Tryon 
was writing confidential letters to Lord Dartmouth, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
stating that “Independency is shooting from the root of the present Contest,” and that if no 
new plan of accommodation was presented by Great Britain, then the colonies would sever 
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themselves from their tie to Britain. Tryon did add that the bulk of the inhabitants, particularly 
in New York, did not wish an independency, but the “great affliction is, the American friends of 
Government in general consider themselves between Scylla and Carybdis, that is the dread of 
Parliamentary Taxation, and the Tyranny of their present Masters”, and that if some 
compromise could be made (“the first principal moved out of the way”), then many would be 
drawn to the British.
3
 
This was a period of dual government, but the upper hand was not with the old 
government, but with the new. At the town and county levels, the old governments still 
functioned for the most part; here the committees were chosen by the town meetings. In areas 
like Queens, however, where Loyalism reigned in many towns, the committees were becoming 
separate from the official governments of the towns. As for the courts in New York, for the 
most part they continued to function, and many a royalist judge and sheriff continued to serve 
until independence was proclaimed.  The Provincial Congress spent much time preparing 
military and militia units, providing for supplies, funds, and other items, but did not assume 
responsibility for the normal administration of justice. 
4
 
What had started as a protest movement against what was considered unconstitutional 
taxation was now open rebellion. However, it was not yet a full-blown revolution.  The hour 
was getting late, but it is not inconceivable that a compromise could have been worked out. 
The revolutionary congresses and committees in New York and several other colonies had many 
moderates and conservatives who longed for reconciliation; Lowe, the Chairman of New York 
City’s committee, was so conservative that he would eventually become a Loyalist. Even the 
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fact of bloodshed did not make the situation irretrievable. British and colonial history were full 
of instances of armed rebellion where the rebels did not seek independence or to overthrow 
the king, but merely to get the lawful authorities to do what good sense (as the rebels saw it) or 
the Constitution demanded. The resort to arms was only made when normal procedures had 
proved inadequate or fruitless—often because the rebels were not properly (in their eyes at 
least) represented. For example, in Bacon’s Rebellion, frontier Virginians had rebelled in part 
because the Virginia government would not attack the Indians they believed threatened them. 
The Regulators wanted adequate representation, and resented their taxes being spent on 
projects like Tryon’s Palace, rather than on defense against the Indians. The Paxton Boys had 
had a similar complaint against Pennsylvania, with tragic results for some peaceful Indians. And 
similarly, the colonists had no representation in Parliament, only a few lobbyists, and what the 
Americans saw as reasonable arguments had been ignored—and the British had begun acting, 
in American eyes at least, in a tyrannical manner. But, because they were rebelling, not 
revolting, had the British made some gesture of compromise, some reconciliation between 
America and Britain could have occurred, despite the ongoing war. America in December, 1775, 
was in a state of rebellion, not revolution.
5
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Rather than compromise, the British did the exact opposite. They dug their heels in.  In 
July, Congress had sent the King the so-called “Olive Branch Petition”, which professed loyalty 
to the king and requested his aid in solving the conflict. It was rejected, and the King proclaimed 
that the colonists were in rebellion in “The Proclamation of Rebellion”, dated August 23, 1775. 
In his King’s Speech on October 26, the King asserted that the American rebellion was 
“manifestly carried on for the purpose of establishing an independent Empire.” The King 
rejected the professions of loyalty to him as a smoke-screen, meant only to “amuse”, while the 
“conspiracy” prepared for a general revolt. The raising of troops and naval forces, the 
assumption of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and the seizure of control of the public 
revenue were all proofs of their hostility.  The time had come to “put a speedy end to these 
disorders.” The King even announced that he was seeking friendly offers of foreign assistance. 
There were protests against this by some members of Parliament. Members of Parliament 
noted that the Congress had explicitly denied a desire for independence, and in the House of 
Lords, the Earl of Shelburne asked if the government was trying to force the Americans to 
declare independence.  Nonetheless, British government policy was clear: crush the rebellion.
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News of this reached the Continental Congress in early January, along with news that 
yet another American town, Norfolk, had been burned by the British. 
7
  The King’s Speech was a 
crushing blow to hopes for reconciliation. The King, on whom so many had pinned their hopes 
for peace and reconciliation, was instead manifestly opposed to the Americans. He was even 
seeking to send foreign troops to attack his own subjects, to aid in the crushing of their liberty. 
No doubt, many felt betrayed by the king they had toasted, by the king whose name they had 
put on liberty poles. Certainly, that for many their love had turned to hate was evidenced a few 
months later, when George III was burned in effigy and his statue destroyed.  The fiction that 
the Americans were fighting “Ministerial” troops was just that: a fiction. They were in rebellion 
against their king, and the King had rejected their reasonable demands.   The question arose: 
Now what?  
On January 9, 1776, the day after Congress received news of the King’s Speech and the 
burning of Norfolk, a small pamphlet called Common Sense appeared on the streets of 
Philadelphia.
8
 Reaction to it was so immense that the pamphlet was constantly reprinted and 
read throughout the colonies. While published anonymously, its author was later learned to be 
Thomas Paine, a recent immigrant from England (among suspected authors were both Samuel 
and John Adams
9
).  In this pamphlet, he had two main points. The first was an attack on the 
very idea of monarchy and hereditary rule.  Paine argued that it was condemned by the Bible 
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itself; “it is the pride of kings which throws mankind into confusion.”  Monarchy was “ranked in 
scripture as one of the sins of the Jews;” Samuel had told the Israelites when they demanded a 
king that he would seize their sons for his armies, their daughters to be his cooks, and much of 
their wealth.
10
  Monarchy was condemned by nature; the descendants of strong kings were 
often unworthy or rogues.   Their claims to rule lacked honor: “A French Bastard [William the 
Conqueror] landing with an armed Banditti and establishing himself king of England against the 
consent of the natives, is in plain terms a very rascally original. It certainly hath no divinity in 
it.”
11
  And hereditary succession did not preserve a nation from civil wars, as many argued it 
did; just look at the Wars of the Roses.
12
 Monarchy, Paine concluded, had laid “the World in 
Blood or Ashes,”
13
 and that “Of more worth is one honest man to society and in the sight of 
God, than all the crowned ruffians that ever lived.”
14
 
By attacking the very idea of monarchy, and by the fact that so many read his pamphlet 
and evidently accepted much of his argument
15
, Paine made it possible to contemplate what 
was becoming the logical next step for the Americans: independence. Many Americans had 
deep emotional attachments to the British Empire and its symbolic and constitutional  head: 
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the King.   No matter what he did,  how could they stand against him, how could they rebel 
against their lawful monarch, chosen at least in part by divine assent and the consent of their 
ancestors?  Paine answered this question by arguing, that rather than the king being chosen 
with divine assent, God is actually opposed to monarchy. Certainly, Paine argued, your 
ancestors chose his ancestor to be their king; but they had no power to bind their posterity.
16
  
And the King’s claim to rule traces back to an usurper, a rascal. Why should this crowned ruffian 
rule you? These were powerful arguments to many. And they set the stage for Paine’s next 
argument: the colonies should declare independence. 
Paine argued that while America may have benefited in the past from her British 
connection, that to argue that it would in the future was like arguing that “because a child hath 
thrived upon milk, that it is never to have meat.”
17
 Britain had protected the colonies, but her 
motive was “interest not attachment,” that she protected the colonies from Britain’s enemies, 
not the enemies of the colonies; indeed, except for the British connection, some of these would 
not be her enemies at all.
18
 If Britain was the parent country, “then the more shame upon her 
conduct. Even brutes do not devour their young.”
19
  Many of us are not even of English descent, 
Paine argued, and even if we were, what of it? With Britain an open enemy, every other claim is 
extinguished. America was strong, with sufficient men and materials to resist Britain, with great 
unity, our plan was commerce, our desire was peace, and it was “repugnant to reason, to the 
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universal order of things…to suppose, that this Continent can long remain subject to any 
external power.” 
20
 
As for reconciliation, Britain had shown little inclination toward it, and ever since 
Lexington-Concord, Paine said he had rejected the “hardened, sullen tempered Pharaoh of 
England forever.”   Paine argued that reconciliation would actually be bad for America. The King 
would have a “negative” over American legislation. The King was English, and he would only 
permit legislation that benefited England. Such a government would be temporary at best; the 
colonies would mature some more, and there would be commotions and disturbances. Paine 
then proposed a continental federation (or confederation) with unicameral legislatures in each 
of the new states and a Congress of 390 delegates as the best form of government for the new 
America.
21
 
As seen by some of the above quotes, Paine spoke in plain language, understandable to 
the meanest worker or subsistence farmer. He addressed many of the fears and misgivings that 
many had towards independency. He used arguments from both religion and from the natural 
law theories of the Enlightenment, couched in simple but forceful language, to make his points. 
Most of his points had been stated before in the press or in Congress, or even from the pulpits. 
Paine gathered these arguments together and “used them not to persuade Congress, which 
was already moving apace toward Independence, but the people whose support Congress 
needed.”
22
 One hundred and fifty thousand copies were printed up in a few months. Since 
pamphlets were often shared, or available for reading in coffeehouses or taverns, its readership 
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was possibly in the millions.  Its timing was also fortuitous; the news of the King’s Speech, the 
burning of Norfolk, and soon the Prohibitory Act (see below) all seemed to foreclose 
alternatives. For the colonies, it was submission or independence. Paine made the argument 
against rule by monarchs and for independence well, and the once dangerous word 
“independence” was now openly discussed in many places.
23
 
A few weeks after the King’s Speech, the Parliament passed the “Prohibitory Act”. This 
act prohibited all commerce with the colonies while the rebellion continued. American ships 
and their cargoes were forfeited to the Crown as if they belonged to the Crown’s enemies, and 
their crews were subject to impressment. George III signed the Act on December 22, 1775, and 
news reached Philadelphia and the Continental Congress in February. John Hancock noted that 
the Act “doesn’t look like a Reconciliation”. John Adams considered it a declaration of 
independence made by the British, completely dismembering the Empire, and throwing the 
colonies out of royal protection. In Philadelphia, and in coffee shops and taverns and around 
kitchen tables throughout much of America, independence was looking like the only option.  
And those who could not stomach that option began to swell the ranks of those who had 
already decided that the Patriot movement, with its extralegal conventions and committees, 
and the path it had taken towards armed conflict, was something they could not be 
 part of.
24
 
New York rather reluctantly at this time began to turn towards revolution. The catalytic 
event was, according to one historian, the British decision to make New York City their main 
base and the province as a major military theatre.  This decision was not surprising. 
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Cadwallader Colden had espoused such a plan as early as 1774, and the noted Loyalist Jonathan 
Boucher wrote Lord Germain in August 1775 urging such a course. New York’s harbor was 
unparalleled, and armies could be sent north along the Hudson (the armies supported for much 
of its length by naval ships) to divide New England from the rest of the colonies (the strategic 
importance of New York will be discussed further in a following chapter.) Long Island, 
Westchester, and New Jersey could provide much of the foodstuff, wood, and forage the 
armies required. One did not have to have much military experience or knowledge to see that 
this was the logical place for the main British base. And there also seemed to be many Loyalists, 
so Boucher argued that it could return to the King’s allegiance fairly easily.
25
 
The news that New York would soon be a battlefield, while it seemed to further doom 
reconciliation, also seemed to dampen Patriotism. Taking the next step of advocating 
independence was a difficult step even for those who stayed Patriots. The many moderates in 
the revolutionary councils hesitated at this step, and some became (or remained) Loyalists. 
Nerves were frayed, and the Provincial Congress, perhaps fearful of the guns of the Asia, rarely 
met. The Continental Congress began pushing New York to take more radical action, and began 
keeping a close eye on New York.  A failed motion in the Continental Congress to arrest Tryon 
led to Tryon fleeing to the safety of a British ship under the protection of the Asia. (See Chapter 
II). Loyalists from lower New York would come to the ship to provide him with information, and 
Tryon would run a spy network from his quarters on the Dutchess of Gordon. New York’s new 
mayor, David Matthews (inaugurated in February, 1776) recruited David King, an African-
American slave and shoemaker, to carry messages to Tryon. Tryon also recruited the Loyalist 
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Minister Charles Inglis to write a pamphlet in reply to Common Sense.  Most ominously, in 
December 1775, convinced of Loyalist strength, Tryon requested several thousand arms from 
General William Howe, the new commander of British forces in America, but Howe demurred.
26
  
William Smith, as he slipped more and more into a Loyalist frame of mind, seems to 
have lost his grasp on public opinion. He proposed a complicated plan to restore British rule, 
involving votes by the Continental Congress and General Assembly to accept Lord North’s 
Conciliation Plan of February, 1775. This plan would have recognized the Continental Congress, 
acknowledged the supremacy of Parliament, and the Continental Congress would have voted a 
revenue to Parliament. The Continental Congress had rejected this plan, but Smith hoped that 
Assembly approval would divide the colonies. The Provincial Congress
27
 decisively rejected 
Smith’s plan. Undeterred, Smith called for new elections. The Assembly, the legal government 
of the colony, had been elected in 1769, and its term was constitutionally due to expire. 
New elections needed to be called.   Hopeful that those who wanted reconciliation 
would be elected, Smith convinced Tryon to dissolve the Assembly on January 2, 1776.  Smith’s 
hopes were unfounded, for of the twenty-nine members elected, twenty-four were Whigs 
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(Patriots) and only four were Loyalists. Thirteen were also members of the new Provincial 
Congress (the third). The new Thirty-Second Assembly, elected after the dissolution of the 1769 
Assembly, was due to meet on February 14; Tryon prorogued it twice. On April 17, the 
Assembly was dissolved, having never met. On that day, all contact with the warships in the 
harbor was cut off (see below). With the exceptions of a few courts still going about their 
procedures, the last vestige of royal government was ended.  With this dissolution, the period 
of dual government was over. The Patriot forces controlled the province.
28
   
 
In the meantime, the situation on Long Island was becoming particularly distressful to 
both New York Patriots and the Continental Congress.  Cadwallader Colden and his son David 
led the effort to block election of Queens’s delegates to the Provincial Congress.  Tryon was 
attempting to arm the Loyalists. By early 1776, the Continental Congress would send troops to 
Long Island.
29
 
On December 21, 1775, the Provincial Congress had resolved that conduct “inimical to 
the Common Cause of the United Colonies” could not be suffered, and that measures needed 
to be taken “to put a stop to it.” Seven hundred and forty names from Queens were placed on a 
list of those in contempt of and out of the protection of the Congress.
30
 Isaac Sears, fresh from 
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the burning of Rivington’s Printing Office in November, 
31
 traveled to Massachusetts to impress 
on Washington and the army the danger of the “Tories” of Long Island to New York. On January 
3, 1776, the Congress in Philadelphia passed “The Tory Act”. Under this act, all those in Queens 
who had voted against sending deputies to New York’s Provincial Congress, or had been named 
in the aforementioned list, were put “out of the protection of the United Colonies”, and they 
could not travel or live in any of the colonies without a certificate vouching for them by the 
New York Congress (referred to inaccurately as the “Convention”). Should they seek legal 
redress, any attorney who aided them was to be considered an enemy of the cause.  Lastly, 
officers from New Jersey and Connecticut, each with five or six hundred men, were ordered to 
enter Queens from east and west and disarm Loyalists, and arrest those who were opposed.
 32
 
About five hundred men, half of whom were on the list of those who had voted against 
electing delegates, on January 19 submitted a declaration to Congress  promising to obey from 
now on the orders of the Provincial and Continental Congresses. For various reasons, the 
Connecticut-based attack was not mounted, but the Jersey-based attack, led by Colonel 
Nathaniel Heard of Woodbridge, New Jersey went forth as scheduled.   About one thousand 
weapons were brought in by Queens residents, and those who had signed the above 
declaration swore an oath that the arms that they had just turned in were all the arms  that they 
possessed. Heard’s men entered New York on the 27
th
, and arrived at Newtown and Jamaica on 
the 30
th
. The Jersey men acted vigorously, and to be frank, rather poorly. Homes were broken 
into and looted, cattle wantonly slaughtered, farm yards looted, and the soldiers billeted 
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among the inhabitants. At Hempstead, where the militant Loyalist captain Richard Hewlett 
lived, resistance was expected, but none occurred.  Nineteen men were arrested, sent to the 
Continental Congress in Philadelphia, which sent them back to New York, which finally released 
them.  An examination of the guns which had been provided by the Queens residents was 
rather disturbing from the Patriot perspective.  They were mostly obsolete arms, hunting pieces 
and the like, not the military arms that the Asia had been supplying. The attempt to disarm the 
Loyalists had failed. The Loyalists were still armed.
33
 
Heard’s troops joined New Jersey militia who were patrolling Staten Island in mid-
February. They were insulted and threatened by the Loyalist-leaning Richmondites. Heard 
finally arrested four Staten Islanders, and rather than hand them over to the island’s 
Committee of Safety, he sent them to Elizabethtown, New Jersey, to be tried for treasonous 
activities (including drinking damnation to independence and providing arms and men to the 
British), thinking conviction was more likely. Attempting to smooth things over, the New York 
Congress ordered the trial be in Staten Island. It was, and all were acquitted.
34
 
About the same time as Heard’s raid into Queens, Suffolk County’s Committee sent a 
letter to the Congress in Philadelphia, noting that the militia of the county was approximately 
two thousand men. The extended nature of the East End, and its exposure to sea-based attack, 
made the committee request that Congress send some Continental troops to help with the 
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defense. They also requested guns to arm those who were lacking, and hinted that financial 
help would be welcome.
35
 
There were undoubtedly a large number of Loyalists in Queens, while Staten Island was 
mainly Loyalist. There were also a large number that could be called non-aligned, such as many 
of the Quakers. But the movement of the province’s people in the winter of 1776 was clearly 
towards independence among those capable of being convinced.
36
 The colonies, however 
reluctantly, were at war with Britain, and all attempts at reconciliation by their side had been 
rejected. The King himself had proclaimed them rebels, and Paine and other pamphleteers 
argued strongly for independence.  But the next step was truly momentous. The colonies were 
drawing towards rejecting the king and the British connection, and towards declaring 
independence. Once they had crossed that “Rubicon”, there would be no turning back.  But 
many were steeling themselves to cross the Rubicon, and many had crossed it in their minds 
already.  The formal crossing of the Rubicon was now needed.   In early March, guns from 
Ticonderoga, having been hauled all winter from upstate New York to the outskirts of Boston, 
were emplaced on Dorchester Heights, overlooking Boston. This gave the Americans the upper 
hand—they could fire on the British Army and destroy Boston if they so chose. The British, 
faced with an untenable position, evacuated on March 17. In April, Washington’s army began to 
transfer itself to New York. General Charles Lee (and later, General Nathaniel Greene) were in 
charge of preparing the defenses.  On April 17, New York finally ceased supplying the Asia and 
other British ships with food and other necessities. British government in the province was 
virtually extinguished by this ending of contact between the Governor on his ship and New 
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York.  Tryon dissolved the Assembly which had been elected in January but had never met. This 
was the quiet end of New York province’s royal assembly; it would never meet again.
37
 A new 
provincial congress was to meet on May 14. Should it form itself into a de jure government, 
rather than the de facto government it was? The Assembly was no more, the governor had fled, 
and the ordinary operations of government such as courts and the validity of contracts were in 
limbo. If the Provincial Congress took on full-fledged government responsibilities, that could be 
construed as declaring independence. This situation existed in many of the colonies; they were 
being governed by revolutionary congresses with no basis in the old system, and no 
constitutional authority to exercise the ordinary functions of government. On May 10, the 
Continental Congress resolved that the colonies should form new state governments.  The 
Provincial Congress at first did nothing towards this. Finally, as some states began to declare 
independence and the Continental Congress moved towards independence, the Third Provincial 
Congress “passed” on the issue. Their passing was couched in fine democratic (or republican) 
language. In two “resolves” they argued that they had not been authorized by the people to 
take such a vote. A new Congress should be held, and via instructions or other means the 
people should tell their deputies how they wanted them to vote on such a question.  But, 
perhaps as a compromise with conservative factions, the people were not to be informed of 
these resolves until after the election.  In other words, a new Congress was to be elected to 
vote on the question of independency—but the voters would not be told that this was the 
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reason for the formation of the new Congress.   The new Congress would also take up the 
question of framing a new constitution.
38
 
The Third Congress had a brief life. It adjourned on June 30, when British sails began to 
appear off Sandy Hook.  They reconvened at White Plains on July 2, but no quorum could be 
mustered. The Congress quietly gave way to its successor, the Fourth Provincial Congress, on 
July 9.  
 
II 
 
 
New York’s leadership, Livingston or Delancey, Loyalist or Patriot, were concerned about 
the devastation the war could bring, which helped in the reluctance to take the final step. The 
Patriots feared the possible confiscation of property—or worse—if they lost.  Their fortunes 
were at risk—and their very lives—if they were on the losing side. The Livingstons and 
Delanceys  also feared the possibility that such a revolutionary struggle could result in 
attempts, forceful or otherwise, at reducing the power of the elite leadership. 
39
 The great 
merchants and landlords were in many ways an oligarchy, and their domination of the province 
was threatened, both by the nouveau-riche merchants of the Sons of Liberty and the mechanics 
and artisans that supported them. New men were rising to power through the revolutionary 
movement, and they were making it clear that they did not want to be ruled by what they saw 
as a corrupt oligarchy.   
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The “mechanics” of New York City, roughly the equivalent of the working class, had 
been a driving force throughout the decade-long revolutionary movement. They had often 
acted as the “shock troops” of the Revolution (as would their counterparts in the French and 
other revolutions). They had composed the bulk of the mobs that had pushed the 
Revolutionary movement and threatened British and Loyalist interests. While the mechanics 
supported the Revolutionary movement, they had their own concerns and had achieved a 
distinct group identity. The mechanics had accepted the leadership of the Sons of Liberty. These 
mainly nouveau-riche merchants had for the most part “blue-collar” roots. They were mainly 
mechanics and artisans who had “made good,” and spoke the same “language” as the 
mechanics.  Out of discussions in taverns with Sears, McDougall, and other Sons of Liberty, the 
mechanics had formed the Body of Mechanics (or Committee of Mechanics) and even 
purchased a meeting place called Mechanics Hall in 1773 or 1774.  The political actions of 
mechanics were coordinated from here.  The mechanics wanted, among other things, a larger 
say in the political life of the city and the province. The revolutionary committee structure, 
which had many carpenters, pewterers, and other mechanics on its committees, provided a 
means for them to gain this. 
40
 
The Mechanics Committee argued forcibly in early June that the people of New York 
must be allowed to ratify a new constitution—that it was their “inalienable right.” While they 
recognized that not everyone had the needed skills and background to draft a constitution, 
everyone possessed enough common sense to determine whether any proposed constitution 
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would be in his best interests. To allow someone else to ratify it, such as the Provincial 
Congress, would both cast the people into “absolute slavery” and destroy the Congress’s power 
over them.  This was an argument for responsible democracy. Some things, such as 
constitution-writing, should be left to the experts—but non-experts were capable of 
intelligently evaluating the product the experts produced.  While recognizing the importance of 
expertise, this clearly challenged elite rule, and deference to the “natural leaders” of the 
community. Not only did the mechanics wish the ordinary people to have a seat at the table, 
they wanted them to have a say in what the table would look like.  In another letter, they also 
urged the delegates in Philadelphia to work for independence.  It is clear that they did not wish 
the seemingly inevitable independent New York to be a carbon copy of the old province, but a 
more democratic state. Here again, the question of who ruled at home was as important as the 
question of home rule. In the event, as will be discussed below, the New York Constitution was 
ratified by the New York Convention in April, 1777, and was not submitted to the people for 
ratification.
41
 
In Philadelphia, discussion turned towards independence. The New York delegation, 
lacking instructions, were unable to participate, and on June 8 requested that the Provincial 
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Congress tell them how to vote.
42
 It was now that the Third Provincial Congress resolved to 
leave the question to a new congress—without publishing the resolutions it made which 
indicated that the electors should inform the deputies of how they should vote on the 
independence question. The Third Provincial Congress was unable to do much more on the 
question. The appearance of British sails near New York forced the adjournment to White Plains 
on July 2—too late to instruct New York’s delegates in Philadelphia.  
On July 2, in Philadelphia, Congress voted in favor of a resolution of independence, and 
on July 4, the Declaration of Independence was signed. On July 3 and July 4, nine thousand 
British and Hessian troops landed on Staten Island.  On July 9, the Fourth Provincial Congress 
met in White Plains in Westchester County, about 20 miles north of New York City. By this time, 
they were well-aware of both the events in Philadelphia and the events on Staten Island. The 
question could no longer be avoided. A committee was appointed at the morning session to 
consider the letter from New York’s delegation to the Continental Congress, and the 
Declaration of Independence which had been enclosed with it.  In the afternoon, the committee 
reported to the Congress. The committee’s report  
 
Resolved, unanimously, That the reasons assigned by the Continental Congress 
for declaring the United Colonies free and independent States are cogent and 
conclusive; and that while we lament the cruel necessity which has rendered 
that measure unavoidable, we approve the same, and will, at the risk of our lives 
and fortunes, join with the other colonies in supporting it.
43
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The report was adopted, and copies of the Declaration were ordered to be printed up 
and distributed throughout Westchester and the other counties of the state. The delegates to 
the Continental Congress were also given authorization in the Resolutions that adopted 
independence to vote for all measures “as they may deem conducive to the happiness and 
welfare of the United States of America.”
44
 
The reluctance to vote for independence and the unhappiness is palpable. The New York 
Independence Resolution was a product of reluctant revolutionaries, driven by circumstances 
to voting for a resolution and an independence they did not want. They lamented “the cruel 
necessity” that had driven them to this, but they felt that they had no choice. They had 
legitimate grievances, and the British had failed to come to a reasonable compromise.  Instead, 
rather than compromise, the British had gone to war with their colonists. The British had gone 
to war with America and New York.   As the Fourth Provincial Congress sat in White Plains, 
Staten Island was occupied, and the province’s—no, the state’s—great city was soon to be 
attacked by the British. Even the state constitution, much of which was written shortly after 
independence was finally declared, seems to hope for, yearn for, reconciliation: 
 
Whereas the present government of this colony, by congress and committees, 
was instituted while the former government, under the Crown of Great Britain, 
existed in full force, and was established for the sole purpose of opposing the 
usurpation of the British Parliament, and was intended to expire on a 
reconciliation with Great Britain, which it was then apprehended would soon 
take place, but is now considered as remote and uncertain;….
45
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Reluctant they may have been, but, as George III had said, the die was now cast. They 
would risk their lives and fortunes to achieve independence. They had crossed the Rubicon.  
 
Let us review the factors and events that led to the final break. New York was an 
oligarchic province, ruled by competing oligarchies. The factional, interest-driven politics of the 
province had tried to absorb the movement we have called Patriot, but was overtaken by it. 
Delancey versus Livingston, Presbyterian versus Anglican, north Hempstead versus south 
Hempstead, all of these disputes may have influenced one’s initial side, but these controversies 
were all subsumed by the Imperial Question.   Committees and then congresses had formed to 
work within the British system to achieve a solution to the tax and underlying constitutional 
problems that afflicted the empire, but had been unable to make headway. Their very 
existence, the existence of political organizations and committees outside the official 
governmental structure, was seen as extra-constitutional, as possibly subversive.
46
 Many 
Loyalists ascribed their names to letters and statements to register their disgust and 
abhorrence with these committees, a “thing unknown to the British Constitution”, as Jones 
described one. The Patriots had tried to work with the Assembly, but as had occurred in 
Pennsylvania and other colonies, it was not the best instrument for revolutionary action, and 
would be succeeded by province-wide Congresses.  
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In general, in the 1760s and early 1770s, virtually every New Yorker who took an 
interest in politics could be considered a Whig, a Patriot. Virtually everyone objected to British 
taxation by Parliament. But some wanted to work through Assembly petitions, through the 
slow processes of the British Constitution. Others wanted more direct action, through 
resolutions by committees and congresses, through boycotts, and even through property 
damage and riot. The unity of the anti-Parliamentary taxation movement began to break up 
after the Intolerable Acts, as some Patriots began to take actions leading to rebellion—and 
possibly independence. In general, those with strong British ties stayed Loyalist, while those 
whom the British connection seemed to harm more than help were more likely to become 
Patriot.  British intransigence forced the Patriots into armed revolt. Even after Lexington-
Concord and Bunker Hill, reconciliation was still possible, but the British dug their heels in and 
turned a rebellion into revolution. Independence seemed the only possible solution short of 
surrender. The love and loyalty the Americans felt for the King was crushed, and soon turned to 
hatred for the king and those who supported him. Having the “wrong opinion” now made one a 
traitor.  
New York was left with no options; save perhaps total surrender to what they believed 
was tyranny. Reluctantly, but probably resolutely, their delegates in White Plains pledged their 
lives and fortunes to the “Glorious Cause.” As of July 10, the Fourth Provincial Congress became 
the Convention of Representatives of the State of New York, charged with running the state 
and a war while writing a permanent constitution. Twenty miles south of White Plains, the 
British were waiting to end the state’s independence—and perhaps the lives of its leaders.  
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III 
 
 
 Having adopted the Declaration of Independence, on July 9, 1776, the Fourth Provincial 
Congress informed John Hancock and the Continental Congress by letter, and the Declaration 
and New York’s acceptance were printed up and distributed.  The acceptance was at the 
afternoon session of the Congress (which the next day changed its name to the Convention of 
the Representatives of the State of New York). At six o’clock in the evening, the Declaration was 
read to Washington’s troops. It was also read on the Common in New York City, where it was 
greeted by cheers.  A mixed group of soldiers and civilians then marched to Bowling Green, 
where stood the statue of George III on horseback. This statue had recently been erected, 
having been commissioned in the wake of the end of the Stamp Act Crisis. The statue was about 
4000 pounds of lead, topped with about 10 ounces of gold leaf.  The king was depicted as the 
Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius.  The excited mob tore down the statue.  Its nose was torn off, 
and the golden crown of laurels was removed.  The statue was decapitated. It has been 
suggested that this was in emulation of the killing of Charles I. The head was stuck on a pike 
outside a tavern. Most of the statue was melted down into 42,088 bullets. The head of the King 
was eventually rescued by a British engineer, John Montresor, who sent it to England so that 
the ministry could see the rage of the rebels first-hand. Exiled Massachusetts governor Thomas 
Hutchinson saw the head in London, and noted that, even without a nose, it bore a striking 
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resemblance to the king. The horse’s tail survived, and is on display at the New York Historical 
Society.  Washington mildly reproved the troops for joining in the mob.
47
 
 This is probably the most famous of the destructions of royal symbols in America, but it 
was not the only one. The historian Brendan McConville describes this as a period of 
iconoclasm, complete with symbolic regicides. The king was burned in effigy in Baltimore after 
the Declaration was read there. The king’s coat and arms were removed from statehouses and 
courtrooms in Pennsylvania.  In Dover, the king’s portrait was burned by a member of the local 
Committee of Safety.
48
 
 On July 22, the Declaration and the Resolutions of the Provincial Congress were “with 
beat of drum” proclaimed in Huntington on Long Island. According to Holt’s New York Journal, 
they were approved and applauded by “animated shouts”.  The flag which waved on the local 
Liberty Pole had the words “Liberty” on one side and “George III” on the other. The King’s name 
was ripped off, and used in a hastily-constructed effigy of the king, which was wrapped in a 
Union Jack lined with gunpowder, with a wooden crown. The effigy was then hung on a gallows 
and was then exploded and burnt to ashes. The Committee and many of the “principal 
inhabitants” of the Town spent the evening toasting the Congress, the commanders of 
American forces, and the fallen.  Thirteen toasts, one for each colony, were made.
49
 
 It was apparent that many Americans, in New York City, in the rural countries that 
surrounded the metropolis, and throughout America, had rejected the king. Indeed, they 
committed acts of symbolic regicide, showing both that they not only rejected the king who 
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they believed had betrayed them, attacking rather than supporting their liberties, but they 
hated him. They now hated a king that they had once loved. This was a king who the people 
had symbolically equated with liberty, as the people of Huntington showed by stitching his 
name onto a flag that also bore the word “Liberty”.  At the raising of one of the New York City 
liberty poles God Save the King had been played, and the king’s name and  the word “Liberty” 
had also been placed on it, showing that the erectors of the Liberty Pole (the local Sons of 
Liberty) did not see a conflict between the king and liberty (see Chapter II). Now, they felt 
betrayed by the King’s actions, and rejected the King.  The intensity of the post-Independence 
actions, these burnings, these hangings in effigy, (and the extreme thoroughness of the 
destruction of the King’s effigy at Huntington, where it was both hung and exploded) 
demonstrated “the power the monarch had once held over provincial imagination.”  The 
intensity also symbolized the betrayal the Americans felt. And this hatred would not be 
confined to effigies. The Loyalists, living symbols of the King and Empire, would be the objects 
of particular hatred. The hatred the Patriots held for the Loyalists was most obviously shown in 
South Carolina a few years later ( as will be discussed  in a following chapter), but it could be 
seen in many places, including the New York region, as will be discussed below.
50
   
 
 
 
 
                                                           
50
 McConville, 306, 308, 311, quote on 311; HTR III 6, July 23, 1776. Conversely, many Loyalists hated or had 
contempt for the Patriots. One anonymous Loyalist “spat and spewed” at the sound of Yankee Doodle Doo; the 
Patriots were considered usurpers and enemies of government, and the warfare in the South and the New York 
region between Loyalists and Patriots was bitter.  OQ #10, 21-22. . 
150 
 
IV. 
 
 The arrival of the British fleet at Sandy Hook was an awe-inspiring sight. More than 130 
British warships had entered New York Bay by June 30. One onlooker thought that “all of 
London was afloat”.  On board his ship General William Howe, commander of British forces in 
America, was advised by Governor Tryon of New York and several Loyalists, who gave him 
intelligence about fortifications in Brooklyn Heights and Gravesend. They advised a quick strike.  
Washington, in the meantime, was in a strategic quandary.  If the British occupied Brooklyn 
Heights, overlooking New York City, they could shell New York City and force a retreat or 
surrender (the situation was similar to Britain’s in Boston a few months earlier, where 
Washington’s occupation of Dorchester Heights with cannon had forced a British evacuation). 
The British could also, if they could navigate the tricky passages around Manhattan, use their 
naval superiority to surround Manhattan and trap Washington on the island, or cut off any 
forces on Long Island from Manhattan. Despite this, Washington made the perhaps unwise 
decision to reinforce Brooklyn. This was dividing one’s army in the face of a superior army, 
which is generally considered unwise.
51
 
Howe’s forces were mainly those who had evacuated Boston, then had been refitted, 
rested, and resupplied in Halifax. Many reinforcements were coming, but Howe thought he had 
enough troops to begin offensive operations. His original aim was to land his men at Gravesend, 
in the south of Kings County, but he was dissuaded by a trusted staff officer, General James 
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Robertson. Robertson urged Howe to wait for the reinforcements before beginning his assault. 
Robertson, among other positions, had served as deputy quartermaster under General Jeffrey 
Amherst, and was familiar with Staten Island. During the Seven Years War, Robertson had 
established a staging area near “the Watering Place”, a fresh-water stream on Staten Island 
where ships often stopped for water.  The location of the island near New Jersey, Manhattan, 
and Long Island made it an excellent base for attacks on any of those places.  It possessed much 
fresh-water, good farmland, and all indications were that it was a very Loyalist area. In addition, 
the island was also poorly defended.   As a result, the occupation of the island was virtually 
unopposed.
52
   
Howe accepted Robertson’s advice and the troops were landed on July 2 at Staten 
Island.   The embarkation was completed on July 4. Howe waited for the reinforcements, and 
the main assault on Long Island and Manhattan did not commence until late August. Thus, 
much of the summer, ideal campaigning weather, was spent with the British troops waiting on 
Staten Island. Howe has been roundly criticized for this, but striking with the whole of one’s 
force is usually not a bad idea. Certainly, while much of the prime campaign season was lost, he 
used the troops quite well once the assault was finally launched—up until the end of the 
campaign. Indeed, he was knighted for the Battle of Long Island.
53
 If not for the Battles of 
Trenton and Princeton, Howe’s campaign would quite possibly be remembered as a masterful 
one—despite all the lost opportunities (see Chapter IV). 
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 William Howe had in 1759 at Quebec led the advance guard that scaled the Heights of 
Abraham, and was the younger brother of Richard Lord Howe, known as “Black Dick” because 
of the dark cast of his skin and his bravery during the Seven Years War.  Richard Howe was the 
naval commander of British forces in America.  During the French and Indian War, the oldest 
brother, George, had led British and American troops at Ticonderoga, and been slain there.  
Massachusetts had allocated funds for a monument to George at Westminster Abbey. The 
remaining Howe brothers ever-after possessed a fondness for America.  Richard had spoken 
against the Stamp Act. William was the Member of Parliament for Nottingham, and he had told 
his constituents that he condemned the government’s American policy and that he would not 
accept a commission there.  The Howe brothers were particular favorites of the King, and most 
likely close relatives. Their mother was probably an illegitimate daughter of George I. Despite 
their conciliatory stance towards the colonies, they were given—or pushed for—the 
appointments.  William Howe wrote one constituent that he was ordered to America and could 
not refuse; Burgoyne said that Howe had diligently sought the command, partially because of 
his low opinion of his predecessor, Gage.  One biographer, Troyer Steel Anderson, believes 
William’s statement that he would not accept a command was a lie. In any event, since the 
brothers were also to be made Peace Commissioners, their sympathy and affection for America 
and Americans could possibly turn out to be an asset. 
54
 
The British were warmly greeted by the Staten Islanders. The few Continental troops on 
the island had fled to New Jersey, bringing some of the prominent Patriots.  Many Loyalists 
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climbed the heights of the eastern shore of the island to see the flotilla and the landing of the 
troops.  Governor Tryon reported that the islanders came down to the shore to greet the 
soldiers as deliverers.    The Continental Congress was publicly cursed, and its paper money was 
burned. Later in July, effigies of George Washington, General Lee and General Isaac Putnam, as 
well as John Witherspoon were burned. Witherspoon, a New Light Presbyterian, was a leading 
Whig in New Jersey, President of Princeton College, and a signatory of the Declaration of 
Independence. In addition to these symbolic actions, more concrete actions were taken by the 
joyous Staten Islanders.   On July 6, more than 500 men, mostly from Staten Island (with a few 
from New Jersey), gathered at Richmond village. At a ceremony provided over by Howe and 
Governor Tryon of New York, more than five hundred men took an oath of allegiance to George 
III, and were formed into “Billopp’s Corps of Staten Island Militia” under the command of 
Christopher Billopp. 
55
 
Patriot leaders deplored the reaction of the Staten Islanders, Washington even calling 
them “our inveterate Enemies.” One British officer noted the joy of the Islanders, and ascribed 
it to “seeing well the difference between anarchy and a regular mild government.” Again, the 
low opinion many of the British officers had for America and its new governments is shown. 
What many of the Americans saw as the people choosing  their own governments, in 
accordance with principles laid down by Locke and others (indeed, in accordance basically with 
the principles of the Glorious Revolution, which were the principles which ultimately legitimized 
George III’s rule), the British saw as anarchy. The Patriots were not just enemies of the 
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government, they were seen as enemies of government; the Loyalists were friends of 
government. As one Marine captain described the joyous Richmondites, they had long been 
oppressed “for their attachment to Government.”
56
 
As would soon occur on Long Island and Manhattan, the homes of prominent 
inhabitants—especially those of a Patriot persuasion—became the homes of British officers. 
General Howe settled at the home of former provincial congressman Adrian Bancker.  Bancker 
had not left Staten Island, and was detained upon a naval vessel by the British. The troops and 
refugees were quartered in private homes, barns, and other buildings. However, the island did 
not have enough buildings to satisfy the need for housing, so many of the soldiers had to live in 
tents.
57
  
For most of the summer, troops poured into the island. Some came from Europe.  Three 
thousand arrived on August 1 with Generals Clinton and Cornwallis, after being withdrawn from 
a failed campaign to take Charleston. From Virginia, Lord Dunmore and the Ethiopian Regiment 
arrived. Dunmore in November, 1775, had promised freedom to any slave who left his master 
to fight for the British. Many slaves responded to the call, and were formed into the regiment. 
Unfortunately, only 150 remained of the regiment, thanks to smallpox. The existence of the 
regiment caused some concern among Staten Islanders, especially those who owned slaves, but 
it was soon apparent that Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation was not the forerunner of a general 
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policy of emancipation, but the product of military exigencies. The uniforms of the Ethiopian 
Regiment, however, bore sashes on which the words “LIBERTY TO SLAVES” were written.
58
 
Thousands of troops were cooped up on the island for nearly two months with little to 
do. It is not surprising that there was some trouble on “that ever loyal island.” Discipline was 
not as strong as it should have been. Lord Rawdon, with inappropriately poetical language, 
cavalierly described a problem that the presence of so many bored men and insufficient 
discipline caused: 
 
The fair Nymphs of this Isle are in wonderful tribulation, as the fresh meat our 
men have got here has made them as riotous as Satyrs. A Girl cannot step into 
the Bushes to pluck a Rose without running the most imminent risque of being  
ravished; and they are so little accustomed to these vigourous methods, that 
they don’t bear them with the proper resignation, and of consequence we have 
most entertaining Courts-Martial every day.
59
 
 
 
In plain language, women on the island were being raped by soldiers. Since, except for a 
few exceptions, the majority of Staten Islanders were Loyalists, this means the women being 
raped were Loyalists or the daughters of Loyalists. These violent acts against women were 
virtually guaranteed to undercut and even destroy American support for the occupation army, 
transforming the British military’s image from liberators and defenders to oppressors, and 
transforming Loyalists to passive neutrals or even into Patriots. Criminal actions by soldiers, 
ranging from minor crimes such as petty thefts and vandalism, to far worse, such as home 
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invasions, kidnapping, and rape, would plague the populations in contact with the British and 
Hessian soldiers throughout the war.     
The British attempted to negotiate with the Americans during the long summer. In mid-
July, Lieutenant Philip Brown was sent with a flag of truce to Washington. He was turned back 
by boat-borne sentries, because the letter he bore was addressed not to General Washington, 
but to George Washington Esq.  A second letter was turned back for a similar reason a few days 
later. Ambrose Serle, secretary to Lord Howe, commented that, while the British had tried “as 
far as Decency and Honor could permit” to prevent bloodshed, that it seemed “to be beneath a 
little paltry Colonel of Militia at the Head of a Banditti or Rebels to treat with the 
Representative of His lawful Sovereign, because ‘tis impossible for him to give all the Titles 
which the poor Creature requires.”
 60
  Pace Serle, this insistence by the Americans on proper 
titles was actually quite vital; the colonies had declared independence, and demanded 
recognition of their generals as generals, given this title by the states or the Congress. For the 
British to give them these titles would be in many ways a partial recognition of independence; 
hence their reluctance to do so. A few years later, when peace was desperately desired by 
Britain, the instructions to the Carlisle Commission told them to use any titles the Americans 
wanted (see Chapter IV). 
All through the summer, Washington kept working on the fortifications and gained more 
reinforcements. Peaceful envoys were not the only thing the British sent to Washington during 
this lull. The British tested the defenses of the Americans by sending two warships, the Phoenix 
and the Rose, up the Hudson. The Americans were unable to stop them. Only about half the 
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men who should have been on duty on the cannons were there; some were allegedly drinking, 
or visiting “the Holy Ground”—the local red light district. Some Americans were killed by 
cannonades by the ships. Panicked New Yorkers continued to flee the city.
61
  
The population of New York City virtually evaporated during 1776. Loyalists, Patriots, 
and the unaffiliated fled the war-zone. Many members of the Sons of Liberty and “mechanics” 
became members of military units, or otherwise left the city. The revolutionary government of 
the province shortly before independence was declared had left New York City for the safer 
confines of White Plains in Westchester, where it now styled itself the Convention of 
Representatives of the State of New York. The exigencies of war would force the Convention—
and later the legislature—to move several times. White Plains would soon be under British 
control.  
The “evaporation” of New York City’s population and the relocation of the government 
to a series of small towns in the Hudson Valley probably had a major effect on the government 
of New York State for the first few decades of independence. The Committee of Mechanics—
representing roughly what we would call  the working class—had urged that the new 
constitution, once written,  be submitted to the people of New York for approval. (See above).  
It is probable that, had New York City remained in American hands and the state capital 
remained there, that the Committee and the mechanics it represented would have put 
pressure on the Convention to make the Constitution a democratic one, or at least more 
democratic than the oligarchs who had long dominated the province would have wanted. But, 
the Convention was not in New York City, and many of the mechanics were not as well. By 
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contrast, in Philadelphia the population remained, and a very democratic constitution was 
written for Pennsylvania in the fall of 1776. Similarly, a few years later, the sans-culottes 
(roughly the equivalent of the mechanics) pushed the French revolutionary assemblies in more 
radical directions—some perhaps more radical than many of the mainly middle-class 
revolutionaries wanted. But in New York, the impact of invasion and the internal “exile” of the 
Convention isolated the classical republican constitution writers from the democratic pressure 
the mechanics of New York City might have exerted. John Jay and his fellow authors produced a 
republican constitution, with a bicameral legislature and checks and balances such as a Council 
of Revision, which would govern the state until 1821.  Arguably, with its bicameral legislature 
and its Council of Revision, the 1777 Constitution was   one more in tune with the interests of 
the oligarchs of New York than a more democratic constitution would have been.  It was 
adopted by the Convention in April, 1777, in “the name and by the authority of the good people 
of this State” and was not submitted to the voters as the Committee of Mechanics had 
wished.
62
   
As discussed in more detail in the following chapter, Howe’s strategy was to gain control 
of Manhattan, and pin Washington’s force in southern New York and New Jersey while an army 
from Canada would march down the Hudson. Washington, faced with two superior armies, 
would either have to retreat (thus abandoning New England to isolation from the middle 
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colonies) or offer battle, where his poorly trained and poorly armed troops would no doubt be 
crushed. General Clinton urged that Howe send ships to land a sizable corps at Spuyten Duyvil, 
at the northern tip of Manhattan, to block the retreat of Washington’s forces. Howe was 
interested in the idea, but eventually did not use it in his campaign. 
63
  
Instead, Howe intended to use his 24 thousand men in a large enveloping movement, 
taking first Long Island, then taking Manhattan from a point northeast of the City (which was in 
1776 a one square-mile town at the southern tip of the island). This plan has been criticized as 
allowing Washington’s troops ample room to escape, and as not fully exploiting the British 
naval advantage.  In the meantime, Washington fortified northern Manhattan. Nathaniel 
Greene, “the fighting Quaker”, was in charge of fortifying Brooklyn Heights.  Greene had 
renounced his sect’s pacifist teachings, and had gained much of his military knowledge from 
reading campaign histories. Greene, it is reported, “had made himself acquainted with every 
pass and defile leading to the city”, but he came down with a serious fever a few days before 
the British struck. Israel Putnam took over the Long Island troops on Aug 23, 1776. General 
Sullivan commanded within the fortifications, and “Lord” Stirling the troops outside the 
fortifications. Sullivan is often reported to have been in command during the Battle of Long 
Island, and he took great pains to correct that impression.
64
    
“Tory hunting” also continued on Long Island.    An investigation into a plot to rearm 
Loyalists resulted in warrants being issued for the arrest of many on Long Island.  Military force 
was sent to capture the 38 people named, and there was a skirmish in a swamp in Queens on 
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June 22 or 23. While there were fortunately no fatalities, this “Battle of Hempstead Swamp” 
was probably the first bloodshed on Long Island. The danger of armed Loyalists was a problem 
to the American military planners. The bulk of the Continental troops were stationed in Kings, a 
Loyalist region, as was much of Queens.  Hempstead’s armed Loyalists were headed by a 
former Indian fighter from the French and Indian War, Hewitt.  Probably to counter them, 
Nathaniel Woodhull, former head of the Provincial Congress and now a militia officer, was 
stationed to the east of Jamaica Queens at the time of the Battle of Long Island. In Brookhaven, 
in the months leading up to the battle, several people were brought before the Committee of 
Safety, and several arrested.
65
  
 
 On August 22, 1776, British troops landed on Long Island. While many have 
criticized the British for wasting much of the summer, the operation when finally launched was 
masterful. The British had built enough flat-bottomed boats to disembark six thousand men in 
one wave. The boats, according to a major in the Quartermaster’s department, each had a 
hinged front that could be let down to serve as a gangplank, by which the men and guns could 
go ashore. In short, they were eighteenth century versions of the landing craft used at 
Normandy and other amphibious invasions of the Second World War. Over 400 vessels were 
involved in the movement. The ships disembarked at Gravesend, in southern King’s County. 
They were met with little resistance; they also were not met by many cheering Loyalists as had 
occurred on Staten Island.  The American troops burned some “corn”, though a recent rain 
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hindered that, and drove off some cattle. The British soldiers and sailors treated themselves to 
the fine apples that grew in abundance. Skirmishing soon began between British and American 
forces.
66
   
The Hessians crossed over on Sunday, the 25
th
; Serle noted in his journal his fear that 
their use would “tend to irritate and inflame the Americans infinitely more than two or three 
British Armies.” In Brookhaven, on the North Shore of Long Island, British troops were landed 
and began shooting cattle on the 26
th
. Some American troops were diverted there; this action 
was a feint by the British to hold the militia of Suffolk County at home, rather in Kings.
67
 
As historian Troyer Steele Anderson puts it, “the battle of Long Island, on August 27, was 
a very brief, simple, and decisive affair.”
68
 Sullivan had been temporarily in command on Long 
Island until Israel Putnam had taken over. As mentioned earlier, Nathaniel Greene, who had 
been in charge of preparing the defenses of Long Island and would probably have led the troops 
in battle, had become very ill and had been relieved of duty. Washington adopted Sullivan’s 
modification to the defensive plan that had been prepared by the sick Greene and earlier by 
Lee: Putnam was ordered to put his best troops into the passes in the Gowanus Heights and the 
other hills of northern Kings. The intent was to not allow the British to reach the fortifications at 
Brooklyn Heights, overlooking New York City. These heights were Britain’s strategic objective in 
the battle. Unfortunately, the Jamaica Pass on the far left of the American lines was left 
unguarded.  It is possible that Greene, with his intimate knowledge of the area, would have not 
made this error. In any event, Howe discovered this weakness, and “turned the left flank” of 
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the American lines. With British and Hessian forces behind the passes they were guarding, the 
Americans had no choice but to retreat. Heavy losses were sustained by the American troops, 
and several high-ranking American officers, such as Lord Stirling, were captured.  By nightfall, 
the remnants of the American army stationed on Long Island were within the Brooklyn Heights 
fortifications. Howe did not attempt to capture the fortifications, as he was not sure of the 
strength of the fort, and did not want to “risk the loss that might have been sustained in the 
assault,” believing that “the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular 
approaches”. He began to besiege the position, unaware that the force holding the fort was 
quite small.  Some clever planning and some fortuitous weather permitted the 9500 American 
soldiers, their equipment, and General Washington (who had crossed over to Long Island on the 
morning of the battle, once he was satisfied that the attack was the main British effort and not 
a feint) to return to Manhattan on the 29
th
 unmolested
 
. On the morning of the 30
th
, the British 
occupied the forts on Brooklyn Heights. Long Island was now theirs. They would not leave until 
1783.
69
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V 
 
 
General Nathaniel Woodhull, a former delegate to several Provincial Congresses, 
commanded the Suffolk County militia. They had been charged on the 24
th
 of August with 
driving the cattle of Queens east of the Hempstead Plains to keep it out of British hands. Of a 
total force of 500, only two hundred met him in Jamaica, and half soon deserted. Despite this, 
Woodhull was successful in his task. His troops remained in Jamaica on the 27
th
, but began to 
scatter on the 28
th
 as rumors of the defeat began to spread. Woodhull was taken prisoner by 
dragoons. According to accounts from fifty years later, after he surrendered his sword, he was 
ordered to say “God save the King.” He refused, saying “God save us all.” At this, the accounts 
continue, the commanding major, identified as the Loyalist Major Oliver Delancey (of the 
famous Delancey clan), struck him in the arm with his sword.  The arm became infected, and 
was amputated, but he soon died. Ballads and tragedies of his life would be written many 
decades later.
70
  
 Two representatives of the Convention, Judge Hobart and James Townshend, learned 
of Woodhull’s capture on August 30, 1776 while in Queens. The militia of Queens had 
dispersed.  The two reported their “unspeakable mortifaction” to the Convention at the twin 
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bad news. The two headed to Huntington, “as the only place where we could have any prospect 
of making an effectual stand”. They then ordered the militia of Suffolk to rendezvous there.  In 
the meantime, the British had spread troops out from Kings. By the 30
th
, they were “in full 
possession” of western Queens, as far as Jamaica, and Loyalists were joining them.  By August 
31, the British reached Newtown in Queens. Virtually everyone there who had taken up arms 
against the British, according to one report, surrendered.
71
 
While a great victory, the Battle of Long Island (or Brooklyn, as it is sometimes called) 
was not quite the decisive battle Howe wanted, as a sizable portion of the “rebel” army still 
existed. However, as far as Long Island was concerned, it was quite decisive. In the face of 
overwhelming military superiority, the troops disbanded and Patriots fled—or submitted to the 
British. On August 30, several militia companies from Brookhaven and Smithtown, as well as 
various militiamen (some complaining that their officers had left them), gathered in 
Huntington. Major Jeffrey Smith called the officers into a room, and told them that their forces 
were insufficient to oppose the enemy and that he “very much gave up the Island”.  He said it 
would not be good policy to “incense a cruel enemy by being taken in arms”. They would fare 
better if they stayed at home. One captain ordered his troops to return home, and the militia of 
Suffolk disbanded.
72
 
Brigadier General William Erskine was appointed commanding officer for the eastern 
part of Long Island.  From his base in Queens, he issued a proclamation for Suffolk County 
ordering committeemen and others to cease their activities, and that all men in arms lay them 
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down. He then ordered that they assist British forces by bringing in their cattle, and wagons and 
horses, promising that they would be fully paid, as “His Majesty having sent his army, not for 
the oppression but for the protection of the inhabitants.” If, however, they did not submit (and 
especially if the cattle and wagons orders were not immediately complied with), he would 
without delay enter the county and “lay waste the property of the disobedient, as persons 
unworthy His Majesty’s clemency.” 
73
 
From Jamaica, Oliver Delancey, Major General of the [Loyalist] Militia in the Southern 
District of the Colony of NY, issued a proclamation on September 1 for the people of Suffolk to 
lay down their arms, take an oath of allegiance, disclaim and reject “the orders of Congress and 
Committees”, and to pray for the king and the royal family in all places of worship. That day, 
dragoons arrived in Huntington.  The next day, Delancey arrived in Huntington and ordered the 
militia of Suffolk to lay down their arms and take an oath of allegiance.  On Sept 5, Delancey 
issued an order to raise a “Brigade of Provincials solely for the defence of this Island to re-
establish order and govt within the same.” Three regiments were eventually raised; as will be 
discussed below, there was much criticism when some were sent to fight in the South when 
they were needed to protect Long Island against raiders. In addition to these orders, several 
orders were issued concerning the gathering of cattle and sheep and wood for the use of the 
King’s troops. While a distinction was to be made between rebel and Loyalist livestock (the 
Loyalists were promised pay), in practice, few were paid.
74
   
After the disastrous Battle of Long Island, many Long Islanders who fought with 
Washington elected to stay with his army.  But perhaps as many as five thousand men, women 
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and children, particularly those who had been very active in Patriot activities, escaped to 
Connecticut, leaving their homes and much of their property behind.   The flight was referred to 
as “Over to the Main” by the refugees. Sag Harbor on the northern shore of the South Fork was 
a major port of departure; before the war and into the next century, Sag Harbor was the second 
greatest port in New York. As late as September 15, and possibly later, the wharves of Sag 
Harbor were crowded with emigrants. The Convention recommended on August 29 that Long 
Island’s inhabitants “remove as many of their women, children and slaves, and as much of their 
live stock and grain, to the main, as they can,” and stated that it would pay the expense. Some 
effort was made to prevent the exodus by the British, but it went forward. Various committees 
in Connecticut helped provide for the needs of the refugees.
75
 
But many remained behind on Long Island, and not all were Loyalists or neutrals or 
“trimmers”. Many of those who stayed were Patriots. Many feared to leave their property 
behind, were unable to secure transport, or feared the uncertainties of exile far from their 
homes. For myriads of reasons, many who had no love for the British remained behind on Long 
Island.  Having chosen or been compelled by circumstance to stay behind, they did what was 
necessary. They feared that failure to pledge allegiance to the King would result in being exiled 
in winter.
76
 They began to take oaths of loyalty to the king—several were demanded during the 
course of the occupation—and those who had been highly-placed in the revolutionary 
movement began to recant their involvement. 
After the Battle of Long Island, each town on the island held town meetings which 
formally surrendered their towns to the British.  The island was now under martial law. The 
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Revolutionary committees began to recant their involvement.  On or about Oct 21, 1776, 
Huntington, Smithtown, Southold, South Hampton and East Hampton’s committees, as well as 
the Committee of the County of Suffolk, all recanted. The statements of Huntington and Suffolk 
were printed in the New York Gazette of November 11. Huntington’s statement was typical: 
 
The Committee of Huntington, being thoroughly convinced of the injurious and 
inimical tendency of our former meetings and resolutions and willing to manifest 
our hearty disapprobation of all such illegal measurs, do hereby dissolve this 
committee, and as far as in us lies revoke and disannul all former orders and 
resolutions of all committees and Congresses whatsoever, as being undutiful to 
our lawful Sovereign, repugnant to the principles of the British Constitution & 
ruinous in the extreme, to the happiness and prosperity of this country.
77
  
 
Among the signers of the above declaration was Platt Conkling.  Platt Conkling had been 
one-third of the original committee of Huntington. He was named as appointed to Huntington’s 
committee in Huntington’s elegant 1774 statement of the issues, the Declaration of Rights. The 
other two named in the Declaration, John Sloss Hobart and Thomas Wickes, had escaped Long 
Island.  All who signed the recantations had been leading Patriots and had supported American 
independence. It is highly unlikely that all of these leading Patriots had changed their minds. 
There had been ample time between July 4 and the beginning of the occupation (or liberation) 
of Long Island for those who thought independence was a step too far to resign. It is apparent 
that their recantations were expedient, a response to the fact of British occupation.
78
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As the war continued, General Howe made several offers of amnesty, and oaths of 
allegiance to Britain were made by the people of the island. According to historian Frederic 
Mather, the “general form” of the oath was thus: 
 
I do swear upon the Evangelist of Almighty God, that I hold true and faithful 
allegiance to his Majesty King George the Third of Great Britain, his heirs and 
successors: and hold an utter abhorrence of congresses, rebellions, etc.; and do 
promise never to be concerned in any manner with his Majesty’s rebellious 
subjects in America. So help me God! 
79
  
 
Several periods of oath-taking occurred during the war; a major signing occurred in the 
fall of 1778. Even the most cursory comparison of the lists of those who signed these oaths and 
of those who had put themselves on record as supporting the Patriot cause will show that many 
names may be found on both lists. For example, John and Solomon Ketcham, as well as 
Nathaniel Smith, Henry Titus, Zachariah Rogers, Silas Wickes, and Platt Conkling, among other 
residents of Huntington signed both the Association on May 8, 1775, and the Oath of Loyalty 
before Governor Tryon in 1778. It is evident that for many of the oath-takers, the oath was only 
a matter of expediency, of protecting their homes, properties, families and persons. The oaths 
were usually administered by commissioners. One commissioner, Abraham Gardiner, who had 
ordered the homes of Col. Jonathan Hedges and Col. David Mulford surrounded in order to force 
them to take the oath, later would become a refugee himself, and would serve the American 
cause. Perhaps he had a change of heart, but it is more likely that his actions as a commissioner 
were only a matter of expediency.
80
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Many local Long Island historians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were descendants of those who had taken the oaths.  A sense of embarrassment, or a need to 
justify their ancestor’s actions, can be detected in their writings.  Local historian Justice Henry 
P. Hedges, in his 1910 “Sag Harbor Address”, defended the oath-takers: 
 
What should they do? Take the oath and live? Refuse and die? They took the 
oath but in heart were as devoted to their country and as hostile to their 
oppressors as before. This is a subject avoided by writers, but fidelity to historic 
truth demands expression. When residents of Sag Harbor and the Hamptons 
took this oath, as they in fact did, they reasoned thus: Refusing , I die with no 
benefit or help to my family, friends or country’s cause; living, I may be a help to 
all…To hold an oath procured by force, valid, is to hold force the law and above 
the right. 
 
He then proceeds to defend the actions of both Colonel Gardiner and Colonel 
Jonathan Hedges.  Allowing for perhaps some excesses in his rhetoric, Hedges was 
probably right in his belief that the oaths did not reflect a change in heart.  While no 
doubt there were, particularly in Queens, many who were nonaligned, and those who 
“trimmed” to the wind, it is likely that many of the oath takers were merely bending to 
the military realities. Particularly suspicious were the recantations from the 
revolutionary committees of Suffolk County that Governor Tryon received in October 
and November of 1776.  It is rather unlikely that leading Patriots had truly changed their 
minds in two or three short months, and it is far more likely that they were bowing to 
the military realities of Long Island.  Charles Street, editor of the Huntington Town 
Records, said of these recantations that they “were concessions forced from a 
170 
 
conquered people.” The sincerity of the recantations of the committees was quite 
questionable, as was the sincerity of many—perhaps most—of the oaths.
81
 
 Unfortunately for the British, too often they suspected everyone of disloyalty, including 
people who were manifestly loyal. It is one of the fatal ironies of the American Revolution that 
high policy makers tended to overestimate the amount of Loyalism in America, thinking that 
the Patriots were a small faction, while at the level of policy implementation, the troops and 
local commanders tended to act as if everyone was a rebel.  This may have made some sense in 
Suffolk, which was overwhelmingly Patriot, but it made no sense in Queens and Kings. From 
virtually the end of the Battle of Long Island, the British acted in manners which not only failed 
to win over the Patriots and neutrals, but actually disaffected many of the Loyalists. As historian 
of Revolutionary Queens and New York Joseph S. Tiedemann put it, by the end of the 
occupation, the Loyalists in Queens (and no doubt the rest of the island) had become “Patriots 
by Default.”
82
 This work will return to these “Revolutionary Incidents” of Long Island   and 
elsewhere in an upcoming chapter.  
 
VI 
 
 Having successfully extricated the forces stationed on Long Island forces from Brooklyn, 
Washington faced the distinct possibility that his army would be trapped on Manhattan. 
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Nathaniel Greene, recovering from his illness, urged that the city be abandoned and burned to 
deny its resources to the British. Brigadier General John Morin Scott, an important New York 
Patriot, who had a large estate and many assets on Manhattan, selflessly concurred. Congress 
informed Washington that the city was not to be harmed. Rather than retreat off the island, 
Washington tried to hold it. 
83
   
 With the British having won an impressive, though not-quite decisive, victory, Admiral 
Howe decided to make one last attempt at peaceful negotiation before unleashing his brother’s 
army.  Howe paroled the captured General Sullivan, who was sent to Philadelphia to attempt to 
set up a face-to-face meeting with members of Congress. John Adams was not pleased with 
this; and told his fellow Congressman Benjamin Rush that he wished the first British shot at the 
battle had gone through Sullivan’s head. Despite Adams’s opposition to meeting with the 
British (or perhaps because of it) he was appointed, with Benjamin Franklin and Edward 
Rutledge, as one of a committee of three to meet with the British.
84
  
 The three Americans met with Lord Howe at Billopp House on Staten Island. Even 
though it belonged to the Loyalist Christopher Billopp, the Hessians who had been quartered 
there had treated it so poorly that for the meeting the floor of the parlor was spread with moss 
and green branches—to dampen the smell.  Howe believed that the great majority of 
Americans were loyal and that the Patriots were a minority.  After discussing his affections for 
America and Massachusetts, Howe observed that the Declaration of Independence had 
“changed the ground”.  If it was given up, pardons could be issued and re-union with Britain on 
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terms advantageous to the colonies as well as Britain could be made. Howe added that he could 
not confer with them as members of Congress, as he could not acknowledge that body, but 
merely as “gentlemen of great ability and influence”, as private persons, and as British subjects. 
Adams replied that he could be considered in any character except as a British subject.
85
  
 This was the sticking point. Independence truly had changed everything. Offers and 
plans which a few months earlier might have diffused the crisis were now inadequate. Having 
crossed the “Rubicon” of Independence, having symbolically executed the king, having had 
their love and loyalty for the King and the Empire turn to hate and rejection, a voluntary return 
to being subjects was impossible. Only crushing military defeat could possibly convince Patriot 
Americans to accept the King as their ruler, and even then their acceptance would be grudging. 
As events on Long Island showed, even the taking of solemn oaths signified for most only a 
bowing to necessity, not a change of heart.  Colonel Gardiner, for example, worked for the 
British and forced people to take the loyalty oath, but when the opportunity arose fled Long 
Island and again served the Patriot cause.  Thus, negotiations which did not acknowledge 
American independence were useless for the Americans.  Negotiations which recognized 
American independence were unacceptable to the British. 
 After three hours of discussion, Howe and the delegates departed. Negotiation was 
impossible as long as the colonies did not give up independence.  The Americans returned to 
their lines. There was nothing left to do but fight.
86
   
                                                           
85
 McCullough, 156-7.  
86
 Ibid., 155-8. Before the committee had left New Jersey for Staten Island, one of Lord Howe’s officers had stated 
that he would remain behind as a guarantee that the committee would not be seized. The committee would not 
hear of it, and the officer returned to Staten Island with the committee. Seeing him return to Staten Island, Howe 
told the committee that they had paid him a great compliment. Whatever else Howe was, he was a gentleman of 
173 
 
 One other thing should be noted here. The Howe brothers wore two hats:  they were 
high-ranking military officers trying to win a war and they were also Peace Commissioners. They 
held the sword in one hand and the olive branch in another. It is difficult to both fight a war and 
try to make peace. Efforts to win a war militarily might doom or poison the peace; conversely, 
efforts to negotiate a peaceful end to a conflict could harm efforts to fight it. For example, 
destroying cities and farms might hasten military victory, but poison relations between victors 
and losers for years—or even harden resistance.  And the pause to seek peace permitted 
Washington to move much of his army north from the city, making the American evacuation of 
Manhattan Island easier. 
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 General Clinton had proposed seizing part of the modern Bronx to block Washington’s 
retreat, but was overruled. With the prospect of peace gone after the Billopps Conference, the 
invasion of Manhattan was ordered.  On September 15, British troops landed at Kips Bay (near 
where the United Nations is now located). The raw recruits guarding the bay broke; 
Washington tried to rally the troops, but failed. In the confusion of the battle, Washington was 
nearly captured or killed. A few days later, there was a major skirmish in a hilly part of 
Manhattan where much of the American army was located. This skirmish became known as the 
Battle of Harlem Heights; much of it was fought on or near the present-day site of Columbia 
University. The British were pushed back here, giving the Americans a morale boost. Despite 
this, Washington’s army soon retreated from Manhattan to the relative safety of the mainland. 
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However, a large force was left in Fort Washington in North Manhattan, overlooking the 
Hudson. Their intent was to block the Hudson, but the fort was eventually captured.
88
 
On September 16, 1776 General James Robertson was made military commandant of 
New York City. Robertson was an experienced staff officer who had lived in the city several 
years earlier and had recommended that the invasion begin in Staten Island, not Gravesend. 
The city he took over had been reduced by the flight of much of its populace to a population of 
about 400 or 500 people, mostly Loyalists, but thousands of Loyalists would stream in during 
the next few months and throughout the war. 
89
  As the historian Judith L. Van Buskirk 
described it, the influx of Loyalist refugees would continue throughout the war, “with surges of 
new Tories arriving whenever the British army withdrew its protection from an area: New 
Jersey in 1777; Philadelphia in 1778; Rhode Island on 1779; Virginia in 1779, 1780, and 1781; 
South Carolina in 1781.”
90
  But on that September day, those who remained in New York City 
“behaved in all respects, women as well as men, like overjoyed Bedlamites.” At the Fort, a 
woman pulled down the rebel flag and hoisted a British flag, “after trampling the other [the 
rebel standard] under Foot with the most contemptuous indignation.”
91
  Manhattan was British 
again. Five days after taking his position as commandant, Robertson was faced with a major 
challenge:   the Great Fire.  
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While small by the standards of London, New York, with its excellent port and strategic 
location,  was clearly a great prize in a war. Its buildings could house many British officers, 
soldiers, and refugees in relative comfort. Hence, the possibility of destroying New York had 
long been discussed—by Americans. Nathaniel Greene, Joseph Reed, and even New Yorker 
John Jay all urged that the city be demolished if it had to be abandoned. After all, as Greene 
argued, with some justice, “Two Thirds of the Property of the City of New York and the 
Subburbs belongs to Tories.” 
92
 British control of the city, with all the advantages it would give 
them, could not be contemplated, so it was argued that the city should be destroyed before 
they could occupy it. Beyond strategic necessity, the historian Philip Ranlet suggests a darker 
motive for the destruction of New York City was possessed by some Americans. New York and 
New England had long distrusted each other, and been rivals economically. Both had 
encroached on and claimed each other’s territories during the colonial era.  Even today, echoes 
of this enmity can be seen in the intense rivalry between the fans of the Boston Red Sox and 
the rather ironically named New York Yankees.  The strong possibility exists that the Great Fire 
was set by Americans, most likely New Englanders, acting either with or without orders. 
93
 
 
Ambrose Serle, Lord Howe’s secretary, described the fire as follows: 
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This Morning about 1 o’clock, we were alarmed with the Appearance of a Fire in 
the Town: and presently after it burst out, at several Places, into a most 
tremendous Blaze. The Wind was rather strong, which increased the Rapidity of 
the Flames: & these extended in a Line for almost the Length of a mile, 
consuming onward from the East River, for several hours together, to the North 
River up to St. Paul’s Church, which wonderfully escaped, while Trinity 
Church…was utterly destroyed.
94
  
 
 
  Serle blamed “Some Rebels, who lurked about the Town,” and stated that several of 
them had been caught with matches and “Fire-balls” upon them.  In addition, Serle reported 
that one man was detected in the act and was “knocked down by a Grenadier & thrown into 
the Flames for his Reward.” Another person was found cutting handles off of water-buckets to 
prevent their use; he was reportedly hanged by sailors.One of the people arrested with 
matches and £500 on his person was Captain Fellows, a New Englander. He became the chief 
suspect. On the smoky morning of September 21, Serle recorded that “The New England People 
are maintained to be at the Bottom of this Plot, which they have long since threatened to put 
into Execution.”
95
  The Mercury commented that “the New-England Incendiaries…had long 
threatened the Performance of this villainous Deed; and this is the best return that the People 
of Property in this City, who have espoused their Cause, are to expect for their heedless 
Credulity.”
96
 
  Smith reported that about one thousand houses, or one-quarter of the City had been 
consumed.  Robertson agreed that about a quarter of the city had been destroyed.
97
 Patriots 
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blamed the British for the fire, or thought it was an accident. 
98
  Despite the illogic of blaming 
the British, the Patriots successfully managed to pin the blame on the British in the public mind. 
The cause of the New York fire has long been disputed by many historians.  There was no 
conclusive trial, and all suspects pled innocence. Amazingly, many of those arrested were soon 
released.  No investigation was launched until Commander-in-Chief Guy Carleton launched one 
in October, 1783. This was only weeks before the final evacuation, and shows an amazing 
slackness by the British authorities.  The most recent historian to examine the question of 
responsibility for the blaze, Benjamin Carp, suggest that Washington ordered the burning 
surreptitiously, or that it was set by “rogue elements” from New England.
99
   
While Robertson may have been slack in investigating the fire, no complaints can be 
made about his fighting of the fire. Two regiments were sent into the city to act as guards on 
the streets and to prevent looting. Public buildings were also guarded. As Smith mentioned, 
Robertson saved several suspected incendiaries from being killed by a furious mob.  The royal 
warehouses and magazine was threatened by flames, and Robertson diverted fire engines to 
save the valuable supplies. In the process, his own home was destroyed.  Howe and Tryon both 
informed the ministry that Robertson’s efforts had prevented the total destruction of the 
city.
100
    
 
 Following the Battle of Harlem Heights and the fire, the two armies traveled by parallel 
paths through Westchester. Washington’s army followed the Bronx River through western 
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Westchester north, leaving Manhattan Island on October 16. The British had attempted to cut 
off the American retreat by landing at Throg’s Neck in southeast Westchester Oct 12, thinking it 
was a peninsula. Unfortunately for them, it turned out to be marshy, often an island, and the 
Americans had destroyed the bridge to more solid ground. Regrouping, a few days later the 
British landed troops at Pell’s Point a few miles north, then marched north, hugging the coast. 
They marched through New Rochelle and Mamaroneck on the Sound, and then turned north to 
White Plains, arriving on October 28. Washington’s troops were waiting for them, having 
established themselves on a hill overlooking the town.
101
 
 The Convention in the meantime, was “a government in flight.” The Fourth Provincial 
Congress had met in White Plains because of its relative safety from the British; the Asia and 
other British warships had been a constant threat, and at the end of June, the British invasion 
fleet had appeared.  It was in White Plains that the Congress had declared New York 
independent and then renamed itself the Convention of Representatives of New York. Now, the 
British were marching on White Plains. The Convention moved about 25 miles north to Fishkill 
(on the east bank of the Hudson in Dutchess County), and then later about another 25 miles 
north to Kingston (on the west bank of the Hudson in Ulster County). It governed the state in 
“abandoned churches and in private homes”, and its “members burdened the ablest among 
them with staggering loads.”  Somehow, despite all this, the Convention managed to produce a 
Constitution. This constitution steered away from both democratic and conservative extremes. 
It declared the people were the source of power, and enlarged the Assembly to over sixty, its 
membership distributed among the counties in a manner roughly proportional to population. 
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However, the legislature also had a second house which could delay or even halt popularly 
desired legislation, and  it excluded many of the lower classes—farm laborers, urban poor—
from the franchise. Kingston was the final location of the Convention—but it would not prove 
to be the end of the travels of the government. The legislature of the state under the new 
constitution would also have to flee.
102
 
 “Westchester County”, as historian Sung Bok Kim notes, “became a major theatre of 
war, as it remained throughout the entire conflict, with devastating consequences for the lives 
of its people.” Soldiers—from both sides—destroyed and trampled fields, cut down trees, 
destroyed houses, and pulled down fences to use as firewood. Noncombatants and their goods 
were attacked and stolen by roving bands of regulars and irregulars. Livestock and other goods 
were “impressed” in return for certificates. The uncertainty of payment on these certificates 
made the line between plundering and impressment hazy. And everyone, Patriots, Loyalists, 
and non-aligned all suffered from these actions.
103
  
 As the British marched towards White Plains, the people along the march were 
plundered and, as one correspondent reported, not even women’s and children’s clothing was 
immune. While laying especial blame on the Hessians, British colonel Stephen Kemble noted 
“No wonder if the country people refused to join us.”
104
 New Englanders, again showing the 
enmity to New Yorkers noted above, plundered Westchester homes, refused protection to 
distressed Westchester residents after the Battle of White Plains, and needlessly burned during 
the battle the county courthouse and most of the homes. The generals of both sides issued 
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orders against these actions, but they were difficult to enforce, especially for the Americans, 
whose troops were new and lacked discipline. 
105
     
On October 28, the British attacked the American forces on Chatterton’s Hill overlooking 
White Plains. The British drove them from the hill, but suffered heavy casualties in what 
became known as the Battle of White Plains. This may have discouraged Howe from pressing 
the attack, for Washington’s army again slipped away. Howe lacked accurate maps, and 
according to British historian Piers MacKesy “was convinced that Washington did not intend to 
stand and fight.” 
106
 Seeing no point in chasing him north, Howe headed south and attacked 
Fort Washington (on the isle of Manhattan) on November 16.  The fort, which the Americans 
had thought invulnerable, was taken with over 3000 men. Fort Lee, on the opposite side of the 
Hudson in New Jersey, was quickly abandoned. Leaving a few thousand troops to guard the 
Highlands (the area straddling the Hudson from approximately Stony Point to Newburgh), 
Washington headed south through New Jersey, as the British followed.
107
    
With the capture of Fort Washington, Manhattan was firmly in British hands. Long 
Island, Staten Island and Manhattan would remain British for the duration of the war. The 
modern Bronx and part of what is now southern Westchester were all in British hands, with a 
no man’s land called the Neutral Ground between them. It seemed certain that much of New 
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Jersey would soon follow. This would, at the very least, provide a large area of forests and 
farms to feed and fuel the British, Hessians, and the people of southern New York. Within six 
weeks of the fall of Fort Washington, these hopes were dashed. In a few months, the strategic 
situation would alter immensely. This would lead to a new strategy which would lead to an 
abortive British attempt to restore civilian government in New York.   
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In 1778, the French entered the war on the American side. The British loss at 
Saratoga, the product of some questionable British decisions, was a major factor in 
French entry. French entry would alter the entire nature of the war for Britain from a 
colonial rebellion to a world war. The main front of the war shifted from the colonies to 
the West Indies. Peace with the colonies was now a priority.  Much of this chapter will 
deal with the Carlisle Commission, which was sent to negotiate a peace. While their 
mission was a failure, a new strategy would arise in part from this mission. This new 
strategy would bring a new governor to New York, tasked with restoring civilian 
government to the British-controlled portion of the province. 
 
 
I 
 
 
 
 In late 1776, General Howe’s troops occupied much of New Jersey as a result of their 
pursuit of Washington’s retreating army. Howe, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in 
America, hoped to hold eastern New Jersey, and proposed that a large number of troops be 
quartered there, “without which we should be under much difficulty to find Covering, Forage, & 
Supplies of fresh Provisions for the Army.”
1
 Howe was quite correct in his assessment, as the 
loss of eastern New Jersey after Trenton and Princeton resulted in an inability to use this area 
to help provision the Army. The inability to freely forage in the area caused great difficulties on 
Long Island and Staten Island, as their wood, hay, and other resources were taxed to the 
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maximum.
2
  Philadelphia was not at the time Howe’s main strategic objective, nor had its 
capture been a major goal of British policy. Indeed, the reason Howe’s army was deep in New 
Jersey in late November 1776 was because the decisive defeat of the main rebel army was the 
British commander’s goal, and Washington had rather unexpectedly retreated in the direction 
of Philadelphia, rather than towards New England.
3
  The British had long considered New 
England to be the heart of the rebellion, and crushing (or at least isolating) the region 
economically and geographically was the main goal of British strategy.  Controlling the Hudson 
and cutting New England off from the rest of the colonies was an important element of British 
policy.
4
   As a bonus, such a strategy would bring the bulk of the province of New York back 
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In late 1775, the Loyalist clergyman Jonathan  Boucher noted the importance of New York, and suggested to 
Germain that  it be made a “Place of Arms”:  
             
New York, the City, I mean, is peculiarly fitted both by its Situation, and the Sentiments of the People, to 
be made a Place of Arms. Not less than 10000 men should be sent thither…Armed vessels can go up to 
Albany, &, with infinite Ease, cut off all Communication between the Northern and Southern 
Governments.   
 
 Boucher to Germain, November 27, 1775, Sackville-Germain Papers, Vol. IV, Clement Library.  
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under the rule of the Crown—and quite possibly would result in the destruction of 
Washington’s army as well.    
 Howe’s November 30 letter to Germain was in accord with this strategy. Howe 
proposed that in 1777, at least ten thousand men should move on Albany, while a defensive 
army of eight thousand would cover New Jersey and keep Washington “in check, by giving a 
Jealousy to Philadelphia”. An army of ten thousand based in Rhode Island was to advance on 
Boston and if possible take it. An attack on Philadelphia was proposed for the autumn, 
depending on the success of the above operations. These plans would require the provision of 
additional troops.
5
 These plans also clearly indicate that New England was the main objective of 
Howe’s plans—Philadelphia was a secondary objective, to be attacked only if the attempt to 
isolate and attack New England had been a success. 
 In the weeks that followed the November 30 communication, much changed. Howe had 
pursued the American army across New Jersey, and found himself at the gates of Philadelphia, 
stymied only by the Delaware River and a lack of boats to cross it.  New Jersey had been 
restored to the Crown, and the people of New Jersey were formally declaring their loyalty to 
the King, as were many Pennsylvanians. While lacking the strategic virtues of New York 
(especially if one’s aim was to isolate and/or crush New England), Philadelphia was arguably the 
most important city in the colonies, and the home of Congress.  If the rebels could be said to 
have a capital, Philadelphia was it.  Howe had failed to gain a decisive defeat at Long Island and 
the battles that followed—perhaps one could be gained here? The apparent change in attitude 
of many Americans, evidenced by their desire to seek pardons, was decisive:  
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…the Opinions of the People being much changed in Pennsylvania, and their 
Minds in general, from the late Progress of the Army disposed to Peace, in which 
sentiment they would be confirmed by our getting Possession of Philadelphia, I 
am from this consideration fully persuaded the principal Army should act 
offensively on that side where the Enemy’s chief strength will certainly be 
collected.
6
  
 
 
 In short, Howe proposed to seize Philadelphia, with the hope that the capture of that 
city would be the decisive blow, at the least ending resistance in the Middle Colonies. This was 
a break with the main outline of prior British strategy.
7
 As discussed above, the British had 
planned to isolate New England by sending one army up the Hudson while another descended 
from Canada. As the plan developed, a third force was to attack from the West against Fort 
Stanwix on the Mohawk (the present site of Rome, New York).  
 Nonetheless, had Howe been a more aggressive general, he might have found a way to 
cross the Delaware and attack Philadelphia in late December or January. Indeed, he hoped to 
cross the Delaware once it was completely frozen.  Such an attack may very well have had the 
demoralizing effects for the Americans Howe thought it would have. But before that could 
happen, Washington attacked Trenton and Princeton. The reverses they suffered in these two 
battles made the British pull back their forces. This pull-back resulted in the abandonment of 
most of New Jersey except Brunswick and Amboy. Many who had taken the King’s pardon now 
submitted to Congress. The Loyalist units that were forming dispersed.
8
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 Nonetheless, Howe did not abandon the idea of attacking Philadelphia, and hopefully 
gaining the decisive victory and destruction of Washington’s army which he had missed so far. 
Such a defeat could end the war, or at the least regain the Middle Colonies for the Crown.   Of 
course, it must be noted that Washington would no doubt have opposed a move up the 
Hudson, providing Howe with plenty of opportunities to destroy Washington’s army in a 
decisive battle. (Conversely, the geography of the area, discussed further below, might have 
provided Washington with opportunities to defeat isolated portions of Howe’s army).   A move 
up the Hudson also would have fit in with prior strategy, and supported the planned invasion 
from Canada. But Howe decided on the Philadelphia campaign for 1777.  
 Communications across the Atlantic were slow, and orders from London were often out 
of date even before they were issued. Trans-Atlantic official correspondence was generally 
numbered, and many a letter began with a recounting of what letters had been received—and 
usually, one or two numbers are conspicuous by their absence. The vagaries of wind, storm, 
and (especially after French entry) enemy action would result in delays, lost letters, and letters 
arriving out of sequence. Travel times were often quite long, for the same reason (not 
surprisingly, since communications could not move faster than the means of transportation). As 
an example, Ambrose Serle, secretary to Lord Howe, left for America with Howe on board a 
British man-of war on May 11, 1776. He arrived in Halifax on June 23, sailed out the same day 
from Halifax, first sighted “the Eastern Part of Long Island” on July 6, and finally arrived at their 
destination, Staten Island, on July 12. Here they were “saluted by all the Ships of War in the 
Harbour, by the Cheers of the Sailors all along the Ships, and by those of the Soldiers on the 
Shore.” The wind had been unfavorable during much of the journey, and they had been 
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plagued by fog and rain. They had also seen some icebergs.
9
 This summer journey—a journey of 
a warship carrying the chief Admiral for the war (and a Peace Commissioner, as well), took two 
months.  And summer was generally considered good sailing weather. These stories could be 
multiplied many times.
10
 Travel and communication across the Atlantic was slow and often 
dangerous, either because of nature or man.   
    Partially as a result of the difficulty and slowness of trans-Atlantic communications,  
Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the American Colonies and de facto secretary of 
war for the American war (of whom more shortly), had limited control over the actions of his 
generals. While Germain tried to give the war some direction, either through orders, or more 
usually, suggestions, much of the conduct of the war was of necessity in the hands of the 
commanders in America. Howe decided on the attack on Philadelphia without consulting 
Germain, though he did inform Britain of his plan, and did receive Germain’s approval.
11
  
 Many believe that Germain should have exerted more control and direction over the 
war. Indeed, many views of Germain have been extremely unfavorable.  For example, the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century soldier and author General F.V Greene called Germain 
“probably the most incompetent official that ever held an important post at a critical moment.”  
Sir John Fortescue, editor of George III’s papers, called him a “deplorable Secretary of State.”
12
 
Alan Valentine, his biographer, relates that “History has tended to accept the harsher verdicts 
[of his contemporaries], since his critics were more eloquent than his defenders.” As for 
himself, Valentine reports that he could not bring himself to like Germain (a failure to like one’s 
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subject is usually disastrous for a biographer), and adds that “In the effort to avoid doing him 
injustice, I have searched for every episode and interpretation that could be turned in his 
favour, but though I have found enough to temper my distaste I have not found enough to 
remove it”. 
13
  
 McKesy dismisses  Greene’s judgment  as based on ignorance, unfamiliarity with the 
workings of eighteenth century government, and reading Lord Shelburne and other “malicious” 
writings too credulously.  He notes that, while impatient of delays and frustrations, Germain 
was well-liked by his Under-Secretaries.  He was considered a good administrator and 
“incapable of despondency.” Optimism, good administrative skills, general agreement with the 
government on war goals, and even impatience (if translated into speeding action) are all good 
qualities in a war leader, as McKesy notes.
14
 Under the circumstances of the Revolutionary War, 
a good administrator who agreed with the King on policy to the colonies and was incapable of 
despair seems like a very good choice for a de facto war minister.  Indeed, not even Yorktown 
seems to have shaken Germain’s optimism, and his papers contain plans for limited offensive 
actions in America in 1782.
15
 Much of the poor contemporary opinion of him probably is a 
result of people seeking to lay blame for the loss of America—as well as resulting from older 
enmities arising from events described below.  However, in the planning for 1777, Germain did 
not exercise his position and authority as forcibly as he should have.  Orders to ensure that 
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Howe would have enough troops on the lower Hudson to support Burgoyne (or to cancel the 
Philadelphia expedition entirely) should have been issued.  It is possible that events in his 
earlier life may have made Germain reluctant to issue the necessary orders to the Howes.
16
 
 Lord Germain was born George Sackville on June 26, 1716, the third son of the seventh 
Earl and first Duke of Dorset. His family was one of the oldest and most powerful in England. 
Herbrand de Sackville had entered England with William the Conqueror. The family had 
prospered as Barons of Buckhurst, and been granted an earldom (the third highest rank of the 
English peerage) and family seat at Knole by Queen Elizabeth. The seat at Knole included six 
quadrangles, known by names such as the Stone Court or Green Court, and 365 rooms. As a 
young man, he seemed both talented and “steady”, and was the favorite of his father and the 
Lady Betty Germain (née Lady Elizabeth Berkeley) a close friend of the family who had an 
apartment at Knole. He had many useful family connections; he was related by blood to Tudors, 
Howards, and other famous families, and he had important Scottish connections through his 
mother. In a country where birth, family and connections were vital to obtaining high and 
important positions (and for all intents and purposes a prerequisite for a high military 
command), George Sackville was well-situated to have an outstanding career.
17
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 Sackville attended Trinity College in Dublin (his father had been made the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland), and began a military career, punctuated by accompanying his father on a 
diplomatic assignment to Paris in the 1730s. He served in the War of the Austrian Succession, 
known in America as King George’s War (1740-1748). In 1743, he accompanied George II, the 
last ruling British monarch to go to battle, on an expedition against the French, where he is said 
to have distinguished himself. He became George II’s aide-de-camp. In 1745, Sackville was 
seriously wounded, shot in the breast at the Battle of Fontenoy. When he fell, he was carried 
into the tent of the French king. Recovery from the wound took a long time. In his next 
command, he helped oppose the Jacobite rebellion of 1745, pursuing the remnants of the 
Scottish supporters of “Bonnie Prince Charlie” after the Battle of Culloden. In between his 
military activities, he pursued a career in Parliament, as the member for Dover (his father was 
Warden of the Cinque Ports, of which Dover was one). 
18
 
 His star was in the ascendant until August of 1759 and the Battle of Minden. The events 
of this battle would haunt his career for many years, give him life-long enemies, and may very 
well have had a negative impact on his management of the American Revolution. Minden was 
one of the most important battles of the Seven Years War. It was a major defeat of the French 
by British and allied forces.  Minden is located in modern northwestern Germany.  The French 
had charged the allies several times, but been repulsed. The allied army then attacked and 
threw the French into confusion. The allied cavalry, under the command of George Sackville, 
had not yet been committed to battle. Prince Ferdinand, the allied commander, sent several 
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messengers to Sackville, ordering an immediate attack. Such an attack could have turned the 
French defeat into a total rout. But, for some mysterious reason, the cavalry attack did not 
come. After a delay of over a half hour, the cavalry finally moved—but by then the French had 
retreated behind the fortifications of Minden. Recriminations flew, and Sackville was told 
bluntly by Ferdinand that he had disobeyed orders, and that the failure to win a great victory 
was his fault. Sackville argued that he had received conflicting or confusing orders, that he had 
done nothing wrong, and eventually insisted on a court martial to clear his name. By the time it 
was held in 1760, public opinion had already convicted him of disobedience, and given the 
reason as cowardice. The actual court-martial declared him guilty of disobeying orders. His 
sentence was to be declared unfit to serve the King in any military capacity. George II forbid his 
appearance at court and had the verdict read to every regiment.
19
 
 Sackville slowly recovered from his disgrace through minor posts and a new King, 
George III. In 1770, Lady Betty Germain died and bequeathed her estates to Sackville—if he 
would take her name. Perhaps hoping for a fresh start, he took the name and by an Act of 
Parliament he became Lord George Germain.
20
 
  On American affairs, Germain held positions similar to the king’s: America should 
acknowledge Parliament’s right to legislate in all cases; once that occurred, then the complaints 
of the Americans could be dealt with.
21
 In November of 1775, Germain joined Lord North’s 
government as Secretary of State for the Colonies (as the position was formally known—many 
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referred to it as the Secretary for America or for the American Colonies).
22
 In this position, he 
would function as a de facto Secretary of War until after Yorktown. His letters reveal optimism 
about the war effort that at times seems to border on Pollyanism. This is historical hindsight— 
much of the information he received concerning America came from questionable intelligence. 
He would not be the last statesman to act on information that at the time seemed correct and 
believable, but later turned out to be incorrect.   
 Germain seems a curious choice for a position which would require him to run a war—
many despised him, and thought that he was a coward—and he had been declared unfit to 
serve the King in a military capacity. But he held views similar to George III, and was a “King’s 
man.”  Germain was part of the old Leicester House faction which had coalesced around the 
future George III during the reign of George II. Such factions arising around the heir to the 
throne were a common feature of the Hanoverian monarchy. It is possible that the Minden case 
was pursued so vehemently against Germain because of his membership in the Leicester House 
faction.
23
   
 George III, the new king, slowly helped the rehabilitation of his faction-member. In any 
event, while Germain was a member of the King’s faction, Germain was not as well-connected 
as the Howes, who were favorites of the King (and, as discussed above, probably relatives).   
Historian Robert Middlekauff  argues that Germain, who was still under suspicion of cowardice 
by many, and had been prohibited by court-martial from further military service, was 
uncomfortable in the new government and in issuing orders to the Howes. In any event, he did 
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not order Howe to abandon his plans for Philadelphia, or to ensure that he could cooperate 
with the invasion from Canada that Germain soon approved. Germain’s failure to more 
forcefully insist on this (or to even cancel the Philadelphia expedition), combined with the 
unavoidable necessity of giving commanders in the Atlantic much free rein (because of the 
slowness and difficulty of communication), were a major cause of the British defeat at Saratoga. 
The mysterious events of Minden appear to have cast a long shadow and affected the waging of 
the Revolutionary War.
24
 
 
 
 At about the same time General Howe was planning an attack on Philadelphia, Germain 
and the King approved a plan by General John Burgoyne to take Albany through an invasion 
from Canada down the Lake Champlain route. It would be supported by an attack by Lt. Colonel 
Barry St. Leger from Oswego down the Mohawk. The two “prongs” of the attack would meet at 
Albany. Burgoyne’s plan did not include a northward march from New York, and Germain failed 
to tell Howe of Burgoyne’s mission early enough for it to affect his planning. Burgoyne claimed 
his plan would isolate New England, though it is difficult to see how possessing Albany alone 
would be enough to do that. New York City was militarily “the only vital city in the colonies.”
25
  
In addition to its magnificent harbor and its position at the mouth of the Hudson, it also 
dominated land communications between New England and the rest of the colonies. The main 
land transportation routes between New England and the other colonies ran in peacetime from 
Trenton and Princeton through New York, Kingsbridge, New Rochelle, and Connecticut. 
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Possession of New York City by the British had pushed the main transportation route back to a 
hilly area known as the Highlands. These Highlands stretched along the Hudson between about 
Stony Point and Newburgh.  One route stretched through Stony Point, while another route 
existed further north at Fishkill, north of Newburgh. The loss of New York City meant that 
American land-based trade, troop movement, and communications went through the two 
crossings in the Highlands. If a British army were to gain possession of the Highlands, and thus, 
the vital crossings at Stony Point and Fishkill, New England would be effectively isolated by that 
army’s presence and by British naval blockade, even if Albany remained in American hands. The 
Americans would make many forts to guard the Highlands. Militarily, the Highlands were as 
vital to the Americans as New York was to the British.
26
  Despite the many good reasons for a 
major armed thrust up the Hudson, and the fact that a southwards attack was to occur, the 
northward attack was not ordered. The southern prong that had long been part of British 
strategy, the march up the Hudson by a sizable army out of New York, thus never occurred, as 
these forces were diverted to the attack on Philadelphia. Failure—a failure which this author 
believes was caused in part by Howe’s decision to head south, not north—followed.  
  The western prong of the attack, under St. Leger, was blunted at Oriskany in August, 
1777. While unfortunate for the British, the failure of this attack was not fatal to their plans. St. 
Leger’s expedition, whose objective was Fort Stanwix (located on the Mohawk in modern 
Rome, NY), was mainly a diversion.   The northern prong, under General Burgoyne, headed 
south from Canada in June of 1777, and had some initial victories, taking the important fort of 
Ticonderoga in early July. Then they ran into supply difficulties, as well as the difficulties of 
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moving a large army through the woods of northern New York, as a large army of Continentals 
and New York and New England militia gathered near Albany. The Americans wrecked bridges 
and dropped trees across their path, and defeated a large British detachment seeking supplies 
near Bennington, Vermont (the actual Battle of Bennington was fought in what is now New 
York State). Burgoyne’s army was finally stymied in September by a strong defensive position in 
the vicinity of Saratoga, about 20 miles north of Albany, prepared by the Polish engineer 
Thaddeus Kosciusko.  
 To the south, Howe’s army had traveled via ship to the Philadelphia region (landing at 
Head of Elk on the Chesapeake) and taken Philadelphia in late September—but by taking the 
sea route, he had left much of New Jersey still in American hands. Washington’s army, while it 
failed to keep the British from taking Philadelphia, was still intact. Hence, Howe’s main army 
was unable to send detachments north or otherwise support Burgoyne’s army. If a sizable 
British force could have traveled north up the Hudson, it would possibly have resulted in the 
American army at Saratoga sending troops south to meet it, or units heading towards Saratoga 
turning instead to face the northbound threat. Either result would have made things easier for 
Burgoyne and given him more options.   
 With Howe in Pennsylvania, General Sir Henry Clinton was left in charge in New York 
City. Finally receiving some long-expected reinforcements, he led a small force north to aid 
Burgoyne in early October.
27
 He seized much of the Highlands (and high praise from Germain),
28
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but his actions were unable to aid Burgoyne. Kingston, north of the Highlands on the Hudson, 
was attacked by units under Clinton’s command on October 15. This resulted in the first session 
of independent New York’s legislature under the new constitution swiftly ending after being in 
session barely a month, as the representatives fled the approaching troops. Two thousand men 
under Clinton’s command headed up the Hudson in transports, but the pilots refused to go 
closer to Albany than about 45 miles away, halting at Livingston Manor on the seventeenth of 
October.  American forces (numbering about 5000) posted on the Hudson made any closer 
approach dangerous. Further movement north would have been futile anyway, for Burgoyne 
had surrendered on the seventeenth, though Clinton’s forces were unaware of this as they had 
no communication with Burgoyne.  Burgoyne had lost the Battle of Freeman’s Farm in 
September. Another battle, the Battle of Bemis Heights, was fought in early October. It was at 
this battle that Benedict Arnold (or his leg at least) won undying fame. This second battle 
resulted in the over-running of important British positions, and Burgoyne, short on troops and 
supplies, retreated north. His retreat failed, and Burgoyne was forced to surrender on Oct. 17, 
1777.
29
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 Clinton was soon forced to abandon the Highlands as many of his units were ordered to 
Philadelphia.
30
  The British thus abandoned without a fight the vital crossings which could have 
effectively isolated New England. The positions, which they had gained at relatively little cost, 
were sacrificed to the needs of the misguided Philadelphia expedition. Indeed, arguably 
Burgoyne’s army had been sacrificed to the needs of the Philadelphia expedition. In later years, 
the British would expend much blood, treasure, and effort to regain the control of the 
Highlands that they had relinquished in 1777. In 1779, they would send a small expedition to 
gain control, only to be rebuffed by Mad Anthony Wayne at the Battle of Stony Point. In 1780, 
they would offer Benedict Arnold thousands of pounds for West Point, the key to the 
Highlands. Major Andre, a well-liked young officer involved in the negotiations with Arnold, 
died as a result of his involvement in these negotiations,  captured and hanged by the 
Americans as a spy. And as will be discussed below, Howe evacuated Philadelphia in June of 
1778. 
 Saratoga is generally considered one of the most decisive battles (or campaigns) in 
history,
31
 and rightly so. The Americans had destroyed an entire British army, and (with no 
small help from the questionable decision by Howe to attack Philadelphia instead of the 
Highlands) thwarted an attempt to split New England from the rest of the colonies. The victory 
seemed proof that “the American country with its armed population might be beyond the 
                                                           
30
 McKesy, 144; Willcox 188-190. 
31
 Sir Edward Shepard Creasy included it in his Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: From Marathon to Waterloo 
(1851) and American military historian Lt. Col. Joseph B. Mitchell included it in his updated version of Creasy, 
Twenty Decisive Battles of the World  (1964, 2004).  
199 
 
power of Britain to reconquer with any force which she could raise and sustain in America.”
32
    
The battle raised American morale, as Howe informed Germain in a private communication:  
 
In consequence of the Misfortune that has fallen upon the troops under 
Lieutenant General Burgoyne’s Command, a considerable Reinforcement from 
General Gate’s Corps has joined General Washington. The Hopes of the People 
at large, as well as of the Rebel army, are greatly raised from this Event, and I am 
free to own I do not apprehend a successful terminate to the War from any 
Advantages His Majesty’s Troops can gain while the Enemy is able to avoid, or 
unwilling to hazard, a decisive Action, which might reduce the Leaders…to make 
an overture for Peace…unless a respectable Addition to the Army is sent from 
Europe… 
33
    
 
 
             Most importantly, the American victory assured France—and eventually other powers—
that the Americans had a chance to win their independence. The Americans had shown they 
could not only defeat British troops (Trenton and Princeton had already demonstrated that), 
but destroy British armies. The possibility that they could actually defeat the British and win 
their independence seemed much  greater after Saratoga.  The victory helped convince the 
French that entering the war on the American side would probably not be a waste of blood and 
treasure. There was a good chance that France would be able to reduce British power by 
helping the colonies leave the Empire—and the war offered a chance for France to gain parts of 
Britain’s empire. France’s war aims were to at least partially to overturn the results of the Great 
War for the Empire, and regain lost parts of her empire and markets—but out of deference to 
her American allies, she would forego her claim on Canada, and seek gains in the West Indies, 
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Africa, and India. When war between France and Britain broke out in the spring of 1778, the 
North American colonies became a secondary front—control of the sugar-rich islands of the 
West Indies became the most important objective of the war for both the French and the 
British, and both sides sent many soldiers and ships there.
34
     
 The news of Saratoga prompted a reappraisal of British strategy, in anticipation of 
French entry into the war. The wealth the Caribbean islands produced was vast. The islands 
accounted for perhaps a third of France’s overseas trade. As for Britain, annually 300 ships 
loaded with sugar and rum entered into London from the West Indies; and, while an important 
port, London was just one of several British ports where Caribbean goods arrived. There was a 
general belief the British economy and finances depended on the West Indies; likewise, it was 
believed that capturing the French islands would cripple the French economy.
35
  Capturing the 
French West Indies and denying their trade to the rebelling colonies would also put an 
economic vise on the Americans, possibly forcing them back into the British fold. And even if 
that did not work, conquering the French West Indies would be good compensation for the loss 
of America.
36
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 On March 13, 1778, France informed the British government of France’s Treaty of 
Commerce with America, signed on February 6, 1778. Such a treaty was tantamount to 
recognition of American independence. A treaty of alliance had also been signed on Feb. 6, but 
the British were not formally informed of that treaty. The British ambassador was recalled. It 
would be a few weeks before actual fighting began, and before that occurred a peace mission 
to the Americans had begun, as will be discussed shortly.
37
 
 French entry into the war changed everything. The war was transformed from a colonial 
rebellion into a world war. Britain had to defend its home islands, defend its Caribbean 
possessions while trying to seize French ones, and defend possessions throughout the world. As 
the war developed, Spain and the Netherlands joined the French as enemies of Britain, and the 
entry of Russia as an enemy was a serious possibility.   Fighting occurred not just in North 
America and the Caribbean, but in India, Gibraltar, and other areas. The home islands had to be 
protected against a serious threat of attack; in 1779, a joint Spanish-French “second armada” 
attempted an invasion of England, but supply and other considerations ended it before any 
landfall was made.
38
  
  With the concurrence of the King,
39
 a decision was made to make the West Indies the 
main front of the war, and to assure that enough ships were available in home waters to guard 
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against a possible French invasion. Ending the war with America in order to concentrate against 
the French was considered desirable—so desirable that the King even contemplated 
abandoning the rebellious colonies entirely. On March 21, Peace Commissioners were ordered 
to be sent to New York at once—and if they determined that there was no prospect of success, 
that city might have to be evacuated. The decision was made to abandon Philadelphia, and to 
send the troops there to New York or Halifax. Under the circumstances, as the King put it, it was 
“a joke to think of keeping Pensilvania” now that France was in the war.   The abandonment of 
Philadelphia would reduce British control in mainland North America to Canada, Florida, the 
New York City region, and part of Rhode Island—mainly Newport on the island of Rhode Island. 
Indeed, the possibility of abandoning all footholds in the rebelling colonies was seriously 
mooted.
40
   
 Ships and men were now needed everywhere, from the Channel to the Philippines, from 
Nicaragua to the Mediterranean. The  number of men and ships available to Britain for the 
North American front, now at best the secondary front of the war (the historians Milton Klein 
and Ronald W. Howard even called it “in some respects, a sideshow”) was now limited.  If 
offensive operations were to be attempted at all in North America, they would have to be 
operations that could prove successful under the new circumstances.  Defeating the Americans 
would have to be pursued at the least possible cost. Both conciliation and the supplementing of 
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the British and Hessian troops with Loyalist troops began to be emphasized. There were still 
presumed to be many Loyalists in the rebelling colonies, perhaps a majority of the populace, 
and they would add new strength to the attempt to achieve peace. Loyalist troops would be 
cheaper than British regulars.
41
 
 Before the 1777 Christmas recess, North promised Parliament that new peace proposals 
would be introduced. North, Eden, and several other officers drafted the proposals, which were 
passed by “a silent and gloomy House” in February. Except for trade regulation, Britain would 
renounce the right to tax the colonies, and the Commissioners—including Eden—were soon 
appointed with very broad powers. Only one thing was off the table--independence. 
42
 
 A new strategy for fighting the war was eventually decided upon. The main source of 
this war-fighting strategy was rather ironic—the Carlisle Commission. The Carlisle Commission 
was the Peace Commission sent to America in the wake of Saratoga, and the new strategy was 
its one real concrete accomplishment.   Let us now take a closer look at the Commission and 
the strategy it inspired. 
 
II 
 
 The Carlisle Commission is an often-overlooked aspect of the American Revolution; for 
example, there are but two brief mentions in Robert Middlekauff’s The Glorious Cause, a nearly 
700 page history of the Revolution.
43
 But the Commission was sent out with high hopes. Its 
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main members were the 29 year-old nobleman, Frederick Howard, the Earl of Carlisle; William 
Eden, Member of Parliament, undersecretary of state, member of the board of trade, and 
George Johnstone, a former governor of West Florida. The Howe brothers were also Peace 
Commissioners, but they were preparing to leave America when the Carlisle Peace 
Commissioners arrived. Considering the importance of the mission, some of the membership 
choices seem curious.  
 Carlisle was young and untested. He had become the fifth Earl of Carlisle at the age of 
ten in 1758. He was educated at Eton, where he became friends with Charles James Fox, the 
future Foreign Secretary. He spent one year at Cambridge. He went on the Grand Tour in the 
late 1760s with Fox, and spent much of the tour drinking, carousing, and gambling. In 1770, he 
entered the House of Lords, and also married Lady Margaret Caroline Leveson-Gower. This 
marriage connected him to the politically influential Earl Gower, his father-in-law. Marriage did 
not end his gaming, and he developed more of a reputation of a rake; he also had at least one 
mistress.
44
   
 Carlisle turned over a new leaf as he neared his thirtieth birthday—he abandoned many 
of his excesses, began taking an interest in politics, and developed an interest in a diplomatic 
career. Perhaps age brought maturity; perhaps it was the debts and the embarrassment of 
having had to wait in Castle Howard for his rents to arrive so he could pay his creditors; perhaps 
his wife exercised a positive influence on him (his private correspondence with his wife, some 
of it excerpted below, indicates that he was quite fond of her, if not in love—and felt 
comfortable discussing important matters of state with her.) He became a privy councilor, but 
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many thought he was young for the mission. Prior to this, he mainly had been known for “the 
variety of his wardrobe and his losses at cards.”  On February 22, 1778, he was named head of 
the Peace Mission that bears his name. The general verdict, as the British historian G.M.  
Trevelyan said, was that he was “a very fit Commissioner for making a treaty which would never 
be made.”
45
 
  William Eden, while he had much knowledge of the American colonies, had been an 
undersecretary of state for the Northern Department under Lord Suffolk—a department whose 
main responsibility was not the colonies but northern Europe. Eden however had been one of 
the main proponents of the mission, and hoped membership would advance his career. He is 
generally considered the true leader of the Carlisle Commission; Carlisle however did take his 
duties seriously. Eden was 34 in 1778, having attended Eton and Christchurch at Oxford. He 
went to the Middle Temple and became a barrister, and had written in 1771 The Principles of 
Penal Law, which argued for various reforms in British law, such as the reduction of the number 
of capital offenses. 1776 proved to be a good year for Eden—he joined the Board of Trade, and 
married Eleanor Elliot. In his positions as undersecretary and Lord of Trade he had a “vast 
secret foreign correspondence”; the biographer Carl Van Doren calls him the manager of “the 
British secret service on the Continent.” He was the confidential friend and intimate of Lord 
North, and anxious for positions of advancement.   In 1778, he helped draft the peace proposals 
(see below), and joined the Commission led by his old Oxford friend, Carlisle.
46
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 Originally, Richard Jackson had been a member of the Commission. He had been a 
correspondent with Benjamin Franklin since 1753, and had worked with him as an agent for 
Pennsylvania.  The essayist Charles Lamb later immortalized Jackson as the “Omniscient 
Jackson” in his essay, Old Benchers of the Inner Temple.  His knowledge of America and its 
interests would have proved invaluable to the Commission, but he was not well-known. Eden 
suggested him to Carlisle to fill out the Commission.  Eden convinced Carlisle that Jackson’s 
“accurate knowledge of the country to which we were to repair, and his long and familiar 
acquaintance with her interests, would outbalance the insignificancy of his situation and the 
obscurity of his name.”  However, Jackson had many doubts about the success of the mission. 
At a meeting with North on March 29, 1778, Carlisle records, “so many adverse arguments 
were started by Mr. Jackson, so often surmounted, and again repeated with a fresh addition of 
difficulties, as to make it absolutely necessary to take advantage of the moment in which he 
seemed desirous to disunite himself from us…” The next day, a letter was sent which removed 
Jackson from the Commission. Carlisle feared that, if he had not been removed, he would have 
driven the other commissioners mad “before we had got to Portsmouth.”
47
  
 Eden was in despair, as the Commission was scheduled to leave by April 12. Fortunately, 
a seemingly suitable substitute was found in George Johnstone, who proved eager to be on the 
Commission. Johnstone was a former governor of a loyal colony (West Florida); not a bad 
choice, especially under the circumstances, but there were many ex-governors and other 
officials who probably had more intimate knowledge of the rebellious colonies than Johnstone.  
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Johnstone was the fourth son of a Scottish baronet, and had chosen a career in the Royal Navy, 
where he earned a reputation for bravery. Like Germain, he was court-martialed for 
disobedience—but here the underlying cause was insubordination. Losing the court martial, he 
was nonetheless ordered back to duty, where he gained more commendations for bravery. His 
problem was that he seemed to lack respect for the naval hierarchy.  Johnstone was also 
friends with Lord Bute’s secretary, the dramatist John Home.  Bute  was appointed prime 
minister in 1761 by George III.  Bute was Scottish, and many Scots received plum assignments 
during his premiership. Johnstone’s connection with Home earned him the position of 
Governor of West Florida. His governorship ended in 1767, after three years, and he became a 
Member of Parliament. While not a member of Rockingham’s faction, Johnstone worked with it 
in opposing Lord North’s American policy, and called the Tea Act “criminally absurd”.  These 
views probably made him seem acceptable to Americans, and earned him a place on the 
Commission. His elder brother, William Pulteney, about the same time as the Carlisle 
Commission, met secretly (under the alias of Mr. Williams) with Benjamin Franklin in Paris to 
discuss peace.
48
 
 Mention should also be made of the acting secretary of the Commission. In many ways, 
he was the most distinguished of all those who would soon travel to America.  He was Adam 
Ferguson, a professor of moral philosophy at Edinburgh University. He was an eminent 
philosopher and historian of the Scottish Enlightenment, and a member of the “Select Society”, 
which was “the central forum of Edinburgh’s republic of letters” (its membership included such 
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luminaries as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Lord Kames).  His most famous work was his Essay 
on the History of Civil Society (1768). He has been called “the father of modern sociology.”  He 
would later be formally appointed secretary.
49
  
 The Commissioners were given broad powers and detailed instructions by the King. They 
were to attempt to communicate with Congress or Washington and to address the colonials “by 
any style or title which may describe them”.
50
 Safe conduct to areas of negotiation was to be 
offered, and a promise that once peace was established, the colonists would “thenceforth be 
protected in trade and commerce by British power.” In times of peace, no standing army would 
be kept in America. There would be no alteration in their “Antient governments or Con 
stitutions without their consent.”
51
 While no doubt meant to be a major concession, the 
problem with this instruction was that none of the colonies were being governed under their 
“antient governments or Constitutions”—they were being governed under revolutionary 
constitutions adopted in 1776 or 1777. Under this instruction, the bulk of the colonies would go 
from a government where the people chose their own governors to a government where their 
executive officer was chosen by the King, among many other changes.  
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 The King recognized the possibility that Congress would not wish to negotiate with the 
Commissioners; in which case, the Commissioners were authorized to make the proposals and 
offers public “in such manner as you shall see fit,” and to watch for the first desire of a province 
to revert to Crown rule. The King also opined that “if an Assembly could be formed under your 
Power of appointing a Governor, in the case in which you are at liberty to enter upon such 
detached Treaty, the good Consequences and the extensive Effects in the operations of such 
Assembly are obvious.”  A closer look at the question of forming loyal assemblies will be taken 
in a following chapter.  For now, let us merely note that the King and those who advised him 
now thought that the benefits of forming pro-British governments, complete with an assembly 
of the people, in regions that had returned to Crown rule was “obvious”.   The Commissioners 
were also authorized to issue a proclamation of the King’s sincere desire to compose the 
differences between the two sides, and to enter into a ceasefire, though when doing that, 
consultation should be made with the military authorities.
52
   
 The King instructed that the basis of the treaty should be the conditions of 1763. The 
King wanted the colonies to be reminded that they had promised to contribute freely to the 
public charge, if it could be of their own free will—they were “called upon to exercise this Act of 
Justice, as such Contribution would now be a mere act of free will.” The King thought the sum 
could be moderate. Trade regulations could be relaxed. The King proposed a bank as a way to 
fix the finances of the colonies, but made it clear that Britain would not pay American war 
debts. In what seems to have been a common suggestion among Loyalists and Britons, the King 
suggested that offices, including high ones like that of governor, be bestowed upon Americans 
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when possible. He even consented that governors could be elected, subject to the king’s 
authority.
53
   
 The King would accept a Congress similar to the one they now had, but in determining 
the powers and functions of that Assembly, “the Sovereignty of the Mother Country shall not 
be infringed”, nor any powers given it that was “capable of being construed into an 
Impeachment of the Sovereign Rights of His Majesty, and the Constitutional Control of this 
Country.” The existence and powers of Congress, as well as having colonial representation in 
Parliament, were considered matters that should be considered by Parliament.
54
  
 Full pardons and amnesties were to be offered, and full restitution for violations of the 
rights of private property was to be made, and the restoration of private property was to be 
made. As there had been much confiscation of property by both the British and the Americans, 
that would probably have been a very difficult provision of any treaty. The Declaration of 
Independence need not be formally revoked, as well as other acts since the “Rupture”, as it and 
the other acts were in the King’s opinion not legal acts, and would be effectively rescinded by 
the conclusion of a treaty. Showing how vital ending the American war was considered now 
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that war with France loomed, negotiations were not to be broken off if the Americans 
absolutely insisted on a point that the instructions, or the commissioners’ discretion, disposed 
them to not give up on. There was one exception to this instruction: independence. The 
Commissioners could not conclude any treaty which made the colonies independent.
55
 
 This was a very moderate set of instructions. The terms were quite favorable to the 
Americans, granting them most of their demands. Not only were taxes not to be imposed 
without their consent, but even the Declaratory Act was negotiable.
56
   Representation in 
Parliament, or a Congress with some say over British acts, were possible (as long as British 
sovereignty was not impeached by this). The Navigation Acts were to be relaxed. Some of the 
instructions were problematic. For example, restitution for property and property return would 
probably have caused many problems. It is likely that the question would have been referred to 
a commission. While the restoration of the “antient” governments might have been a problem, 
it is likely that the point could have been negotiated, and the colonies could have kept their 
new governments intact, with perhaps some changes to their constitutions to acknowledge the 
rule of the King. But, in general, the proposed terms were quite favorable to the Americans. 
Indeed, there is evidence that that the Cabinet considered the terms a surrender of British war 
aims, but one that French intervention made unavoidable.
57
 About the only American demand 
that was not granted was a relatively recent one—independence. 
 Had a similar set of proposals been made in 1770 or 1773 or 1774 it is likely that the 
dispute between the colonies and Great Britain would have been settled peacefully and on 
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terms quite favorable to the interests of the American colonies. Even after Lexington-Concord, 
such a set of proposals would probably have been viewed favorably, as many Americans still 
desired reconciliation with Britain. But under the conditions of 1778, the Peace Commission 
was met with contempt. 
 What to the British seemed reasonable propositions were no longer acceptable to the 
Americans, who had breached the psychological barrier of declaring independence, and had 
fought the British for three years, two as an independent country.  Independence marked a 
turning point that made any solution that required the Americans to return to being subjects 
unacceptable to many Americans, short of an overwhelming British military victory—and even 
then, the acceptance may very well have been sullen.
58
 The Americans during the Revolution 
had at the very least begun a transition from being subjects of a king to self-ruling citizens, and 
some had completed it. 
 Making a return to subject-hood even more difficult was the sense of betrayal and even 
hatred many now felt for the king. (See Chapter III) The King, guardian of their liberties, had 
sided against them in their dispute with Parliament, and had declared them to be in rebellion.  
He had sent his own soldiers and even foreign troops to crush what the Americans saw as their 
rights, raided cities, and committed acts of pillage and plunder. The love and loyalty many had 
felt for the King and the Empire, built up over generations, was gone, and it was likely that 
nothing could be done to restore it. Common Sense had ridiculed and attacked the very concept 
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of monarchy, saying God opposed it, and that the King was merely the descendant of a “rascal”. 
Thomas Paine’s words and arguments had been read by many Americans, and many agreed 
with at least part of his arguments concerning monarchy. Republicanism and even democracy 
were taking hold of Americans. This was a slow process, and what historian Gordon Wood 
called “monarchism”, and others have referred to as “The Age of Deference” would not really 
be fully gone until the time of Jackson. But the process had begun, and it is difficult to see how 
it could have been reversed. Even military victory by Britain, as Serle noted, might only “skin 
over the Sore for a Time”; sooner or later, the Americans would desire to be free citizens ruling 
themselves, and seek independence again. 
59
       
  Thus, the Americans were not prepared to return to being subjects once they had been 
citizens. They were not prepared to be subsidiary to the interests of a distant kingdom, no 
matter what ties of blood, trade, custom, law and history bound them together. And they 
certainly were not willing to do this when it was clear that they had the upper hand over the 
British. They had defeated a British army, and France was now on their side. Only a catastrophic 
military loss or series of losses might induce the Americans to sue for peace on terms that 
included their return to British rule. Even then, their “reconciliation” would be forced and 
sullen, and a strong possibility existed that they would be willing and eager to revolt at the 
earliest opportunity. The British did not aid their cause or the tasks of the Commissioners by 
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presenting the Americans with the defeat of American arms. Instead, the British soon 
evacuated Philadelphia.
60
 
 
 
III 
 
 
 The Commission set sail for America in late 1778 on board a man-of-war known as the 
Trident. Over six hundred were crowded into the ship, and Lord Cornwallis, who had been in 
London, also returned to America on board the ship, making it even more crowded. Eden spent 
much of the journey seasick, while Carlisle and Cornwallis spent much time playing whist. Eden 
had brought his pregnant wife Eleanor with him, and she withstood the rigors of sea travel far 
better than her husband, evoking much admiration for her. Carlisle, who thought their 
destination was to be New York, wrote his wife that he had been told that New York was “very 
hot, and the gnats extremely troublesome.” Carlisle was particularly bothered by gnats, and 
however peace were to be established in America, he feared that with the gnats it would be 
“perpetual war.” 
61
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 During the journey they also prepared for the important work before them. Governor 
Johnstone had prepared a paper entitled “Heads of Accommodation”. This was based on 
discussions his brother, William Pulteney, had had with Benjamin Franklin. Pulteney had 
traveled to Paris under an alias to negotiate with Franklin, the United States Ambassador to 
France. On May 6, the commissioners “perused” Johnstone’s proposal. Under Johnstone’s 
proposal, Congress would “subsist”, and its powers were to be defined. The King would name a 
President. Free trade from all places would exist, as long as it did not interfere with grants to 
exclusive companies. Johnstone believed that representation in Parliament would be pleasing 
to the rebels.  Carlisle commented that “If they be content with their present Governments, 
little objection occurs to this article…any union injurious to G.B. seems to threaten less by 
leaving them their antient forms.”
 62
   Once again, it should be noted that the colonies were no 
longer under their “antient” forms.  
 On June 1, Carlisle prepared a paper entitled “Hints of general reasoning from which to 
form our letter to the Congress.” Carlisle here described the intent of the mission to be to 
“Offer Peace to America upon terms honourable and beneficial for her to embrace.” He 
promised that the methods to achieve the peace and reestablish the union with Great Britain 
would be “sincerity, good-faith, and unreserved confidence.” As a post-script, Carlisle noted 
that it remained “to show in what manner they quit the former ground on which they stood, 
and by becoming the allies of the House of Bourbon, they become our most dangerous 
enemies: must be treated as such: that they must lose every advocate who supported them in 
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the rectitude of their resistance: and that the calamities of a most bloody war will [be] the 
consequences of their treatment of our proposals.”
63
     This was a Peace Commission that 
clearly held both an olive branch and a sword in its hands. Their offers of peace were to be 
backed up by the threat of the British military. “Britain,” as General Clinton’s biographer argues, 
“had only as much bargaining power as she had prestige, and both were already at low ebb; her 
abandoning the capital of the rebellion would ensure rejection of her olive branch.”
64
 Yet when 
the Commissioners arrived, they found that the military was preparing to abandon Philadelphia. 
Their olive branch was useless without the sword to back it up. 
 Rather dejectedly, Carlisle informed Lady Carlisle that the evacuation of Philadelphia, 
where they finally arrived in June: 
 
…will not give us much assistance in our business. In case the Congress was not 
inclined to come into measures, we wished to have desired them to consider 
that so fine an army, so disciplined, so healthy, so everything, might possibly be 
of some inconvenience to them if they rejected our proposals; but for some wise 
purposes, which we are not acquainted with, this fine army is to be of no 
inconvenience to them whatever…As I begin to think our business nearly over, I 
don’t see what we have to do here.
65
 
 
 
The Commissioners had not been informed of the impending evacuation. This may have merely 
been the result of an innocent error; Lord North said that he thought that Eden knew, as did 
Germain. McKesy suggests that full knowledge of the plans for the evacuation (and the hope 
that it would free up troops to be used on an assault on the French West Indies island of St. 
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Lucia) were “virtually confined” to the Cabinet, and that Germain had not been at liberty to 
reveal the secret.  Carlisle, it must be noted, was on a very important mission, and this was 
information that he needed to know. However, Carlisle was also a “smart penurious young 
man” who was friends with many “fashionable gossips.” Perhaps it was best not to let him 
know while he was still in London. In any event, Carlisle was “astounded and extremely alarmed 
for the fate of our Commission” on learning of the evacuation, and told Lord Gower, his father-
in-law, that “We here were informed that every measure relative to this campaign was 
determined upon long before our departure from England, and that the evacuation of 
Philadelphia was not to be delayed, because such a delay would materially affect other 
objects…” Eden was angry, having been privy to the “deepest secrets” for years, as he told his 
colleague Alexander Wedderburn.  As the Commissioners informed Germain, they were 
“naturally surprised” to learn that the army was leaving, under orders dated about three weeks 
before they left Britain, and “at a Time most critical to the operation of” the Commission.
 66
   
             As Carlisle’s letter to his wife indicated, the Commission hoped to use the army in some 
manner to persuade the Americans to accept their proposals.  Carlisle told his former tutor, the 
Reverend Dr. Jeffrey Ekins: 
 
…the great instrument which was to secure us success, the active and offensive 
course of Military operation, was no longer to support our proceedings. A 
defensive war carries with it neither threats [n]or terror; and when the rejection 
of everything we had to offer was to be followed by no distress to those who 
consulted alone their private interests or ambition in the refusal, and the 
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advantage of either country; and when it was most evident that nothing but the 
menaces of war, or its real destructive consequences, could shake men of this 
description in their power, and bring those who had conferred this power on 
them to their senses: you will agree with me that our offers of peace wore too 
much the appearances of supplications for mercy from a vanquished and 
exhausted State.
67
  
 
The Commission hoped to use the threat of destruction by the army—or the actuality of 
destruction—as a bargaining tool. Now their instrument of persuasion was retreating and 
unavailable. Would their carrot be useful without the stick to back it up?  
 Nonetheless, the Commissioners sought to carry out their mission.   A letter from the 
Commission was delivered under flag of truce by Lord Cathcart (soon to lead the British Legion 
at the Battle of Monmouth, and later the Coldstream Guards) addressed to “His Excellency 
Henry Laurens, the President and other members of the Congress.” This was in accordance with 
the King’s instructions to address the Americans by any title they used. No circumlocutions such 
as “leaders of forces presently in rebellion against the King” were used— as discussed above, in 
the American Civil War, the Confederacy had resorted to a similar title in a letter from Jefferson 
Davis to Lincoln.
68
  Laurens, President of the Congress, replied from “York Town” (present-day 
York, Pennsylvania), which was the site of Congress, on June 14, 1778. He stated that he was 
writing in a private capacity, but declared with “great assurance” that the only terms with 
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which Congress would treat would be independence, which he considered would be in the best 
interest of Great Britain. His official reply of the seventeenth reiterated this.
69
 
 Lord Howe, through Ambrose Serle, had on May 27
th
 or 28
th
, sent letters to Washington 
and Laurens enclosing acts of Parliament empowering the Commissioners to treat and 
abrogating tax acts and other acts.  Serle commented in his journal that the acts “ ’tis most 
likely, will be treated with the Contempt given to former Overtures of Reconciliation.” Laurens’ 
replied to the letter that “Yr Lp may be assured, that when the King of G.B. shall be seriously 
disposed to put an End to the unprovoked & cruel War, waged against these United States, 
Congress will readily attend to such terms of Peace as may consist with the Honor of 
Independent Nations, the Interest of their Constituents, and the sacred regard they mean to 
pay to Treaties.”    Serle had been correct in his assessment. 
70
  
 Howe had long desired reinforcements, and begun to believe that he was not being 
adequately supported by the government. This belief was increased by the fact that many of 
the troops that were sent over in 1777 were sent to Burgoyne.  At the end of 1777, he 
requested to be relieved of his command, and he was replaced by General Sir Henry Clinton.
71
 
An elaborate fete (the so-called Mischianza) was given Howe before he left Philadelphia on 
May 25
th72
, and Carlisle rather bemusedly (or disgustedly) described it to Lady Carlisle: 
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I forgot to mention the, I don’t know what to call it, that was given to Sir W. 
Howe. I fear that it was a very foolish business….I only know there were 
triumphal arches, and that General Washinton was within twenty-four miles of 
them, and that Lord Howe saluted Sir W. Howe, and Sir W. Howe saluted Lord 
Howe, and that it cost above four thousand pounds, and everybody paid 
whether they could afford it or not.
73
   
 
 
 The Commissioners soon returned to the Trident, which was anchored in the Delaware. 
Carlisle was bothered by gnats “as large as sparrows”. He protected himself against them by 
wearing trousers, which he noted was the “constant dress” of the country. He also noted to his 
wife that people wore many feathers in their hats. Turning more serious, Carlisle told his wife 
that their “business” looked desperate: “As long as we had the army to back us—we had hopes 
of success, but this turning our backs upon Mr. Washinton [as he usually spelled the name] will 
certainly make them reject offers that perhaps the fear of what that army could have done 
would have made them listen to. We have by these measures explicitly told all our friends here, 
‘We can protect you no longer, therefore make the best terms for yourselves with the 
Congress.’” 
74
  
 There were also harbingers that one of the Commissioners might cause future trouble. 
Serle recorded on June 14 that he was told by Galloway that Johnstone had brought over a 
picture of Washington in the lid of a snuff box, which he presented to Elizabeth Ferguson, “a 
Woman noted for her Virulence in the Cause of Rebellion.” Galloway also told Serle that 
Johnstone was “very inquisitive” about land values and prices in America, and even spoke of 
selling his property in England and settling down in America.  This manner of speaking had 
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resulted in “great Reproaches” from Loyalists in Philadelphia.  Galloway, as time went by 
became an increasingly desperate Loyalist, and his words must be taken with care. 
Nonetheless, while Galloway’s assertions must be looked at with some caution, it is evident 
that Serle believed Galloway’s words, and commented that “A man of this kind is not likely to 
be solicitous for the Interest & Honor of my dear Country.”
75
  It would not be long before 
Johnstone would seriously embarrass the Commission. 
  
 The Commission finally arrived in New York in early July, where they attempted to 
continue their mission.  New York was suffering a heat wave, and Lord Carlisle rarely stirred 
from his home in the daytime while it continued.  Despite the heat, he did seem to enjoy New 
York City: 
 
 The views and the country about this town are beyond all description 
beautiful; you will judge by the map how delightfully it must be situated when 
you see those two large rivers run so close to it, which are at present filled with 
vessels of every sort and size; the banks are covered with farms, villa, camps, 
wood, corn, and several sorts of trees which are unknown to me, of singular 
beauty. Long Island, Staten Island, and the Jersey shore bind the whole.
76
    
 
  
 The Commission decided to publish their correspondence with Congress in a 
proclamation “to the people at large.” Carlisle was not sanguine in his expectations for the 
proclamation, but he considered it “a step not to be dispensed with.” While the weather had  
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improved somewhat, the military situation had worsened. The Trident had sailed into New York 
just ahead of a sizable French fleet. The English fleet was drawn up in Rariton Bay, just west of 
Sandy Hook, while the French were lined up to the east of Sandy Hook and south of Brooklyn.  
As Carlisle described the situation: “Our prison is very narrow: Gen Washinton [sic] and Gates 
are supposed to be near each other on the White Plains”. 
77
  
 Carlisle believed that the arrival of the French fleet made “every hope of success in our 
business ridiculous.” While the proclamation had been tried, and ought to have been tried, 
Carlisle believed that “in truth the compliance with our instructions in this particular is the mere 
obedience to a form.” He continued to tell his wife: 
 
The leaders on the enemy’s side are too powerful; the common people hate us 
in their hearts, notwithstanding all that is said of their secret attachment to the 
mother country. I cannot give you a better proof of their unanimity against us 
than in our last march; in the whole country there was not found one single man 
capable of bearing arms at home; they left their dwelling unprotected, and after 
having cut all the ropes of the wells had fled to General Washinton. Formerly, 
when things went better for us, there was an appearance of friendship by their 
coming in for pardons, that might have deceived even those who have been the 
most acquainted with them. But no sooner our situation was the least altered for 
the worse, but these friends were the first to fire upon us, and many were taken 
with the pardons in [their] pockets. Beat Gen. Washinton, drive away Monsr. 
D’Estaign, and we should have friend enough in this country; but in our present 
condition the only friends we have, or are likely to have, are those who are 
absolutely ruined for us, and in such distress I leave you to judge what possible 
use they can be to us.
78
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 “The common people hate us in their hearts.” This was the considered opinion of one of 
His Majesty’s Peace Commissioners, though addressed privately to his wife and not publicly or 
officially. The arguments of Loyalists and Britons as to the secret attachment to Britain of the 
majority of Americans seemed incorrect (perhaps nonsensical would be a better word) to Lord 
Carlisle. Rather than proof of friendship, as Howe had thought in December, 1776, the taking of 
pardons was expediency only. Only decisive military victory, it seemed to Carlisle, would give 
Britain the “friends” it needed, outside a few whose attachment to the British cause would 
leave them refugees.  Their mission was hopeless, it seemed to Carlisle, and Carlisle and the 
Commission would just go through the motions, though, as he told Lady Carlisle, “as everybody 
in the world will not be ruled perhaps by my opinions, we must stay till there is not a possibility 
of doubt upon that subject.”
79
 Perhaps this realization that the British were hated by the 
average American would lead Carlisle, with Eden as well, to argue for policies with the aim of 
winning the “hearts and minds” of Americans. Unless something could change, “the common 
people hate us in their hearts” could well prove to be the epitaph for the British Empire in the 
thirteen colonies. Indeed, even overwhelming military victory without such a change of heart 
would only result in giving Britain false friends. Such a victory was one to be avoided.  
 Carlisle was not the only British observer to be disillusioned with the prospects of peace 
on terms acceptable to Britain in that summer of 1778. Ambrose Serle’s journal is a diary, not a 
work of fiction, but if any diary can be said to follow a dramatic arc, then it is Serles’. Serle, Lord 
Howe’s secretary from 1776 to 1778 (and formerly a secretary to Lord Dartmouth), had long 
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been interested in the relationship between Britain and the colonies. He believed in 1770 that 
an establishment of an Anglican episcopate was vital to uniting the Empire, and did not leave 
that view. In a 1774 pamphlet, Americans against Liberty: or an Essay on the Nature and 
Principles of True Freedom, Shewing that the Designs and Conduct of the Americans Tend only 
to Tyranny and Slavery, he argued that “The King, Lords, and Commons…compose the 
Constitution, and supreme Legislature of the British Empire” and that there could not be two 
legislatures of equal authority in any properly arranged polity. Everyone within the Empire, he 
believed, is under the control of the Constitution, and protected by it.  The establishment of an 
episcopacy and the supremacy of the British constitution in America were his beliefs when he 
boarded HMS Eagle in May of 1776 for what would turn out to be a two year journey to 
America.
80
 
 Serle soon grow to believe that the colonies had drained Britain of men and money, for 
little recompense beyond disloyalty. Serle spoke much with Loyalists about conditions in 
America and ways to solve the dispute. He spoke much with prisoners of war as well, and was 
early on convinced that a few unprincipled men had misled many honest Americans. His 
original confidence in rapid success began to dissipate as events went against the British. When 
on May 21, 1778,  the King’s order to evacuate Philadelphia was announced, Serle saw that the 
war was lost and that the revolutionaries had won: 
 
I now look upon the Contest as at an End. No man can be expected to declare for 
us, when he cannot be assured of a Fortnight’s Protection. Every man, on the 
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contrary, whatever might have been his primary Inclinations, will find it his 
Interest to oppose & drive us out of the Country.
81
  
 
 
 
 Serle had grown to believe the war was unwinnable. Indeed, British policy, which seized 
areas only to abandon them, seemed to him to be a major reason—even those who loved the 
King would find it in his own interest to be an enemy—for he could not be assured the British 
would stay and protect him from rebel retribution. Serle left Philadelphia in mid-June. He was 
heading back to England
82
.  One can trace in his journal a “dramatic arc” stretching from full 
confidence in the sure success of the British cause, to despair and a belief that the war was lost. 
 In the summer of 1778, all seemed lost for the British. The hearts and minds, the love 
and loyalty of many Americans seemed to many British observers to be lost, and even those 
Americans who were still loyal in their hearts seemed likely to oppose the British out of self-
interest. But the belief remained that many Loyalists existed, and some persisted in the belief 
that they were a majority of the population, at least in some areas. According to the historian 
Paul H. Smith, one-fifth of the white population was Loyalist overall,
83
 and in some areas, that 
number was higher. If a new strategy could be found, perhaps all was not lost.  
 The King himself seemed discouraged from the reports he received: 
 
The Present accounts from America seem to put a final stop to all Negociation: 
farther concession is a joke, all that can now be done is steadily to pursue the 
plan…providing Nova Scotia, the Floridas and Canada with troops, and should 
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that not leave enough for New York which may in the end be the case we must 
then abandon that place….
84
   
 
 The King once again contemplated abandoning New York and merely “distressing” the 
rebels, at least until the French could be defeated.
85
    The evacuation of Philadelphia seemed 
to be a signal that the war was being lost, if not already lost. Carlisle’s and Serle’s 
discouragement at the prospect of achieving reconciliation seemed to indicate  that the 
attempt to restore America to the Empire was hopeless—some wanted to return to the Empire, 
but many hated the British.  Yet the retreat was not a total abandonment, but part of a 
consolidation of forces to meet the French threat. While the thirteen colonies were now a 
secondary front in the war, the hopes of regaining America had not been abandoned by the 
British. But a new strategy was clearly needed, one that would get the most out of the limited 
resources Britain could devote to the front—and in addition, win back the hearts and minds of 
the Americans.   
 The Commissioners continued as well they could their work in New York, while 
requesting permission to return. They spoke with many Loyalists, and tried to get an 
understanding of the situation. But, the mission took two more bad turns before the 
Commissioners returned to Britain. Johnstone attempted to bribe Joseph Reed, an aide to 
Washington, member of Congress, and President of Pennsylvania, with a position in a future 
government and ten thousand pounds if he would help the Commissioners in their task of 
reuniting America and Britain. Reed’s antipathy to Loyalists was well-known, making the offer 
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not only foolish by futile. Reed contemptuously turned the offer down. Congress expressed its 
extreme displeasure, and published Johnstone’s letter.
86
  
 As an indirect result of Johnstone’s actions, Carlisle was faced with a situation perhaps 
even more farcical, if more potentially deadly: he was challenged to a duel by the Marquis de 
Lafayette. In a letter to Congress by Carlisle, Clinton, and Eden, dated August 26, the trio denied 
any knowledge of Johnstone’s actions, while stating that Johnstone in all his conversations with 
them had only been concerned with reestablishing the bond with the colonies and thereby 
securing “the permanent happiness of the inhabitants of this Continent.” Later in the letter, in 
reference to the “French connection” they expressed astonishment at America’s continued 
deference to “a Power that has ever shewn itself an enemy to all civil and religious liberty; and 
whose offers…were made with a view to prevent our reconciliation, and to prolong this 
destructive war.” Lafayette, as the first French officer in rank in the American army, and as a 
person not unknown to the British, felt honor-bound to challenge Carlisle. Lafayette challenged 
Carlisle, as head of the commission, to a duel because of the “insulting words about my country 
that you have signed.”  Carlisle demurred, claiming diplomatic prerogatives. Carlisle’s reply told 
Lafayette that the Commission’s correspondence with the Congress was not of a “private 
Nature,” and that he thought that “all national Disputes will be best decided by the Meeting of 
Admiral Byron and the Comte D’Estaing.”   There the matter rested.
87
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 American leaders had united against the peace effort long before the Commissioners 
arrived. Patriot propagandists were enlisted to ensure that Americans would not forsake 
independence.  Some of their efforts were truly creative. Governor Livingston of New Jersey 
pretended to be a woman named “Belinda”.  “Belinda” reported that mothers in “her” district 
had promised to disown their sons, and wives and maidens to refuse the caresses and advances 
of husbands and suitors who showed “the least symptoms of being imposed upon by this flimsy 
subterfuge, which I call the dying speech, and last groans of Great-Britain.”
88
 In addition to this 
rather Lysistratan appeal, Congress called upon the American people to not be lulled by 
“fallacious hope of peace”, but to gird for battle.
89
  The commissioners were made objects of 
ridicule. Carlisle was reported  to have brought with him “one dozen bottles essence of 
roses…half a dozen opera glasses—forty boxes of pearl coloured powder for the teeth…ninety 
wardrobe cases for cloaths…twelve dozen best tooth picks—an abridgement of the history of 
America, for the use of children…two portable billiard tables…”
90
  to name but a few items. 
Even if the report exaggerated (as it probably did), it is likely that Carlisle’s baggage was rather 
excessive. 
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 Johnstone returned to Britain on September 23, and Carlisle and Eden returned on 
November 27, 1778.
91
 Their mission had ended in failure and farce. Before looking at the 
aftermath of the Commission, let us pause to examine why the Commission failed. First, the 
Commissioners were dealing from weakness, not strength. The disastrous loss at Saratoga had 
led to French intervention, and the need to consolidate British forces in North America. The 
sole bright spot of 1777 for the British, the capture of the rebel “capital” of Philadelphia, was 
being abandoned.  The Commissioners had hoped to use the stick of the army as a threat to 
induce the rebels to accept the carrot of reconciliation on highly favorable terms for the 
Americans.  Instead, they arrived in Philadelphia in time to see it evacuated.  Their messages to 
the Americans were met with contempt. After leaving Philadelphia, they arrived in New York in 
time to see it virtually besieged.  It is little wonder that their mission failed.  British prestige was 
at low ebb; if Britain could somehow achieve a major victory, if they could have, as Carlisle had 
told his wife, beaten “Washinton” and driven away d’Estaing, then their mission might have had 
some success. But the Americans seemed unlikely to come to the table unless they were in 
extremis. 
 Secondly, the concessions offered, while generous, were “a day late and a dollar short”.  
The Americans were independent, and wished to remain so.  Laurens and the Congress insisted 
on their independency. The Americans governed themselves as free men; many of them had no 
desire to return to being subjects, no matter how free—even subjects of a King who 
constitutionally had been ultimately chosen by the people acting through Parliament
92
 —
especially when they had no representation in that Parliament. Concessions that would have 
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worked in 1775 or earlier were worthless after July 4, 1776. Of course, had the British decisively 
defeated the Americans, perhaps they might have been willing to reluctantly return to being 
subjects.  After all, many Patriots—including members of revolutionary committees—had taken 
loyalty oaths to the king on Long Island.  But, as Carlisle pointed out, this was probably not a 
change of heart, but “trimming” to the wind, as the expression of the time went.  
 Lastly, while the Commissioners tried their best, the Commission was undermined by 
the foolish actions of one of its members. First, it is highly unlikely that any person, no matter 
how highly placed, could have swung America to reconciliation with Britain under the terms the 
Carlisle Commission could offer.  So, any bribe would most probably have been futile even if a 
useful official had been found who was willing to be bribed. Secondly, it is not inconceivable 
that there were members of Congress or of the state governments who would have been 
amenable to bribery. As Benedict Arnold would soon prove, there was at least one leading 
military official who was so amenable.  But such a bribe must be approached delicately, a likely 
target determined, and the target’s willingness to be bought ascertained slowly and surely.  
Johnstone targeted an extremely unlikely candidate in Joseph Reed, who predictably was 
gravely offended. The attempt was revealed to Congress, who published the correspondence, 
embarrassing the Commission and making an impossible task even more difficult. To make 
matters worse, the Commission’s attempt to overcome the incident created another incident. 
The Commission foolishly chose to include in their declaration that they were unaware of 
Johnstone’s actions an attack on the “French connection”.   Such an attack, if it was to be made 
at all, should have waited for a later letter, and should have been expressed more mildly. As it 
was, the attack on America’s alliance was coached in language which, while mild by today’s 
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standards, was considered harsh enough by a leading French soldier in America, Lafayette, to 
induce him to challenge Carlisle to a duel.  Carlisle managed to avoid the duel, claiming in effect 
diplomatic immunity and treating the whole matter with his characteristic humor—but none of 
this was calculated to increase British prestige or bring America to negotiate peace.  These last 
events may be considered farcical, but they were also a sign of the utter failure of a mission 
which had been invested with such high hopes. 
 
 
IV 
 
 
 Despite their disappointment at the failure of the Commission, and Carlisle’s private 
belief that the common American hated the British,  in a series of letters the Commissioners 
continued to express hope that reconciliation was possible—but force might be required to 
effectuate it. They argued that the “defensive and offensive Alliance with France is disagreeable 
to a great proportion of the People”, and that their terms were highly acceptable. But as long as 
Washington’s army could stay in the field, and “awe the country”, there was no hope that any 
province would declare for Britain.
93
  On July 7 and Sept 21, they argued that force might work 
against a people they believed were beginning “to recollect the blessings of Peace” and 
“sensible…that they are kept in Rebellion by their Leaders without either a Grievance or a just 
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Object.”
94
  By October 15, they told Germain that there was good reason “to believe that the 
spirit of the Revolt is much abated…and that the French connexion is generally disliked.” 
Indeed, the crisis was favorable for an attempt to break the entire rebellion.
95
 
 As discussed above, the Commissioners were not adverse to the use of force in the 
service of peace. Eden, it appears, was particularly “rankled” by the unsuccessful mission. On 
returning to Britain, the Commissioners made several oral and written reports. Eden discussed 
the colonial situation in an audience with the king. On January 9
th
, 1779, Eden and Johnstone 
testified on American affairs before a cabinet council, and made a written report to Germain 
dated March 8, 1779. In these reports, they argued that there was “widespread disaffection” 
with the Continental Congress, and much loyalist strength among the American people. They 
argued for an offensive to force Washington into a direct battle. If he could not be decisively 
defeated, his army should be forced to retreat into the New York or New Jersey Highlands. In 
the territory that he was forced to abandon, they assured their listeners, the people would 
renounce Congress and return to their former and natural loyalty to the Crown. Then, a civilian 
administration would be established for New York “to conciliate the affections of the 
inhabitants…remove apprehensions” and to “extend the benefit of law and police as far as 
practicable.” They were sure that a civil administration could be easily organized in New York. 
The success of renewed civilian government in New York would showcase to the other colonies 
British willingness to restore constitutional government to loyal subjects.
96
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 Germain argued for a new strategy based on the Commissioner’s reports: 
 
The principal object of the Main Army [Clinton’s New York-based army] in the 
Opinion of the Commissioners sh’d be the getting possession of the Ridge of 
High Land wch runs across from the Hudson’s River to the Connecticut, and 
therby cover all the fertile Country brtween that Ridge & the Sea the Inhabitants 
of wch are said to desirous of returning to their allegiance and w.d gladly receive 
a civil Gvt. from His Majesty. Shd such an Establishment take place there, 
Massachusets Bay w.d be unable to draw any considerable supplies or Succour 
from the Southwards & left to its own Resources might soon be brought to 
submit to the Kings Authority….
97
  
 
 Perhaps the most important phrase in the above letter is “getting possession.” In the 
early part of the war, the army had tried to destroy the rebellion by decisively defeating its 
armies and gaining control of important cities—while at the same time, they tried to isolate 
New England. In war, the question whether one’s main aim should be to seek to destroy the 
enemy’s army or take territory is perhaps the most important question that has to be made. 
The two aims are not mutually exclusive; if one seizes or attempts to seize enough territory, or 
a vital position, such as a city or an important pass,   the enemy army will often be forced to 
offer battle. If an army focuses chiefly on destroying the other army, the danger is that it may 
neglect to consolidate territorial gains. This question is often quite acute in civil wars or colonial 
rebellions, where restoring the region to the nation or empire is the goal of one side, and 
independence is the goal of the other.  
 In 1776 and 1777, the British had failed to consolidate their territorial gains much 
beyond southern New York.  They had sought to destroy Washington’s army and seize 
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important cities. A broader design of isolating New England existed, but was basically 
abandoned by Howe when he attacked Philadelphia. Consolidation of territory was an 
afterthought.
98
 The result was the British army marching all across the American landscape, 
then abandoning its control (and incidentally, leaving Loyalists in a very bad situation). Indeed, 
Howe’s attack on Philadelphia was an attempt to cut off one, and hopefully both, of the two 
heads of the rebel “beast”: the political head by taking the capital, and the military head by 
destroying the main rebel army when it attempted to defend the political head.    
 The problem was that the rebellious colonies really did not have a political head; they 
were decentralized, divided into thirteen colonies, loosely knit together into a confederacy for 
the purposes of fighting the British. Indeed, the national government, such as it was, was still a 
revolutionary organization in early 1779—the Articles of Confederation would not be ratified 
for another two years.
99
  Rather than fighting one country, it could be argued that the British 
were, in some ways, fighting thirteen wars against thirteen countries. While there was a 
common army, supplemented by state militias, politically there was no head to chop off—there 
were thirteen, and many colonies had few identifiable places whose capture would mean the 
capture of the province. Perhaps the appropriate strategy would be to attempt to take the 
colonies back county by county, colony by colony. And to do this, they must “reclaim to their 
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duty” the inhabitants of these counties and colonies.  A rudimentary version of the concept was 
presented in a report on the southern colonies from 1778: 
 
The great point to be wished for, is that the Inhabitants of some considerable 
Colony, were so far reclaimed to their Duty, that the revival of the British 
Constitution, and the free operation of the Laws, might without prejudice be 
permitted amongst them, the superior Advantage and Security, they would then 
enjoy, above those who lived under a different Dominion, could not fail, to 
suggest comparison that would daily be productive, of the most important 
consequences, and an earnest wish, to partake of these Benefits, and Blessing 
which they saw their Neighbors in the enjoyment of… 
 
 By restoring the “blessings of British liberty”, restoring the operation of the British constitution, 
in short, restoring civilian government (complete with a legislative assembly), an example 
would be made of British willingness to end martial law and restore British liberties.
100
  
  Because of the worldwide nature of the war, and secondary status of the North 
American theatre, Germain was under pressure to reduce military commitments in America, 
and found the new idea “attractively simple.” The colonies would be reduced “piecemeal”, 
separately. Such an effort might achieve what the attempt to destroy the political and military 
centers might not. The main Continental army of Washington would be pushed back and 
confined to the Highlands; smaller forces would clear areas of rebel militia, eventually gaining 
back entire colonies. Loyalist militia units would hold and protect the pacified regions from the 
rebels. Civil government would be restored in these areas, guarded by the loyal militias.   This 
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restoration and reintegration into the Empire would serve to demonstrate the advantages of 
returning to the allegiance to the Crown.
101
  
 In short, the idea was to use a field army to seize areas, and then local militia to hold the 
area while the field army continued into the next area. The pacified region would have civilian 
government restored, and be reintegrated into the Empire. The Revolutionary War was a new 
type of war, and demanded new types of strategy and war-fighting methods. The proposed 
new strategy was quite innovative, and McKesy has described it as “a fledgling theory of 
counterrevolutionary warfare.”
102
   
 The proposed strategy also depended on there being many Loyalists in the colonies, 
willing and able to join and support the militias, and support, staff, and vote for the new 
Royalist governments.  Modern estimates of the amount of Loyalist put the number at one-fifth 
of the population.  (See above). This is still a sizable number, but probably less than the British 
thought actually existed. Germain was assured by officials from the southern colonies, such as 
Governor James Wright of Georgia, that there was a sizable body of loyalists in the South. 
Joseph Galloway was in constant touch with Serle, Germain, and Lord Dartmouth, and assured 
the British that Pennsylvania and the Middle Colonies were full of Loyalists, and war-weary as 
well. There was also plenty of evidence, from places like Long Island and New Jersey, that the 
Americans were willing to sign oaths of loyalty when the British controlled a region. While some 
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of these were no doubt Loyalists, it is likely that many of them were “trimmers”—people who 
“trimmed their sails” depending on which ways the political winds were blowing for purposes 
of protecting themselves, their families, and their property. The British assumed the Patriots 
were a small minority. In any event, listening mainly to questionable sources such as Galloway 
whose statements fit their preconceived notions, the British and Germain were convinced that 
there was enough Loyalist strength to make the plan work. They had more than the word of 
Loyalists and refugees as to Loyalist strength—officials such as Governor Wright, General 
Robertson (who was Commandant of New York City and who had much experience in America), 
and the Peace Commissioners were all convinced that most Americans opposed the rebellion 
(though Carlisle, at least, thought differently in private). Perhaps they misread war-weariness or 
neutrality as Loyalism; but in any case, the decision was made to attempt to implement a new 
strategy that depended on a sizable body of Loyalists.
103
   
 As will be discussed below, such a strategy was already being implemented in Georgia, 
and would prove rather successful, all things considered. But Georgia was a small and distant 
colony; if such a policy could be implemented successfully in New York, its demonstration 
value—its propaganda value—would be immense.  Germain set about implementing the new 
policy. He instructed Clinton, headquartered In New York City, to contain Washington, and 
allow thereby the loyal subjects of the King in “the open country” to renounce their allegiance 
to Congress. Once this was accomplished, elections for an assembly were to be called. Germain 
had come to the realization that the route to victory in this war was political, and only 
incidentally military: 
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Notwithstanding the great exertions this country has made and the prodigious 
force sent out for subduing the rebellion, I am convinced our utmost efforts will 
fail of their effect, if we cannot find means to engage the people of America in 
support of a cause which is equally their own and ours, and when their enemies 
are drawn away or subdued induce them to employ their own force to protect 
themselves in the enjoyment of the blessings of that constitution to which they 
shall have been restored.
104
 
 
 
The war was to become what it had always been—a war for the hearts and minds of the 
Americans. 
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Chapter V 
 
The Failed Attempt to Restore Civilian Government to New York 
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I 
 
 
  In October 1775, Governor Tryon of New York received information that he was to be 
apprehended as “an enemy to America,” made a prisoner, and transported to Connecticut and 
confined for the duration of the war. Tryon undoubtedly found the source credible, for he soon 
boarded the British man-of-war Asia, which was at the time docked in the harbor. He soon 
transferred to the Dutchess of Gordon.  From here, he acted as governor, and met with his 
Council.  Council members such as William Smith would be rowed to and from the ship for the 
meetings. The Provincial Congress slowly took over the management of the Province, while the 
official government was literally “at sea”.
1
   
 Several other governors found themselves “governing” their provinces from warships 
off the coast, or returned to Britain till they could be restored to office.  No longer governing, 
they still retained their posts, but in a “dormant” state. British authority had vanished across 
the thirteen colonies, unless one wishes to include the rather pathetic ship-based governors.  
While a brief period of “dual” rule existed in the colonies from about 1774 to as late as 1776 in 
some colonies, by May 1776 British authority had vanished in the thirteen colonies. In New 
York, elections were actually held for the Assembly in January, 1776, but that Assembly never 
sat.  Many colonies were under the rule of provincial congresses, though a few were still under 
their old government. The court systems still functioned, though Patriots filled many positions 
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abandoned by Loyalists.  In May, 1776, Congress recommended that the colonies form new 
governments that had no ties to the old colonial, British-approved government— in other 
words, to form revolutionary governments. 
2
 
                    The Howe brothers were made Peace Commissioners (as well as commanders of the 
Army and Navy) in 1776, but their authority was not absolute. The Howes as Peace 
Commissioners could only offer pardons to those who renounced the rebellion—hostilities 
could thus not end until the Americans disbanded and dissolved their armed forces and 
revolutionary governments. As for the restoration of civil government, this would only occur 
once the rebels had been defeated—the Howe brothers were given authority to restore a 
colony (or a portion of a colony) to its former government once the rebels had been defeated. 
The possible advantages (as well as the difficulties) of restoring civil government were not 
recognized in the early days of the war, and would not be until the aftermath of the Carlisle 
Commission. The British historian K.G. Davies calls the plan of action the British contemplated 
in 1775 to have been “in the nature of a large-scale police operation.” At its end, “the ancient 
forms of civil government would be reestablished as a matter of course.” Some leaders of the 
rebellion would probably have to be punished, but most Americans (at least outside of New 
England) were thought to be either loyal or deluded by their leaders, so no major difficulty was 
contemplated.  Secretary of State Germain in late 1775 ordered Clinton, then preparing an 
expedition against the Southern colonies, to attempt to restore legal government, because 
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reports promised much support and many civilian officials were still in the area and ready to 
restore British rule. Clinton was to proclaim pardon for those who laid down their arms, 
dissolve Provincial Congresses and Committees, and reopen the civil courts. In other words, 
once the rebellion had been suppressed, British government would restore itself. 
3
  
Davies notes that “Nowhere in the proceedings of the Howe commission is there 
recognition of the possibility of using restored civil government as a political weapon to 
advance the British cause and discomfort the rebels. Confirmation of this negative attitude 
comes from the refusal of the commissioners to contemplate restoring civil government in the 
only place where in 1776 it was practicable to do so, the part of New York recovered by the 
British army.” The Howe brothers and Germain agreed the area recovered was too small.  In 
addition, William Tryon, the British governor of New York, wanted a command in the war. This 
desire reduced the pressure he might otherwise have exerted for the restoration of 
government to southern New York.  Tryon argued that New York was “in the present period too 
much convulsed for the civil government to act with any good effect…I therefore have kept the 
executive powers of civil government dormant, leaving everything to the direction of the 
military.”
4
  In December 1777, Tryon informed Lord Germain that “his sphere in Civil Governt is 
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not enlarged in this last Campaign.... I can now hardly be said to sit within the shade of my 
Governt”. He told Germain he wished to resign, if he could be given command of a regiment.
5
   
So, the possibility and benefits of restoring civil government in British-controlled New 
York were overlooked or just not seen in the early phases of the war. Now, in the wake of the 
Carlisle Commission, discussed in the preceding chapter, the possibilities of restoring civil 
government, not as a follow-up to a military victory, but as a way of achieving a political victory, 
of winning back hearts and minds and gaining new Loyalist recruits, began to be appreciated. 
Some success was achieved in Georgia, as will be discussed at further length below. But, 
Georgia was a tiny and distant colony. New York was another story. It was a major colony, much 
of it was securely under British control, there was much loyalism, and it was both a commercial 
center and located at a very strategic location—perhaps the most strategic location on the 
continent. The new strategy, the “pacification program” as the historians Klein and Howard call 
it, would be given great credibility if the New York experiment succeeded.
 6
   
Much would depend on the Governor selected,
7
  and the response of the military 
authorities to his position. The man selected was Major General James Robertson, 
Commandant of New York City. Robertson, as Klein and Howard state, “is not one of the better 
known figures of the American Revolution.” Over the years, Robertson, like Germain, was 
viewed quite unfavorably by those few historians who did notice him.  Like Germain, much of 
our information comes from biased sources such as the Loyalists Smith and Jones, and General 
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Clinton. Clinton, in his private correspondence, spoke unfavorably of Robertson. Jones despised 
all Presbyterians and Scotsmen (he saw no difference between the two), and Robertson was a 
Scot. Jones ascribed Robertson’s remarkable rise (described below) to being “a true Scot, 
assiduous, flattering, and submissive.” He accused him of corruption, and said that in his role as 
Governor, Robertson “was universally despised.”  After becoming Governor, Jones alleges, “he 
so often broke and forfeited his word, his honour, and his promises, that the people lost all 
confidence in him.” He also states that Robertson was nearly eighty (not true—he was sixty -
two at the time of his appointment), in his dotage, and that he ran after young girls, some as 
young as twelve. Smith, who was a strong proponent of restoring civil government, viewed 
Robertson quite favorably in the early days of his governorship when it seemed that civil 
government would soon be restored. However, by September of 1781, Smith was writing in his 
journal that Robertson “…is a Dotard and abandoned to Frivolity. He has Parties of Girls in the 
Fort Garden, in the midst of his own Fears, and the Anxieties of this Hour.” 
8
 This picture has 
lingered, and often been accepted uncritically.  The record shows, however, that Robertson was 
a good officer, whatever his personal failings may have been. Under eighteenth-century 
conditions, his rise to the rank of “general” is quite extraordinary. His opinions, especially on 
America, were respected and sought after.  He was a valued staff officer. As commandant of 
New York City, he saved much of the city from burning in September, 1776.  As governor, while 
he was possibly corrupt, and a “lady’s man” (even according to more balanced sources than 
Jones), his corruption seems to have been within acceptable parameters   for the eighteenth 
century, and his dalliances were probably not as depraved as Jones makes them.  Despite the 
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handicaps he labored under, he did try to exercise the duties of his office and bring civilian 
government back to New York. This competent if flawed human being was entrusted by the 
British government with the important task of making British-controlled New York a shining 
example to the other colonies.   He failed in this task, but not all the blame for that can be laid 
on his shoulders.  It is possible that a more favorable picture of Robertson will arise from a 
review of his career and governorship.
9
 
Robertson was a Scottish officer in the British army with much experience in the 
Americas. Unlike many Scottish officers, he was not a wealthy landed proprietor or titled 
nobleman, but came from a more “middling” background. Robertson’s family were freeholders. 
They had a small estate called Newbigging in Fife, near Edinburgh. The family had many 
community responsibilities and much local status; the family included doctors, lawyers, and 
ministers. Robertson’s father was trained as a solicitor, and had the courtesy title of the “Laird 
of Newbigging.” As freeholders in a society where most were tenants, the Robertsons had 
considerable status in the community, and much responsibility for administering local 
government.
10
  
Born in 1717, by the 1730s James Robertson wished to be an officer. To obtain a 
commission, one needed political connections and money. Officer’s commissions up to the level 
of colonel were bought, not earned. Rising in the ranks was as often a result of wealth and 
station than of skill in battle.. As for generals, they almost always sprang from the titled 
aristocracy. Loyalty to the king was a “necessary prerequisite for military command.” The army 
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was a force which the entire social order might have to depend upon, and the officers had to be 
people whose loyalty to the king was “bred into the bone.”   Robertson’s rise is a testament to 
talent and may be considered extraordinary, and may be attributed to his intelligence, 
“canniness”, and capacity for hard work. Indeed, only two other individuals of modest 
background seem to have advanced to comparable heights during the eighteenth century. 
Robertson was unable to afford a commission, and enlisted as a volunteer in 1739 in the hope 
of securing an officer’s commission for merit. He began as a private, and became a sergeant on 
merit. He was soon commissioned as a second lieutenant in a marine regiment during the War 
of Jenkins’s Ear. He eventually gained an important patron, the Earl of Loudoun, who became 
commander-in-chief of the British Army in North America in 1756.
11
  
 The Earl of Loudoun had a taste for high living, and Klein and Howard suggest he 
transmitted this to Robertson.  The Earl is reported to have in one week consumed over six 
dozen bottles of claret, Madeira, and other wines and alcoholic beverages.  Perhaps not all had 
been consumed by the Earl himself; his junior officers (of whom Robertson was one) often 
dined with him, and these meals were usually attended by women.  Robertson apparently 
picked up some of these habits. On an official trip to New London for the Earl, he is reported to 
have brought along the wife of one of his fellow officers. To make matters worse, he played 
cards with her, offending the provincial governor. In Puritan-founded Connecticut, card-playing 
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was illegal.  By 1775, Robertson was presiding at his own parties in Boston—which was under 
siege by rebellious Americans for much of that period.
12
       
 Robertson served for better than two decades in America, accomplishing much, and 
learning more than how to live the high life.  He made his mark as a staff officer, serving much 
of the time in the staff of Lord Amherst, the new commander-in-chief, who became his new 
patron. He served as quartermaster-general and inspector-general. His recommendations 
concerning quartering troops were very influential in the Quartering Act in 1765.   One of his 
recommendations was creation of the post of Barrackmaster-General to centralize the work of 
the separate barrackmasters in America. The post was created by the Act and given to him. As 
Barrackmaster-General, he was responsible for the care of the permanent barracks in America, 
their furnishing and supply. He supervised the work of twenty-seven barrackmasters in posts 
from St. Augustine in Florida to Louisbourg on Cape Breton, to Detroit on the frontier. 
Robertson remained in this role until June 30, 1776. 
13
     
Working mainly out of New York City, he gained much influence with the merchants of 
Boston and New York, purchasing the supplies the barracks needed from them (this function 
later was performed by the Treasury Board in England). As a leading Scotsman, he joined the St. 
Andrew’s Society in 1757. Here, he became acquainted with many of New York’s movers and 
shakers, people who would soon become leading Loyalists or Patriots: Colden, the Livingstons, 
and John Morin Scott to name a few. He bought a residence in New York City, and acquired 
lands in Cumberland and Charlotte Counties. It is quite possible that during this time period he 
engaged in profiteering on the supplies he purchased. What is clear is that he gave himself a 
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commission of one percent on cash transferred to local barrack-masters; the Treasury 
eventually claimed that he owed them ten thousand pounds.
14
 These allegations of corruption 
would haunt him as Governor and helped to diminish his stature among Loyalists—especially 
those who were disappointed by what they saw as his failures. 
 
  
In September, 1774, Robertson joined Gage in Boston, acting as a staff officer, licensing 
dram shops in Boston, and observing (but not participating in) the battles of Lexington-Concord 
and Bunker Hill.  Robertson was appointed a colonel-commandant and battalion commander in 
January 1776 and with other “old colonels” was soon promoted to major-general, after what 
seems to have been a bureaucratic error which originally left him off the promotion list. He 
offered to lead an assault on Dorchester Heights in early March 1776.  The fortification of these 
heights overlooking Boston by the Americans (with guns obtained from the capture of Fort 
Ticonderoga) made Boston untenable to the British.  An assault on Dorchester Heights would 
probably have involved a frontal assault similar to Bunker Hill, which was a Pyrrhic British 
victory. Wisely, Robertson summoned a lawyer and wrote a will. Fortunately for Robertson, bad 
weather intervened, and Howe, who by this time was in command in Boston, reconsidered the 
proposed assault and decided instead to withdraw from Boston.
15
  
The evacuation presented a problem of both policy and logistics. As staff officer, 
Robertson was in charge of supervising the movement of men and materiel during the 
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evacuation. He urged Howe to remove everything that could possibly be of use to the 
Americans, and destroy the rest. But Howe feared an attack by Washington during the 
embarkation. He did have a hostage: Boston. Between Howe’s army and the naval vessels, 
Boston could have been destroyed. A tacit understanding seems to have been reached between 
Howe and Washington that the British could leave unmolested. While attacking the British 
rearguard might have been gratifying, especially after a long, boring, but occasionally deadly 
siege, the price—the destruction of Boston—was just not worth it. Robertson, despite his 
recommendation for destruction, seems to have been one of the chief assurers of Bostonians 
that the city would not be ravaged. Howe was later accused, unjustly in one historian’s view, of 
dereliction of duty for leaving too many stores in Boston.  Robertson, by contrast, was accused 
of plundering Boston for his own use, though that also seems to have been unjust. In addition, 
Robertson was not in Boston during the last days of the British occupation, so it would have 
been difficult for him to engage in pillage. Plundering for his own personal gain would also have 
been senseless, since it would have been difficult to find a place on the transports to put ill-
gotten goods.  Room was at a premium on the evacuation fleet, since in addition to Howe’s 
men, the transports also had to accommodate the persons and goods of many Boston 
Loyalists.
16
  
Robertson set sail for Halifax shortly before the evacuation to prepare for the arrival of 
the evacuating army. Thousands of men would have to be fed, billeted, clothed, and provided 
with firewood and other necessities in Halifax. Robertson, as Barrack-Master General, was a 
perfect choice for this mission. This was Robertson’s last important assignment as a staff officer 
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for General Howe. Robertson was soon informed of a War Office directive which effectively 
prohibited the office of Barrack-Master General from being held by a regimental commander.  
To keep his regimental command, Robertson had to give up his position as Barrack-Master in 
June of 1776. Having been relieved of these duties, Robertson was given his first field 
command, leading a brigade of four regiments under General Sir Henry Clinton.
17
  
Howe’s army finally left Halifax, and headed for New York harbor. Originally, they 
planned to land on Long Island, but Robertson is credited with changing Howe’s mind. 
According to a report by Justice Smith of a conversation Smith had with Governor Tryon, Howe 
“was running into the most perilous Temerity, proposing when he arrived from 
Hallifax to land his little Army at New Utrecht. The Men were in the Boats when 
he got General Robertson to hold this Language to him: ‘If you beat the Rebels 
before the Reinforcements arrive, you disgrace the Ministry for sending them. If 
you are defeated, they will be of no Use when they arrive. Land therefore on 
Staten Island.”
18
 
 
 As discussed earlier, the delay in attacking Long Island has been criticized by numerous 
parties.  If one holds with the critical view, then Robertson is partially responsible for the British 
wasting much of the summer. Alternately, Robertson stopped the British from engaging, with 
less than their full force, in possibly yet another deadly frontal assault against prepared 
positions.  
  Robertson’s brigade landed on Staten Island on July 3, and spent much of the summer of 
1776 on Staten Island. When Long Island was finally invaded in late August, his brigade landed 
at Gravesend in Brooklyn, and was in the second wave of the Long Island campaign, holding 
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territory for the most part. On August 30, Robertson’s brigade was ordered to Hell’s Gate to 
oppose General Lee, who was reported to be landing there. Marching from Gravesend, 
Robertson and his brigade marched through Bedford and Cripplebush, the town spot of 
Newtown (in present day northwest Queens). From there, they continued to Hell’s Gate, but 
found no enemy. Robertson took up residence in a local house, while his men billeted for about 
two weeks at Hell’s Gate.
19
               
              Robertson, a long-time resident of New York City, was convinced, like many British 
officers and officials, that the rebels were a small minority, and that the majority of Long 
Island’s inhabitants would welcome the British. He therefore urged that the British troops avoid 
pillage and other actions that could turn the population against them.  Not all of Howe’s 
generals agreed with him; they urged that the British and Hessian troops be allowed to “ravage 
at will” as a lesson.
20
 While in Newtown, Robertson took swift action against his own troops 
who he caught plundering. He even issued a public promise that in the future his troops would 
“abstain from a crime which disgraces even victory, and defeats the King’s intention to protect 
and reclaim his American subjects.”
21
 Robertson also offered to personally compensate pillaged 
Americans, though no evidence exists that anyone took him up on his offer.
22
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On September 15 Howe invaded Manhattan, and after some battles and skirmishes, he 
was in control of the entire island with the exception of a fort which fell in November. The next 
day, Robertson was made military commandant of New York City. The city he took over had 
been reduced by the flight of much of its populace to a population of about 400 or 500 people, 
mostly Loyalists,
23
 but thousands of Loyalists would stream in during the next few months and 
throughout the war.  The influx of Loyalist refugees would continue throughout the war. But on 
that September day, those who remained in New York City were overjoyed, pulling down and 
trampling on rebel flags as a few months earlier the rebels had destroyed the statue of the 
King.
24
  Manhattan was British again, and Robertson was its military ruler.  
Five days after taking his position as commandant, Robertson was faced with the major 
challenge of the great fire, which has been described in greater detail in Chapter III. Its main 
effects were to destroy a substantial portion of the buildings in the city, making the remaining 
housing stock rather crowded as more people moved to the city. Robertson tirelessly fought 
the fire, and even sacrificed his home to ensure that the royal magazine and warehouse were 
unharmed. General Howe and Governor Tryon both informed the ministry that Robertson’s 
efforts had prevented the total destruction of the city.
25
 
   
Robertson erected barracks and confiscated the vacant homes of rebels to use as officer 
housing. Many buildings were converted into warehouses, and many churches into temporary 
hospitals. Fortifications were rebuilt. The city fire watch was reestablished. Ten companies of 
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volunteer militia were organized. In addition to its military uses, the militia provided something 
to do for many of the Loyalist refugees. Municipal services such as street lights and cleaning 
were reestablished, and a vestry for the poor was established.  A police department under 
Andrew Eliot, former receiver-general of customs, was created. There were no taxes or civilian 
courts, and prices were set and trade controlled by Robertson himself.
26
   
Despite the reestablishment of street cleaning, the streets were often dirty, and the 
sanitation problem was never solved. “Noisome vapours” arose from the mud and from the 
crowding. With the housing-stock reduced by perhaps one third by the fire, Loyalists, residents, 
soldiers and sailors were forced to live in close quarters, increasing   friction among the groups. 
And with no true civil courts, there was little opportunity In New York City, or elsewhere in the 
British zone, to get redress for the looting and other depredations of the troops. These included 
drunken rioting by sailors, and even murders by drunken soldiers.
27
 
Firm in his belief that most New York City residents were loyal subjects of the King (and, 
since most were Loyalist refugees during his tenure as Commandant, he was undoubtedly 
correct), Robertson’s rule was mild. He believed that the purpose of the military was to support 
“the good Subjects against the bad.” Troops were ordered to avoid taking rebel property 
without authorization, and pillaging soldiers were dealt with severely—one was even executed. 
Hoping that acting humanely would help the British among those pre-disposed to British rule, 
he treated American prisoners mildly, unlike other officials such as Provost Marshal William 
Cunningham, who treated American prisoners abominably.
28
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Robertson retained his post as Commandant till 1778. His tenure was punctuated by 
several trips to London.  His advice and views were sought out on these journeys, and George III 
was personally notified that Robertson was in Britain in 1777. On a journey to Britain in 1779, 
Robertson testified at the Parliamentary inquiry of General Howe. This inquiry had been 
demanded by the Howes to vindicate their conduct of the war, which had come into question. 
This inquiry was in many respects a battle between Germain and Howe, and Robertson’s 
testimony aided Germain. Robertson thought that Howe on several occasions had allowed 
Washington to slip from his grasp.   Robertson maintained that much additional manpower was 
not needed in the colonies. He also argued that two-thirds of the Americans were loyal, and 
that if the point of taxation by Parliament had been abandoned, that would probably have 
ended the war.  The great object of the war, he argued, was “to be the regaining the people, 
and to do this by letting them see we were their friends.”
29
  
Robertson’s views on the war were outlined in a memorandum he wrote at the behest 
of Lord Amherst. Lord Amherst had been Commander in Chief in America for much of the Seven 
Years War; in 1779 he was Commander in Chief of the Forces, which gave him command of the 
entire British Army and a seat in the Cabinet. He was also one of Robertson’s patrons.  Amherst 
forwarded the memorandum to the King on or about January 1, 1779. In the “Memorandums 
Relative to the Mode of Making War in America,” Robertson asserted that his belief was well-
founded that a majority of Americans wished to be subjects of the King and were adverse to the 
revolutionary government, “and it is on this foundation, we should build our hopes of renewing 
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all the advantages this nation can derive from its Colonys.” The rebellion’s authors were well 
aware of this, and seduced the people by “artfully” taking “advantages of incidents, which I 
need not mention in detail…to induce a general beleif, that no alternative was left the 
inhabitants, but taking arms, or submitting to slavery.”
 30
  
 Robertson continued: 
 
I have proofs in my hands from some of the best inform’d of the rebel councils, 
and of the state of the peoples minds, dated two years ago—that if the two 
foundations on which the rebellion stood, were taken away, by an explicit 
declaration on our part, that the right of taxation by us, wou’d be given up and a 
general pardon granted, that the congress would not be able to raise a thousand 
men.
31
 
 
 
However, Robertson continued that “Circumstances are now much alter’d, the address and 
management necessary now to bring the people back to their duty… must now be much 
greater.” What was before easy would now require great talent. One possible method 
suggested itself; the ambitions of half the rebel leaders had been disappointed, and offices they 
had sought had gone to rivals. No “very profound management or refined policy” was 
necessary to induce them to prefer a position of consequence under the British to being 
mortified by being subject to their rivals—though it would be necessary to understand the state 
of each colony and the interests and resentments of their leading men.
32
    
 Here, Robertson is arguing that some appeal to the hunger for office and preferment 
that existed in both Britain and America should be used to “bring…people back to their duty”. 
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As the historian Gordon Wood notes, while not as developed in America as it was in Britain, a 
hierarchical, “monarchical” society of patrons and preference did exist in the colonies, a milieu 
of striving for honors (many of which could only be given by a patron). Indeed, Wood argues 
that much of the “radicalism” of the American Revolution consisted of the ending of this 
monarchical society, though this process would take decades.  Even that most quintessential 
American, Benjamin Franklin, had strived mightily as a young man so that he could retire in 
middle age as a gentleman.
33
  A survey of the writings of many British generals shows a striving 
after honor and an awareness of the slightest slights. This can also be seen on the American 
side.   For example, Nathaniel Greene bitterly resented becoming quartermaster of 
Washington’s army because he thought it would deprive him of the glory he sought (to his 
credit, he served in the post well and was eventually awarded with the Southern Command.)
34
 
Benedict Arnold’s resentments at perceived slights and in not receiving the glory and posts and 
recognition that he believed he was due (in most cases, quite rightly) led him to treason. 
However, while there was at least some hunger for office and advancement on the rebel side, it 
was difficult to find too many rebel leaders who could be turned, as Reed had shown a few 
months earlier. Disappointed many of them may have been in not getting positions they had 
hoped for, but personal advancement through obtaining government or military office was 
probably not the only, or even the main, reason they had supported the rebellion. The vast 
majority of rebel leaders probably truly believed in the ideals of the Revolution to one extent or 
another, and could not be seduced back to the Crown by the mere offer of a position. Even 
those who might have been susceptible to temptation were unlikely to be tempted under the 
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relatively favorable circumstances of late 1778 (when the memorandum was most likely 
written). It was possible, if not probable, that some rebel leaders would turn or “trim” under 
conditions of invasion or conquest, as many Long Island patriots had trimmed, but not under 
the relatively favorable conditions prevailing in late 1778.
35
  
As discussed above, there had been much consensus among Americans on the broad 
outlines of political philosophy and on the injustice and unconstitutional nature of Britain’s 
policy. Even many who became leading Loyalists had been in general agreement on most of 
these ideas and ideals. That so many British officers and officials thought an appeal to the 
desire for office would be generally useful shows a profound misunderstanding of the 
Revolution, the character of the Americans, and of the leadership of the Revolution. It should 
also be noted that the Revolution, with its revolutionary committees and new governments and 
fleeing British and Loyalist officials, had both freed-up and created many new positions for 
leaders to fight for. For example, there were eleven (twelve if we include Vermont) new 
governorships now available to Americans (as opposed to Britons, as had been the usual 
practice), and thirteen or fourteen new state councils.
36
  Many “new men” arose through the 
increase in political participation that occurred during the Revolution. Indeed, Robertson’s 
soon-to-be- counterpart, Governor George Clinton of “free” New York, is generally considered 
one of these.
37
 
                                                           
35
 In December 1778, America was allied with France, and the British had evacuated Philadelphia several months 
earlier. Prospects looked quite favorable to the Americans. On the downside for the United States, Georgia was 
invaded in late 1778; the invasion would soon gain control of most of Georgia.  
36
 Rhode Island and Connecticut alone among the colonies in the late colonial era chose their own governors 
through election. 
37
  See Ryerson for a general discussion of “new men”, especially 4-6 and chapter 4.   
258 
 
 In his testimony at the Howe Inquiry, Robertson had argued that few Americans had 
returned to their allegiance because British troops had rarely stayed in any place for long.
38
 
Loyalists were afraid that if they showed their loyalty, they would be punished once the British 
left—so they kept quiet.
39
   In his Memorandum, Robertson told Amherst that the rebels were 
trying to create a belief “that we are about to abandon our friends and that the country is to be 
given up to them”. This belief had to be destroyed. He suggested that the government should 
issue a declaration that “we will not abandon our friends, or quit the country,” and that this 
declaration should be communicated to the people at large.
40
 
 Robertson suggested cutting off communications between New England and the other 
colonies by seizing the Highlands. Possessing this area would not only starve out New England, 
but result in about six thousand Loyalist troops—a substantial reinforcement.  Since “the gros 
[greater amount] of the respectable inhabitants of a Country are not to be expected to” act as 
soldiers, the duties of the Loyalist troops would be mainly patrol and defense—and all without 
costing the government a penny, since they would be local volunteers.  With the lower Hudson 
and northern Jersey in British hands, supplies, provisions, and forage would be greatly 
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improved.
41
 Robertson’s thinking, we can see, was dove-tailing with the recommendations that 
the Carlisle Commission had been making, and similar to Germain’s thinking of late 1778 and 
early 1779. 
 Robertson suggested raids against New England, particularly Salem and Newbury. This 
would destroy privateers and prevent reinforcements from being sent against the assault on 
the Hudson. Robertson strongly urged that “The Army shou’d not wander to places that cant be 
supported nor shou’d we call people into Arms who cant be sustain’d”. This would only result in 
a defeat which would aid the rebels.  Those people that could be properly supported by the 
government should be “put under a civil government the offices shoul’d be fill’d by the most 
respectable of the inhabitants, every priviledge and advantage even in trade shou’d be given, 
their State shou’d be made the envy of the neighbours, this wou’d bring numbers under our 
protection.”
42
 Again, his thinking was similar to ideas under discussion among the ministry.   
 Robertson believed that the government of a restored British Province of New York 
would soon be self-supporting. The example of a restored Royalist New York, plus negotiations 
and the progress of British arms, would disabuse the other provinces and the rebels of the idea 
that Britain was abandoning the colonies. Indeed, with civil government restored, trade 
restored, and leading New Yorkers in most major posts, and with the rebel colonies subject to 
invasion and raid, they would “regret their condition, and wish for our protection.”
43
    
Robertson’s and Germain’s views on America and the possibilities of civil government 
meshed. Robertson’s testimony and his memorandum both asserted that a majority—two 
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thirds—of Americans supported the King. The war could be won through persuasion 
(supplemented by the sensible and effective use of military force). Robertson’s memorandum, 
if not read by Germain, was surely discussed with him by Amherst or the King. The similarity of 
views of Robertson and Germain in early 1779, plus Robertson’s long experience in America and 
in New York, made him perhaps the perfect choice to restore civilian government to New York.  
The fact that Robertson’s testimony aided Germain in his battle with Howe certainly did not 
hurt, but the decision may have been made before the testimony. In any event, his royal 
commission making him governor of New York was signed on May 11, 1779.
44
  
 
II 
 
 
  In early July, 1779, Robertson was instructed by Germain that “Sir Henry Clinton 
[Commander in Chief in America] is vested with the powers to restore to Peace the whole, or 
any part of Province if he shall judge it fitting, in which case the Civil Constitution will revive.”  
Once an area had been declared at peace, then civil government was restored, and Robertson’s 
authority as civil governor of New York would become activated.  Germain then informed 
Robertson as to the “measures…it is wished you should adopt, as Opportunities may offer for 
carrying them into Execution.”
 45
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 As Governor, Robertson would appoint a Council. Germain stressed that it was of the 
utmost importance that the loyalties of council members be without a doubt. Germain spoke 
much of the possibility of calling a new assembly, but acknowledged that it was a matter which 
would require much consideration. While the King desired to “give Proof” to New Yorkers and 
other Americans that it was “not His Majesty’s intention to govern America by Military Law,” it 
was stressed to Robertson that “it would defeat that end, if an Assembly were convened before 
such part of the Province was restored to Peace.” A loyal assembly was desired.
46
 
 A declaratory act would be issued annulling all laws and legal proceedings of the rebel 
government.  Robertson was to give free allotments of land to refugees desiring to settle in 
New York, and to provide for the support of those refugees needing it. Deserted tenements 
could be used for troops or rented out. Getting to the heart of the dispute between the 
colonies and the mother country, Germain told Robertson that 
 
The making a permanent Provision for the Provincial Expenses and fixing a ratio 
for the Contribution of New York to the General Charge of the Empire would be 
no more than suitable Returns for the Generousity of Parliament in relinquishing 
all Purpose of imposing Taxes in the Colonies, except as Regulations of Trade, 
and even in that case suffering the Revenue arising from them to be carried to 
the Account of the Colonies.
47
  
 
 
By taking the lead in enacting such a “dutiful and grateful Measure”, Germain stated, that New 
York would be eligible for particular favor. To encourage this, Robertson could assure the 
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Assembly that quitrent arrears would be remitted by his majesty and that future revenue would 
be spent within the province.
48
  
 In summary, civilian government was to be restored in those parts of New York that had 
been pacified.  This had clearly been achieved in the three off-shore islands, and New Yorkers 
such as William Smith had been clamoring for such an action for several years. Some difficulty 
with Clinton was anticipated. The Howe brothers had feared civilian interference because it was 
likely to restrain or divert military operations, 
49
 and Clinton would probably be similarly 
reluctant. However, it was difficult to see how downstate New York could not be declared at 
peace. Despite the occasional raid from Connecticut or New Jersey, the area was secured.  
Outside of Halifax, it was probably the securest British possession on the continent.  
Even though he was being sent as a civilian governor, Robertson retained his military 
rank. To avoid too much friction with Clinton and the other military officers, Robertson was 
directed not to actively command troops. 
50
 
  
Despite the importance of the mission, Robertson did not leave London until September 
16, 1779. One of the reasons for the delay was probably the failed Franco-Spanish “Other 
Armada” that slipped into the Channel and threatened England with invasion in late July and 
August of that year. The campaign against the Armada did not end until early September.
51
  
Until then, sailing was hazardous. From London, Robertson sailed to Cork, Ireland. Here he 
awaited the assembly of a supply fleet, with which he was to sail to North America. He waited 
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for an extremely long time. The dangers of attack by the French, Spanish, or the occasional 
American privateer made trans-Atlantic travel a dangerous proposition requiring much 
planning. While the Admiralty and Navy Boards did yeoman’s service in the immensely difficult 
task of supplying an army 2000 miles (or two months travel time) away, there were often many 
delays. Indeed, the British historian McKesy believes that the shipping bottleneck killed British 
hopes for decisive victory in 1776.
52
  In any event, Robertson was delayed by the assembly of 
the supply fleet he was to sail with. Further delay in reaching New York was occasioned by the 
fact that the fleet that he sailed with was not headed to New York, but to Savannah, Georgia.
53
   
Travelling on board the Raleigh, Robertson arrived in Savannah on February 16, 1780. 
The British army was then involved in an early phase of the so-called “Southern Strategy,” and 
Charleston (or “Charles Town”, as Robertson called it) was being besieged. Robertson was soon 
transported to James Island, opposite Charleston, where the British army was headquartered. 
General Sir Henry Clinton himself was overseeing operations. Since the Raleigh was in much 
demand for operations against Charleston, and getting to New York would take some time, 
Robertson offered his services in any capacity in the siege. This was not in violation of his 
orders, as he was not yet in New York, and it is likely that the general wished one more chance 
to serve in a military capacity before taking up his civilian duties.  While he would probably 
have been given a staff position, perhaps he hoped for a last chance for the martial glory that 
had eluded him in an otherwise stellar career. Robertson laconically recorded that “Sir Henry 
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after considering the Matter, next Morning told me that he thought I could be of most Service 
at New York.” Robertson soon transferred to the Russel, which transported him to New York. 
54
 
Robertson, a few months shy of his sixty-third birthday, arrived in New York City on 
March 21, 1780.
55
  The weather was cold, and six inches of snow would fall on March 31 and 
April 1.
56
  A small reception was held for him on the evening of his arrival, attended by a “large 
company of Ladies and others,” including William Smith. Smith noted that Robertson was “thin 
but sound in Health.” Smith and Robertson had known each other for twenty years, and had 
worked with each other during the Drummond peace proposal.
57
  Smith, who was greatly 
interested in seeing civil government restored, was quite pleased with Robertson’s arrival. He 
stated in his journal that the “multitude” of Loyalists “sighed” for Robertson’s arrival.  In 
general, the sentiment among New Yorkers at Robertson’s arrival seems to have been 
favorable. Andrew Elliot, then police chief of New York City and soon to be Lieutenant-
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Governor, considered him a sensible and intelligent man with a cheerful temper.  However, not 
all were pleased. It can be inferred from his History that the Scots-hating Thomas Jones was not 
as pleased.  Indeed, he described at some length how Robertson, in his old position of Barrack 
Master, would clip coins called “half Joes” when paying contractors, which they had little choice 
but to take; the coins, according to Jones, became known as “Robertsons”.  Jones then argues 
that Robertson “was universally despised and execrated by” New York’s inhabitants. Of course, 
Jones was a man of strong opinions and heavily biased against Prebyterians and Scots.
58
 Still, 
many seemed to view Robertson’s appointment favorably or at least hopefully—and a sizable 
amount of New York City’s population, as refugees from elsewhere, probably had little memory 
of Robertson’s alleged corruption.  It would soon become apparent that Clinton did not view 
Robertson’s arrival as favorably as many of the New Yorkers seemed to view it.  
Robertson swiftly went to work. On March 22, he summoned the Council.
 59
   Except for 
two additions occasioned by deaths, it was the same Council that had sailed to meet with Tryon 
on board the Dutchess of Gordon four years earlier. Among its notable members was Andrew 
Elliot, former receiver general of revenues and collectors of customs and during the occupation 
superintendant of police (among other duties); Oliver DeLancey, who as brigadier general was 
the highest ranking American Loyalist, Roger Morris,  a Westchester loyalist who was connected 
by marriage to the Phillipse family, and William Smith.  Smith was made the Chief Justice; he 
would prove to be the last Chief Justice of the Province of New York.  
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Governor Tryon seemed to relish his military duties more than his civilian duties and had 
put little pressure on the military authorities to restore civil government. So New York had 
remained under martial law, while its nominal governor led several raids on Connecticut and 
other places.  A severe attack of gout afflicted Tryon about the time of Robertson’s arrival.  As 
Smith records Robertson’s inauguration: 
 
 
We read the Commission with Tryon’s Consent in a Room opposite to his 
Bedroom, fearing it would be too much for him to hear it and then administered 
the Oaths in his Presence to the new Governor. On which he delivered the Great 
Seals and a Number of Papers. We then returned and took the Oaths ourselves. 
And afterwards proceeded to the Balcony of the City Hall from whence after 
Proclamation to keep Silence it was read again. The Day concluded in a Dinner at 
General Tryon’s which he could not attend.
60
  
 
 
   
Robertson informed Smith that he had “no Authority to set up Civil Government till Sir. 
H.C. [Clinton] has declared the Country at the King’s Peace. But Sr. H will do this on its being 
asked.” Robertson seemed to think that Clinton’s declaration was only a mere formality, or at 
least something that could be obtained fairly easily. Robertson soon asked Smith to draft an 
“Instrument” declaring part of New York at the King’s Peace, plus a letter to Clinton urging the 
declaration be made without delay. Smith hurried these to Robertson.
61
   
In this Smith-prepared letter to Clinton, Robertson informed Clinton that he could “do 
nothing very material, towards attaining the great Objects of my Civil Commission, until your 
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Excellency shall have declared such Parts of this Colony, as are within our Lines, at the King’s 
Peace.” Military force alone, he said, could not satisfy the Loyalists of downstate New York.  In a 
passage which perhaps reflected Smith’s views as much as Robertson, he stated  that “I find 
that they [the Loyalists] have been looking for my Arrival, as connected with the immediate 
Revival of the Civil Authority, and the Restoration of the Blessings of the Constitution, which it 
is the King’s Wish they should enjoy.”
62
   
Citing intelligence gathered by Tryon “which seems daily to receive Confirmation,” 
Robertson informed Clinton that there was a “great and favorable Change of Temper” among 
the rebels. He strongly suspected that the “Usurpers”, as he called the rebel leadership, would 
abandon their arms if they had “Hope of an Act of Oblivion” [a general pardon for political 
offenses] to shield them from the “vindictive rage of their own Countrymen.” An assembly 
would be required to pass such an act. If an assembly could be called, Robertson said that he 
would consider the rebellion finished in New York, and sure to end soon in the other colonies.
63
 
While Germain had stressed to Robertson the importance of an assembly,
64
 the 
influence of Robertson’s “ghost-writer” Smith can be seen in these passages. Smith was a 
strong supporter of restoring civil government, and clearly was taking the opportunity 
Robertson had given him to push his own views on Clinton.  This was not the first time Smith 
had been presented with such an opportunity. In December of 1779 he had dined with Josiah 
Martin II, formerly royal governor of North Carolina, and nephew of the Loyalist Josiah Martin 
of Rock Hall on Long Island. Martin confidentially told him that he would be joining   General 
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Clinton’s upcoming Southern expedition and that he was to be the royal Governor of South 
Carolina. Martin asked Smith what he would advise him to do. Smith advised Martin to convoke 
an Assembly as quickly as possible for two reasons. The first reason would be to encourage and 
support loyal militias, and the second would be to encourage the rebels to return to their 
Allegiance. Smith also told Martin that the “Obstinancy of the Rebellion” was encouraged not 
by “a Distrust of the King’s Clemency nor the Nation’s Liberality, but the Wrath of their own 
Countrymen.”  Only an Act of Oblivion could save the rebel leadership from private actions for 
compensation, and only a colonial legislature would be likely to enact one. It seem that the 
judicially-minded Smith feared civil actions mainly, not more violent forms of “compensation” 
(or revenge) against the rebels.  In the event, both Loyalists and Patriots, particularly in South 
Carolina but also in the New York City region, often had to worry about violent forms of 
“compensation.” The advice Smith gave in December to Martin was very similar to the wording 
of the March letter Smith drafted for Robertson.
65
  
Robertson told Clinton he was anxious to begin the “Experiment.” It would be, if it 
worked, “productive of the greatest Benefits” and to the Crown’s advantage. Even if his 
expectations were too high, it would still be helpful by “subdividing the Faction” and increasing 
the  number of the King’s Friends. He also added, probably aware of Howe’s problems with 
restoring civil government and Clinton’s likely similar qualms, that “Civil Government 
administered by a Friend to the Troops would conduce to their Interest and Accomodation.” In 
other words, as Governor he would not let the civilian government get in the way of military 
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operations. He even added his belief that civil government would make the soldiers better 
soldiers.
66
    
Robertson enclosed in his letter a form proclamation drafted by Smith whereby the 
King’s Peace was declared in New York, Staten Island, and Nassau (or Long) Island.
67
  While 
awaiting the positive reply which he expected Clinton to give, Robertson prepared, with the 
assistance of Smith and others, a proclamation that promised civil government in the near 
future. This proclamation was issued as a broadside on April 15, 1780, and soon printed in 
newspapers. It was frequently reprinted, and was even printed in German (many tenants in 
upstate New York were German-speaking).  In this proclamation, Robertson informed New 
Yorkers that His Majesty wished to revive civil government to prove to all that it was his desire 
to govern America not by military law, but by civilian. He mentioned the steps he had already 
taken, and stated that as soon as possible, he would reopen the Courts and convene an 
Assembly. Robertson in the proclamation stated that he took “great Satisfaction in the 
Anticipation of that happy Day,” when “Your Country with your antient privileges, will then 
participate in an extensive Commerce and be exempted from all Taxations not imposed by 
yourselves”. He stated that Patriot claims that Britain intended to impair American rights and 
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eastern Queens after the western portion was incorporated into New York City in the late 1890s.    
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privileges were false and malicious, as were insinuations that she wanted to abandon the 
provinces to anarchy or “the fraudulent and ambitious Views of foreign, Popish, and arbitrary 
Powers.” Britain, happy under her Constitution which was the envy of her neighbors, wished 
“to include in one comprehensive System of Felicity, all the Branches of a Stock, intimately 
connected by the Ties of Language, Manners, Laws, Customs, Habits, Interests, Religion, and 
Blood.” He warned “the Few who have found Means to acquire a Sway in the Management of 
your Affairs” to desist, from any future Attempts to restrain and seduce the Loyalty of others.” 
He promised protection and support to all those who accepted the proclamation of a general 
pardon (to those who returned to their “duty”) issued in early March by Clinton, who had also 
been made a peace commissioner. Robertson  also promised that those “who shall most 
distinguish themselves by their laudable Efforts for these good Purposes, will most assuredly 
best recommend themselves to the Royal Approbation and Favour.”
68
 
Again, the Proclamation indicated the common belief of many Britons that the rebellion 
was by a small few, and that the majority wished to remain under British rule. New York would 
be returned to its pre-Revolutionary state, and constitutional government under the king would 
be restored. Pardons would be liberally granted, and commerce restored (this may have been 
considered particularly appealing to a commercially-oriented state like New York.) And again, 
the granting of signs of favor—such as positions and perhaps titles—by the King was implied for 
those who distinguished themselves in “accomplishing the King’s most gracious Design of 
restoring the Blessings of Peace and good Government.”
69
 Robertson would no doubt have 
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agreed with Serle and others who wanted to make the colonies more like Britain by granting 
titles and offices, and importing as much of Britain’s patronage system as possible. 
The April 15 broadside was posted at several places, such as outside the offices of James 
Rivington, the Loyalist publisher of the Royal Gazette. Smith reports that crowds were 
“perusing” the Proclamation that had been affixed to Rivington’s Corner, and that he had been 
told by Henry White (a wealthy merchant and a member of the Council) that it went down with 
the resentful “like chopped Hay”. The merchant Will Bayard and the Loyalist Ashfield were 
reported to have been livid at what they saw as the liberality of Clinton’s proclamation. 
However, years after the event, Thomas Jones remembered things differently: “The Inhabitants 
within the British lines, long oppressed by the imperious mandates and tyrannical sway of the 
military, were charmed with the thoughts of being restored to the enjoyment of civil law.” 
These hopes, he goes on to record, were soon dashed by the creation of the Police Courts, 
which will be further discussed below. 
70
 
A question has to be asked—why was this proclamation issued at all? It is doubtful that 
Clinton, then in South Carolina, had even received Robertson’s March 29
th
 letter, much less had 
time to reply. It is possible that Robertson—or possibly Smith—was trying to put pressure on 
Clinton by presenting him with a proclamation that it would have been most embarrassing to 
reject. Perhaps he wished to remind Clinton that restoring civil government was not only the 
Ministry’s wish, but that of His Majesty himself. Or perhaps he was eager to get on with the 
“experiment”, and, unable to proceed officially without Clinton’s blessing, did what he could 
legitimately do in early April, 1780: tell everyone that civil government would soon be restored. 
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If so, he probably acted on the assumption that the proclamation that southern New York was 
“at the King’s Peace” would surely be made by Clinton. It is dangerous to assume. Clinton never 
certified that any part of New York was pacified—not in April, May, or June 1780, not on his 
return to New York, not ever. Without that certification, British New York could not be returned 
to civilian government under the King. Clinton, despite the manifest fact that the region was 
pacified and acquiescent to British rule, never certified that it was. Civilian government did not 
return to southern New York until George Washington entered New York City in late 1783. 
Why did Clinton not certify southern New York was at peace? There is a strong 
possibility that certain personality problems of Clinton may have had a major influence on his 
failure to certify. To better understand his actions of 1780, actions that doomed Germain’s 
hope to make New York a shining example to the other colonies, this work will now briefly 
review Clinton’s life and career.  
 
 
III 
 
 
As his biographer William J. Willcox puts it, Henry Clinton, “like most men who rose to 
be generals in eighteenth-century England, was born with a silver spoon in his mouth.” While 
England was not an ancien regime in the French sense, and its thriving merchant and middle 
classes did permit some social mobility, such developments barely touched the officer class. 
The army was the particular sphere of royal influence, “for only men whose loyalty to the 
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Crown was bred into the bone could be trusted to control the force on which the social order 
depended.” One had to be a titled aristocrat or a member of the gentry to be an officer. Most 
of the higher officers of the British army of the time were either members of the peerage, 
future members of the peerage, or the younger brothers of those in or destined for the House 
of Lords. Indeed, many British colonels and generals in the Seven Years War and American 
Revolution were Members of Parliament. While there were rare exceptions, such as James 
Robertson, they were the proverbial exceptions which proved the rule. To rise in the army, 
proper ancestry and connections were more important than merit; patronage could be more 
important than winning battles. Clinton came from a well-connected family that was titled in its 
own right.
71
   
Clinton’s family traced its earldom back to the time of Elizabeth, and another branch of 
his family had been barons since the 1200s. More importantly, Clinton’s uncle, the Earl of 
Lincoln, had married a sister of the Duke of Newcastle (who was one of George II’s first 
ministers); in 1768 the Duke died sonless, making Henry Clinton’s cousin (the Duke’s nephew) 
the new Duke of Newcastle.  Henry Clinton was thus well-connected to a powerful family; in 
addition, Clinton was in the line of succession for a dukedom as well. Henry’s father used his 
many connections to gain positions, and had a career at sea. This meant that Henry rarely saw 
his father. 
72
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In such a system of patronage, it is necessary that one “put oneself forward,” and 
indicate to one’s patrons one’s suitability and desire for a position. 
73
 While one must avoid 
being over-aggressive and assertive, and must be ever mindful of the niceties of dealing with 
one’s social “superiors”, one must avoid “bashfulness”.  Bashfulness is a harmful personality 
trait in such a social system. George Clinton, Henry’s father, was bashful, and thought that his 
less-than- sterling early career had been due in part to “a diffidence, peculiar to my family and 
self, of my own sufficiency.” He preferred to communicate with his patron, Newcastle, by letter, 
because of a “family bashfulness”. George Clinton not only seemed to lack self-confidence and 
be unassertive, but believed his unassertiveness was a family trait. His biographer, while 
doubting that such a trait was genetic, believes that a belief in this unfortunate “family trait” 
was transmitted to his son Henry. In short, Henry Clinton, while in many ways gifted, lacked the 
needed self-confidence to fully use his gifts.
74
 
George eventually became Governor of New York in 1743 (staying in that post until 
1753), and Henry, who had been born in 1730, spent much of his adolescence in New York 
province. He attended Reverend Samuel Seabury’s school at Hempstead on Long Island, where 
he apparently made the acquaintance of Seabury’s son, also called Samuel. This younger 
Seabury would later become the first bishop of the American Episcopal Church. In 1745, during 
King George’s War, Henry served in Manhattan as lieutenant of fusiliers, and saw some action 
on Prince Edward’s Island after the capture of Louisbourg. By 1751, he was commissioned in 
the Coldstream Guards (then, as now, one of the elite regiments of the British Army) as a 
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captain lieutenant.  He appears to have been a man-about-town during his years in London, and 
his father, appalled at his expenses, asked Lord Lincoln to obtain for him a “genteel post.” 
Lincoln got him a position as aide-de-camp to Sir John Ligonier in 1756. Ligonier, of French 
origin, was Britain’s top soldier, and in 1757 became Lord Ligonier, field marshal, and 
commander in chief of the army in Britain. By becoming his aide-de-camp, Clinton was now in 
the highest circles of the army.
75
 
 In 1760, his regiment was ordered to Germany, and he managed to secure service with 
the future Duke of Brunswick, nephew of the Prussian king and soon to be one of Europe’s top 
soldiers.  He soon became the future Duke’s aide-de-camp. At the Battle of Friedberg in 1762, 
Clinton and the future Duke were both wounded. Not realizing that Clinton was injured, the 
Duke, who was being carried off the field on a cannon, ordered Clinton to bring a report to 
Prince Ferdinand, the Commander in Chief.  Clinton was unable to comply, and had to march 
two leagues before he was eventually “hacked” by a German surgeon. He never fully recovered 
from the “hacking”, but did gain a reputation for gallantry from the incident. 
76
 
 After the war, he married, probably from love, as his wife had no major connections. 
Unfortunately, Harriet Clinton died in 1772, shortly after delivering her fifth child in five years. 
By all accounts, Clinton was devastated. That same year, he was promoted to major general, 
and elected as a Member of Parliament for a borough in Yorkshire.  In 1774, he was again 
elected a Member of Parliament for a different district, and in February, 1775, he was ordered 
to America. In 1775, he was a good soldier, seemingly ready to take on an independent field 
command, with a keen analytical mind, and good strategic planning skills. However, he was also 
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sensitive and “prickly”. Eighteenth century British officers were often prickly; they were ever 
alert to perceived slights to their honor, were often quarrelsome, angry at rebukes, and saw 
nothing insubordinate about criticizing their superiors. However, Clinton seems to have been 
perhaps excessively prickly. He was constantly quarreling and threatening to resign. He had 
difficult working or getting along with his fellow officers, and this difficulty seemed to increase 
in proportion to stress.
77
   
 In the war, Clinton’s plans were sound. In 1776, he urged more aggressive use of British 
sea power to trap Washington on Manhattan, and the Southern Strategy he tried to implement 
was in many ways sensible. Like Robertson, he did not agree with moving into an area only to 
leave again; he believed this was a betrayal of trust. His Hudson campaign of 1777, while it 
failed and was soon negated by Howe’s ordering of troops away from him, was masterful. Yet, 
Clinton had difficulty working with his superiors and inferiors. There is evidence that his plans 
were often rejected because he was the source—he had made himself so obnoxious that his 
suggestions were rejected. His biographer, after looking at these and similar traits, believes that 
he was at war with himself, had difficulty in sharing authority, and argues that he was 
neurotic.
78
 
 In what was perhaps one of the earliest attempts at using psychology to understand the 
actions of long-dead historical figures, Willcox in the 1950s conducted a “joint investigation” of 
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Clinton’s writings with Frederick Wyatt, then head of the Psychological Clinic at the University 
of Michigan. Wyatt and Willcox argued that Clinton  
 
as an adult had a particularly intense craving for authority of his own, because at 
some deep level he was still trying to free himself  from that of his parents. In 
the eyes of the world he succeeded, for at the peak of his career he had 
authority in full measure and much of the time he used it with apparent self-
assurance. But the assurance was precarious. Part of him insisted, at the same 
deep level, that he was a usurper guilty of intruding on the parental domain…[At 
times the insistence was so great that…] he was so torn between his craving and 
his guilt that he could not exercise the authority he had.
79
   
 
 
 Psychoanalyzing a long-dead historical figure is a difficult proposition.  Willcox and 
Wyatt’s attempt, however, is impressive and worthy of serious consideration. Wyatt, after all, 
was the head of a psychology clinic at a major university. Of course, Freudian analysis is not in 
as much vogue as it used to be, and many schools of psychology compete with it. Still, whether 
Clinton was neurotic or not (or whether neurosis is even a real or useful diagnosis), the 
evidence is  clear that he had difficulty sharing authority,  and had little desire to share any 
authority over New York with Robertson. On learning of Robertson’s appointment, he asked 
“What do they mean by it?”
80
 So, a difficulty in sharing authority, perhaps a neurotic difficulty 
in sharing authority, may have been one reason he failed to certify New York as pacified. But 
there may have been other reasons for his puzzling failure.  
 Recall that the Howe brothers had become peace commissioners in May of 1776. As 
commissioners, they had the power to declare colonies or parts of colonies “at the King’s 
Peace” assuming several conditions (most noticeably the dissolution of revolutionary 
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congresses and committees and the meeting of an Assembly which declared its allegiance to 
the King) had been achieved. They too failed to create a civilian government in New York, 
Rhode Island, New Jersey or Philadelphia. While the Philadelphia occupation was relatively 
short, and the Jersey occupation was ephemeral and then minimal (a few port cities guarding 
Manhattan and Staten Island), the Rhode Island occupation lasted two years, and the New York 
occupation for the entire war. Yet during the Howe’s term as commissioner, they never 
attempted to achieve civil government in New York or Rhode Island.  The Rhode Island failure 
seems even more puzzling in some ways than the New York failure.    In December, 1776, the 
island of Rhode Island had been captured by Clinton, bottling up the “Continental Fleet” in 
Narragansett Bay
81
, sealing off the Long Island Sound, and providing a possible base for a move 
on Boston. The main city of the island was Newport, then one of America’s five cities.
82
  The 
province of Rhode Island had long been New England’s “Siberia”; a place of exile, either 
voluntary or through expulsion, for those who disagreed with the Puritan establishments in 
Massachusetts and Connecticut. In 1776, much of Rhode Island was Quaker.  Newport and the 
island of Rhode Island were mainly Quaker. Quakers were pacifists (those who took up arms 
were often those who had fallen away from the Society of Friends, such as “the Fighting 
Quaker”, Nathanael Greene).  They also believed in obedience to established authority—and 
many of them thought that meant the British. While mainly neutral during the war, because of 
their acquiescence to British rule, they were often thought to be Loyalists. Many suffered for 
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this; for example, in foraging expeditions during the winter of 1777 and 1778, American troops 
from Valley Forge would often confiscate food from Quaker farms because they were thought 
to have Loyalist sympathies.
83
  But Quaker acquiescence to authority meant that the British had 
few problems governing Newport and the island. It seems that the island of Rhode Island would 
have been a good candidate for an experiment in restoring government. But no such 
experiment was attempted.  The concept of creating alternative, loyal American governments 
and then negotiating with them, as one historian notes, did not seem to occur to the Howes.
84
  
 With the exception of the Carlisle Commission in 1778, the power to restore civil 
government was exclusively in the hands of the commanders-in-chief of the Army and Navy. 
When William Howe left for Britain, the power transferred to Clinton as Peace Commissioner, 
and after the Carlisle Commission, Admiral Arbuthnot became the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Navy and a Peace Commissioner. Arbuthnot was an experienced naval commander, twenty 
years Clinton’s elder, and had recently been given the high rank of Vice Admiral of the Blue. 
85
 
Some believed that leaving the power of peace in the hands of the main general and admiral 
was a problem, and that, as Germain argued in late 1781, “finishing the war should not so 
absolutely depend upon the decision of those whose interest in continuing it may in some 
degree influence their judgments.”
86
 Here Germain seems to imply that the Howes and Clinton 
did not pursue peace as well as they could have, preferring military victory or glory (indeed, the 
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statement follows a paragraph extolling the policy of establishing civil government).  This is 
unfair to Clinton and the Howes, but there is a kernel of truth here. A civilian power could 
restrain military freedom of action; the Howes and Clinton “feared civilian interference, not 
because it might put an end to the war and their own importance, but because it was likely to 
restrain or divert their military operations.”
87
   Military men might reject a chance for peace 
(such as, for argument’s sake, civilian government in New York) in exchange for an opportunity 
for military victory—which in the long run might not prove as valuable as the peaceful path. 
And military officers would tend to think that the best way to achieve peace was to beat the 
enemy decisively, not negotiation. Sometimes, they would be quite correct in thinking this, but 
in the situation of a colonial rebellion, it is at least arguable that victory is more likely to be 
achieved through a combination of military victory and winning the people over. Germain 
argued that “It is much to be wished that some one person should be invested with full power 
to treat of and conclude peace” in order to avoid “future jealousies and misunderstandings.”
88
 
So, an apprehension or worry by both the Howes and Clinton as to civilian interference in 
military operations seems to be another possibility. Indeed, in Robertson’s letter of March 29
th
, 
1780, discussed above, he tried to allay these fears.
89
 
 Thomas Jones had a darker explanation for the failure to establish civilian government 
Jones, writing years after the events, was angry at many involved in the loss of New York to the 
British Empire, British as well as rebels, and tended to believe many were activated by vile, 
sinister, self-interested motives.  The high ideals and expressions of belief in Constitutional 
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principle of the revolutionaries, to Jones, merely were masks for their real reasons.  Jones 
believed that if civilian government had been restored, the result would be that the restored 
civilian courts would order compensation for seizures by the military, and punish and prevent 
much corruption by British military and government officials. He believed that the occupation 
authorities had no desire to see that happen. Jones must be read with the proverbial grain of 
salt, especially when he assigns a base motive for an action. Still, there may be more of a grain 
of truth to his explanation for the British failure to establish civil government.
90
   As will be 
discussed further below, Robertson created three “Police Courts” in lieu of restoring the civil 
courts. With his usual tendency to see only the worst in people, Jones ascribed this to having 
“no intention nor inclination” to carry out his orders to restore the courts (if he even had such 
orders). This was confirmed, for Jones, by the creation of “three more arbitrary, illegal, 
tyrannical, and unconstitutional Courts of Police.” When Loyalists asked why normal civil 
government had not been restored, Jones records, they were “given to understand, that the 
then situation of affairs would by no means admit of a restoration of the civil law.” The reasons 
or circumstances were never explained to the Loyalists. Only the Governor, General Clinton, 
and a few other officers and officials knew the reason. The Police Courts used different 
procedures from civil courts, were limited in jurisdiction, and had no appeals. But the officers 
and officials, Jones alleges, had  
 
…particular purposes to serve, and the erection of such courts with such 
abridged, limited, and restricted, powers, answered their designs. It prevented 
the recovery of large debts justly due, and put it in the power of certain persons 
to make large fortunes with the use of other people’s money. And it did (which 
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perhaps was never intended) put it in the power of villains to defraud the poor, 
the widow, and the fatherless. The abolition of the Courts of civil law, and the 
establishment of these new ones, entirely answered the purposes of the military, 
for being courts of a General’s or a Governor’s creation, the Judges, or 
Superintendents, were solely in their power, were their tools, and could be 
displaced at their pleasure. Their salaries were dependent upon them, they were 
subservient to all their whims, did what they were ordered, behaved as 
submissively as spaniels, and acted like so many ciphers.  No prosecution could 
be carried on, no trespass punished, nor a debt recovered, where an officer, a 
commissary, a barrack-master, a soldier, a conductor, a wagon-driver, or any 
other dependent upon the army, was concerned. Over the military these courts 
claimed no power, took no cognizance, nor exercised any jurisdiction.
91
  
 
  
As will be discussed in Chapter VI of this work, the occupying authorities and the troops 
had committed many questionable acts. Property had been stolen or vandalized. Churches and 
other buildings had been destroyed, allegedly from military necessity, or just wantonly. 
Property had been taken in return for vouchers that were not honored. Many people had real 
and legitimate grievances against the British.  Military discipline under Howe had generally 
been rather lax. If civil government was restored, then officers, barrack-masters, 
quartermasters, commissaries would have been sued civilly and perhaps prosecuted 
criminally.
92
   Jones alleges that a consultation was held among the main officials and officers of 
British New York that civil law would not be restored, and that civil and criminal matters would 
be heard only by military courts or courts of police. He also states that Superintendant George 
Ludlow (of more below), the head of Long Island’s Police Court, had stated shortly after 
receiving his office, “that [restoring the Courts of Law] would be inconvenient, prejudicial, and 
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injurious to the king’s service, that the Governor did not intend to pursue.” He also mentioned 
that the first action brought under the restored civil law in Georgia had been brought against a 
quartermaster for an act done in his official capacity; this Ludlow held was sufficient reason 
why civil law should not be restored in British-controlled New York.
93
 
Whether or not the alleged meeting took place, the decision was ultimately Clinton’s. 
But, the possibility of the army being hamstrung by constant suits, and the expense of paying 
out judgments, was a real one, and certainly one that Clinton probably considered. It is likely 
that the concern that civil government would mean a welter of civil suits and criminal 
prosecutions was a factor in Clinton’s decision to withhold his certification of pacification.   
 
This section has discussed in some detail the issues that most likely impacted Clinton’s 
decision concerning the restoration of civilian government. To briefly recapitulate, the fear that 
a civilian government might hamper the military’s freedom of action was probably the 
dominant consideration, with Clinton’s reluctance (or inability) to share authority second and 
the fear of civil and criminal actions against the military third. It must be remembered that the 
King and the government wanted civil government to happen, if the military authorities—that 
is, Clinton—believed New York at peace. Clinton’s failure to certify New York as at the King’s 
Peace was going against the express wishes of the King and his ministers, though it was within 
Clinton’s discretion. Military considerations, the fact that the area was often raided, the large 
Patriot population in Suffolk, and the possibility, though remote, of a Franco-American attack, 
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at least left cover for refusing to declare the area pacified. This decision was probably based 
most on the desire to keep freedom of action for the military, combined with the desire to 
avoid sharing power.  The rather venal reasons Jones assigned for the failure to restore civil 
government, and thus the ruination of Germain’s plans to create a showcase to the other 
colonies of British intentions, were most likely minor factors, though avoiding suits and 
prosecutions was most likely one of the factors that went into the decision. In summary, a 
reluctance to share authority, a desire to preserve the military’s freedom of action which civil 
government might have hampered, and a fear of civil and criminal actions hamstringing his 
army were all probable factors in Clinton’s decision. Thus ended the possibility of restoring civil 
government under the Crown to New York.  
 
 
IV 
 
 
 By May 3, 1780, Robertson appears to have realized that the expected certification that 
lower New York was at the King’s Peace would not be coming anytime soon from Clinton. In a 
letter to Clinton sent on that date, he told Clinton that he thought that it was proper to hold 
out the hope of civil government to the people of New York, but that “You [Clinton] are Judge 
of the time, and probably will think with me, that this is not exactly the hour—If the power was 
now lodged with me I would not exercise it, till I thought our Arms would thereby derive 
285 
 
benefit.”
94
 It is likely that Robertson was adjusting to the realities of the situation, though 
understandably some eventually thought he had never been for civil government in the first 
place.
95
   This is unlikely; he had called for civil government in his Memorandum of January 1, 
1779, and this call had been one of the things that had won him the position of Governor.  
Germain had chosen him to move energetically in the direction of civil government.
96
 All of his 
actions since arriving in New York, especially his April 15 Proclamation, had pointed towards 
getting civilian government restored. Either Robertson had been lying for over a year or a half, 
or he was adjusting to Clinton’s opposition. In addition to Clinton, many Loyalists and officials, 
such as Tryon and Governor Franklin of New Jersey, considered civil government to be an 
attempt to conciliate the rebels, and had little enthusiasm for it. Andrew Eliot, Robertson’s 
lieutenant governor, also had doubts. Many had disliked the April 15 Proclamation.
97
  All 
indications are that Robertson was adjusting to the opposition of Clinton and of many Loyalists 
to the restoration of civil government. 
 Clinton was “utterly opposed” to civilian government according to his private 
correspondence. Smith noted on June 18, 1780, that Clinton’s former “Expressions to Tryon 
against Civil Authority shows that we can have little reason to suppose he will consent to it 
here.”
98
 However, it is likely that Clinton, despite his opposition to the policy, realized that he 
should try to comply with the King’s wishes as much as possible. “At his most rebellious,” 
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argues his biographer, the King was one person that Clinton “never dared to question.”
99
  On 
June 2, 1780, Clinton wrote Germain suggesting that he be authorized to restore civilian 
government “partially and by decrees.” One way to do this would be to create criminal 
courts.
100
 It should be noted that the authorization Clinton requested was to be for Clinton, not 
Robertson, the civil governor.  
Despite the appointment of a civil governor, civil government was not to be restored in 
New York for the foreseeable future.  New York remained under martial law. Which brings up 
an interesting question: What do you do with a civilian governor in a province under martial 
law?  
 Clinton returned to New York on June 18.
101
 The delicate negotiations between Clinton 
and Robertson continued.  Robertson met with Clinton on June 20
th
, and according to Justice 
Smith, before the meeting perceived that “Sir H.C. has Jealousies of Inconveniences to the 
Army.”  Admiral Arbuthnot, the other Peace Commissioner, was for civil government as a 
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necessary measure to “convince and convert the People,” and put an end to the war.
102
 The 
next day, Robertson sent for Justice Smith.  Describing the meeting of June 20
th
 to Smith, 
Robertson told him that Arbuthnot was “violent” for erecting a civil government, but Clinton so 
much opposed him as to declare that he would go home if it was set up. As Robertson later told 
Lord Amherst, “Sir Henry after much civil language and polite compliments to me, declared, 
that if Civil government should take place in a province where military operations were carrying 
on, he would give up the Command.”
 103
   Then Clinton made an intriguing suggestion to 
Robertson.  
 Clinton was the Commander in Chief in America. He offered to promote Robertson to 
Lieutenant General, and give him the military command of New York. Clinton told Robertson 
that he would be authorized to “take the direction of the police of the province” and appoint 
“the most respectable among the inhabitants to decide all differences”.  In short, Robertson 
would be the highest ranking officer in New York, outranked only by Clinton, with command of 
the province. In his military capacity, he could set up courts, which would, in some cases, 
probably be quicker than civil courts.
104
  
 These courts—the so-called “Police Courts”—while they substituted for civilian courts, 
were not civilian courts but military courts. If not the “arbitrary, illegal, tyrannical, and 
unconstitutional” courts that Jones called them
105
, neither were they a revival of the old civilian 
court system.   They were not civil courts; while they might act the part of a civilian court, their 
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ultimate source of authority was the military. But Robertson believed that a military police was 
a “judicious” step in the right direction. As Robertson told Clinton in a letter of June 25th, he 
would “endeavor to adopt the spirit and give the Country all the real advantages of Civil 
government, free from the loss of time, and the expense of law suits.”     He requested an order 
or letter declaring his command of the troops in the province and his ability to regulate the 
police.  In this and a subsequent letter of the 27
th
, Robertson made it clear that he wished to 
postpone or avoid “every question about the propriety of establishing Civil government.”  On 
the 27
th
, Clinton told Robertson that he could not consent to civil government, but would give 
Robertson a “compleat Command”, and asked him draw up papers to that effect.  As Robertson 
told Smith, he would conceal the “Character” in which he acted. Thus, he would create 
“civilian” courts in his military capacity, not his civil capacity.  These “civilian” courts would thus 
actually be military courts.  In many respects, he was like the governors in 1775 and 1776 who 
“governed” their provinces from warships; his powers as civilian governor were virtually 
dormant, and what authority he exercised was for the most part in his military capacity. Clinton 
would soon prepare a letter authorizing Robertson to perform some civil functions, but 
declined to sign it.
106
  
Thus Clinton thwarted the plan to restore civilian government to British-occupied New 
York, substituting a pale imitation of civilian government for the real thing. This was hardly the 
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shining example of the blessings of British liberty that the King and his ministers had desired.  
However, Germain, when he was informed, agreed to the compromise.
107
 
 
 Having gained the right to establish military courts to mimic the actions of civilian 
courts, Robertson soon set out to establish these military courts.  The Police Courts, as these 
courts were called, were established “to take care that the people of the province, may have all 
the advantages free from the inconveniencys which at this moment would flow from a renewal 
of Civil government.”
108
  A Police Court had been established in May of 1778 in New York City, 
with Andrew Elliot as Superintendant of Police. The former mayor David Mathews was one of 
the members of the court, which tried minor civil and criminal cases. Robertson desired to set 
up a court on Long Island (a court would later be added on Staten Island) because he 
 
…found that the distance from some parts of Long Island, and the expense of 
living at New York, made most of the inhabitants of that Isle rather suffer wrong 
than apply to the Courts at New York—for redress—and that the want of Courts 
on Long Island—left every licentiousness and Crimes unpunished-- 
109
   
 
 
  Robertson approached Judge George Duncan Ludlow of Hempstead, a major town in 
eastern Queens.  According to Jones, Ludlow was “a gentleman of a liberal education, the 
eldest son of an opulent merchant, with large family connections, of great abilities, and deeply 
read in the law.” He was apparently friendly with Cadwallader Colden, who recommended him 
to the Council to fill a vacancy in the New York Supreme Court in 1769. After September, 1773, 
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he served with Jones on the Supreme Court. Ludlow, according to Jones, was vexed when Smith 
became Chief Justice under Robertson, and resigned. Ludlow, it appears, had many important 
friends, who were annoyed at Smith getting the position, especially as Smith was a Whig. Some 
suspected Smith of being sympathetic to the rebels, since he still corresponded with some 
rebels, and had been treated mildly when he was in their territory in the early part of the war 
(as discussed in Chapter II).  Robertson met with Ludlow, flattered and calmed him, and if Jones 
(a long-time opponent of Smith) is to be believed, expressed his sorrow at Smith’s 
appointment, stating it had been forced on him by powerful friends of Smith in England. It 
should be noted that if Robertson did express sorrow at Smith’s appointment, he was probably 
lying, as he seems to have had a good relationship with Smith, at least in 1780.  
 Robertson offered Ludlow the position of Master of the Rolls and Superintendant of the 
Court of Police on Long Island at least in partial compensation for the failure to be made Chief 
Justice. Ludlow was a Long Islander and clearly qualified for the positions, and his ruffled 
feathers were soothed by the appointments.    Smith noted that he perceived the appointment 
to be the first act of Governor Robertson under the military powers of the “Letter of Service” 
Robertson and Clinton had agreed to about a fortnight earlier.
110
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 The appointment, though it may have soothed some ruffled feathers, annoyed Clinton. 
Clinton believed that appointing a Master of Rolls exceeded Robertson’s authority. Smith had 
advised Robertson that he possessed the power as governor.
111
 Questions of leadership and of 
the division of authority between the civilian and military leaders of New York were becoming 
increasingly tangled and confused in New York under its military-civilian mixed government.  
Robertson’s intentions in setting up the Police Court may have been the best, but the 
establishment of the Police Court in many ways represented a step backwards for civil 
government on Long Island. After martial law began with the British conquest of 1776, justices 
of the peace remained on Long Island, but they were limited to cases of petty larceny. Under 
martial law, they were forbidden from handling civil cases. Cases concerning vandalism and 
other bad acts by the troops, the failure by British authorities to pay for provisions, questions of 
ownership of abandoned property, as well as normal civil cases all needed to be handled by civil 
courts, but all these cases had languished because of the lack of civil courts. However, 
mortgage-recording offices remained functioning, as did the Boards of Supervisors of the 
various Long Island counties.  This all changed with the establishment of the Court of Police. 
The justices of the peace lost their power to try petty larcenies. Trial by jury was not restored. 
The Board of Supervisors in Queens ceased meeting. And, to repeat, the Court ultimately rested 
on military, not civilian, authority. Superintendant Ludlow remained directly responsible to 
military authorities. Since many of the cases he would oversee would deal with claims against 
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the military, this meant that he and his court lacked, at least theoretically, the independence  
one would expect a judge and court to have.
112
  
Ludlow opened his office at Jamaica, in Queens County (to this day, there is a major 
working courthouse in Jamaica). While closer to the East End of Long Island than Manhattan, 
this location still was a hardship for the people of Southold, Southampton, and the rest of the 
East End, who lived over fifty miles away—Jamaica is only a few miles east of Manhattan. 
Having a court located in Jamaica was thus not much of an improvement; a more central 
location like Huntington might have made more sense.  Having opened his office, Ludlow 
appointed an assistant, a treasurer, clerks, and other officers, most of whom were relations, 
friends, or dependents. He then, according to Jones, proceeded to become “the little tyrant of 
the Island.”
113
 Despite’s Robertson’s assertions that the men he chose as judges had executed 
“Justice and equity and order,”
114
 Ludlow’s actions seem to have fallen short of that standard, 
as will be discussed shortly. 
After the British occupation began, a lucrative smuggling trade had been established 
between Long Island and New England. Goods (usually from Britain) from the merchants of 
New York would be carried to the East End of Long Island; from there they would be 
transported to Patriot-held Connecticut, for “an amazing profit.” Howe issued a proclamation in 
November 1776 by which no goods could leave New York City without a permit issued by the 
Superintendant of Exports and Imports. After a short while, permits would only be issued to 
those who could present a recommendation that they were loyal and honest, and that the 
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goods that were leaving New York were for the use of Long Island. The permit power upon 
Robertson’s arrival was held by the commander of the King’s soldiers on the island, General 
Oliver Delancey.
115
  
Trade between New York and New England was actually in many ways beneficial to the 
British cause. New York received many provisions from New England, and the Patriots were 
drained of hard currency (the merchants would only accept hard currency). As long as 
gunpowder or other military items (including “coarse clothes”) were not included in the goods 
exported to New England, there was little harm to the Empire by winking at this trade. So, trade 
with New England continued with official connivance. Permits were issued for bringing goods to 
Long Island, and the goods soon found their way to New England, while rebel coffers were 
reduced of hard currency. One does not need to be a criminal mastermind to see that there 
was a way for an enterprising official or two to make some money off this trade through 
charging fees, under the table, for the issuance of these permits. Whether profiting from this 
illicit but beneficial trade was the intent of Robertson or not (as Jones alleges), the power to 
issue permits was soon transferred to the Court of Police, and “if what report said at the time 
was true, it soon became a most lucrative branch of business, the profits of which were equally 
divided between Robertson, Elliot, and Ludlow.”
116
  
In addition to Robertson and Ludlow’s alleged involvement in the illicit trade with New 
England, Ludlow may have found another way to supplement his income. About the same time 
that the Long Island Police Courts had been proclaimed, Robertson, “in order to give relief to 
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the many loyal subjects who had been driven from their possessions by the Rebels,” issued a 
proclamation regarding rebel property. Rebel homes and property would be divided and small 
lots assigned to distressed refugees (except for those needed for the “King’s service”). Philip J. 
Livingston was put in charge of this program. Livingston was a former sheriff of Dutchess 
County, and from the Livingston family which had mainly chosen the Patriot side in the 
Revolution. Like many a family, the Livingston family had been split by the Revolution.  
117
 
 Working with Phillip Livingston in his capacity as the Superintendent of Derelict 
Properties on Long Island, Ludlow used the power of the court to confiscate rebel lands, and 
then rented them. The fees were supposed to go to a fund to help refugee Loyalists, but the 
land was rented at absurdly low values. Ludlow may have just been helping out friends, or was 
perhaps pocketing a small fee for renting the land way below its worth.  Much of the fees and 
other moneys the Court collected went not to refugees but to salaries.
 118
 
At a meeting in late 1782 with Robertson, Guy Carleton, and Smith, Ludlow told General 
Robertson that the Police Courts cost the province nothing. Ludlow responded to a question by 
Smith as to how court officers were paid, by saying that officers were paid by tavern licenses 
and a duty on peddlers and hawkers. At the time of the meeting, these measures brought in 
1000 pounds sterling, but the number had been as high as 1800 or 2000 pounds. The amount 
had been reduced by breaking up lesser dram shops. It also “came out” at this meeting that 
there was also a poor tax on Long Island. It was heaviest in the eastern parts of Long Island; in 
Hempstead the tax was £1200. Ludlow remarked several times that he was “a King”, and Smith 
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remarked that he appeared to have “acted as he pleased.”  This tends to show that Jones’s 
characterization of Ludlow as a “little tyrant” was, while an exaggeration, perhaps only a slight 
exaggeration—he seems to have had much power, and few restraints seem to have been put 
upon him.
119
  
Even by the admittedly low standards of the eighteenth century, the actions of Ludlow 
and the Court were questionable. If Ludlow was not “the little tyrant” of the island, he himself 
thought that he had the powers of a king.  In many ways, Robertson’s attempts to create 
something resembling civilian government on Long Island had only added to the miseries the 
islanders faced. And the Police Courts were but a pale imitation of civilian government. There 
were no true civilian courts, and no assembly. The hoped-for shining example of restored 
civilian government had been thwarted by General Clinton. 
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The Military Occupation of Southern New York 
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Any military occupation will require large numbers of soldiers to coexist with the 
inhabitants, many of whom are unhappy that they are there. The soldiers will need to be fed 
and housed, and will need fuel to heat their fires. The occupation will put stress on the 
resources of the occupied region. And soldiers will often get bored or homesick or even just 
hungry. All of these may result in acts of vandalism, theft, or even worse. While it is virtually 
inevitable that a military occupation will be unpleasant for the inhabitants, some occupations 
may be worse than others. In a situation of a colonial rebellion, regaining the hearts and minds, 
the love and loyalty, of the populace is vital. Therefore, it is extremely important that the 
occupiers from the mother country try to minimize objectionable or appalling incidents with 
the occupied population, and to protect the people from criminals or raids. A violent or even 
ineffectual occupation could poison the effort to restore a colonial region to the empire.  
 The British occupation could have been much better. There were many mistakes by the 
government and bad acts by the troops. These helped poison any chance for reconciliation. This 
chapter will take a look at the occupation of Southern New York from the “ground level” of 
soldiers and inhabitants during the seven year occupation. In the next chapter, the 
chronological discussion will continue, as the final days of British rule in New York will be 
examined.  
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I 
  
 
In the fall of 1776, General Howe defeated Washington’s forces at White Plains. 
Washington’s army retreated towards New Jersey, leaving much of Westchester in British 
control. While not the decisive battle Howe needed, for southern Westchester at least, the 
Battle of White Plains was quite decisive. The present-day Bronx and the southern part of 
Westchester were now under British control.  American forces stationed themselves 
approximately 12 miles north of Tarrytown (the present location of the Tappan Zee Bridge) at 
Peekskill in the northwest of the county, near the border with Revolutionary-era Dutchess 
County (the southern part of the old Dutchess County is now Putnam County). Advance posts 
extended from Mamaroneck on the Long Island Sound to Dobbs Ferry on the Hudson a few 
miles south of Tarrytown. The British had posts from Kingsbridge (in the modern south Bronx 
across from the northeast tip of Manhattan) to West Farm, near the Sound in the modern 
Bronx. The area between the two armies became known as the “Neutral Ground.” A better 
designation would have been “No Man’s Land”, as historian Jacob Judd notes. The area was a 
battleground between the armies and bands of raiders. The Americans and British would fight 
over this area, and it inevitably suffered the worst; however, areas outside the Neutral Ground 
were also subject to raids.
1
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So, unlike Long Island, which while subject to raids was fundamentally behind the lines 
for the duration of the war, Westchester was a front-line in the war for the duration. As such, it 
not only suffered from the movements of the armies, but from foraging, raids and the general 
breakdown of law and order caused by the fact that neither side controlled a large portion of 
the county. The Hudson River on the west and the Sound on the east provided easy highways 
for raiders and armies to attack. The fact that the British, after the Battles of Trenton and 
Princeton, held little of New Jersey beyond two bridgeheads, meant that they had to rely on the 
limited resources of the area they controlled, especially Long Island and Staten Island, to feed, 
house, and fuel their soldiers and the civilian population. This situation encouraged foraging 
expeditions by the British to increase their resources in both New Jersey (using Staten Island as 
a base) and into Westchester.  This resulted in plunder, the disruption of agriculture, famine 
and malnutrition, and possibly disease among the civilian population. The Americans as well 
were not averse to seizing livestock and other items to deny their use to the British.
2
  
The people of Westchester were also plagued by loosely-organized groups of raiders. 
Those who supported the Loyalist cause were dubbed “Cowboys”; those who supported the 
Patriot cause were “Skinners.”   For the most part, whatever cause they espoused, the end 
result was to steal property and terrorize people. The politics of those that were raided often 
did not really matter. Among the most prominent of these groups were De Lancey’s Raiders, led 
by James DeLancey. American militia units would indiscriminately plunder from Patriot families, 
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and in July 1779, Banastre Tarleton destroyed two villages because the residents were 
uncooperative with his  attempt to seize   supplies for his troops.
3
 
Even the Battle of Yorktown, which led to the end of the war and British recognition of 
American independence, resulted in suffering for the people of Westchester. Several American 
units were removed from the area, making DeLancey’s raids easier. As late as 1782, when it was 
common knowledge that peace negotiations were underway, warfare continued in 
Westchester. The last British regulars were removed from the county on May 13, 1783; but 
American militia and Loyalist militia, especially the Raiders, continued fighting each other. 
Finally, in July of 1783, Washington sent some troops into the county to preserve the peace by 
stopping the fighting between Loyalists and Patriots; eight companies guarded Westchester 
until the British evacuation from New York City on November 25.
4
  
While South Carolina is infamous for its backwoods fighting between Loyalists and 
Patriots, the northeast also possessed its share of bloody civil war. The Patriots hated the 
Loyalists, seeing them as representatives of the King who had betrayed them, or even as 
traitors; to the Loyalists, the Patriots were traitors and even anarchists. Fighting, often low-level 
but still deadly and frightening to those involved, continued, in Westchester and elsewhere in 
the New York region. Especially as it became apparent that the Americans would win their 
independence, an element of spite would enter into some Loyalist and British actions, as will be 
described below.  
The military historian John Shy argues that the Revolutionary War was a “social process” 
of political education, or more colloquially, a “struggle for hearts and minds.” Shy argues that as 
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British pillaging and plundering increased, and as more men served in the military, many 
Americans who had been apathetic and averse to the war became patriotic citizens of the 
United States. They were politicized and nationalized by the war itself.
5
 The historian Sung Bok 
Kim respectfully disagrees. Kim had been a teenager in Korea during the Korean War. According 
to Kim, “I and many other Koreans resented the war, cursed every ideology of public import as 
a scourge, and escaped into privatism for the time being.” Kim argues that similar suffering 
occurred in Westchester, and a similar response of privatism, not patriotic enthusiasm, 
occurred.  The war-weary people of Westchester, he argues, ceased to care about the broader 
picture, and by late in the war, much of America was experiencing some of the misery which 
Westchester had long endured.
6
   
It seems that perhaps both occurred here; increased politicization by some in either a 
Loyalist and Patriot direction, and   political apathy and just trying to survive by many. The raids 
and armed foraging, while they may have originated from military necessity or political 
ideology, soon degenerated into naked plunder and pillage with politics providing only a fig-leaf 
of justification. The lawlessness and the seeming inability of the British to protect people from 
these raids were hardly examples of the blessings of good government the British had 
promised.  While Long Island was behind the lines, occupation and the occasional raid produced 
results at least partially comparable to the result in Westchester. Long Island will be looked at 
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later in this chapter. For now, let us note that the situation in Westchester was not too 
conducive to winning hearts and minds for either side, and may have alienated many of 
Westchester’s people from both Loyalism and Patriotism.  
 
II 
 
The situation in New York City was unusual. The pre-war population had virtually 
vanished, though many of the Loyalists who had fled the city began to return after the British 
conquest. There were few, if any Patriots living there.  The city was populated by occupation 
troops, officers, and an increasing number of Loyalist refugees who began flooding into the city; 
by 1781, the civilian population of New York may have reached 25 to 26 thousand. The 
population would swell with every British reverse, and it may have reached as high as 33 
thousand just before the evacuation.
7
  Many of these were die-hard Loyalists, or those who 
feared retribution from their Patriot neighbors now that the war was over. Many of these 
would not remain in New York but would leave for Canada or other destinations when the 
British evacuated.
8
 Thus, the capital and great city of colonial New York was populated during 
the Revolutionary War by thousands of people who for the most part had little connection to 
either the city or the province (or state) of New York.   
The most urgent need, especially after the fire, was housing. Robertson, the 
Commandant of the city, erected barracks and confiscated the vacant homes of rebels to use as 
officer housing. Many buildings were converted into warehouses, and many churches into 
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temporary hospitals. Fortifications were rebuilt. The city fire watch was reestablished. Ten 
companies of volunteer militia were organized. In addition to its military uses, the formation of 
a militia provided something to do for many of the Loyalist refugees. Municipal services such as 
street lights and cleaning were reestablished.  A police department under Andrew Eliot, former 
receiver-general of customs, was created. There were no taxes or civilian courts, and prices 
were set and trade controlled by Robertson himself.
9
   
Many Loyalist refugees began living in confiscated Patriot homes, but were ordered out 
of them by November 1, 1777 to provide more housing for troops. A city vestry was appointed 
by Robertson in late December 1777 to care for the poor, and was given control of homes not 
used by the military. Rents were collected by the vestry, and the money was used to help the 
poor and pay for municipal services such as lighting lamps and cleaning the streets. As there 
were no taxes, the city could not have paid for these services without these rents.
10
 
Despite the reestablishment of street cleaning, the streets were often dirty, and the 
sanitation problem was never solved. “Noisome vapours” arose from the mud and from “such a 
number of people being crowded together in so small a compass almost like herrings in a 
barrel, most of them very dirty.” The housing-stock had been reduced by perhaps one third by 
the fire, forcing Loyalists, residents, and soldiers and sailors to live in close quarters, increasing   
friction among the groups. The housing shortage was so great that soldiers and officers were 
quartered in private homes, and they frequently ill-treated the inhabitants of these homes.  
These mainly Loyalist inhabitants were not happy with the treatment they received.  They 
complained to the military authorities, but there was little action by these authorities. And with 
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no true civil courts, there was little opportunity In New York City, or elsewhere in the British 
zone, to get redress for the looting and other depredations of the troops. These included 
drunken rioting by sailors, and even murders by drunken soldiers.
11
 
Firm in his belief that most New York City residents were loyal subjects of the King (and, 
since most were Loyalists during his tenure as Commandant, he was undoubtedly correct), 
Robertson’s rule was mild. He believed that the purpose of the military was to support “the 
good Subjects against the bad.” Troops were ordered to avoid taking rebel property without 
authorization, and pillaging soldiers were dealt with severely—one was even executed. Hoping 
that acting humanely would help the British among those pre-disposed to British rule, he 
treated American prisoners mildly. This contrasts with the actions of officials such as Provost 
Marshal William Cunningham, who treated American prisoners abominably.
12
 
Churches were often used as barracks or hospitals. The British tried to spare Anglican 
churches that were still standing, but Dutch, Presbyterian, French, Baptist, and Quaker places of 
worship were all converted to prisons or hospitals. The interiors of these churches were usually 
destroyed in the process. While the shortage of suitable large buildings was one reason for 
these actions, the British do seem to have taken particular pleasure in damaging “Dissenter” 
churches, especially Presbyterian.  Many Britons and Loyalists considered the “Presbyterians”, 
by which they meant both the members of the Presbyterian churches of New York and New 
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England and the Congregationalists, to have been the fomenters of the rebellion.  However, it 
must be remembered that the overwhelming majority of the people of occupied New York City 
were Loyalists. While most of them were Anglicans, a sizable minority was not. Some, like 
William Smith Jr., were even Presbyterians.  In November of 1779, it was rumored that St. 
George’s, an Anglican church, was to be used as hospital, but the Anglican Parson Inglis 
objected to that use. The Scottish Seceding Church was used for a Hessian hospital. The pews 
were removed, and the Presbyterians and Lutherans who shared the building were “disgusted”. 
The Old Dutch Church had been made hospital a few weeks earlier, and the Dutch had shared 
St. George’s. Smith commented that “Neither of their measures yield to Prejudices friendly to 
the Royal Interest.” In short, he believed that such actions would alienate non-Anglicans away 
from the British cause.
13
 
The hospitals were necessary; as has happened so many times throughout the millennia 
when large populations have gathered together in tight quarters during a war, disease struck.   
August, 1777, was a particularly bad month. The Moravian pastor Ewald Gustav Schaukirk 
reported that “many people, especially children died. On many evenings 7 or 8 were buried, 
and on one in particular seventeen.”
14
 
The general overpopulation of the city even affected the holding of Anglican church 
services.  Several Anglican churches had been destroyed in the fire. Trinity Church, for example, 
would not re-open until after the occupation ended, and its ruins were converted by the British 
into a rather controversial entertainment center called “The Mall”.  Here, lanterns were hung, 
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benches placed, and bands played on summer evenings as soldiers would promenade with their 
ladies. Obviously, it was not available for the holding of services. By 1782, St. George’s and St. 
Paul’s could not accommodate their flocks, and Governor Robertson permitted worship in the 
large courtroom of City Hall. Even here, extra seats were required. 
15
 
Feeding the city and providing firewood was a constant problem. The region under 
British control was just too small to provide for the thousands of soldiers and civilians needs, 
despite constant requisitions. Food was transported from Great Britain and Ireland in convoys; 
this exposed them to enemy attack, especially after French entry in 1778. Delays caused by 
weather or enemy action often resulted in spoilage and great anxiety in the City as supplies 
grew low. The arrival of the Cork Fleet—the supply convoy—was “one of the most eagerly 
anticipated events in occupied New York”.
16
  
Foraging was one method the British used to gain the needed supplies; this would result 
in many small-scale military actions as American forces opposed the foraging parties. In the 
early months of 1777, British and American troops fought what is called “the Forage War” in 
New Jersey. Another method of obtaining food and fuel was by trading with the Americans. The 
Americans had food and wood; the British had British manufactured goods and other trade 
goods.  Much of this activity was between old business associates who were on opposite 
political sides, or had been neutral, or were family members.
17
 As discussed in Chapter V, 
attempts to regulate this trade would eventually be instituted, making it less illicit—at least 
from the British point of view.  
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  Some effort was made at achieving a favorable press. Some have called this control of 
the press, though that may be going too far, at least at the beginning. As the population was 
mainly Loyalist, the editorial slant of the papers was Loyalist as well. Ambrose Serle helped 
revive the Weekly Mercury and the Gazette. He wrote from September, 1776 until July of 1777 
news items, essays, and commentaries that espoused the British cause. He did try to keep the 
news accurate. This contrasted with James Rivington, who filled his paper with baseless stories 
such as Washington being declared “Lord Protector” (Cromwell’s title) or assassinated.
18
 
Martial law remained in place for the entire war, despite efforts to alleviate it with 
military-controlled courts (the “Police Courts”) or replace it with civilian rule. While better than 
no courts, there was an obvious conflict of interest with the Police Courts. The reasons for 
martial law remaining have been discussed elsewhere in this work, but the inability or difficulty 
in adjudicating disputes—especially with the military—and the harshness of military decisions 
did not have a positive effect on New Yorker’s views of the British. Indeed, there were signs of 
disaffection, and by 1781, a fear that some had secretly become rebels. Rivington, perhaps the 
last person one would think would become a spy for the Americans, became one. High-handed 
attempts by British officials to control what he wrote or to keep newsworthy items out of his 
paper seem to have driven him into American arms. The information he sent out was 
apparently enclosed in the binding of books which he was allowed to send outside the British 
zone. While rumored for decades, his role was not conclusively established until 1959. 
Rivington, to the surprise of many, was allowed to stay in New York after the Americans 
reoccupied. He received some gold from Washington for his services, but his paper soon went 
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out of business—no one wanted to buy a paper written by the king’s former official printer, by 
a man who had printed such scurrilous anti-American stories. 
19
     
 
African-Americans, mostly slaves, had constituted a sizable portion of the pre-war 
population of the region. Indeed, following the Declaration of Independence, one paper had 
proudly printed the Declaration on its first page—when but a few days earlier it had ran  
prominent advertisements  offering ten dollars for the recovery of a run-away slave named 
Jack, and another less prominent one offering twenty  to forty shillings for the return of a 
“negro man named TOM.”
20
 Slaves worked the fields in Staten Island and Kings, and often 
worked as house slaves. One house slave, Jupiter Hammon of Lloyd Manor in Suffolk (north-
west of Huntington), had several poems published. This possibly earned him a room with a 
fireplace in the slave quarters of the mansion, but it did not earn him his freedom.
21
 As 
previously noted, the presence of large numbers of slaves in regions like Staten Island and Kings 
may have been a factor in the Loyalism of these regions. 
New York City and its environs would thus seem an unpromising place for a Promised 
Land, but it soon became a Mecca for slaves throughout America.   Beginning with Dunmore’s 
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Proclamation in Virginia of freedom for those who served in His Majesty’s forces (see above), 
many African-Americans decided to cast their lot with the British, and many of these eventually 
came to New York City. Not only were the British offering freedom, but to the horror of many 
Americans, especially slave-owners, they were offering to arm the African-Americans. A black 
man with a weapon was the greatest nightmare many a slave-owner could think of. In June of 
1779, a new order was given by David Jones, Commandant of New York, that “All Negroes that 
fly from the Enemy’s Country are Free—No person whatever can claim a Right to them--
Whoever sells them shall be prosecuted with the utmost severity.”  This order did not affect 
slaves already living in New York or “belonging” to Loyalists. Thus, not all slaves were freed; 
some were, some were not. If a slave’s “master” was a Loyalist, one was less likely to be freed—
and had to watch walking on the streets of New York freed blacks who had escaped from 
unoccupied, “free”, America.
22
 
Not all blacks joined the British; many African-Americans fought on the Patriot side, and 
the black sexton of the John Street Methodist Church, Peter Williams Sr., was a Patriot. He 
remained in the city and at his post at the church because he was a slave of a Loyalist tobacco 
dealer. After Congress lifted its ban on enlisting blacks, many joined the Patriot forces.  At war’s 
end, many Loyalist blacks left for Canada and other places.
23
 
 
Unlike Westchester and Staten Island (and increasingly, as the war continued, Long 
Island’s North Shore), New York City was not on the frontline. An attempt to capture it, or even 
raids, did not seem imminent for much of the war. Hence, the City became a relatively pleasant 
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place, despite its overcrowding and dependence on a long supply line, with many social 
activities to help pass the time. Perhaps because it lacked the Puritan background of New 
England, the relatively cosmopolitan city had in the late colonial era boasted a fairly robust 
theatre life. While plays were not held on a regular seasonal schedule, and sometimes months 
would go by without plays, some of the finest productions of the time were staged in New York 
City. In October, 1774, the Continental Congress forbade shows, plays, and other expensive 
diversions. No doubt this was to show their seriousness, but perhaps the Puritan background of 
many of the members of Congress helped create this decision. The Congress moved against 
plays and the theatre again in 1778, since these were thought to divert people from the 
Revolution.  Such disapproval of entertainment has been seen in other revolutions, such as the 
French.
24
 
The British did not share either Puritan-influenced or revolutionary sentiments, and 
reopened the John Street theatre in January 1777. The actors were members of the army or 
navy. At a “gala occasion” on January 25, Tom Thumb was performed to good reviews from 
Gaine’s Mercury. The plays continued throughout the occupation, with about eighteen plays a 
year. The plays consisted of, comedies, tragedies and farces, with musical entertainment 
between acts. The profits from each performance were given to the poor.
25
 
As discussed above in Chapter II, one of the ways the British had created or reinforced 
love and loyalty (or at least respect) for the royal family was through holidays. The various 
British royal holidays, such as the King and Queens’ birthdays, became major events in occupied 
New York. Fireworks, balls, and other entertainment would be used to celebrate these holidays. 
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The celebrations, usually organized by the British, were far beyond anything the Americans 
were used to in connection with these holidays, and some Loyalists began to be disturbed by 
the expense of the entertainment in comparison with the suffering in the city of the 
displaced.
26
   Perhaps the ultimate royal holiday occurred in 1781 when a member of the royal 
family, the future King William IV, visited. This visit will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter.   
New York City, and to a lesser extent Long Island and Staten Island, became the scenes 
of many balls and festivals. Celebrating the capture of the city, General Howe ordered 
“Toujours de la gaieté!” in imitation of Frederick the Great.  He attended many balls and feasts. 
Twice a month, the City Tavern hosted the “Garrison Assembly”, where   junior officers mingled 
with young women. Howe himself had begun a “dalliance” with the Loyalist Elizabeth Loring. 
Her husband Joshua Loring did not seem to mind; he had been appointed Commissary of 
Prisoners by Howe, at least allegedly in “exchange” for permitting or not protesting Howe’s 
dalliance. This provided Joshua Loring much opportunity for corruption, and supplies that 
should have gone to the care of prisoners-of-war were often sold to others, leaving the 
prisoners in a terrible state. Howe and Mrs. Loring were often seen publicly together at balls 
and at the gambling tables. Some at the time and since have argued that Howe’s enjoyable life-
style prevented him from being sufficiently aggressive in pursuing the war.   This view was 
expressed at the time in a popular ballad written by Francis Hopkinson, musician and a signer of 
the Declaration of Independence from New Jersey: 
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                                Sir William he, snug as a flea, 
Lay all this time a-snoring, 
Nor dreamed of harm as he lay warm 
In bed with Mrs. L-------g
27
 
 
 
“Partying” by the British leaders, officers, and common men would continue throughout 
the war. Governor Robertson was said to be “frolicking” with girls as young as twelve on the 
eve of Yorktown (see chapter VII). Some entertainment was probably necessary for the morale 
of both the soldiers and sailors and the civilian populace, but New York City was a city of 
refugees, of people who had given their all out of loyalty to King and Empire. The actions of the 
army of the Empire annoyed and shocked many of them. Many of the Loyalists were in many 
ways more socially conservative and religious than the British seemed to be.   The British army 
did not seem to encourage church attendance, and most of the churches, Dissenter and 
Anglican, were used as barracks, hospitals, and even stables. Trinity Church, as discussed above, 
was used as a promenade; the walk was even widened at one point by removing some tombs, 
perhaps to accommodate the size of women’s dresses. As one Quaker teenager, Hannah 
Lawrence (aka Mathilda) wryly noted: “The female Size, by hoops increased/Demands a tomb 
or two at least.” Disaffection and disenchantment grew; as the historian Van Buskirk notes, 
many things that many Loyalists thought was right and proper were being violated by the 
representatives of His Majesty.  She notes that those like Smith and Jones and Mathilda, who 
had thought themselves English before the war, when faced with large numbers of actual 
Englishmen from England found that the English were a “different people” from New Yorkers: 
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They seemed less respectful of sacred places, more concerned with the pursuit of pleasure, and 
insensitive to how their pursuit of pleasure appeared to the suffering Loyalists. 
28
    
As mentioned above, conditions for prisoners of war in New York were horrible. Many 
lived—and died—in prison hulks. About 12,000 captive soldiers and sailors died in New York’s 
prisons during the Revolution. Some prisoners were recruited into the British military. Many of 
these probably joined to escape the terrible conditions, and some of the recruits deserted as 
soon as they had the chance.  It is doubtful that many of those who joined British military units 
had truly had a change of heart. In many ways, this was a more extreme case of what we have 
already observed on Long Island: Patriots, even committee men, being compelled by necessity 
into taking oaths of loyalty.  Historian Philip Ranlet cautions that “any use of enlistment totals 
to estimate loyalism must be done with extreme caution.”
29
     
 
Staten Island was much closer to the front lines than Manhattan. It was separated from 
New Jersey by a narrow channel, the Arthur Kill, which at some points was less than 500 feet 
wide. It was a staging area for attacks and raids into rebel-held territory, as well as foraging 
expeditions; conversely, it was a tempting and fairly accessible target for rebel raids. The end 
result was that its residents suffered from both the actions of warring armies and partisans, and 
from marauding gangs. In addition, much of its wood and other agricultural resources were 
used to feed the military and New York’s population, often without proper compensation.  
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Historian Philip Papas argues that the experiences of Staten Islanders, “like those of the 
residents of Westchester County in New York…were similar to those of the residents of the 
southern backcountry. And by the end of the war, it was these experiences that led many 
Staten Islanders to question their initial loyalties and to have a political change of heart.”
30
     
After the defeats at Trenton and Princeton, the British pulled out of most of New Jersey, 
retaining a small and thin bridgehead “anchored” at Perth Amboy and New Brunswick.  The 
British left several units on Staten Island, including a brigade of convalescents, a brigade from 
the Fourteenth Regiment of Foot, the Staten Island militia; and the island served as the 
headquarters for several Loyalist units. Some British and Hessian units were occasionally sent 
there to guard against attack. British, Hessian, and Loyalist units made raids into New Jersey 
from Staten Island. Despite the bridgehead in New Jersey, partisan units from New Jersey 
would frequently cross the narrow Kill and raid farms, loot homes, and torture victims. They 
also stole slaves—who were then sold for profit. Not all of the raiders were Jerseymen—some 
of the raiders were Patriot refugees from Staten Island, seeking revenge for the indignities they 
had suffered from Staten Island Loyalists.
31
 
Because of the British presence, most of these raids on Staten Island were at night, to 
elude the British. Two favorite targets were a store in Richmond owned by two prominent 
Loyalist militiamen, and the Bentley Manor estate of Christopher Billopp. One Staten Islander, 
Peter Houseman, was robbed by partisans who beat him and his son-in-law with clubs; he died, 
but his son-in-law survived. Another Staten Islander was tortured with heated fire tongs by 
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Whig partisans. There were also many kidnappings; Christopher Billopp himself was captured in 
mid-1778 and languished in a New Jersey prison for nine months. He later had to endure 
another capture, where he was chained to a jail floor for nine months and fed bread and 
water.
32
     
Periodically, large raids were launched by Continental forces, who also plundered farms 
and homes. The largest Continental raid was in January, 1780, when 3000 soldiers under 
William Alexander of New Jersey attacked across the frozen solid Kill. The British were alerted, 
and met the invasion from prepared positions. The Continentals retreated, having 
accomplished little. Alexander did try to control his troops, and threatened “Instant Death” to 
any who plundered.
33
 
The raids by partisans and Continentals were not the only thing Staten Islanders had to 
worry about. The occupation soldiers tended to attack and pillage indiscriminately. To the 
Hessians, all Americans were rebels, so Loyalists were often attacked. Soldiers also got drunk, 
vandalized, and attacked people. Fences were destroyed for firewood or to help build 
fortifications. Even Loyalist refugees would join in. And as the war continued, more rapes 
occurred. And the fact that the island was under martial law meant there was little recourse to 
the courts for those whose property—or worse—had been injured.
34
 
The end result was that the Loyalists of Staten Island began to scorn their liberators as 
occupiers. Many began to question their Loyalism, and some began to supply information to 
the Americans, and even commit acts of sabotage. By war’s end, only the most dedicated 
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Loyalists would leave in exile.
35
 The lack of respect for the persons and property of Staten 
Islanders, and the British inability to protect the Island from raids, had turned “that ever loyal 
island” into an island full of Patriots and of neutrals. 
Thus, in both New York City and Staten Island, two very Loyalist locations, British actions 
and insensitivity had soured much of the population on Britain. British frolicking in the midst of 
refugees seemed insensitive to many Americans, and their treatment of churches and 
graveyards seemed terrible to many. As discussed above, one young woman, the Quaker poet 
Mathilda, even poetically called down Heaven’s wrath on the British.  Matters were made even 
worse in Richmond by its proximity to New Jersey. Staten Island and New Jersey suffered 
horrors arguably comparable in many respects to the civil war in backwoods South Carolina, of 
which a modern scholar argues that many “of the acts bordered on the barbaric, and the 
conduct of those who perpetrated them verged on the sadistic.”
36
 In addition, the British 
seemed incapable of protecting the Staten Islanders from American raids. The British, rather 
than winning hearts and minds, were alienating their supporters and failing to win over neutrals 
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and Patriots. Indeed, some in both New York City and Staten Island even went all the way from 
Loyalism to active cooperation and support for the Patriots.  
 
 
III 
 
 
On August 27, 1776, British troops had defeated American troops at the Battle of Long 
Island. They followed up that battle by rapidly gaining control of Long Island. Long Island 
represented a source of raw material and food and a place to bivouac soldiers. Its eastern forks 
provided a sheltered bay for the British fleet, and the sheer length of Long Island, stretching 
from Manhattan to Rhode Island, provided an excellent base for raids of New England, and 
even invasions. Protected by the British fleet and the British possession of Manhattan and 
Staten Island, it was a near impervious sanctuary, safely in British hands. British occupation was 
never seriously challenged, though at one point the British feared a Franco-American 
invasion,
37
 and the island was subject to sea-borne raids for the length of the war. The island 
did possess a sizable portion of Patriots, particularly in Suffolk County, but a fairly large 
proportion of Loyalists as well, especially in Queens and Kings. It presented the British with a 
golden opportunity to, by wise rule, win back the loyalties, or at least gain grudging acceptance 
of British rule, of a large population of their rebellious colonists. They failed.     
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After the Battle of Long Island, the army closed all civil courts and established martial 
law. The army began to requisition needed property such as cattle, grain, and other items. 
Because no good system for obtaining and paying for these items was ever established, many 
abuses occurred. Property was often not paid for and was often seized without receipts. 
Despite instructions from Howe and others to treat Loyalists better in obtaining and paying for 
property, in actuality little distinction was often made between Loyalists and rebels. Enlisted 
men and junior officers could not tell Patriots from Loyalists, and treated all of them as rebels.
38
   
 The army’s need for both supplies and labor was seemingly insatiable. The army 
requisitioned all the cattle and sheep in Suffolk, and ordered the residents to help drive them to 
Jamaica in western Queens. Grain, straw, and hay were requested, and grain, forage, and 
livestock was seized, and boats, wagons, and horses were impressed. Timber for cooking fires 
and building materials was in great demand, and much of Long Island’s forest and woodlands 
was cut down, as well as many fences and buildings (especially Presbyterian churches).  This 
may be apocryphal, but it is said that at war’s end, “no tree on Long Island over six inches in 
circumference was left standing except the Great Oak in Lloyd Neck.”  This is unlikely. In early 
1784, a few months after the war finally ended, “the Precursor of South American 
Independence”, Francisco de Miranda, traveled across eastern Long Island and made no 
mention of such devastation. Still, that much of Long Island’s woodland was cut down to feed 
the needs of the refugees in New York City and the British soldiers and sailors cannot be 
doubted, despite possible rhetorical exaggeration by the reporters. And it must be noted, the 
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lack of a civilian justice system meant that it was virtually impossible for Long Islanders to seek 
redress for their grievances in a court. Indeed, the lack of such a court permitted many British 
officials to line their pockets.
39
 
  British, Hessian, and Loyalist officers and soldiers made many requisitions, purchases, 
and outright seizures of property. They often did not pay. Many records of these were made at 
war’s end, in the hope, often vain, of receiving compensation. On June 16, 1783 in Smithtown, 
fifty-three residents formally swore under oath before Justice Gilbert Smith of Smithtown to 
having provided goods and services to the British since the occupation began and to having 
never been paid.  For example, Obadiah Smith (as I mentioned before, the town was aptly 
named) put in claims totaling 90 pounds for three horses taken and never returned, for almost 
13 pounds of oats and hay, and five pounds for five blankets taken at the order of General 
Delancey. The total claim was 112 pounds and 9 shillings, a sizable sum. Joseph Blydenburgh’s 
farm was raided at one point, and he entered a claim for over 20 sheep, valued at 16 pounds, 
and the loss of a bullock worth 15 pounds. The innkeeper Epenetus Smith entered a voluminous 
set of claims, totaling about one-seventh of the total recorded in the “Blydenburgh 
Manuscript”, as the record is now known. These included 8 shillings for 16 turkeys, 9 shillings 
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for sugar cups and salt cellars, 18 pounds for board, 19 pounds for one horse, and 50 pounds 
for cattle. On November 21, 1777, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, who would soon gain 
fame (or infamy) in South Carolina, and Major Cochran arrived in Smithtown with members of 
the British Legion to forage. In four days, they raided the property of numerous Smiths, as well 
as the property of Jeremiah Platt, Joseph and William Blydenburgh, and others.  They carried 
away nearly 6400 feet of boards from the Presbyterian Church. Their unpaid bill was 4 pounds, 
17 shillings, and 6 pence for food and drink for the officers. Forty gallons of rum valued by 
Epenectus Smith at 28 pounds was carried off. Tarleton also removed 4 sheets, as well as one 
new petticoat and one silk handkerchief.   The total sum recorded of claims for the town came 
to over 3400 £.  The above-listed claims are merely a sample from one town, one inn, and one 
church.  The examples could be multiplied many times for each town on Long Island.  Benjamin 
Thompson, a mid-nineteenth century historian, estimated that the loss of property to Long 
Islanders from unpaid requisitions alone was over half a million dollars—in 1840s dollars.
40
  
 The more elaborate mansions of well-to-do Long Islanders became headquarters for 
staff officers and their aides. Rock Hall in Hempstead, on the South Shore, was the country seat 
of the loyalist Martin family, and became the center of much social life. “Graceful minuets and 
quadrilles” were danced here, and there were perhaps twenty weddings as a result.
41
   
Further east, the Queens Rangers, commanded by John Graves Simcoe (later the 
Governor of Upper Canada), were quartered in Jericho and Oyster Bay. Simcoe and several 
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other soldiers were quartered at the Townshend home in Oyster Bay, one of the finest houses 
in the area, and now known as Raynham Hall. Its parlor was large enough that small balls or 
fetes could be held in it, if the furniture was moved out of the way. Samuel Townshend, a 
leading merchant, was one of the leading Patriots of the town, and was not happy with the 
occupation of his house.  For six months in 1778 to 1779, his home was the headquarters for 
the Rangers. Simcoe was frequently visited by Major Andre, who would later be Benedict 
Arnold’s contact.  Samuel’s daughter Sarah, usually known as Sally, was about 19, and is 
reputed to have been quite beautiful. Indeed, several soldiers were so enamored of her beauty 
that they carved their initials and her name into panes of glass which are still on display at the 
Hall. Simcoe himself was also quite taken with her, and sent her a valentine, reputed to be the 
first valentine in America: 
 
 
 
Fairest Maid, where all is fair 
Beauty’s pride and Nature’s care; 
To you my heart I must resign 
O choose me for your valentine! 
 
 
 
It continues in a similar vein for about twelve more verses. It was found among Sarah 
Townshend’s effects when she died at the age of eighty-two, and made it into the hands of that 
invaluable collector of “Revolutionary Incidents,” Henry Onderdonk. Despite her beauty, Sally 
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never married, and this has raised speculation that Sally had found true, star-crossed love with 
Simcoe.
42
 
 Sally’s older brother was Robert Townsend, a New York City-based merchant who would 
often as part of his work walk along the docks, observing the goings-on and comings and goings 
of ships. He gathered the gossip in the taverns of the city, and would no doubt on occasion 
have gone home to Oyster Bay to see his father, and perhaps even had the chance to meet with 
Simcoe and Andre. Townsend had another name: He was Culper Jr., George Washington’s chief 
spy. He would send coded messages (or messages in invisible ink) through a courier, Austin Roe, 
who maintained a tavern in East Setauket.  From here, they would be delivered to Abraham 
Woodhull (Culper Sr.), who again encoded them, then sent them to Connecticut via whaleboat. 
There were several “drops” where the information could be picked up. According to the 
historian Morton Pennypacker, a woman named Anna Strong would set out clothes on her 
clotheslines, and the number of handkerchiefs on them would indicate which drop to go to. 
(Unfortunately, the papers which would prove this tale seem to have gone missing).  Once in 
Connecticut, Caleb Brewster, the whaleboat man, would deliver them to Major Benjamin 
Tallmadge who relayed it to Washington. The system worked for about five years, and about 70 
messages were sent. 
43
 
                                                           
42
 Raynham Hall Museum website, http://www.raynhamhallmuseum.org/History.aspx, accessed August 2, 2011;  
OQ,  # 390, dated Valentine’s Day [February 14], 1779, 214-215. 
43
 Raynham Hall Museum website; Peter Luyster Van Santvoord, “Revolutionary Incidents of Oyster Bay Town,” 
Long Island Courant 3, March 1967, 18-32,  25-27. This system was put in place after Nathan’s Hale’s capture. Hale 
was probably captured in Huntington, in a district now called Halesite, but his death was most likely in Manhattan. 
Abraham Woodhull played the main spy role for a while, before leaving the front-line work for Townsend. 
Townsend’s role was determined one hundred and fifty years later by careful scholarship and handwriting 
comparisons. Incidentally, it is thought that Sally knew of Robert’s spy-work, and may have been a “passive spy”—
passing on whatever she learned from Simcoe, but doing no active information gathering. If so, this makes the 
question of the Valentine even more interesting—and her story more tragic. See Vincitorio, 72. According to 
Morton Pennypacker however, Sarah eavesdropped on a whispered conversation between Andre and Simcoe in 
323 
 
 
 There was much improper and even appalling   behavior by British and Hessian troops. 
In Southampton, British and Hessian troops committed many acts of vandalism, such that the 
word “Hessian” became a local epithet.  Indeed, one historian, writing about the time of World 
War I, noted that young boys in Southampton “not yet in their teens would fling the word 
[Hessian] at one another as an expression of opprobrium.” These acts of vandalism were 
despite the fact that the local commander, Major Erskine, tried to restrain his troops. 
Bridgehampton and Sag Harbor were overseen by the “notorious” Major Cochrane, who 
according to historian J. T. Adams, “seemed to love cruelty for its own sake.” Throughout Long 
Island, “meaningless atrocities accompanied by petty abuses of all kinds were visited upon a 
helpless population” as Myron Luke put it.
44
  
 While some incidents, especially those relating to raids (see below), were reported in 
the papers of the time or otherwise contemporaneously recorded, others were not, but passed 
down as oral history. Most of these were not written down until the 1840s, 1850s, or even a 
century after the events recorded.  While some of these were no doubt embellished (especially 
in the dialogue), and need to be taken with the proverbial “grain of salt”, they do provide a 
clear and consistent account of troops and raiders abusing the population of Long Island, and 
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are consistent with stories reported from Staten Island, Westchester, and other areas. As 
Natalie Naylor, formerly of the Long Island Studies Institute, argues concerning one oral history 
recorded about 1881, “Although these oral histories were not written down for more than a 
century, they do have the mark of authenticity.” 
45
  
  The home of Francis Lewis, a prominent resident of Whitestone, Queens and a signatory 
of the Declaration of Independence, was attacked shortly after the Battle of Long Island by 
British soldiers who ransacked his home, destroying his extensive library and papers. He was 
not there, but his wife was taken prisoner and held for months without a change of clothes or a 
bed. She died shortly after her release was secured.   One resident of Flushing in Queens, 
Thomas Kelley, did not remove his hat when Captain Archibald Hamilton, aide de camp to 
Governor Tryon (and after December, 1778, Commandant of the Militia of Queens County), 
entered the house where Kelley was. Hamilton beat Kelley over the head several times. In Black 
Stump near Flushing, several Tories entered the house of a Quaker named Willet Bowne. They 
tied him to his bed, and tortured him with a lighted candle in order to get him to reveal where 
he kept his wealth. Bowne refused to divulge the whereabouts of his wealth, and they finally 
fled. Perhaps from mercy, perhaps from fear, Bowne never revealed the names of his attackers, 
although he recognized them.
46
 In the winter of 1778-79, one poor woman in Amagansett (in 
East Hampton) had to place her grandchildren in the brick oven of her house for safety when 
British soldiers fired through the doors and windows of her house. 
47
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 Food was a major concern of many of the soldiers quartered on the island. Supply 
difficulties and the relatively small area under British control made officially-sanctioned 
foraging necessary (and officially-unsanctioned pilfering common).   One incident in East 
Hampton occurred during a foraging expedition by British soldiers quartered in Southampton. 
Mrs. Joseph Osborn was making some Indian berry pudding for her lunch. The smell of the 
boiling attracted the foragers, who went to seize it. What allegedly happened next was 
recorded in verse by a woman named Fannie Elkins: 
 
“Oh no you’re not,” she made reply 
Then seized the boiling pot, 
Ran with it through another door 
And threw it, blazing hot, 
Pudding and all, adown the hill 
And left it in the sand, 
Amid curses, loud and deep, 
Of all the hungry band. 
 
The hill is still known as Pudding Hill, and some Revolutionary era British uniform buttons have 
been found there.
48
 
 Not even Anglican churches were immune from theft by hungry troops. The Loyalist 
Anglican cleric James Lyons resumed services at Caroline Church in Setauket after British rule 
was restored. One day, while he was giving a sermon to some British officers, he spied through 
the window some Hessian soldiers stealing potatoes from his garden. In exasperation, he 
ceased the sermon and is reputed to have said “Here I am preaching the blessed gospel and 
there are your damned Redcoats in my garden stealing potatoes.” During the war, Caroline 
                                                           
48
 Edna Howell Yeager, “Long Island Women in the Revolution”, Long Island Forum 40 (January 1977): 10-11. 
326 
 
Church also suffered the loss of communion sets and silver linens. Setauket was also raided by 
500 Patriots from Connecticut; bullet holes are still visible on the church, and (in the form of a 
weather vane) the Union Jack still flies over the church. The Church after this raid was used as a 
hospital, while the Presbyterian meeting house was fortified by Col. Hewitt.
49
   
Femmetie Hegeman Leffert’s homestead in Flatbush was destroyed a few days before 
the Battle of Long Island, probably by American forces, though her account (written decades 
after the incident) accused the British of this action. She was about 16 at the time. The Dutch 
Reformed Church she attended became a barracks, and the old school-house became a 
hospital. An epidemic struck the British and Hessians stationed nearby in the fall of 1776, and 
more homes became hospitals. Femmetie reports that pro-American papers managed to reach 
them and were passed around to everyone, from neighbor to neighbor.  Rivington’s Gazette 
and other pro-British papers also reached Brooklyn, but, as she put it, “The last mentioned of 
these papers left us in doubt about everything, except the loyalty due to the King of England.”
50
 
The Hegeman family was Dutch-speaking, and Femmetie reports that her education was in 
Dutch; she taught herself to read English. Like many Dutch families of Kings County, the family 
had a few slaves. One of the family slaves, Caesar, had managed to hide a few cows in the 
woods, and the milk and butter from the cows was sold to the British, providing the family with 
much needed income. The family lived with friends as the house was rebuilt.
51
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Caesar was rather enterprising, and he managed to provide the family with additional 
income by arranging for cavalry officers to pasture their horses on some of the wood-lots the 
family owned.  One of these wood lots was known as, for some reason, “Nova Scotia”. One day, 
an officer requested his horse from Caesar, and Caesar told him it was in Nova Scotia. The 
officer, thinking Caesar meant the far-away province, asked him how he dared send his horse 
there. The officer stormed to the house to protest, and Femmetie met him at the door. The 
officer struggled between his anger and his desire to be a gentleman. While he was losing this 
struggle, the horse was brought up, and the officer profusely apologized for his rudeness and 
became a fast friend of the family, providing them with many acts of kindness. This did not 
prevent Caesar from spreading the story, and the officer was teased for months by his fellow 
officers. And it also did not prevent soldiers and prisoners being billeted with the family, or 
soldiers from stealing their chickens or other food.
52
  
Many of the above incidents have involved interactions between women on Long Island 
and soldiers and officers loyal to the Crown. But one unfortunately relatively common 
“interaction” between soldiers in war-time and civilian women is conspicuous by its absence. It 
should be noted that, unlike Staten Island, there seems to be no reports of rapes on Long 
Island. Perhaps this was a function of better discipline or restraint by the British on Long Island 
than on Staten Island. But it must be noted that the troops on Long Island were for the most 
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part the same troops that had reportedly committed rape on Staten Island. It is thus more likely 
that some rapes did occur on Long Island, but were not reported. Many rape victims may have 
felt shame, humiliation, horror or reluctance to report what had happened, and the dismissive 
attitude of officers like Lord Rawdon may also have discouraged reporting. Many military men 
of the time, both officers and soldiers, thought that rape was just an ordinary part of war, and 
even a tactic or strategy of war. There is also a strong possibility that rapes were treated as 
minor crimes, and tried by informal regimental courts. The proceedings of these courts were 
often not recorded. Nonetheless, while there are many tales of vandalism and pillage and even 
torture by soldiers on Long Island, there are no references to sexual attacks on Long Island 
women. “Of course,” cautions local historian Edna Howell Yeager, “it must be remembered that 
little was ever written of women’s lot anyway.”
53
 
There were sporadic attempts to improve discipline by British, Loyalist, and Hessian 
troops. On April 3, 1777, Delancey issued an order prohibiting the taking of horses or carriages 
without his permission. He also issued an order in March of that year prohibiting civilians from 
selling rum to soldiers, “As the Rum allowed by his Majesty to his Troops in these quarters is full 
sufficient for them—It is Expected from the Inhabitants that they will not sell to a solder Rum 
under any pretence whatever as the Certain Consequences are involving men into Scrapes & 
Disgrace unfitting them for Duty & Leading them into acts of Disorder they otherwise would 
avoid.” One suspects this order was more obeyed in the breach.
54
   
Despite these efforts, the situation on Long Island was grim for many. There was little 
recourse for the depredations of the troops and the army. The Loyalist Reverend Leonard 
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Cutting of St. George’s Church in Hempstead described in a December 1781 letter how his 
church and his personal property were used and abused by the army without permission or 
restoration. His home was twice commandeered by the army. Cutting wrote that “Where the 
army is, oppression (such as in England you have no conception of) universally prevails. We 
have nothing we can all our own, and the door of redress is inaccessible. What a state must 
people be in who can find relief neither from law, justice, nor humanity, where the military is 
concerned! This is the case of the inhabitants within the King’s lines.” It should be stressed that 
this was written by a Loyalist.  Cutting left his parish, and most likely America, in 1783 or 
1784.
55
 
 
Some mention should be made of the German troops serving with His Majesty’s forces. 
These were not mercenaries in the present-day sense of “soldiers-of-fortune”, but tough and 
disciplined regulars serving in the militaries of their small German principalities. Their rulers 
would sell their services to provide income for their tiny states (perhaps their rulers may be 
considered mercenaries). Their officers were veterans who had been “trained in the school of 
Frederick the Great and Ferdinand of Brunswick.” Without their aid, Britain would not have had 
the manpower to attempt to reconquer America. Britain signed treaties for 18000 German 
troops in January, 1776. Most of these (about 12500) came from Hesse-Cassel in the Rhineland, 
and the term “Hessian” was used generically to refer to all German troops serving in America 
during the Revolution.  Nine hundred soldiers also came from nearby Hesse Hanau. In addition, 
4000 came from Brunswick in northern Germany and 750 from Waldeck (near Hesse Cassel). 
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More contracts were signed in 1777 with Ansbach-Bayreuth, (1285 men) and in 1778 with 
Anhalt-Zerbst (1160 men). The total number of Germans sent to North America during the war 
was a little over 29000.
56
 
While fierce fighters, they were often more disciplined than the British Regulars or 
Loyalist militias. While in some regions they became “a local epithet” (see above), in other 
regions they were more liked.  They were more popular in Oyster Bay than the Loyalist units, as 
they were quieter, and their crimes were usually confined to pilfering, not to the violence and 
bloodshed that was often attributable to the Loyalists.  Long Island, especially the western 
parts, was actually not a bad posting for the “Hessians”.  Most of them came from the 
Rhineland and were Calvinists. The German spoken in the Rhineland was close enough to Dutch 
as to make the Hessians able to converse with Dutch-speaking inhabitants and understand 
Dutch church services, and many of them would often attend Dutch Reformed Church services. 
One Hessian unit, the Jaeger Corps, was stationed throughout eastern Queens.  One area where 
they were stationed was Westbury. They set a guard to protect the Quaker Meeting House 
from damage, but the pacifist Quakers asked them to withdraw it. On occasion, the officers 
would attend the Meeting, where it is said they “sat very commendable.” Several Hessians are 
buried near the Westbury Meeting House.
57
     
One Hessian chaplain, Chaplain Coester of the Hesse-Cassel von Donop Regiment,                                              
was stationed at Brooklyn Ferry, across from New York City, shortly after the Battle of Long 
Island. Here he baptized the five day old child of an English-speaking Long Islander on Sept 9, 
1776. He was asked to do this because the local pastor had left to join “the rebels”. Coester did 
                                                           
56
 Mckesy, 62, 62 n.1.  
57
 Van Santvoord, 22-3. 
331 
 
not want to do this, as his English was not very good, but he relented before the parents’ 
entreaties. Lacking anything to pay him with, the joyful parents shared a glass of wine with the 
chaplain.
58
 
Coester and other Hessian chaplains performed confirmations and marriages as well as 
baptisms. In addition to soldiers,  large numbers of women and even children seem to have 
come over to America. For example, Coester notes that “On 20 October 1782, I confirmed 
Elisabeth Lentz, from Volmarshausen, a legitimate daughter of Johannes Lentz, private soldier 
in the D’Angelelli Regiment. According to the testimony, this Elisabeth was fifteen years old.”
59
 
The mention of legitimacy underlines the fact that, as happens in all wars, some of the Hessian 
soldiers entered into consensual non-marital sexual relations with the local women.  Some of 
these liaisons produced children.  For example, Coester records that  
 
Andreas—an illegitimate son, was born at New York on 17 April 1780 to Barbara 
Rheider, born at Rhode Island and the daughter of an Anabaptist by the name of 
Rheider. The mentioned Barbara said Lieutenant Dietzel of the Hessian Artillery 
was the father and added that she had a child by him previously which was still 
living.  N.B.—She calls herself Mrs. Dietzel, because she says, her marriage was 
made in Heaven…Therefore another pair of wretched boys and girls more in the 
world! Therefore, take care and do not be fooled by a man who promises to 
marry you!
60
  
 
Hessian chaplains also perfomed marriages between Hessians and local New Yorkers. 
For example, Coester married Casimir Theodor Goerke, lieutenant of artillery, to Elisabeth 
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Roosewel of New York , in July of 1783. Coester also married soldiers to women who had come 
over from Germany, such as Maria Elisabeth Wiederhold to a musketeer named Johannes 
Sustmann in November 1776, and a grenadier from Hesse Cassel to a young woman from 
Hesse-Hanau in December, 1777.
61
    
In January, 1779, one Hessian officer named Feilitzche commented in his diary on the 
pillage the Hessians engaged in: 
 
The cost of living has increased sharply and for a lot of money, nothing is to be 
had. It is especially true with bread. The common soldier has it the worst. His pay 
is not sufficient to buy bread. Complaints are heard daily and it is necessary to 
feel sorry for the men. The frequent crimes which occur create problems for the 
officers. The jaegers steal and slaughter their landlords’ cattle at night. Such 
complaints arise daily. We check them out every day but to no avail…
62
   
 
This officer several times noted in his diary what can only be called war-weariness. In his 
entry for July 11, 1778, he prayed to God that his unit be sent to Germany, and stated that the 
entire army was dissatisfied. On the seventeenth of July, he stated that he would “always hate 
this life.”  On May 28, 1779, before the beginning of the campaign against Stony Point, he noted 
in his diary “How happy I would be if this were our last campaign. However, I will have patience 
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and give myself over to the higher will and to Him, who has protected me during two 
campaigns and other great perils.”
63
  
 
 This work has noted the supply difficulties the British and their allies labored under. The 
relatively small area they controlled limited the local resources that they could muster to feed, 
clothe, house, and heat their troops and the refugees in New York City. This resulted in foraging 
raids into American-controlled territory, and heavy requisitions of food and fuel from the areas 
under British, as well as unauthorized supplementation by soldiers. By the middle of the war, as 
Feilitzche’s diary indicated, war-fueled inflation was hitting the common soldier hard, driving 
some to pillage and rob. The officers had difficulty controlling their troops.  
Historian Myron Luke believes that the conduct of the troops depended on their 
commanding officer. Some gave swift punishment to troops who stole or otherwise acted 
criminally, others were lax. Some lay down strict rules, others did not. The historian Joseph 
Tiedemann suggests that the ultimate responsibility for the soldier’s conduct lay with General 
Sir William Howe, army commander in chief during the initial years of the war. He was quite 
lenient, and often pardoned or commuted court-martial sentences involving crimes against 
civilians. Luke notes that while robbery and the like by soldiers are to be expected in an 
occupied area, the “enmity incurred by responsible officers who deliberately went out of their 
way to incite the population is scarcely excusable.” 
64
  Fort Golgotha, perhaps the most 
egregious of these incidents, will be discussed below.  
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 Luke makes an important point concerning robbery by soldiers. Occupations are 
generally unpleasant, even the most model occupation. In some ways, the British occupation 
was relatively insignificant. While towns and farms were burned in enemy-held regions, this 
was generally not the case behind the British lines. Churches were damaged by conversion to 
military purposes, sometimes maliciously so, and fence-rails were destroyed, and there was 
petty vandalism, and grain and livestock were often fair game for plunder, but in comparison 
with the brutality of some modern occupations, it could have been much worse.
65
  
The poor behavior of the British and their officers on Long Island failed to win the hearts 
and minds of patriots and neutrals, and disaffected, disheartened or just annoyed the loyal.  
Loyalists were not immune to pillage by British or Allied troops, or other questionable acts. 
Parson Lyon’s potatoes were stolen as he preached. Reverend Cuttings’ home was twice 
confiscated. The people were subject to requisitions and were often not paid for the property 
taken, even if they possessed a receipt.  There was no means of legal redress for years. There 
was no civil government outside town meetings. There were no civilian courts by which redress 
could be found; only military courts or courts which seemed civilian but were ultimately 
military.  But one more factor beyond these truly made conditions on Long Island miserable: 
the raids. 
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Staten Island, with its proximity to American- held territory, was particularly vulnerable 
to raids.   But Long Island also suffered from raids launched from American-held territory. The 
raiders arrived on Long Island, mainly from Connecticut, on whaleboats:  
 
The whaleboats were sharp at each end, the sheathing often not over half an 
inch thick, and so light as to be easily carried on men’s shoulders, either to be hid 
in the bushes or relaunched in the South Bay. Some were thirty-two feet long, 
and impelled by from eight to twenty oars, and would shoot ahead of an 
ordinary boat with great velocity, and leave their pursuers far behind. They were 
always on the lookout, and in a calm would row out of their lurking places, and 
board market boats, or even cut off the detached vessels of a convoy.
66
 
 
 
 
 The raids began in 1777 as fully-authorized (by the governors of New York or 
Connecticut) military harassment of British installations on the North Shore and disruption of 
British supplies and movement. The whaleboat men would attack cargoes of wood or other 
products moving along the coast and either seize or destroy them. Both sides recognized this as 
fully legitimate “hit-and-run” warfare under the rules of war of the time. While hardly typical, 
the most famous of these raids was the Sag Harbor or Meigs Raid of May, 1777. This was in 
retaliation for General Tryon’s April raid on Danbury Connecticut. Sag Harbor is located on 
Peconic Bay (the bay between the two forks), on the northern shore of the South Fork, and was 
a major regional port. Leaving Guilford Connecticut, Meigs and his 170 men landed at Southold 
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on the North Fork, carried their whaleboats about five miles across the Fork to Peconic Bay, re-
embarked, and landed near Sag Harbor. They then captured the fort guarding Sag Harbor and 
destroyed much of the supplies and shipping that could be found there. They then returned to 
Connecticut, and Meigs was later voted a sword by Congress for his “enterprise and valor.”
67
 
 Authorized raids of this sort continued across the Sound for the duration.  But, “the 
whaleboat warfare at length degenerated into downright robbery.” 
68
  Lawless “brigands”, 
claiming to be Patriots (or occasionally Loyalists) engaged in these raids. Men were murdered 
and houses ransacked. Many in northern Queens, fairly close to Connecticut, abandoned their 
houses at nightfall. Many of the raiders were refugees from Long Island, and would often try to 
settle a few old scores during these raids.  
In July, 1780, raiders from Connecticut landed in Setauket, and kidnapped two men, 
Doctor Punderson and William Jayne, Jr. The raiders told Mrs. Punderson that they were taken 
to exchange for two rebels who had been taken at Smithtown.    In 1781, Simon Flint and 
Gilbert Flint’s homes in Oyster Bay were plundered, and Gilbert was hung until he was nearly 
dead. The same thing occurred to Richard Thorne and Esquire Coulne of Great Neck. The father 
of Phillip Hewitt of South Huntington (modern Babylon) had his store robbed several times. He 
finally pursued the robbers across the Sound to Norwalk Connecticut. Kings County was on 
occasion raided from New Jersey; a rebel whaleboat landed near Flatlands and carried off, 
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among other things, much specie and two slaves. These examples could be multiplied many 
times.
69
 
 Even legitimate, authorized whaleboaters pillaged private property. Such pillage 
actually had a military purpose: denying the enemy the use or potential use of the property.  
American officers even promised a share of the plunder soldiers took from the enemy, though 
attempts were made by Washington to stop this. However, there seems to have been much 
public approval for these raids in the unoccupied regions of America. Kidnapping could even be 
said to have a military purpose.  As the example of Doctor Punderson shows, Loyalists were 
often kidnapped to exchange for prisoners held by the British.  But  the  Sound acted as a 
lawless “No Man’s Sea” between the two sides, and many of the raids as time went on became 
mere piracy, with the war and politics providing only a mere fig-leaf of an excuse for naked 
free-booting. The situation was analogous in many ways to the situation in Westchester. 
Political persuasion made little difference; the raiders were increasingly un-selective about who 
was attacked.  In September of 1781, the inhabitants of Southold and Shelter Island (two 
Patriot towns) even made a formal protest to Governor Clinton of independent New York 
against the raids.
70
     
The British had hoped to re-establish not just legitimate, civilian government but good 
government in America. According to most theories of government (including those common at 
the time of the Revolution), one of the main functions of government is to protect the lives and 
property of the people against attack. The British were  doing a  poor job at this. As in the 
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“Neutral Ground”, as on the Arthur Kill, anarchy reigned.  Three battalions of militia had been 
raised by the British early in the war to defend Long Island.  Rather than staying on Long Island 
to protect the people from raiders, two of them were sent to Georgia in the fall of 1778, 
angering many on Long Island who thought they should be defending the lives and property of 
Long Islanders. Whaleboat raids increased after this.  Long Islanders argued that warships 
should patrol the coast to guard against the raiders.  A few did, but not enough. In the early 
1780s, General Sir Henry Clinton, now commander-in-chief of British forces, twice complained 
that the Navy was not providing enough ships for this important service.  The Navy was highly 
pressed worldwide, and its ships were in demand everywhere. Still, one would think that 
Southern New York should have been a priority, if one wished to regain the loyalties of the 
population of a major region that the Crown wished to reincorporate into its empire. The 
whaleboat warfare intensified at approximately the same time as the effort to restore civilian 
government to southern New York The historian Joseph S. Tiedemann, speaking of Queens, 
argues 
It apparently did not dawn on the British that to win the minds and hearts of 
county residents they needed to defend the local population from such attacks. 
Failure to do so underscored Britain’s military weakness and undermined the 
legitimacy of her continued rule over New York.
71
   
 
There were some bright spots in the occupation: Hessian soldiers whittling toys for 
children, “glittering” military balls and fetes, and some commanders tried to rule with restraint.   
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Town meetings were allowed to continue and local officials continued to be elected (though 
higher civil government functions and much of the court system existed in only martial forms). 
But the wanton property destruction, either authorized or unauthorized, of the occupation left 
an indelible impression on the people of southern New York beyond New York City. As late as 
the 1960s, perhaps later, the term “Hessian” was a youthful epithet on Long Island.  The shame 
of submission still haunted descendants over a century later. And very importantly, the British 
failed in what many consider the first duty of government, as it failed to protect Long Islanders 
from freebooting and piracy.
72
 
In addition to this failure to protect, the actions of some of the officers were most 
egregious. Many viewed the colonists as social inferiors and as most likely Patriots, even in 
areas where most were (at least initially) Loyalist. Some apparently sought to relieve boredom 
by bullying defenseless citizens. Tiedemann argues that “It is impossible to state how many 
acted this way, but the number was sufficiently large to alienate inhabitants, and the entire 
officer corps shared responsibility by failing to punish offenders.”
73
  Loyalists like the Reverend 
Cutting began to argue that they were living under a tyranny; Thomas Jones called George 
Duncan Ludlow of the Police Court (see Chapter V) “the little tyrant of the island”.
74
 The 
continuing misrule, the destruction of property, the vandalism of churches, the various 
indignities of oaths and the like, the continuing inability to seek redress, the forced labor, and 
the inability of the government to protect the people of Long Island and the other regions from 
brigandage (whether naked or disguised as “military” action) failed to win the hearts and minds 
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of Patriots and neutrals, and disaffected many Loyalists. Some Loyalists went as far as actively 
aiding the Patriots; others were more passive, merely failing to evacuate in 1783, but remaining 
behind and accepting the rule of the United States.  As Tiedemann argued in regards to Queens, 
many of the non-Patriot inhabitants, especially those who had been non-aligned before the 
war, became “patriots, less by choice or conviction than by British default.”
75
  
But this is probably not the whole story. As Kim notes from personal experience of war, 
many of the people of Korea in the Korean War were depoliticized by the war, retreating into 
“privatism”, a lack of concern with public issues; in short, they cared little for the great political 
questions of their day and just wanted to be left alone. Kim argues quite persuasively that a 
similar reaction to the horrors of war occurred in Westchester. Events in Staten Island and Long 
Island may have had a similar effect—indeed, “patriotism by default” could in many ways be 
merely another variety of privatism. What is evident is that the misrule, the abuse, and the 
failure to protect doomed any chance to bring the region willingly back into the British Empire. 
After the province had crossed the psychological “Rubicon” of declaring independence, the 
chances that they could be persuaded to willingly return to the Empire were probably quite 
slim, but perhaps better rule could have altered things; this question will be discussed further in 
the concluding chapter. But it is clear that the British fumbled away even this small chance by 
their occupation, which rather than engendering loyalty alienated the people of Southern New 
York, even driving some Loyalists all the way into the arms of the Patriots. 
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One final incident should be included as a coda to this chapter, for in many ways it 
symbolizes many of the errors of the British occupation. This was the building of Fort 
Golgotha.
76
   
 
Churches and the like were often abused during the occupation. As discussed earlier, 
churches were used as barracks, stables, and hospitals. Not even Church of England buildings 
were immune; for example, St. George’s in Hempstead was seized by the military several times. 
While some of this may have been the result of the grim necessities of war and occupation 
(churches were often the largest buildings in town), some of it was not.  Many Loyalists and 
Britons associated Presbyterianism with republicanism and rebellion, and their churches seem 
to have been singled out for special attention. They were habitually abused and desecrated; 
Presbyterian churches as far away as Islip in southwest Suffolk were dismantled and sent to 
Hempstead for the use of their lumber.
77
 
 To dismayed Americans of every political persuasion, literally nothing seemed sacred to 
the British. Not even the graves of the dead seemed immune. In New York City, the ruins of the 
Anglican Trinity Church had been turned into a promenade known as “The Mall”, and 
gravestones had even been removed to widen the promenade (see above). British and Hessian 
troops were sometimes quartered in the burial grounds of churches. Many felt rather uneasy 
about that; as one Hessian told his brother, “We were also obliged to spend a night…among the 
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tombstones, as we were unable to find another place for our equipage or any other shelter for 
ourselves—if a night in a graveyard could be called by that term. This experience gave us our 
first conception of what is meant by war in America!”  Gravestones were used for fire bricks, 
hearths, and oven bottoms. There are stories from both Huntington and Hempstead that the 
“inscriptions [from the gravestones] had been baked onto the bottom of the bread.” One can 
only imagine how uneasy that made the soldiers who had to eat the bread.
78
 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that a British or Loyalist officer would feel 
little compunction about building a fort in the graveyard of Huntington’s Presbyterian Church.  
In late 1782, such a fort was built by Benjamin Thompson, for reasons that may have had more 
to do with spite than military necessity.    
 
Benjamin Thompson
79
 was a Loyalist from New Hampshire, born in Massachusetts in 
1753. In the autumn of 1775, he carried dispatches from Howe in Boston to the Secretary for 
America, George Germain. He so impressed Germain that he was made his secretary. After 
Germain and the North ministry fell from power, Thompson attained a commission as a colonel 
of cavalry, and came to Huntington in 1782 as commander of a Loyalist unit known as the King’s 
American Dragoons.
80
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 In November, 1782, Thompson ordered the local residents of Huntington to assist in 
building a fort. The fort was to be built in the graveyard of the Presbyterian Church. A small 
army of carpenters were ordered to assist in building the fort and dismantling the church. 
These orders were dated November 5 and 26
th
, 1782. A further order on December 3 ordered 
“all the Waggons in your District To appear at the Fort tomorrow morning by 7 O Clock to cart 
provisions from the Vessels” to the fort. Thompson compelled forced labor to create this fort, a 
fort made on the graves of the ancestors of many of those who were compelled to work on it, 
out of at least in part the gravestones and the lumber of the church (other sources were also 
used).  It is likely that, as local historian Lois Meyer argues, “The location and manner of 
obtaining the materials however struck all as inconceivable and they were horror stricken at 
having to participate themselves in the act.”
81
 
The fort soon became known as Fort Golgotha, after the site where Jesus is said to have 
been crucified. It is likely that this name was given it by the Huntingtonians.   The Huntington 
Town Records contain a short description of the fort by a person known only as “D.M.”, most 
likely an American spy:  
 
 
On the 1
st
 Dec., he was at Huntington passing for an inhabitant, and passed 
within 4 rods of the front of the Fort which faces the north. It is about 5 rods in 
front with a gate in the middle, it extends a considerable distance north and 
south; the works were altogether of earth, about six foot high, no pickets or any 
other obstruction to the works, except a sort of ditch, which was very 
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inconsiderable some brush like small trees fixed on the top of the works, in a 
perpendicular form; he was told it encompassed near 2 acres of ground. It is 
built on a rising ground, and takes in the burying-ground; the Meeting house 
they have pulled down…some [of the troops] hutted along the sides of the Fort, 
which makes one side of the fort. The inhabitants of Huntington do suffer 
exceedingly from the treatment they receive from the troops, who say the 
inhabitants of that Country are all Rebels, and therefore they care not how they 
suffer.
82
 
 
In Thompson’s defense, the graveyard was not a bad location for a fort. The graveyard 
was on a hill, thus easy to defend, and a fairly good view of Huntington Harbor could be had 
from it. Huntington was a major population center, and nearby Lloyd’s Neck had been subject 
to attack by American forces. The graveyard and church were in the center of town, near the 
“town spot”, Platt’s Tavern, the armory, and other important locations (it is currently about a 
quarter-mile from the present Town Hall, and directly across from the Huntington Historical 
Society). The area was a likely candidate for major raids or even invasions from across the 
Sound, hence fortifying a major defendable hill made sense. And Thompson had to put his 
troops somewhere. Had the fort been built several years earlier, such as 1776 or 1777, one 
could at least argue that it was built out of military necessity.  
But, it is often said that timing is everything.  The orders for building the fort date back 
to November or December 1782. The siege of Yorktown had ended with an American victory 
over a year earlier. While there still was some small-scale fighting, in modern parlance, most 
“major combat operations” had ended in the thirteen former colonies. The preliminary peace 
treaty had already been signed, and the final peace treaty was only a few months away. This 
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was arguably not the time for the British to be building forts, especially forts which desecrated 
graveyards.
83
  
Against this must be countered that small-scale fighting was still continuing in the 
region, as it was in the South.  Indeed, an attack on Huntington was planned by Major 
Tallmadge of the Americans for early December, but cancelled after the Boat Fight on 
December 7, where the raiders surprised and defeated some British ships.
84
 It should also be 
noted that the preliminary treaty was signed November 30, 1782 in Europe, and it would be 
months before that fact was known on this side of the Atlantic.   
The nineteenth-century historian Benjamin Thompson argued that Colonel Thompson 
had the fort built, “without any assignable purpose, except that of filling his own pockets, by 
affording the ground of a claim on the British treasury for the expenses.”  More recently, 
historian John G. Staudt argues that it was possible that Thompson built the fort for military 
reasons, to discourage raiders from Connecticut. And, had the raid planned on Huntington 
actually occurred, the fort might have proved quite useful to Thompson’s troops.  But it was 
likely there was another explanation. Thompson, as he would soon show, was a rather 
intelligent man, and could clearly see that the war was lost and coming to an end. Exile from 
America was his probable fate.  Like many, perhaps he blamed the Presbyterians for the revolt. 
This explanation makes much more sense, especially when viewed against the pattern of abuse, 
desecration, and destruction that had been “habitually” directed against Presbyterian churches 
on Long Island. Indeed Staudt, while seeing a possible military purpose for building the fort, is 
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inclined to a less innocent explanation. Thompson had gone out of his way to have the locals 
participate in building the fort, ordering them to aid in destroying the church where many of 
them worshipped, and the graveyard where many of their parents, grandparents, deceased 
friends and loved ones were buried. Staudt argues that the sheer “ruthlessness of his 
actions…suggests that he was seeking retribution against Huntington’s Presbyterian rebels for 
Britain’s defeat in the war.” 
85
         
 In other words, Fort Golgotha was built from spite. 
 
This chapter has spoken of an occupation. In Staten Island and other places, such as 
New York City, the British were seen at first as liberators. But what could have potentially been 
a liberation turned into an occupation—a very different thing. For seven years, the British ruled 
southern New York. This gave them a golden opportunity to win over the unaffiliated and win 
back the loyalty of the Patriots in not just the region, but throughout America. After 
independence, this was probably a difficult if not impossible project, but one well-worth 
pursuing if Britain  had any hope of regaining  its empire in North America. The effort to restore 
civil government in British-controlled New York was abortive. Even if it been achieved, 
whatever chance of success it might have had was doomed by seven years of misrule. Some of 
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this was probably unavoidable; occupations are generally not pleasant, and some petty crime 
by bored troops is probably expectable. But some of the crimes were not petty, and some of 
the officers, such as Thompson, seem to have gone out of their way to make life miserable for 
the New Yorkers. Even Loyalists were appalled by some British actions, and some even became 
Patriots and even spies.   
New York City was crowded and malodorous, but relatively safe and pleasant, and here 
the people were mainly pro-British refugees—but even here British actions seemed high-
handed and disaffected people. Things were worse in the rural regions. The people of the rural 
regions of southern New York suffered seven years of bad government (as did the refugees of 
New York City). Their persons were not safe and neither was their property. They were 
compelled to labor against their will. They had little redress for their grievances, and were 
subject to arbitrary military rule. They were subjected to petty abuses and the desecration and 
destruction of sacred places. As for the British, the British ended the war with a useless fort 
built from spite in a graveyard.  
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The attempt to restore civilian government in Southern New York was abortive. 
The region, however, still had to be governed. The attention of the government turned 
to the mundane but vital matters of providing firewood and ensuring the population 
could be fed. While the war shifted to the south, New York was still intimately involved 
in the war. Partisan activities continued, and occasionally there were events in the 
North which led to the maneuvering of troops and fleets, and which could have led to 
major fighting. 
 Despite the shift of the war, New York, with its harbor and geographic position, 
was still the most important point in America for Britain.  Much of the commerce 
between Britain and the American colonies, and amongst the American colonies, passed 
through it. There had even been proposals as early as the 1720s to build a canal to 
connect it with the Great Lakes, which would have resulted in much of the trade of the 
Great Lakes region passing through New York City (as eventually did occur with the 
building of the Erie Canal). Thus, for both military and commercial reasons, the British 
wished to hold onto New York.    Thus, while the British pursued the “Southern 
Strategy” of fighting in Georgia and the Carolinas, a region believed to have many 
Loyalists and where American forces were generally weaker than in the North, they 
maintained large ground and navy forces to protect New York City.  Washington greatly 
desired to seize the City if he could, but never was able to. After the post-Yorktown 
consolidation of British forces, the British still retained their hold on southern New York.  
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Some Britons, such as Germain, hoped to retain the City and its environs even if America 
was granted independence.
1
  New York City was important to Britain, and they did not 
want to lose control over it. 
The war in America climaxed with the American victory at Yorktown. New York 
and its military masters were greatly affected by the fallout of the Battle of Yorktown.  
Surprisingly, one of these effects would be a final attempt to restore civilian government 
to New York.   
 
I 
 
 
 
In the latter half of 1780, much of Robertson’s time and correspondence was taken up 
with military matters; from late August to mid-September, 1780, Robertson was temporary 
military commandant of the City.
2
 It is possible that he spent much time socializing: Smith 
noted that “the Hurry and Dissipation of his over charged Hours has prevented his Attention” to 
a matter Robertson had already approved (and added the comment “How detestable this 
Military Government.”)
3
 In 1780, the main military front in America was located in South 
Carolina, but some important military events occurred—or perhaps it would be better to say 
“did not occur”—in the New York region which are worth a brief mention.  
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Benedict Arnold, who had been passing information to Clinton through the soon-to-be 
unfortunate Major John André (Clinton’s adjutant) for several months, had passed on some 
information that French troops would be landing in Rhode Island (which had been evacuated by 
the British in 1779). There was even a report that Long Island was to be invaded. Clinton hoped 
to attack the French, and put together a 6000 man force. They embarked eastward through the 
Sound in late July, 1780, arriving at Huntington Bay on July 28th. However, the French had 
gotten to Rhode Island first, dug in, and Admiral Arbuthnot, sailing off Rhode Island, informed 
Clinton that the French defenses, reinforced by American militia and artillery, were too strong 
to be carried. There were also disturbing reports from the Highlands that Washington was 
prepared to attack. Clinton convened a council of war (a rarity for him), which determined that 
Huntington was too far from New York to respond rapidly to an invasion. They advised him 
unanimously to fall back on Flushing in northern Queens (about ten miles from Manhattan) and 
he agreed.
4
   
 Shortly after the failed attack on Rhode Island, Robertson felt it necessary to remind 
New Yorkers of the importance of militia service in a set of militia regulations he published in 
Rivington’s Royal Gazette in September. All were to enroll in the militia, except Quakers, 
firemen, and those already in volunteer companies. After some early success in gaining Loyalist 
military support, there had been some slippage in support. The difficulties would continue. 
After receiving authorization to issue letters of marque against the Dutch (against whom Britain 
had declared war on in December, 1780), Robertson found it difficult to get privateers fitted 
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out. One reason was the forced impressment of 300 sailors (possibly including some American 
prisoners) by Admiral Arbuthnot in May, 1781.
5
  
The second important event of 1780 was the defection of Benedict Arnold in 
September. While Arnold successfully defected to the British, his main contact, the popular and 
well-liked Major André, was apprehended just north of Tarrytown and soon hanged as a spy. 
His capture resulted in a furious exchange of messages between the British and American 
camps. Robertson vigorously pled for André’s life, arguing (as did Clinton) that André had 
traveled under a flag of truce and therefore “could not be considered as a Spy.” Robertson, 
William Smith, and Elliot traveled to the American camp at Dobb’s Ferry, a few miles south of 
Tarrytown, to plead for André’s life. The Americans would not permit Elliot and Smith to come 
ashore; only Robertson was permitted to meet with Nathanael Greene. Greene, one of 
Washington’s favorite generals, had presided at André’s court-martial. Greene met Robertson 
“in civility as a Gentleman”, but could say nothing officially. Robertson “soothed and 
threatened civilly and even begged” but to no avail. André was hanged on October 2, 1780. 
Robertson forwarded to André before his execution various personal items, including a letter 
from his mother. Robertson lamented André’s death as the loss of “a good son, a good officer, 
and an amiable man,” and consoled himself that he had done his utmost.
6
    
Despite the grief Robertson and many others felt at André’s death, the defection was 
quite a coup, and even at this distance one can feel the excitement Robertson must have felt; 
as Robertson wrote Lord Amherst, “Arnold the boldest and most enterprising of the rebel 
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Generals, lives with me and sits by me while I write…”.
7
   The people of New York “exulted” at 
the defection, and Smith opined that “This Desertion must have good Effects.”
8
 Arnold would 
soon be deployed on raids in Virginia and elsewhere. But his defection was in many ways a 
failure. While Arnold had successfully defected, a good man had died, and West Point, which 
Arnold had promised to deliver into the hands of the British, was still in American hands. The 
Highlands, perhaps the most strategic region in the independent states, the one spot 
Washington could not afford to lose, remained in American hands. The chance to take it 
without a shot had been lost.  
Whether or not André was a spy, the Revolutionary   War was tailor-made for 
espionage; both sides spoke the same language, and there were many Loyalists behind 
American lines, and many Patriots behind British lines.  The British employed a large network of 
spies to give them both military information, as well as a “feel” for the opinion of the 
Americans.    Many Loyalists would send information as well.  One of the more famous British 
spies was the Connecticut-based “Mr. Heron”.  In September, 1780, he reported on the 
difficulties the Americans had in filling their ranks; he had been told by a reliable source that 
only 800 of 2500 drafted in Connecticut had been sent to Washington. He also reported that 
Washington’s army had about ten thousand men, many of them ready to desert.
9
   An earlier 
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report, furnished by a Loyalist, had reported that western Connecticut was ready to revolt 
against the “Usurpers”.
10
     
While there was clearly unrest and war-weariness in New England, especially in a region 
on or near the front-lines of the war, this report most likely exaggerated the dissatisfaction of 
Western Connecticut. Like all intelligence reports, the reports of spies were sometimes 
accurate, sometimes partially accurate, and sometimes very, very wrong. Those that described 
the tenor and opinions of Americans (especially as to their desire to return to British rule) seem 
to modern eyes to have been suspect, or colored by the opinions of the reporters. But the fact 
that so many spies reported dissatisfaction with the “usurpers” and even willingness to revolt 
against them helps to explain why so many Loyalists and Britons truly believed the revolt was 
the work of a small minority, and that reconciliation was a legitimate possibility.  They received 
so much information that fit this view (a view which jibed with their preconceptions) that it is 
not surprising that they ignored or discounted conflicting information, or that many accepted 
“trimmers” as truly loyal. If these Loyalists and Britons had known of Carlisle’s private belief 
that “the common people hate us in their heart,” no doubt they would have disagreed with 
him. The Americans also had their spies, and many of them were naturally centered in the New 
York region (as it was military headquarters for the British). The most famous American spies of 
the Revolution, Nathan Hale and the Culper Ring, were active in the New York region and have 
been discussed in Chapter VI. 
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II 
 
Throughout 1781, the attention of New Yorkers and their military masters were focused 
southward. Benedict Arnold in the spring led a highly successful raiding operation in Virginia, 
which nearly captured Thomas Jefferson (his home was briefly captured, but Arnold ordered 
that it be spared from destruction or pillage). At the same time, in the Carolinas, Cornwallis was 
engaged in a series of battles with Nathanael Greene and many partisans. To a reader of 
London newspapers, it would have appeared that Cornwallis was conquering South Carolina, 
driving Greene’s small army backwards. Technically, Greene lost virtually every battle, but 
Cornwallis’s supplies and army were slowly whittled down.  Ignoring the advice of Robertson 
and others, South Carolina was not secured—Cornwallis’ army travelled across the state, 
marching north and south, east and west, but failed to establish a permanent presence. Many 
Loyalists suffered for this.
11
 
Robertson almost became intimately involved in the Southern campaign. In May, 1781, 
Clinton ordered Robertson to take over the command of Virginia. Clinton had received word 
that General Phillips, in command of the British Army in Virginia, was ill. Robertson was on 
board a British frigate ready to sail south, but Clinton’s orders were countermanded when word 
was received that Lord Cornwallis had reached Petersburg, Virginia, and joined Phillip’s army 
(Phillips had died a few days earlier). Robertson returned to his duties as New York governor on 
May 29
th
. The possibility of Robertson having a field command did not exactly worry the 
Americans, or comfort the British. Upon hearing that Robertson was to be commander, 
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Washington wrote Lafayette that “You may have something to apprehend from his age and 
experience but not much from his Activity.”  The letter was leaked, and one British officer 
opined that it was “a just description”, that Robertson wanted “firmness and decision.” 
12
 
While Robertson was at sea, Andrew Elliot was sworn in as acting governor, but 
hesitated at the oath to see the laws of trade executed, as there was no civil government, and 
the source of his authority was military. After some insistence by Judge Smith, Elliot took the 
oath.
13
 The strange nature of New York’s pseudo-civilian government, neither fish nor fowl, 
neither civilian nor military, had once again caused difficulty, as both military and civilian 
personnel questioned their authority and powers.  
 
To Robertson’s disappointment, a planned raid on Philadelphia for the summer of 1781 
by Clinton did not occur. French armies appeared with Washington’s at White Plains (in 
American-held Westchester County, and the site of a major battle in 1776). The appearance of 
several French ships in the Sound in July drove all small craft into Huntington Bay, and two 
frigates were ordered into the Sound to counter them, but the French ships had left by the time 
the frigates arrived.  Robertson assured William Knox (an undersecretary of state under 
Germain) that the militia was ready to defend the city and thus free the King’s troops to attack 
the enemy.
14
    
New York and its British masters were not total bystanders to the climactic events of 
Yorktown.  Cornwallis established his ill-fated base at Yorktown in August, and on the 
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nineteenth of that month French and American troops began their march from the Hudson to 
the Chesapeake. Robertson reported that the French and rebels were at Paramus, New Jersey, 
with the “declared Object” to attack Staten Island (no such attack occurred).  Clinton in New 
York also received news of major French fleet movements toward the Chesapeake, but 
discounted the news. Soon, a sizable French fleet of about thirty six ships of the line were in the 
region of the Chesapeake.  Clinton, Robertson, the Hessian general Knyphausen, and others 
decided to send 5 or 6 thousand men south to support Cornwallis. In early September, Arnold 
sailed to raid New London, Connecticut. 
15
  
Smith noted many troops embarking. While they were publicly stated to be headed to 
Virginia (and that was their actual destination), Smith suspected that they were headed instead 
for the Highlands; he had urged such an action to Robertson as a diversion to aid Cornwallis, 
and later tried to suggest this second-hand to Clinton. Smith complained that “There is no Spirit 
of Enterprize. The general Dullness kills the Spark that happens to rise in the Mind of any 
Man…” Preparing the relief expedition would take till early October. Smith and others were 
quite anxious as to the fate of Cornwallis’s army, as it was by now surrounded and under siege. 
In mid-September, Clinton was reportedly more confident than Robertson, who was “in Terror” 
at rebel accounts of 28 French ships of the line.  Smith had slowly been losing faith in the 
military leadership; he had long had a poor opinion of Clinton, and his former high opinion of 
Robertson was in tatters. It was on September 13 that he wrote, “General Robertson talks in 
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this pitiful Strain. He is a Dotard and abandoned to Frivolity. He has Parties of Girls in the Fort 
Garden, in the midst of his own Fears, and the Anxieties of this Hour.”
16
 
In the middle of this anxious time, and as preparations for the relief exhibition 
continued, a welcome diversion occurred. Admiral Arbuthnot had been relieved of his duties 
several months earlier, replaced temporarily by Admiral Graves, who was in the Chesapeake 
region in September, 1781. Arbuthnot’s replacement, Admiral Robert Digby, arrived on Sept. 24 
with three ships, and a rather important midshipman: Prince William-Henry, the third son of 
King George III (and eventually, in 1830, King William IV). William was sixteen at the time of his 
visit, and spent some time in New York. The Prince landed on the 26
th
, and was received by “Sir 
H. Clinton, the Governor, and a Crowd behind Kennedy’s House on the North River”. The Prince 
dined with the Admiral that evening (not a normal occurrence for a midshipman!), and lodged 
at General Birch’s, who gave up the house he had been using.   An address was prepared for the 
prince by the Council.  At noon of the next day, Prince William Henry walked with Clinton and 
his officers from Headquarters to a fort called Bunker’s Hill. He returned by the Bowery, and 
turned in at Queen Street. A great crowd of people, both old and young, watched. On Friday, 
the 28
th
, the Prince held what can best be described as a court at Governor Robertson’s house. 
For the first and last time, a prince of the blood held court in America as a representative of the 
ruling monarch. Smith describes the scene: 
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At 10 o’Clock we went with the Governor, and were called up and introduced at 
the Head of the Stairs to Admiral Digby who brought us in to the Prince…The 
Passage all thro’ was lined with General and other Officers of the Army and 
Navy, waiting to be introduced. The Prince stood at the Right of the Fireplace 
with a Paper in his Hand, and up at his Breast, and bowed as we entred. Digby 
was at his right Hand, a little behind. General Robertson advanced and took out 
the Address, but not having Spectacles got thro’ with great Difficulty. The Prince 
then read his Answer. After which the Governor named us several as we stood 
on his Right and down to the Bottom, ending with the Mayor and General De 
Lancey. On this he bowed and retired, and so we did severally. 
17
   
 
 
Many monarchs and members of royal families, British or otherwise, would visit New 
York in the centuries to come. They would often be well-greeted by many otherwise republican 
Americans eager to meet with a king or queen or prince.  Many New Yorkers and Americans 
have, at least figuratively, bowed before these royals since that September day in 1781.  But 
these royals were all visitors to an independent, republican country, one that had rejected 
monarchy, and one where such fawning displays would be decried or mocked by many fellow 
citizens. As John Adams had said, “the Idolatry” felt toward monarchy had rapidly dissipated in 
the newly independent states. For many, the loyalty and even love that they had felt for the 
king was gone, dissipated by what was seen as a betrayal, and by the actions of the soldiers 
sent to enforce the king’s will.  The monarchism that was displayed on the 28
th
 of September 
would soon be wiped away by a republican and democratic tide, except for the occasional, 
almost atavistic, exceptions  discussed above, or nostalgic remembrances of a “simpler” time 
(such as Renaissance festivals or films about monarchs).  The thought that one should bow to a 
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sixteen year old merely because he outranked you in a societal hierarchy was dying rapidly in 
America and would soon seem to many to be ridiculous, though it was not yet dead. For a short 
while, just before the “world turned upside down”, the tiny enclave of British New York was 
deeply integrated into the empire.  
William’s visit was almost the last gasp of the British monarchy and the Empire in 
America. Unknown to any of the “courtiers,” less than two weeks earlier, the French had driven 
off Admiral Graves’s fleet at the Battle of the Chesapeake, preserving the encirclement of 
Cornwallis’s army. Within three weeks, Cornwallis would surrender. In a little more than two 
years, New York would be evacuated.  But for now, Prince William would receive addresses and 
walk in the streets so that the loyal subjects could see him.
18
 In a little more than two years 
(and for some, a little less), many of these loyal subjects would be gone from America as well.    
Before leaving for Virginia, the admirals, Sir Henry Clinton, and the prince attended 
service at St. Paul’s.  This visit by Clinton was rumored to be the first time he had been in a 
church—this was highly unlikely, though perhaps he had rarely been to church in America 
during the war. Certainly, the less-than-reverent attitude towards places of worship and 
graveyards the British had shown over the course of the war may have contributed to this 
rumor (see Chapter VI).  The relief expedition was originally scheduled to leave on October 5; it 
did not leave until October 12. Despite the urgency of the situation, it takes time to launch any 
major expedition, but perhaps more speed could have been shown. Many were anxious at the 
delay. In addition to time, relief expeditions also require men, preferably trained. Robertson 
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asked for volunteers solely for the mission, promising them that they would be discharged and 
able to return to their lives or their ships after the completion of the mission. They would 
receive certain privileges for volunteering, including a certificate which would give them partial 
protection from a future “press” for sailors.   They would also be paid; the New York Chamber 
of Commerce offered a bounty of three guineas per volunteer. 
19
 
 The expedition, led by Clinton with almost seven thousand men, sailed about the 
twelfth of October towards Yorktown. Robertson, having been promised a place with the 
expedition, was ordered to remain, to his evident disappointment. On October 24, much 
gunfire was heard from New Jersey, which many believed to be sounds of rejoicing, making 
many apprehensive that Cornwallis had been captured. That same day, New Yorkers were 
shocked by a hand bill out of New Jersey which stated that Cornwallis had surrendered at 
Yorktown on the seventeenth. Smith dismissed it as an “Artifice” to prevent a Loyalist 
insurrection. Robertson, however, believed it. Definite word arrived on the 26
th
 that Cornwallis 
had surrendered. The relief expedition arrived at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay on Oct 24, 
only to learn that Cornwallis had surrendered 5 days earlier. As in 1777, Clinton’s relief 
expedition had arrived too late. The world had turned upside down, and Yorktown would lead 
to the fall of ministers, ministries, and British rule.  But many, such as Germain and Smith, did 
not seem to realize that, as will be discussed further below.   In Britain, former Peace 
Commissioner Lord Carlisle could barely bring himself to comment, writing his friend George 
Selwyn (a Member of Parliament and a member of the infamous Hellfire Club), “Everything that 
                                                           
19
 Schaukirk, 22 (Oct. 13, 1781); Proposal for Raising Volunteers for the Navy, Oct 4, 1781, Letter Book 219;  John 
Austin Stevens, Jr., ed., Colonial Records of the New York Chamber of Commerce 1768-1784, (New York: Burt 
Franklin) 1867, 1971, 365-6.  
362 
 
can be said upon this cursed event in America has been said by this time a thousand times, by 
those who lament and by those who rejoice at our misfortunes. I shall therefore spare you my 
melancholy reflexions.  As for speculations, I have long since left off making any, seeing that 
when I indulged any I very seldom was right.”
20
          
 The news of the surrender reached London on November 25, 1781. Germain went to 
North with the news, which had arrived by packet. According to Germain, North took the news 
“as he would have taken a ball in the breast.” North paced up and down the room, saying “Oh 
God! It is all over.” This was a universal feeling; the news had arrived shortly after news of an 
attack on British-held Minorca (in the Mediterranean) and of French and Spanish fleets again 
threatening the channel. The London Gazette, “published by authority”, tried to bury the story 
on the second page (or “below the fold,” in modern parlance) in its late December paper.  The 
first page dealt with a knighting ceremony and with news of a battle in India with Hyder Ali. 
Cornwallis’ letter to Clinton, informing him of the surrender, followed.
21
 
  
 Clinton was soon relieved of his command, to be replaced by Sir Guy Carleton, the 
former Governor of Quebec. It also seemed necessary to relieve Germain of his position. 
Relieving Germain was more complicated.  The policies of Germain and of the King were 
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essentially the same, and Germain’s removal from his post would reflect badly on the King, who 
had not yet abandoned all hope of retaining the colonies. The King, perhaps looking for a face-
saving way to let Germain go, noted to Lord Stormont, the Secretary of State for the Northern 
Department, that Carleton would “certainly not accept this Command if He is to correspond 
with” Germain. Germain and Carleton had clashed over military policies in 1777, there had 
been many intemperate remarks, and they were still feuding. Germain hoped for a peerage, 
and the King, noting that Germain and Carleton were incompatible, thought that Germain 
would surely retire if he obtained a peerage. Of course, such a peerage would distress those 
who remembered Germain’s role at Minden without fondness.
22
 
 Germain still continued making plans for North America. In his 1782 Propositions 
(probably prepared in December 1781), he argued for keeping what Britain still held, and 
fighting for a settlement on a basis of uti possiditis (keeping what each side had).The continued 
possession of New York, Charleston, and Savannah by Britain after a peace settlement with 
America would help safeguard Britain’s extensive trade, and help with launching winter 
operations in the West Indies.
23
 There was even a possibility, Germain thought, that suspicions 
might arise among the rebels and “shake to pieces their ill formed constitution”, and if the 
British were still in a position to “receive and protect them”, they might be inclined to return to 
their former connection (at this late date, he still clung to that increasingly fantastical hope).     
He suggested using some troops for raids, and even attempting to liberate the “Delmarva” 
Peninsula. However, on this, he warned:  
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The sending a force there, or into any other part where there are Loyalists, will 
rather disserve than promote our cause, if better Order be not kept among the 
troops, for the relaxation of Discipline which has prevailed throughout the 
prosecution of this war, has been universally complained of, has disgraced the 
Army and alienated the affections of the Inhabitants from the Royal Cause. 
Plunder has been the common Object, and in the pursuit of it, no Distinction 
have been made between the well-affected and the notorious rebels. This 
grievance calls aloud for redress, and some officers much to their credit have 
shewn that discipline may be restored by proper attention and firmness.
24
  
 
 This paper was for all intents and purposes his last official statement of the war, and 
McKesy notes that it was “only the wearied repetition of a formula which he still believed to be 
right.”
25
 His advice concerning discipline was quite good but also quite late; better treatment of 
the civilian population in the earlier years of the war could only have helped the British cause. 
 Clinton was relieved of his position on December 23. The King still was in basic 
agreement with Germain and opposed to independence; replacing Germain would be a change 
of personnel, not policy.  It was not until February 9, 1782 that Germain left, to be replaced by 
Welbor Ellis. Germain would soon be awarded with a peerage, dying in 1785 as the Viscount 
Sackville. The North Ministry itself fell on March 27
th
, 1782, replaced by the Rockingham 
Ministry. They desired to end the war with America and transfer the troops to the Indies.
26
 
Shortly after the battle, Robertson wrote Germain that there were 40 thousand men 
stationed in America, and that if better use were made of them, all would be well. To Amherst, 
he wrote that Clinton was saying that Clinton was “sorry for Lord Cornwallis because he loved 
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him and had a great regard for his army—but the evil like any other great evils may be 
productive of good. It will produce a new Minister…”, one who would listen to Clinton, and give 
him the army he needed. Robertson told Amherst that “I hope it has not escaped You, that I 
have tryed on every occasion to give Activity to the War, and to cease making war on the 
treasury by reducing at least half our expence.” This letter was read to Smith, who believed that 
Robertson was hoping to receive Clinton’s command in the shake-up that would probably 
follow the disaster of Yorktown.
27
 
While ministries tottered and positions were angled for, more mundane matters 
exercised New Yorkers. The troops sent to aid Cornwallis returned to New York by early 
November, 1781, and Robertson issued a proclamation on fire-wood, of which the Moravian 
cleric Schaukirk hopefully wrote that it would “afford much relief, for the distress and extortion 
has been great already.” Unfortunately, by December 11, Schaukirk would write that the 
“Weather very cold; great distress for want of wood, the proclamations of no avail.”  The winter 
was very cold, and to add to the miseries of the city, rents went up to “extravagant figures.”
28
 
Despite proclamations, there was a shortage of firewood.  The soldiers in the barracks 
got what fuel was available, but the city-dwellers suffered. Smith blamed a lack of ships in the 
Sound to guard the shipments of fuel, which were mainly transferred by water, as well as an 
order prohibiting any fuel leaving Staten Island until the garrison there was supplied. According 
to Robertson, wood coming to town was seized and given to favorites.  To make matters worse, 
in mid-November, two New Jersey whale boats seized a victualler in New York harbor. The 
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whale boats and victualler were pursued, and the rebels burnt the ship on the shore. The ship 
contained 1000 barrels of pork and seven thousand pounds of wine.
29
  
 In late 1781 and early 1782, an important matter which had exercised much attention 
among the leadership came to a head. The Green Mountain region had long been disputed 
between New Hampshire and New York. The area was often called Hampshire Grants, as New 
Hampshire had granted land to settlers there. Many claimed a freehold tenancy with only a 
minimum quitrent (a quitrent was a payment made in lieu of performing feudal duties). 
However, New York also claimed the area, and had granted land in it to speculators. If the area 
was found to belong to New York, then the New Hampshire freeholders were New York tenants 
with a high quitrent. Unsurprisingly, the Vermonters preferred to be part of New Hampshire. In 
1764, a British court declared the area part of New York. New York organized the area into 
counties, but many of the Vermonters refused to accept New York authority, and a small-scale 
civil war broke out. Both the colonial and revolutionary governments of New York were unable 
to maintain control of the region.  Vermont in 1777 declared itself an independent republic; 
New York did not acknowledge their secession and still claimed the area to be part of New 
York.
30
 
 What had happened in Vermont was not an isolated incident. Although details differed, 
similar situations had occurred in Vermont, the Hudson Valley, New Jersey, and other places. In 
all these regions, there was a dispute between the allegedly “legal” owners of the land and the 
actual possessors. Those who lived on the land, who worked and improved the land, were told 
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that someone else, perhaps someone they had never seen and who had never seen the land, 
was considered the owner—and that they had to pay him onerous quitrents, rents, or other 
fees. In most cases, the law and the courts were on the side of the proprietors, landlords, and 
absentee owners. The law—by which is mean the “black-letter law” of statutes, common law 
and cases, not just the possibly biased judges and judicial systems—would usually  consider the 
proprietor or absentee owner or landlord to have the better claim. The actual inhabitants of the 
land considered that they had made the land their own by the “Lockean” method of improving 
the land, often supplemented by purchasing from Indians or by a donation or “patent” from a 
governor. However, in places like New Jersey, there were often conflicting patents and grants. 
Many settlers refused to follow court rulings, or suspected the courts of being biased against 
them. These problems would not disappear with the Revolution. Large tracts of land would be 
granted or purchased, only to have the legal owners find the lands occupied by “squatters” who 
claimed ownership of the land by the Lockean means of improving the land.  This was a 
common occurrence in America throughout the colonial era and early nineteenth century. In 
New York, landlord-tenant disputes would persist into the 1840s, until the great Hudson Valley 
estates finally began to break up.
31
    
 New York, the other states and the Congress were reluctant to recognize Vermont as an 
independent state. Ethan Allen and other Vermont leaders, including Governor Chittendon, 
began to conduct tentative negotiations with Governor Haldimand of Quebec. While ostensibly 
prisoner –exchange negotiations, the possibility of Vermont becoming a loyal province was a 
major topic of discussion. If Vermont “returned to its former allegiance” in return for 
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independence from New York, this would be a major victory for the British cause (especially 
after Yorktown).  It is possible that the Vermont leaders hoped to use the possibility of 
returning to British control as a “bargaining chip” in their negotiations with New York and the 
other states, as they continued to press their claim to independence from New York in 
Congress.  The negotiations with the British were secret, and Vermont’s legislature was kept in 
the dark about them.  In December 1781, Haldimand sent to Clinton an “express” containing 
“proposals made by the inhabitants of Vermont for returning to their allegiance and putting 
themselves under the protection of the Crown.”   Clinton, unsure of the extent of his legal 
powers in this matter (he was, after all, being asked to divide one of the King’s provinces in 
two), sought legal advice from Smith who told him he had no authority, and should forward the 
express to Britain.  But in February, 1782, Governor George Clinton of independent New York   
laid before the Assembly a series of documents concerning the negotiations. These included 
affidavits proving the proposed treaty, and even included Smith’s advice. 
32
  
The exposure of the negotiations to the light of day doomed them and any possibility of 
Vermont becoming a loyal British province. Someone had provided the documents to Governor 
Clinton. The most likely candidates were Vermonters who opposed the negotiations; in January, 
they warned Clinton of an “intrigue with Canada.” Jones, who detested Smith, believed that 
Smith had leaked them. Governor George Clinton had been the pupil of Smith, who had been 
Clinton’s patron. Smith had been a youthful radical and was a Presbyterian, which in the mind 
of Jones and many Anglicans made him seem more inclined to rebellion. Smith also had much 
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land in Vermont, under New York grants, as did many of his friends. All of these claims would 
have to be given up if Vermont became a separate province. 
33
 
 Any reader of Smith’s Memoirs would realize that Smith was a dedicated Loyalist, and 
thus it is highly unlikely that he would deliberately do anything that would harm the British 
cause, such as leaking the documents to Governor Clinton. If Smith, rather than Vermonters or 
others who had access to the documents, did leak the proposal, it was to preserve Vermont for 
New York—but a royal New York. Perhaps he did not see that his actions greatly harmed the 
British cause, or that his loyalty to his province had to be outweighed by the greater good to 
the Empire that Vermont’s return would bring.  If he did leak the documents, perhaps he did 
not think that his actions could be considered treasonous, though many would consider them 
treasonous (a similar statement may be made about Ethan Allen and the other Vermonters 
engaged in the Haldiman negotiations). In any event, whatever chance Britain had to retain 
Vermont was lost by the leaking of the documents.  
 
III 
 
 
 Thanks mainly to the opposition of Clinton and a substantial portion of the Loyalist 
community, civil government had not been restored to British-controlled New York. Smith had 
tirelessly pushed for it, but little had come of his efforts. New York’s government during the 
occupation was neither fish nor fowl, being partly civilian and partly military.  Civilian officials 
were so unsure of the extent or source of their authority, that when Lt. Governor Eliot was 
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sworn in as Acting Governor, he hesitated to say parts of the oath because he was not sure he 
had the authority (see above).  The absence of much normal taxation under martial law was 
definitely a factor in the desire of many Loyalists to remain under military rule. 
34
 Despite this, 
civilian government had some advantages, even for those inclined to prefer martial law.  For 
example, certain offices received fees based on taxes and duties that were not being collected 
under military rule, and certain actions could only be performed by civilian governors. In July of 
1781, Clinton “begged” Robertson to assume the powers of a civil governor so that some 
vessels seized in Virginia by Arnold and brought to New York could be “libeled” as prizes to the 
King.  A libel is the formal declaration or statement of claim in an admiralty case. The vessels 
here were being libeled as prizes to the Navy. A compromise was eventually reached with the 
King’s intervention.
35
 
 Surprisingly, the most serious attempt to restore civil government to New York since the 
failure to certify of 1780 was made shortly after Yorktown. The impetus for this new push for 
civil government arose out of the surrender at Yorktown. The Tenth Article of Capitulation at 
Yorktown provided that “Natives or inhabitants of different parts of this country at present in 
York or Gloucester, are not to be punished on account of having joined the British Army.” The 
intent of the article was to protect Loyalist troops from being punished by the Americans as 
traitors; they would be treated as prisoners instead. Washington refused to accept this 
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provision, believing the status of these Loyalists to be determinable by civil authorities only. 
Washington’s interpretation created a great uproar among the Loyalist community.
36
 
 The first intimations that civil government might be revived were made by Chief Justice 
Smyth of New Jersey, who informed Smith in mid-December that the Council in a few days 
would be consulted on it. Smith spoke at length with Clinton on the topic, but at that time to 
little avail. Clinton on January 14, 1782, called a council to discuss the matter and see how to 
“pacify” the outraged Loyalists.  Here, he expressed a desire to reestablish civil government so 
that rebel prisoners could be, “as Washington does,” left to “Civil Resort.” In other words, if civil 
government was reestablished, then rebels could be tried as traitors in civil courts—just as the 
British believed Washington wanted done. Clinton apparently hoped that the threat of such 
civil courts would probably act as a deterrent on both sides to trying prisoners as traitors.
37
    
 Robertson proposed in response the issuance of a proclamation threatening retaliation 
against American prisoners of war should Loyalists held by the Americans be treated as 
anything other than prisoners. Such a proclamation was not issued; instead, Governor Franklin 
of New Jersey suggested that Clinton send an order to all posts that no distinctions were to be 
made between regular and provincial troops in any future surrender.  Clinton’s correspondence 
to this effect was published in Rivington’s Royal Gazette and Gaine’s New York Mercury in early 
March. While Clinton had been relieved, he was still in command pending Carleton’s arrival, 
which did not come until May 5, 1782.
38
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 At a February 20 headquarters meeting, the question of civil government came up again 
when Smith noted that taxation would be useful. Clinton made a pointed observation to 
Robertson that he had no objection to reviving civil government whenever Robertson thought it 
fitting. This apparently prompted Robertson to review his instructions and consult Justice Smith 
in Smith’s professional capacity. Robertson, in accordance with Smith’s views, found that civil 
government could not be erected until Clinton had freed the port from the Restraining Act. In 
short, the first action to civil government had to be with Sir Henry Clinton. Elliot disagreed, 
believing that civil authority could be recreated while the port remained closed.
39
  
 Discussion continued on the topic. On March 14, Clinton wrote Robertson that he would 
not oppose the restoration of civil government if Robertson thought it absolutely necessary. 
Robertson called his Privy Council to discuss the matter on March 21, 1782. That civil 
government was being discussed at all provoked astonishment. Everyone Robertson consulted, 
he would soon report, were surprised “that, after a measure had been so long suppressed while 
it might have been of service to the King…should be proposed under circumstances similar to 
those which induce other governors to declare military law.” Robertson thought that now was 
not the moment, and so did his Council. Most surprisingly, Smith, who had long been a tireless 
advocate for restoring civil government in New York, agreed that now was not the time.
40
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 The March 21 meeting was held a few short months after the surrender of Yorktown; 
indeed, it was partially in response to a problem created by that surrender. Many agreed with 
Lord North that “it was all over” after that battle. Even the most optimistic recognized that the 
loss at Yorktown, coming after six years of war, meant that British options were limited. At the 
very least, news of a new ministry—perhaps a peace ministry—was expected, and the best that 
could be hoped for was a peace based on uti possendis (possession). The Council surely 
remembered the dark days of 1778, when Philadelphia was abandoned by the British, and there 
was a real possibility in the spring of 1782 that New York would soon be abandoned. What 
sense would it be to reestablish full civilian government, complete with an assembly, if the 
British were planning to abandon New York? The Council argued that, in general, restoring civil 
government under the king was the “direct Object of all Military Operations against the 
Rebellion.” However, none of the good effects of calling an Assembly would occur if it was “his 
Majesty’s Pleasure” to remove his forces now here. They thought it best to defer the measure 
until there was better word as to the king’s intentions. Smith agreed, but also thought that the 
Prohibitory Act needed to be repealed first.
41
  In short, the Council thought it senseless and 
useless to restore civilian government in southern New York if the region was soon to be 
abandoned. 
 In addition to there being general agreement that now was not the time to restore civil 
government, there was also much concurrence on the procedure to be followed in restoring 
civil government (if the time ever came).  The entire Privy Council agreed that before civil 
courts could be opened, an Assembly would need to be called. The Assembly in 1775 had been 
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composed of 31 members, with sixteen making a quorum. The area under British control did 
not reach 16 representatives; thus an Assembly drawn from only downstate New York would 
not have a quorum. Several suggestions were made to correct this, generally involving 
Robertson creating new boroughs or increasing the representation of the areas included so that 
the numbers reached sixteen. Robertson sent a letter to Germain requesting advice as to the 
legality and advisability of these proposals, should civil government be again contemplated.
42
 
 The proposal was again brought up briefly before the council on May 4, but the Council 
rejected the proposition. Carleton, the new Commander-in-Chief,   in mid-June argued that an 
“assembly would render us ridiculous beyond the lines”. Smith continued to press for it, arguing 
that restoring civil government was the only way to punish crimes not punishable under the 
Articles of War.
43
 But it was clear that barring an unexpected change in fortunes, the last hope 
of restoring civil government was ended, mainly because of its execrable timing. Thus ended 
the attempt to restore civilian government in British-occupied New York.   
 Why had civilian rule not been restored in New York? Several factors must be looked at. 
First, the virtually tax-free nature of the occupation undoubtedly made the Loyalists, many of 
whom were in tight financial straits as refugees, desirous of keeping martial law. Many Loyalists 
feared that restoring civilian government would result in the pardon of rebels, and they had no 
stomach for that. Oliver Delancey, a member of the Council, declared that he would not pardon 
any of the rebels.
44
  The possibility that the civilian government would cause obstacles to 
military operations was one held by both Howe and Clinton, and Robertson had made a special 
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effort to ensure Clinton that he would not interfere with Clinton’s military operations. This was 
especially important, as the possibility always existed that the British zone would be subject to 
a Franco-American assault, and cooperation between the military and the civilian government 
in such circumstances would be vital. 
 The military concerns detailed above seem like legitimate concerns. However, less 
legitimate concerns also seemed to be an important factor to both Howe and Clinton. The 
British and Hessian soldiers had committed many crimes, ranging from petty theft and 
vandalism to rape and murder. Officers had taken property without leaving a receipt, or had 
left receipts and never paid. Petty corruption had governed the necessary trade with the rebels 
that was conducted on Long Island.  In short, many people in the British zone, Loyalist, neutral, 
Patriot or trimmer had many legitimate claims against the British army and government which 
the absence of a civilian court system prevented them from pursuing (the Police Courts 
alleviated this somewhat, but not entirely). For many members of the British army and 
government, it was very important that martial law continue so that the civilian court system 
would not be revived. As long as martial law continued, they would probably not have to pay 
for their questionable actions. 
 The British zone also consisted of five counties and part of a sixth. One county, New 
York, was mainly occupied by refugees from many of the colonies.   There were significant 
constitutional questions that would have to be answered about how an assembly that only 
included part of the state (albeit its richest and most populous part) would be constituted. As 
Robertson noted, the area under British control did not produce a quorum of the old Assembly. 
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Some alteration of the rules governing the Assembly would probably have been necessary.
45
 
One other county, Suffolk, had had many Patriots (including a signer of the Declaration of 
Independence).  Could they even produce a loyal Assemblyman?  
 Despite all these reasons, perhaps the primary reason for civilian government not being 
instituted was Clinton. While there were some arguably legitimate reasons (and illegitimate 
reasons) for not instituting civilian government, the decision had been made at the highest 
levels of the British government that British-controlled New York was to be restored to civilian 
government. Communication problems made it difficult to know in London what was 
happening in New York; information was often months out of date. Therefore, rather than 
ordering that civilian government be automatically restored, some discretion had been given to 
Clinton; Clinton had to declare the area under the King’s Peace before civilian government 
could be restored.  As discussed above, southern New York could reasonably be considered 
pacified. Indeed, the area was pacified, and the certification that it was should have been given. 
The conclusion must be made that the failure to certify by Clinton was an abuse of his 
discretion. 
 As discussed above, Clinton was reluctant to—or incapable—of sharing authority. This 
personality quirk may very well have been the main reason he did not give his certification. He 
did not want to share authority, did not wish to, and found it difficult to cooperate and work 
with Robertson.  But, the restoration of civilian government to New York was the wish of His 
Majesty’s government. Clinton would only have been justified in blocking this if the area had 
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been suffering a major revolt or was under sustained attack by enemy forces. These 
circumstances did not exist in 1780 or 1781. Clinton blocked a major policy initiative of his 
government without a legitimate justification. 
 Some blame must be placed on Germain, and perhaps Robertson. The restoration of 
civil government in New York was Germain’s policy, and Robertson was his main agent for 
implementing it. Germain and Robertson should have vigorously pushed it, and pressured 
Clinton to give his certification. This was a high-ranking military officer flouting the wishes of 
the civilian government of his nation. While circumstances differ, this is a situation that has 
occurred several times throughout history. One thinks of the problems Lincoln had with 
McClellan, or Truman with MacArthur. McClellan and MacArthur were soon relieved of duty; 
Clinton stayed on.  Germain was thousands of miles away, and perhaps believed that he had no 
choice but to accept the decision of the military commander on the spot. Or perhaps he was 
reluctant to push Clinton. Germain, it must be remembered, was under a cloud because of his 
questionable actions at Minden; giving orders or pushing his views on a general of 
unquestioned courage (whatever his other flaws) may have been something he wished to 
avoid. In that case, however, Germain was in the wrong position, because his role as de facto 
Minister of War required him to do just that. 
 Of course, the question remains whether the restoration of civilian government in 
British New York would have made any real difference in the Revolutionary War. This question 
will be looked at further in the conclusion. For now, it is clear that what many thought was a 
promising new strategy that had the potential to positively impact the British cause was not 
attempted. Indeed, it was thrown away. The military master of New York refused to cooperate 
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and work with the new civilian governor, and only requested civilian government at the worst 
possible time. However, it must be noted that the experiment of restoring civilian government 
was attempted in Georgia with some success. This work will now take a brief look at events in 
Georgia, and contrast them with events in New York.    
 
 
IV 
 
 
 
 Georgia was the youngest of the thirteen colonies, not having been founded until 1733.  
The economy was similar to its neighbor South Carolina, with rice and indigo as its main 
exports. It had a large servile population; in 1773, its population consisted of 18000 whites and 
15000 slaves. The population was mainly found along the coast between the Savannah River 
and the Altamaha rivers (about 50 miles from the Florida border), but colonists had moved 
northwest along the Savannah River to the vicinity of Augusta. The frontier had recently begun 
to be settled by second-generation Americans from the Carolinas and Virginia, many of Scots-
Irish ancestry. Their rough manners often appalled the earlier settlers based at the capital of 
Savannah. Many of these frontiersmen would become the leaders of Revolutionary Georgia.
46
  
The colony long acted as a buffer between South Carolina and Spanish-held Florida, until 
Florida became British at the end of the French and Indian War. In the 1770s Georgia still 
desired British protection from Indians (as well as its own slave population).  Begun as a 
proprietary colony by idealistic Englishmen, by 1752 the colony had become a royal colony. Like 
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New York, it was governed by a royally-appointed governor, an appointed Council which acted 
as the upper house of the legislature and as an advisor for the Governor, and a popularly-
elected assembly known as the Commons House of Assembly. Like New York’s Assembly, which 
reached the grand total of 31 members in the 1770s, the Commons House of Assembly was also 
small, never reaching more than thirty members (at least in Georgia, there was the excuse that 
the colony was new and not too populous). These members were elected by all Georgians—if 
they were free, white, male, and owned fifty or more acres of land. In 1765, the colony was 
divided into 12 parishes for administrative purposes. 
47
   
Georgia had been blessed with one of the King’s most conscientious and competent 
public servants as governor. Appointed in 1760 by King George II, James Wright was to govern 
Georgia until 1782 (with the exceptions caused by his exile during the Revolution). Wright was a 
native of South Carolina, educated in law in England. Early in his administration, he achieved a 
major settlement with the Indian nations of Georgia, ensuring peace as well as a large cession 
of land from the Creeks. Wright was universally admired in Georgia in the early 1760s.
48
  
As in the other colonies, there was much opposition to the Stamp Act. Thanks to 
Governor Wright’s influence, Georgia sent no official delegates to the Stamp Act Congress, but 
did send an official observer. Georgia’s agent in London was instructed to oppose the act, but 
did not, finding nothing wrong with it. As in New York and other colonies, a group calling itself 
the Sons of Liberty formed and opposed the act. Wright was perhaps the only governor to 
succeed in enforcing the Stamp Act.
49
 The Liberty Party, a Patriot party, controlled the assembly 
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from 1765. As in the other colonies, the Boston Tea Party resulted in the formation of 
committees. However, the Georgians, perhaps because of the relative newness and small 
population of the colony, were very reluctant to get too involved. No Georgian delegate 
appeared at the First Continental Congress. By January, 1775, Georgia, upon learning of the 
non-importation agreement passed by Congress, formed a Provincial Congress. The Congress 
was mainly composed of delegates to the Assembly. The Congress ran the anti-British 
movement and prepared the beginnings of a revolutionary government, while its membership 
(in their capacity as members of the Assembly) continued running the official colonial 
government.
50
 This was reminiscent of events in Massachusetts, where the Provincial Congress 
was also largely formed of members of the legislature there. As in New York, as in 1917 Russia, 
as in many revolutions, there was a period of dual or competing government between the 
official government and a rising revolutionary government. In Georgia, the revolutionary 
government and the official government were virtually the same for a time. 
 
While Georgia initially failed to send delegates to the Second Continental Congress, it 
began to take more and more revolutionary actions. In January 1776, the Provisional 
Government arrested Governor Wright. On February 11, Wright escaped from house arrest. It is 
possible that he was permitted to escape, as he had many friends and admirers who did not 
want him to be harmed.
51
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After independence, a turbulent period of self-government occurred. Two constitutions 
were rapidly produced (a temporary constitution and one meant to be permanent), and the 
state of Georgia’s first governor, Button Gwinnett (a signatory of the Declaration of 
Independence) was killed in a duel with another patriot.  In contrast, for the first few years, the 
war was fairly quiet in Georgia. Every year, Georgia would launch an expedition against the 
loyal British colony in East Florida, and every year, disease or other factors would force it to 
return short of the St. Mary’s River, which is roughly the border between Georgia and Florida.  
This all changed in December of 1778. Georgia’s exiled British governor, James Wright, along 
with South Carolina’s governor Lord William Campbell, had agitated since their arrival in 
England in 1776 for the recapture of their provinces. Both believed their colonies included a 
substantial number of Loyalists. About 3000 British, German, and Loyalist troops under the 
command of Colonel Archibald Campbell invaded and quickly seized Savannah, the main city of 
colonial Georgia.  Squabbling among the Patriot defenders was a major contributor to the 
successful British attack.  About one hundred eighty eight defenders of Savanna were captured. 
Savannah would remain British for the duration of the occupation. 
52
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At about the same time as the assault on Savannah, a small army from Florida under 
William Prevost, a Swiss soldier serving in the British army, invaded Georgia from the South. 
According to a memorandum in the Sackville-Germain papers: 
 
The conduct of Wm Prevost in Georgia is much more obnoxious to the friends of 
this Country  [Britain] than to its Enemys and is likely to prove fatal to our 
interest there…His progress from the Southward was attended with a wanton 
destruction of Property which has never yet marked even the Retreat of any our 
Armys and had more the appearance of a plundering Party, whose Stay in an 
Enemy’s country was to be very short; than that of a Royal Army come to occupy 
the Province for the defence and Protection of the kings Subjects.
53
 
 
 
According to the memorandum, on his march Prevost destroyed thirty seven houses in 
Georgia, plus grain and provisions of all kind. After this small-scale but Shermanesque “March 
through Georgia”, he continued his plundering ways in South Carolina. The memorandum 
writer blames his actions on the “ignorance natural to a foreigner of the ideas which British 
subjects entertain of the right of private property, even in the midst of war as far as it can be 
maintained.”
54
 In short, what Governor Wright no doubt considered “liberation” began as a 
plundering invasion; the British repeated the same mistakes they had up north, making 
themselves obnoxious to the people whose loyalties they needed to preserve or win over.   
 The British forces soon gained control of coastal Georgia, extending their control inland 
as far west as Augusta, which changed hands several times during the occupation.  By February, 
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1779, only Wilkes County, a mainly frontier county, was in Patriot hands. The government 
situation for independent Georgia was quite confused; at one point there were competing 
Patriot governments.  In the British-controlled zone, military officers ruled for four months, 
until the Governor and other officers of the old colonial government returned.  Campbell in 
January proclaimed to the people of Savannah that he came to protect Savannah, not punish 
those who had sided with the rebels. All who swore loyalty to the King and renounced the state 
government would be fully pardoned if this was done within 3 months of the proclamation.  
Many Georgians accepted; some may have been Loyalists, some trimmers, and others may 
have been Patriots who thought the American cause was lost.  A loyal militia was formed, but 
some left to rejoin the Whigs when Whig military fortunes improved.  General Prevost assumed 
the role of Governor in March, and reestablished partial civilian rule. Loyalist Georgians were 
appointed as provincial officers and all laws in effect when the British left in 1775 were 
declared still in effect.
55
  
Wright returned to Savannah on the fourteenth of July, and while he did not find the 
province as secure as he had hoped it would be, he did believe that it had been restored to the 
King’s Peace. However, he found it imprudent to issue election writs because he thought the 
military hold on the province weakened by the expedition into South Carolina. He also found 
that “several of the Leading Rebels are very busy in keeping up the Expiring Flame of Rebellion 
& that there yet Many here who if they had an Opportunity would adhere to the Independent 
Scheme.” By the end of July, 1779, he was again the governor.
56
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Hoping that the province would become more secure, Wright delayed calling an 
Assembly for almost a year. An Assembly was finally called and met from May to July of 1780. 
At the opening of the Commons House of Assembly, Wright contrasted the “War, 
Imprisonments, proscriptions, oppression, attainders, and confiscations” that he said the rebels 
had brought, with the “Peace, happiness, true liberty and the enjoyment of property” which 
had long been “banished from this land.” He added that “it will evidently appear that Great 
Britain never meant to oppress or injure the Colonies, but that they should return to the mild, 
just, and benign government, they formerly enjoyed.” 
57
 
  It is instructive to look at the actions of this Loyalist Assembly, to understand what a 
Loyalist Assembly could have accomplished in New York. The Assembly worked hard to restore 
Georgia to its pre-Revolutionary status. The acts of the Patriot state government were declared 
illegal, and 151 prominent rebels were disqualified politically. The legislature attempted to 
attaint (basically, permanently strip from them and their heirs their property) 112 rebels, and 
eventually attainted 24 rebels (pending royal approval—though there is no evidence this was 
ever received). The Royal Assembly in the spring of 1781 added new parishes and a court, 
though the parishes probably never functioned as the region they were located in soon became 
Whig again. The court definitely never functioned. Perhaps most importantly, the colony 
granted the King a permanent revenue, as their share of imperial expenses (Parliament had 
foresworn colonial taxation).
58
 
                                                           
57
 Coleman 289-2, 297; “Governor Wright’s Speech to the Commons House of Assembly”, Savannah the 9
th
 of May, 
1780,  No. 62 in Killion, 212. 
58
 Ibid., 297-8. Killion and Waller note that the list of disqualified persons in the Disqualifying Act of 1780  has 
become “for Georgia an honor roll of its heroes of the Revolution.” Introduction to No. 63, “Disqualifying Act of 
1780”, in Killion 213. 
385 
 
 British forces in Georgia were soon greatly reduced as units were transferred to the 
fighting in the Carolinas.  Wright’s forces were reduced to 500 men in Savannah, 371 about 35 
miles upriver, and four regiments of suspect Georgia militia. Wright lost his sense of security, as 
rebel raids kept the capital in disorder, and Wright constantly harangued London for more 
troops. His plantations on the Ogeechee River were unprotected and often raided. The laws the 
Assembly passed could not be enforced, and inflation was pushing food prices to unheard of 
levels. Warfare on the frontier was vicious. American military success in the South and British 
lack of troops eventually forced the evacuation of the British and the end of Loyalist Georgia by 
July of 1782.
59
  
   
The contrast between Georgia and British New York is instructive. British rule over Long 
Island and New York City was relatively secure (though it is not inconceivable that a French 
expedition could have seized part of Long Island). Despite this relative security, the region 
remained under martial law for the length of the war (though there was a civilian governor). In 
Georgia, four months after the invasion, the civilian government was restored. About 
seventeen months after the invasion, a loyal assembly met. All this occurred despite a fluid 
military situation and a shortage of troops—the opposite of the situation in New York. The 
Assembly created courts and parishes and passed laws. The Assembly voided Patriot laws and 
attainted rebels—and would probably have attainted more if it had not squabbled. However, a 
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true assembly will often squabble amongst itself as different viewpoints and interests clash. .  
Perhaps most importantly, the Georgian Assembly passed laws to help solve the imperial 
revenue problem which had been a central cause of the Revolution. All of this occurred in 
Georgia, a small province at the fringe of American society. It is not difficult to imagine the 
propaganda value such actions could have had had they been made by a Loyal Assembly freely 
elected by the people of a sizable portion of a major province such as New York.  
 This is not to underestimate the dangers such an approach would have presented to the 
British. Kings and Staten Island were notably Loyalist and Manhattan was filled with Loyalist 
refugees, but Queens was mixed in its loyalties, and Suffolk was Patriot. A Royal Assembly in 
British New York could at times have worked at cross-purposes to the British effort. It would 
probably have contained one or two members whose sympathies were not wholly with the 
British. It would have undoubtedly been “factious and contentious” even in the best of 
circumstances. But even a difficult Assembly would have been evidence that the British—the 
legitimate government, at least in British eyes—were in New York to stay, and that the British 
respected the rights and liberties of the people of New York. This, it may be argued, was a risk 
worth taking.   
 Why the differences in the approaches taken in the two provinces? The relative success 
of the Georgian experiment is probably because Governor Wright was dedicated to 
reestablishing civilian government in Georgia, and because he had the cooperation of the 
military authorities (though he clearly needed more troops to protect his province). This 
situation was clearly lacking in New York. Tryon, the governor for the first years of the 
occupation, had not pushed for civilian government. When Robertson arrived, Clinton refused 
387 
 
to certify Southern New York as pacified, as Germain’s orders required before civilian 
government could be restored. Clinton had difficulty working with Governor Robertson. Had 
the military authorities been more cooperative, a true civilian government could perhaps have 
been created. Instead, Robertson was forced to institute half-measures like his Police Court.  
One thing is clear—New York was a lost opportunity for the British to restore civilian 
government in an area where the propaganda value, the opportunity to win over hearts and 
minds, would have been great. Whether such an action would have helped change events will 
be discussed in the concluding chapter. But the attempt should have been made.   
 
   
 
V 
 
 
  
 Robertson remained Governor of New York until April, 1783, and carried on the 
necessary duties of his office.  Robertson was briefly Commander in Chief until he was relieved 
of these duties by the arrival of General Guy Carleton. During Robertson’s brief turn in the top 
position, he corresponded in May, 1782 with George Washington (doing him the courtesy of 
referring to him as General Washington) concerning what the British considered “acts of 
Barbarity” committed against Loyalists by Continental and militia troops.
60
 This was to be a 
major problem of the last days of British rule: the violence unleashed against both the 
British/Loyalist side and the Patriot side.   While paling besides that of South Carolina, they 
were bad enough. 
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 As briefly mentioned above, at Yorktown the Tenth Article of Capitulation provided that 
““Natives or inhabitants of different parts of this country at present in York or Gloucester, are 
not to be punished on account of having joined the British Army.”
61
 This article, intended to 
protect Loyalist troops from being treated as traitors by the Americans, was not accepted by 
Washington, who believed the status of such Loyalists could only be determined by the civil 
authorities.
62
 While the deference Washington showed to civilian authority is admirable and 
one of his finest qualities, the result was outrage among the Loyalists.  
 The Associated Loyalists, a militant group of Loyalist irregulars who would often raid 
Connecticut (some would argue that they were pirates and freebooters) were angered at the 
Tenth Article and its interpretation. On April 12, 1782, one of them, Captain Richard Lippincott 
of New Jersey, killed Captain Joshua Huddy, a Patriot prisoner, on the grounds he had killed the 
Loyalist Philip White.  Lippencott did not act on his own, but under the orders of the Board of 
Directors of the Associated Loyalists. This created a major incident. Washington wrote Clinton 
complaining of the killing, and demanded that Lippencott be surrendered to the Americans for 
punishment.  Robertson supported proceeding against Lippencott as a murderer. The Council 
decided to court-martial Lippencott.  Robertson informed Washington of this, and urged 
Washington to join with him in preventing or punishing breaches of the rule of war.  
Washington replied on May 4, and agreed on the need to conducting the war in a civilized 
manner, but again insisted that Lippencott be extradited. Of far more significance, Washington 
threatened retaliation on a British officer in American custody.  This was not an idle threat; an 
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officer was actually selected by lot to be the victim of retaliation, one Captain Charles Asgill of 
the First Regiment of Foot Guards. The British proceeded with the court martial, and 
threatened to hang Henry Brockholst Livingston, then a prisoner, should Asgill be harmed. 
Livingston was the son of William Livingston, the Revolutionary governor of New Jersey. 
Lippencott was acquitted of murder by the court-martial, on the ground that he thought his 
actions were under official orders from the Associated Loyalists, an organization authorized by 
Clinton and Germain. Fortunately for Lippencott, Henry Livingston, Charles Asgill, and the 
reputations of Washington and everyone involved, Washington backed off from his threat.
63
        
 Guy Carleton, the new Commander-in-Chief, arrived on Sunday, May 5, 1782, after a 
surprisingly short passage of only 25 days.  He got straight to work, and less than four hours 
after his arrival, he was being briefed on the Lippencot matter.
64
 Carleton (Known as Sir Guy 
after 1776, and as Lord Dorchester after 1786) had been governor and captain-general of 
Quebec in 1775. He had been born in the County Down, Ireland, of Scots-Irish stock to a local 
landowner in 1724. He had been commissioned an ensign in 1742, and had risen in the ranks. 
Part of this rise was owed to the friendship of James Wolfe, who secured him a position as 
quartermaster general of the army which captured Quebec in 1759. He served in Canada, 
Europe, and against the Spanish at Havana, and was thrice-wounded. In 1766, he became the 
Governor of Quebec. Carleton realized that the large French Catholic population of Quebec 
made Canada a very different province than one which had been peopled by British 
Protestants. He developed this realization into the policies included in the Quebec Act of 1774. 
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This, as one biographer notes, developed into the conception of “a larger ‘British’ liberty of 
non-English people to retain their own distinctive character” within the British Empire.
65
 
 The actual implementation of these policies proved difficult. The interests of English-
speaking settlers, many of them merchants, often clashed with the French-speaking majority. 
Carleton believed that because of these conflicting interests, it was best that there be no 
assembly.
66
 Carleton, aided by a council, would govern Quebec as a benevolent despotism. In 
the actuality, he was impatient with opposition, disliked the English merchants, eliminated from 
the government many who opposed him and stifled free discussion of his decisions. After a four 
year return to England, he returned with an eighteen-year old French-educated wife, the Lady 
Maria Howard, daughter of the Earl of Effingham. Not only did this help him in the patronage 
and connection society of Britain, but her enjoyment of things French was no doubt an aid to 
his administration of the French-speaking province. On his return, he hoped to make Quebec a 
bastion against the increasingly rebellious colonists. He was disappointed at the lukewarm 
response of the populace to the American invasion of 1775. Few took up arms, and some even 
joined with the invaders. While the American invasion ultimately failed, it did reach the gates of 
Quebec City.  In 1776, Carleton defeated on Lake Champlain a small flotilla commanded by 
Benedict Arnold, but failed to take Fort Ticonderoga. 
67
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  Carleton was criticized for his conduct of the campaign, especially his failure to take 
Fort Ticonderoga. Germain questioned his actions, and Carleton replied intemperately. The king 
criticized both men for their immoderate, angry correspondence, but noted that Carleton was 
wrong to “convey such asperity to a Secretary of State.” Thus began a long-standing feud 
between the two men. Carleton returned to England in 1778, and his name was oft-mentioned 
as a possible successor to Clinton. He was finally appointed.
68
  
 Unfortunately for Carleton, the position of Commander-in-Chief offered little chance for 
glory in 1782. As he left Britain, it was made clear to him by Rockingham’s peace ministry that 
his task would be to arrange for the withdrawal of British troops from New York, the South, and 
even St. Augustine in Florida. Carleton hoped to bring the southern troops to New York, and 
would even divert some ships bound for Halifax to New York. He hoped to strengthen the New 
York garrison so as to give the British more leverage to bring the Americans to the bargaining 
table. It is doubtful that this would have succeeded, and the question was moot, as discussions 
in Paris were headed in the way of recognizing American independence. Carleton would later 
be the governor of Canada from 1786 to 1796, where he gained a reputation as one of Canada’s 
founders.
69
                                   
 Carleton infused some energy into British rule. One of his first acts was to review the 
Lippincott case, and he also quickly forwarded copies of Parliament’s resolution to suspend all 
offensive military operations in America to Washington. He rose early and rode around 
Manhattan, familiarizing himself with the city and its problems. Prisoners were released from 
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their ships during the summer onto Blackwell’s Island (now Roosevelt Island). He attacked 
corruption and instituted reforms, and initiated a long overdue inquiry into the September, 
1776 fire (See Chapter III). Clinton left New York a week after Carleton’s arrival. He spent much 
of the following years trying to rehabilitate his reputation.
70
 
 With Carleton’s arrival, New York learned of the change of the Ministry which had 
occurred on March 27. Among the changes was the elimination of Germain’s old position, 
Secretary of State for the American Department. The Earl of Shelburne, William Fitzmaurice 
Petty, was made Secretary of State for Home, Irish, and Colonial Affairs. This essentially gave 
him Germain’s old duties (along with other responsibilities). Shelburne corresponded with 
Robertson as to why civil government had been not instituted. Robertson politely blamed 
Clinton, stating that he had “never failed to urge Sir Henry Clinton in whose power this lay,” and 
laying out the reasons for the recent rejection (see above). Perhaps Germain and Robertson 
should have pushed harder for civilian government; even Rockingham’s Ministry wanted to 
know why it had not been tried.  Having assured Shelburne of his zeal to serve with Carleton, 
Robertson also requested to be relieved of his Governorship.
71
  
 Robertson’s relations with Carleton were problematic. As discussed above, Carleton and 
Germain had a long-standing feud.  Robertson was considered a confidant of Germain, who was 
not only out-of-favor with Carleton but with the new government. Carleton also believed that 
Robertson had obstructed plans for civil government despite the desire of Clinton for it (!).  The 
probable source of this highly erroneous belief was Clinton. Robertson protested that he had 
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pushed for civil government only to meet a stone wall in Clinton. Carleton failed to believe him, 
and Smith, by now disappointed with Robertson, reinforced his disbelief. 
72
  
In a May 9, 1782 letter to the Earl of Shelburne, Robertson replied to a letter sent him 
by Welbore Ellis, Germain’s replacement as Secretary of State for the American Department 
(and the last to hold that position). Ellis wished to know why Robertson objected to civil 
government. Robertson argued that 
 
I came to America possest of a belief, that by restoring Civil government I might 
have the honor of being instrumental in restoring His Majesty’s Authority—This 
belief was confirmed by observation, and I never failed to urge Sir Henry Clinton 
in whose power this lay—to make the people happy in their wishes by restoring 
their Constitution—I pressed this so earnestly, that Sir Henry declared he would 
Quit his Command if ever Civil government took place in a province where he 
carried on War-—
73
 
 
 
 
 Robertson ended the letter by requesting leave to return home, for reasons of his health 
and his family’s situation. In a letter to Lord Amherst, he told him that he wished to see the 
“remains” of my family, and he told Lord Haldimand that his wife’s grief (over their daughter 
who had died recently) made him anxious to return to support her.
74
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 It would be several months before Robertson’s request would be granted, and 
Robertson would not actually leave New York until April, 1783. Robertson carried on his duties. 
In June, 1782, he issued a proclamation requiring virtually all “persons” (presumably all men) 
except for ministers and a few other exceptions to perform militia duty, or provide a substitute 
if they were old or infirm. Proclamations concerning carts, horses, and wagons used for 
supplying the wants of the city and military were issued in July. Robertson also pardoned a 
pirate on condition that he served in the fleet, and issued a proclamation of public thanksgiving 
on the occasion of the successful relief of Gibraltar.
75
   
 Robertson left New York for England on April 16
th
, 1783. He held a final Council meeting 
on April 10.
76
 Before leaving, he wrote two letters, one to Carleton, the second to Lieutenant 
Governor Elliot, which may be considered a “Valedictory”, or summation of his governorship.  
In his letter to Carleton, Robertson discussed his establishment of Police Courts on Long Island. 
Robertson seems to have been quite proud of his establishment of the Police Courts, and to 
have considered them one of the major accomplishments of his administration.  The picture 
Robertson painted of the Court of Police of Long Island is greatly different from that painted by 
Thomas Jones: 
 
I found that the distance from some parts of Long Island, and the expence of 
living at New York, made most of the inhabitants of that Isle rather suffer 
wrongly than apply to the Courts at New York—for redress—and that the want 
of Courts on Long Island—left every licentiousness and Crimes unpunished—
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These Considerations led me to institute a Court of Police on Long 
Island…Happily the Gentlemen who were chose for Judges—have executed 
whatever I could hope from them—Justice and equity and order have taken 
place there—and a want of the rules which are instituted for guarding liberty—
have been little felt—while delay and expence have been entirely avoided--.
77
 
 
 
 
 This contrasted with the picture drawn by Jones, who considered the court to have been 
“an arbitrary and despotic court.”   Jones called Ludlow, the Superintendant of the Court, “The 
little tyrant of the Island”.  Robertson perhaps was aware of criticisms of the courts, and argued 
to Carleton that the lack of juries and the other “rules which are instituted for guarding liberty” 
had been little felt, while delays and costs had been avoided.  Even if Ludlow did not act 
tyrannically (and there is evidence that he was corrupt or at least arbitrary, as discussed above), 
the court by its very nature was only a pale shadow of a true British court. The truth is probably 
somewhere between these two pictures.
78
  
 His April 14 letter to Elliot seems to indicate some sadness and depression over his 
Governorship, though perhaps that is reading too much into an official communication. As he 
informed Elliot, his successor as governor and the last Royal Governor, he had “exercised few 
Acts in the Character of a Civil Governor.” All of his authority had been derived from the 
Commander of Chief—and under it he had tried as a general “to supply the want of Civil 
Government.” This truly showed the oxymoronic nature of New York’s occupation government.  
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Robertson advised Elliot that he would gain more “advantage” from his “private Character and 
the regard people have for your person, than from your Office.”
79
  
 Robertson returned to relative obscurity in England. His friendship with Smith was 
resumed in 1784, when the exiled Smith arrived in London. Robertson had a small circle of 
friends, former officers who had served in America, who regularly met for conversation, cards, 
and wine, including Lord Amherst, General Gage, and Frederick Haldimand.  Smith joined this 
group. Smith also aided him in certain land claims Robertson had in America, but to no avail. 
Robertson was dunned for receipts and vouchers from his years in America. He became ill and 
passed away on March 4, 1788.
80
  His obituary in the Gentleman’s Magazine was brief: 
 
 
In Wimpole Street, Cavendish Square, Lieutenant-General James Robertson, 
colonel of the 16
th
 regiment of foot, and late governor of New York.
81
 
 
 
 
VI 
 
 
 
Robertson had left New York for the last time on April 16, 1783. By this time, provisional 
articles for peace had been signed between Britain and the United States, and between Britain, 
France and Spain. In February, George III had proclaimed a “Cessation of Arms”. This was read 
in front of City Hall a few days before Robertson left, on April 9, 1783. The mainly Loyalist 
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crowd “groaned and hissed”, and their faces were full of despair. In the next few days, some 
would take their lives.
82
  
 Prisoners of war were released on April 6 and 9. Patriot Americans began to return to 
British-occupied New York—at least 2000 by one estimate. In early May, George Washington, 
George Clinton, the Governor of American-controlled New York, and the British commanders, 
General Guy Carleton and Admiral Robert Digby, met at Tappan (just north of the border with 
New Jersey) to discuss the arrangements for a British evacuation. William Smith, Chief Justice of 
British New York, attended. He was no doubt a little pleased to meet with Governor Clinton, 
who had once been his clerk, but he also stated that he felt some humiliation as well. 
Washington was concerned that the British not destroy or steal American property, especially 
slaves. Carleton would not return slaves who were leaving or had left for Nova Scotia, but 
agreed to a registry for compensation. Many blacks would leave for Canada.
83
  
Loyalist refugees from throughout the thirteen colonies flooded into the city, as Patriots 
began to return. Daily auctions were held as wealthy loyalists liquidated their possessions.  In 
October, 1782, a fleet with 500 refugees had left; larger fleets left in April and September 1783. 
About 29,000 left New York City, and about 70,000 left the entire United States.  While some 
were exiled to Britain or the West Indies, about 50,000 of them went to Nova Scotia or Quebec. 
Many of them did not go to Halifax or the other relatively small towns in Nova Scotia, but to an 
unsettled frontier: Saint John on the Bay of Fundy. One New York Loyalist, Sarah Frost, 
described it as “The roughest land I ever saw… But this is to be the city, they say. We are all 
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ordered to land tomorrow and not a shelter to go under.” The winter was harsh; many lived in 
tents with the frozen ground as a floor—and many did not live through the winter.  Not mixing 
well with the older settlers, they petitioned for the Loyalist-settled regions to be made separate 
colonies from Nova Scotia. This request was granted, and New Brunswick (where Saint John is 
located), Prince Edward’s Island, and Cape Breton were all made separate colonies.
84
   
 On the Ontario peninsula (then part of Quebec), many Loyalists from disbanded 
regiments were settled. Their descendants formed the bulk of the forces that stymied American 
invasions of what is now Ontario during the War of 1812. Also settling in Quebec was New 
York’s William Smith, who became the Chief Justice of Quebec.  In 1789, the Loyalists of 
modern Quebec and Ontario and their descendants were honored by being allowed to affix 
“U.E.” after their name. This stood for “United Empire”, and was awarded for their adherence 
to the principle of unity of empire. Their descendants refer to themselves as United Empire 
Loyalists. 
85
  
 Rather ironically, while they had left America, they were still characteristically American. 
As has been argued earlier in this work, there was much agreement between Loyalists and 
Patriots as to many political issues; the difference was in what methods should be employed, 
and eventually in the loyalty that should be given the king. Arguably, even the Loyalists could be 
considered Whigs, and a bit more “left-wing” or “progressive” than many of the British. Harvard 
historian Maya Jasanoff notes that Loyalists, wherever they went, promptly expressed an 
“uncannily American desire for greater political representation.” The transplanted Loyalists 
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agitated for freehold tenure to be instituted in Quebec, rather than the semi-medieval 
seigneurial system used in Quebec. They also agitated for elected assemblies. This eventually 
resulted in the 1791 Canada Act, by which Quebec and Ontario were separated into two 
colonies, each with an elected assembly, and with freehold tenure in Ontario (then known as 
Upper Canada).
86
  
 But their experiences and reactions to the American Revolution also marked them. They 
had seen what they saw as “mob-rule” in their old homes. They had seen arms seized by 
committees with no legitimate power to seize them (at least in the eyes of the Loyalists); they 
had seen these weapons taken from those who disagreed with the committees. Their distrust 
for republicanism and fear of mob rule helped influence the “gradual, ‘paper-strewn’ path to 
nationhood” of Canada. And their ties to Britain and their antipathy to the United States helped 
create a separate Canadian identity, and no doubt helped preserve British rule during the War 
of 1812.
87
  
  
 Carleton in November gave the Americans precise dates for the withdrawal of British 
troops from New York. Eastern Long Island and northern Manhattan would be evacuated on 
November 21, and New York City and Brooklyn at noon on the twenty-fifth, weather 
permitting. The weather was acceptable, and the evacuation occurred on the twenty-fifth. The 
last piece of occupied soil in New York (indeed, in the United States—not counting some 
frontier forts the British failed to evacuate for several years) was Fort George, at the very 
southern tip of Manhattan. Here, British soldiers had “helpfully” greased the flag-pole. After a 
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brief delay to overcome the greasing, the American flag flew over the city.
88
 While the 
Revolution was in many ways not over, the war was definitely over. 
 After the Battle of Yorktown, the band at the surrender is said to have played “The 
World turned Upside Down.”  The reoccupation of New York, symbolizing the American victory 
over Britain, was a truly momentous, earth-shattering occurrence. As if to accentuate this, a 
few days after the British evacuated, the earth in New York literally shook, as the Moravian 
Reverend Schaukirk recorded in his diary: 
 
In the evening about 8 o’clock, we felt a slight shock of an earthquake; and about 
eleven, there was a more violent one, which shook all the city in a surprising 
manner. We felt it in bed—enough to arouse us from our first sleep.
89
 
  
 
VII 
 
 
The Anglican Church struggled to find its footing in the new republican world, but it 
eventually reestablished itself as the Episcopal Church.   Reverend Cutting recorded in 1783 
that offending passages (most likely prayers for the king) in prayer books were pasted over with 
strips of white paper writing invocations for the President of the United States. This is curious, 
as no such officer existed in 1783; it is likely he meant the president of Congress. The 
Presbyterians rebuilt their churches. The records of Oyster Bay show many manumissions of 
slaves in the 1780s.  This was probably the result of an intensification of economic trends that 
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had been making slavery less common in the region; but it is possible that the ideology of 
freedom and the incongruity of slavery may have been a factor. Quaker manumissions seem to 
have had an influence on Long Island. 
90
  
On Long Island, about one of every six inhabitants fled. The state legislature deprived 
many Loyalists of civil rights, attainting some, depriving others of voting rights; a violation of 
the spirit if not the letter of the peace treaty.   The exile of many leading citizens, and the 
republican and democratic ethos that had swept and were continuing to sweep the colonies, 
finally reached the southern district of New York.  New people, new names, and new families 
began to be elected to local and state wide offices. The oligarchic control of a few families in 
Long Island towns began to broken. The governor of the state was considered a “new man”, 
who would probably not have reached such a height if there had not been a revolution. While 
Loyalist estates such as those of Frederick Philipse were forfeited and broken up, other great 
estates remained; the tenancy system would last until the 1840s.
91
  
The district had suffered greatly during the war. Rather unfairly, shortly after the war, a 
tax was imposed on the area by the state legislature, because they allegedly had not 
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contributed to the war effort.  The trees slowly recovered from their devastation, and the 
returning refugees sought compensation from the British. They were generally unsuccessful, 
but much of our information on the actions of the British and Hessian troops comes from the 
documents and affidavits they prepared in connection with these attempts. The Blydenburgh 
Manuscript, discussed in an earlier chapter, is one of these documents.
92
 
 
The Earl of Carlisle became the viceroy of Ireland in 1780, and later became a strong 
supporter of the war against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.  He became the guardian of 
the great Romantic poet, Lord Byron, who later satirized him in a poem. William Smith, Jr. 
became the Chief Justice of Canada, while Thomas Jones spent a few years in exile in Britain 
before penning his acerbic history. Robertson spent his final years quietly back in Britain. 
Germain became the Viscount of Sackville, dying in 1785. General Howe after the inconclusive 
Parliamentary inquiry saw some limited action in the French Revolutionary wars. Historians still 
debate his actions during the Revolutionary War. His brother served with distinction in 
European actions during the Revolution and in the French Revolutionary wars. General Sir 
Henry Clinton served in Parliament and in several distinguished posts, and blamed Cornwallis 
for the disaster at Yorktown. 
The spies of the Revolution faded into obscurity until their secrets were uncovered in 
the 1930s. John Graves Simcoe, who had penned what may have been America’s first valentine 
to Sally Townsend, became the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada in the 1790s, and is 
considered one of the founders of Canada.   Sally Townsend, unbeknownst to Simcoe, was the 
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sister of America’s top spy, Robert Townsend, and probably a bit of a spy herself. She died 
unmarried in the 1840s, despite the great beauty she is said to have possessed. The valentine 
was found amongst her possessions after her death. 
Banastre Tarleton, who had taken many items from the inn at Smithtown, and burned 
down two villages in Westchester that refused to cooperate in their plunder, later served in 
South Carolina.   Here he gained a reputation for ruthlessness, such that the term “Tarleton’s 
Quarter” became synonymous for “No Quarter.” He later served in Parliament, where he 
became well-known for supporting the slave trade. Benedict Arnold went to Canada for a few 
years, engaged in business dealings involving the West Indies, and eventually moved to Britain 
where he died.  His important role in the Battle of Saratoga was eventually honored by a statue; 
because of his later treason, the statue was of a boot, and the person honored was not named 
(Arnold had been wounded in the leg during the battle). Benjamin Thompson, the builder of 
Fort Golgotha, gained a reputation as a scientist and gained the title Count Rumford.  Fort 
Golgotha was eventually dismantled, and the hill where it stood became once again a 
graveyard, and remains so to this day.   
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I 
 
 
Before concluding this work, let us briefly summarize it. The Imperial Crisis was triggered 
in the mid-1760s by a dispute over the right of Parliament to tax Americans.  Most Americans, 
including many who eventually became Loyalists, believed that Parliament did not have the 
right to do that. This was basically a constitutional question, and could probably have been 
solved by giving the Americans some say in determining the taxes they had to pay.
1
 A broad-
based protest against the Stamp Act and other British-imposed taxes began. Resistance took a 
form ranging from formal motions by colonial assemblies respectfully outlining their differences 
with British policy to violent street actions.  New York was a fairly reluctant participant in these 
activities.  
Of New York’s two main political factions, the great merchants, who had many 
commercial and other ties with Britain, tended to be cautious in their opposition to British 
policy, while the great landlord faction strongly supported the anti-British movement, and 
eventually independence. The rather conservative, elite-based political system of New York was 
altered and destroyed by the Patriot movement. A new faction, the Sons of Liberty arose, that 
represented a rising group of newly-rich merchants as well as the “mechanicks”, the working 
class of New York. There was a general consensus among all three factions that the British 
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Parliament did not have the right to impose taxes on the Americans. The factions differed 
mainly on stridency and methods, with the Sons of Liberty the most strident and most likely to 
prefer violent street actions or political vandalism.  
British intransigence and provocative actions such as the various “Tea Parties” led to 
actions by the British which appeared tyrannical, such as the Intolerable Acts. It did not help 
that many of the Livingstons were Real Whigs, a political tendency which argued that those 
with power are constantly seeking to enlarge it and for vigilance against tyrannical actions—the 
Intolerable Acts only confirmed them in their beliefs.  A system of committees, often chosen by 
local governments, began to develop to coordinate the anti-British movement. These 
committees began taking on governmental powers, and provincial and Continental congresses 
arose from the committees.  The Continental and provincial congresses began to move in the 
direction of armed conflict with Great Britain.  Many Patriots, opposed to this direction, left the 
movement, becoming Loyalists. In New York and other colonies the provincial congresses began 
to take control of the government, and in New York and other colonies the governor fled the 
capital and tried to govern from onboard a British ship. 
Even after fighting began, the movement was not necessarily a movement for 
independence.  There was a long Anglo-American tradition of violent action and even armed 
rebellion whose purpose was not independence or the overthrow of the government, but to 
force the government to do what the rebels saw as sensible or constitutional. But the British 
and the King refused to listen, and the King declared the Americans to be rebels. The 
Americans, who believed the King was the guarantor of their liberties, felt betrayed, and their 
loyalty and love began to turn to hate. An influential pamphlet, Common Sense, ridiculed the 
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whole notion of monarchy, and argued for independence. Independence was eventually 
declared by the Continental Congress, and the revolutionary government of New York, which 
had been in virtual control of the province for months, reluctantly declared independence. This 
news was greeted by symbolic acts of regicide, such as the destruction of King George’s 
equestrian statue in New York City. 
Southern New York was soon occupied by the British, who remained there until the very 
end of the war in November, 1783.   While in many ways a mild occupation, there were enough 
appalling incidents and breakdowns of law and order as to alienate many Loyalists and make 
the task of restoring loyalty difficult. Churches and graveyards were desecrated; while some of 
this was military necessity, some may have been done from spite. The Carlisle Commission and 
others believed that restoring civilian government in the British-controlled territory would have 
many beneficial attempts, such as signaling that Britain desired not tyranny but liberty in its 
colonies. An attempt to restore civilian rule in the British zone was thwarted by military 
opposition (particularly that of General Clinton).  It is arguable that this was a major lost 
opportunity for the British; this will be discussed below. 
 
 
II 
 
The basic question of this work was stated in the introduction thusly: 
 
Would the restoration by the British of full civilian government have had the 
beneficial effects the British desired from it? Would it have returned large 
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numbers of individuals, counties, colonies, or regions back to British allegiance, or 
was the attempt too late to have any such effect? If the latter, at what point was 
reconciliation not possible, and what factors made this failure to achieve 
reconciliation more likely? 
 
One way at looking at the idea of restoring civilian government is to look at it as 
an attempt to restore loyalty.  Restoring civilian government would, it was believed, 
showcase the benefits of remaining in the empire,  and highlight to the Americans that 
it was not Britain’s desire to create a tyranny, but to create free provinces within the 
British Empire, to restore the blessings of liberty and the British Constitution to the 
rebellious provinces.  This, it was hoped and believed, would bring many Americans 
back to “their former allegiance.” If one wishes to evaluate the success or failure of an 
attempt to restore loyalty, then one must understand how that loyalty was gained—and 
how it was lost.  One must also understand the factors that drove the actors, what their 
interests and beliefs were. Hence, before discussing the question of restoring civilian 
government, this work examined the history of colonial New York, the factions of New 
York, and the break with Britain in New York.    
Loyalty to a king is not “natural”—it must be taught and encouraged. This is 
especially so in a colony such as New York, where many of the colonists were a 
conquered people, and many of the rest come from a suspect religious minority.  Many 
methods, detailed above, were used to turn the inhabitants into loyal subjects. By the 
mid-eighteenth century, these efforts had borne fruit, and many Americans and New 
Yorkers were quite fond of the king. What is more, he was seen as the guarantor of the 
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people’s liberties. His name and the word “Liberty” was sewn together on flags flown 
from liberty poles.    
He was more than a guarantor of liberty—he was the leader of a vast trans-Atlantic 
(indeed, worldwide) trading empire from which many New Yorkers benefitted greatly. There 
were those who benefitted directly from this, while there were others where the benefit 
seemed more abstract—indeed who found the British connection constraining.   The economic 
and other interests of New Yorkers greatly influenced the path New York took towards 
independence, and the positions individuals took. To help understand the loss of loyalty of 
many New Yorkers, as well as its retention by others, this work examined the nature of its  
factions,  as well as the various divisions to be found in rural regions such as Long Island. This is 
briefly summarized below. 
 
Colonial New York at the end of the French and Indian War was dominated politically by 
two factions, representing the interests of two great economic elites: the Livingstons, who 
represented the landed interest, and the Delanceys who represented the interests of the great 
merchants. Both factions would seek to gain the favor of other groups, and would constantly 
jockey for power. Ideologically, both groups may be classified as Whigs, believers in what would 
become known as liberalism, in the principles of 1688, and in constitutionalism.   
Whigs believed that property and liberty were inextricably linked. Property gave one 
independence and hence liberty. Indeed, the whole purpose of men “entering into Society” was 
to create a government that would preserve property. A tax imposed without one’s consent 
was a seizure of property, of one’s independence, of one’s liberty.   Many Whigs would argue 
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that such an action was tyrannical, though they might differ as to the appropriate response. The 
Livingstons came from the more extreme branch of the Whig continuum. They were “Real 
Whigs”, and they believed that those in power would constantly try to expand their power 
beyond its lawful limits. Thus, one had to be constantly vigilant against those in power. A Real 
Whig was thus sensitive—perhaps overly sensitive—to the actions of government. Even an 
innocent-seeming action could, to a Real Whig, be the harbinger of tyranny. 
2
     
The Delanceys for the most part were not Real Whigs, and while they opposed the 
Stamp Act and similar taxes, resisted any characterization of British actions as tyrannical or of 
the Empire as a tyranny.
3
  Much of their trade was with Britain, and they saw the Empire as a 
vast trading network. Their personal fortunes would have been directly threatened by a break 
between American and Britain and the disruption it would cause.  They thus were a moderating 
influence in the Imperial Crisis.   In general, they worked for reconciliation and opposed 
measures they thought would worsen the situation. In the various committees of 1774-76, they 
played a major role, even dominating important revolutionary committees. 
4
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 The landed interest was thus the more revolutionary or radical of the two traditional factions. While they had an 
affinity for English lifestyles, their direct connections to England were often slight. The Livingstons were much less 
likely to suffer direct harm from a break or even temporary breach with Britain than the great merchants. This of 
course assumes that no full-scale social revolution occurred concurrent with a political revolution. Then, the 
Livingstons would probably have been the targets of land-reform measures (at the very least) by their tenants.  The 
Delanceys, however were risking the entire trading system from which their wealth derived when they opposed 
Britain, and they suffered real economic losses with the various boycotts. Despite this, they would often go along 
with such boycotts. It should also be noted that, as discussed earlier in the text, that some of the Delancey leaders 
would curry favor with the “common people” by mixing with them in the common people’s taverns. The 
Livingstons rarely did that. Rather ironically, the more elitist-seeming of the two elite factions was the one that 
tended to support independence when the time came 
So, in New York, there was arguably a rather confounding situation. The great landlords, generally a 
conservative group in many polities (in the sense of wanting to keep things the same as much as possible), were 
actually rather radical and would be among those who led the province to independence.  Merchants are also 
often quite conservative, but for much of the next century, in many countries some often believed that revolution 
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As discussed above, the two-faction system based on economic interests which had 
dominated the province for decades was joined in the Stamp Act Crisis by a new faction which 
represented not only a new economic interest but a determined opposition to British tax 
policies. The Sons of Liberty (also known as the Liberty Boys) were lead by newly-rich 
merchants many of whom had started out in the “working class”, gaining their fortunes in the 
French and Indian War, and often engaged in a “North-South” with the West Indies or other 
colonies, rather than with England. Their commercial activities thus differed from the “East-
West” trade with Britain that the Delanceys mainly engaged in, and they were thus much less 
vulnerable to direct economic harm from boycotts or a break with England than the Delanceys. 
Coming out of the working class, they understood its concerns and language, and often lead 
mobs and groups composed of the “common” people. This gave them an advantage over both 
elite factions in appealing to the common people.  Despite their wealth, by virtue of their 
plebian origins, the leaders of the Liberty Boys were not quite accepted into the elite.  
Therefore, unlike the other factions, they were in many ways not an elite group. They desired a 
more egalitarian, meritocratic society, one with more democracy. They differed thus from the 
more classical republican ideas of the Livingstons and Delanceys. They were more strident in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(against the remnants of feudalism or a mother country) was in their best interests. Not so in New York. Here 
revolution and rebellion was against their interests. Surprisingly, sometimes revolution or rebellion is actually the 
best way to maintain the status quo—or seems to be. In a colonial revolt, the local elite leadership (or elements of 
it) may revolt against the mother country to preserve their privileges and positions if they think they are 
threatened by the mother country.  Arguably, this happened in New York. Similarly, Robert A Gross argues that the 
people of Concord, Massachusetts had “gone to war not to promote change but to stop it…They rose in fury 
against the assault on their autonomy, and at the peak of the Revolutionary movement they were attached more 
strongly than ever to the ideals and values of the past. They would restore order to their lives by clinging to 
custom---and making revolution.”  Gross, 190. He goes on to say, however, that “the strains of war deflated their 
hopes.” The American Revolution, at least in New York, was a most conservative revolution.  However, the elite of 
New York split on this issue; unlike the landed elite, the merchant elite believed that staying with the mother 
country would be the best way to preserve their positions.  Hence, many of them chose not to rebel, and would 
find themselves on the Loyalist side of the ledger.  
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their opposition, and more inclined to direct action and symbolism, such as riots, liberty poles, 
and acts of political vandalism such as the New York Tea Party. 
The Livingstons in this political continuum seem almost to have been the moderates. 
The Delanceys shied away from armed rebellion and independence, and the Liberty Boys 
moved towards them. The Livingstons moved towards independence to preserve their 
privileges and rights, which they saw as threatened by the British.  But, they did not desire the 
more egalitarian society the Liberty Boys desired.  The Livingstons dominated the new state’s 
government. Perhaps influenced by classical republicanism, they produced a constitution for 
New York that limited the people’s power, with many checks and balances.  
The maneuverings, actions, and ideologies of the various factions affected both the pace 
and nature of both the movement towards independence, and the nature of the permanent 
government that was formed after independence for decades (the Constitution of 1777 was in 
effect until the 1820s). While the Imperial Crisis was at first merely another issue the elite 
factions could use to jockey for power, it soon began to morph into something out of the 
ordinary run of political disputes, out of the ordinary factional give and take. The Sons of Liberty 
in New York and elsewhere constantly pushed the movement in a more radical, less 
accomodationist direction.  The factional dispute between merchants and the landed was 
subsumed by the split between Loyalists and Patriots. Soon, the Patriots were running a war 
with Britain, and eventually declared independence.  Those who disagreed with the Patriot 
position were under suspicion, had their arms confiscated, and were occasionally arrested. This 
was far beyond ordinary politics; it was revolutionary. Indeed, many Loyalists thought it was 
mob rule—or even tyranny.   
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When discussing Loyalists and Patriots, one important point should be stressed, and 
bears repeating. Both the Patriots and Loyalists were Whigs. Most Loyalists were distressed by 
Britain’s policy of imposing taxes that most Americans considered unconstitutional, and with 
Britain’s failure to understand what the Americans thought were legitimate complaints against 
the policy. The difference between the two groups was stridency, protest methods, and how far 
each side was willing to go.  The Patriots found themselves willing to go as far as armed 
rebellion to change the British government’s mind. When that failed, they found that they were 
willing to take the final step and declare independence. Those who became Loyalists wanted to 
change British policy through persuasion and the ordinary processes of colonial governance, 
such as Assembly resolutions and lobbying through colonial agents. Many disliked the 
committees even where they were appointed by town meetings, as they were “a thing 
unknown to the constitution.”   
While Loyalists had many interests tying them to Britain, it is also probable that they 
could not break the emotional and other ties that bound them to the monarch. When push 
came to shove, they chose the British Empire and the King. But, as the later actions of the 
Loyalist refugees in Canada and elsewhere showed, at the same time, they believed in liberty, 
and they pushed the regions where they settled towards that. Liberty was their desire, and this 
they believed could best be accomplished within the Empire. Georgia, it may be argued, 
showed that both were possible, and that liberty could be had within the Empire and under the 
rule of the King. Had civilian government been restored in New York, it could also have shown 
that.    
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 The reality and intenseness of the emotional bond many felt to the King and the Empire 
is evidenced by the many who remained Loyalist, as well as by those who became rebels. The 
attacks on symbolic targets such as statues and effigies of the king, as well as on those who 
remained loyal, helps show the intensity of the feeling that had been overthrown by those who 
chose the Patriot side. Love had turned to hate.  
In the rural counties surrounding New York, local factors were quite important in 
determining whether the area was mainly Loyalist or Patriot. Economic ties to New York City 
seem to have influenced  some counties to be basically Loyalist, as did a high degree of slave 
ownership, or a desire to remain a distinct community (such as with the Dutch). Those areas 
with fewer direct ties to New York City, or with a cultural affinity to New England (such as 
Suffolk County) were more likely to be Patriot. Similar to events in New York City, after news of 
the Intolerable Acts arrived, in most of the towns of the rural regions committees were formed 
to coordinate the protests against British actions. Showing the rather conservative nature of 
the Revolution, for the most part these committees were usually formed by legal town 
meetings. Despite this seeming legal imprimatur, virtually each committee in each town was 
faced with a written protest, usually published in a newspaper, signed by a sizable number of 
citizens denouncing the committees as extra-constitutional, among other things.  These 
committees would form the revolutionary structure that would lead the way to independence 
and the eventual establishment of more permanent governments. This is quite remarkable: the 
revolutionary government, at least in New York, grew out of committees which in many places 
were formed by elements of the officially recognized government. 
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Two other groups should be mentioned: tenants and the workers. Tenants often 
resented their lords, and if their lord was Patriot, they would often become Loyalists. The 
“mechanicks” and other artisans (the working class of eighteenth century New York, 
concentrated mainly in the City) tended to support the Patriot cause, accepting many of its 
ideological arguments and accepting the leadership of the Sons of Liberty, many of whom had 
risen from their ranks. They also had their own agenda; they wanted more political power in 
New York, and the Revolutionary movement with its multiplicity of positions was one way to 
get it. They hoped for a more democratic constitution than was actually produced, and their 
pleas to submit it to the people were ignored.  
Lastly, many made no choice, but remained unaffiliated. The number of unaffiliated, of 
neutrals, may have actually increased as the war went on, as Kim suggests in regards to 
Westchester. And there were those who either from a lack of conviction or from necessity, 
“trimmed” as the winds blew, depending on who controlled their area. And for those who 
chose Patriotism or Loyalism, while economic, philosophical, religious, ethnic, or other 
considerations would in general indicate what choice an individual would make, it was an 
individual choice.  The choice was individual and idiosyncratic, depending on a myriad of 
conditions.  Many whose background would indicate that they would probably be Patriots 
could not bring themselves to break with the Mother Country, and there were Patriots among 
those one would assume would be Loyalists.  
Having examined the development of New York’s political system, and the long 
complicated process by which loyalty was lost, the work then turned to the attempt to restore 
loyalty and to win the hearts and minds of Americans through the establishment of civilian 
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government in New York. Let us briefly review this attempt and the reasons for its failure. We 
shall also attempt to answer certain subsidiary questions, such as the question of the effects of 
personality, mistaken assumptions, the effect of some appalling (if not atrocious) behavior by  
occupation troops and officers,  and perhaps most fundamentally, the question of timing. 
 
III 
 
As detailed above, French intervention totally changed the nature of the war for the 
British. The colonies were now a secondary front, and the sugar-rich West Indies had priority 
for troop deployment over them. Faced with a world war, Britain tried to achieve peace with 
the Americans, dispatching a peace commission authorized to concede virtually everything 
except independence. Arriving in Philadelphia in time to see it evacuated, it was met with 
contempt.  However, from the ashes of the failed mission arose at least in part a new “counter-
insurgency” strategy. As part of this strategy, civilian government was to be restored to British-
controlled New York.   
The man chosen for this position was General James Robertson, a staff officer with 
much experience in New York. Robertson arrived in New York in 1780 and attempted to restore 
civilian government. However, before Robertson could fully restore civilian government, the 
commanding military officer General Sir Henry Clinton had to declare southern New York “at 
the King’s Peace”. While the region was subject to raids, the region was overall peaceful and 
secure. Despite this, Clinton failed to issue the required declaration. There were several reasons 
for this, ranging from a legitimate military concern to preserve the army’s freedom of action, to 
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a desire to avoid claims against the army for unpaid goods.  But perhaps the most important 
reason was the difficulty, if not inability, Clinton had in sharing authority; a difficulty that his 
biographer believes was neurotic. In 1782, a few months after the disastrous British defeat at 
Yorktown, there was one final attempt at restoring civilian government. The general consensus 
was that the time was not right, and the attempt was abandoned. Robertson returned home in 
the spring of 1783, and southern New York was evacuated by the British a few months later.  
Only then was civilian government fully restored—by the Americans, not the British. 
5
 
 In many ways, restoring civilian government was an excellent idea. The British prided 
themselves on their liberty, and had no desire to be tyrants; indeed in some ways the whole 
colonial dispute could be boiled down to the question as to whether the British were acting as 
tyrants or not. The British would strenuously argue that they were not tyrants, nor did they 
have any desire to be tyrants. Restoring civilian government in a portion of a major province 
could go a long way to proving that, and perhaps restore many Americans to allegiance to the 
Crown. 
What would have happened if Clinton had acquiesced in 1780 and allowed civilian 
government to be restored? If there had been none of the impediments to restoring civilian 
government that there actually were, if civilian government had been restored, if courts had 
functioned in accordance with civilian rules and the ancient liberties and rights of Englishmen, if 
an Assembly had been formed and granted the King a revenue as a free gift, and performed all 
the other functions of a free assembly, would it have had the desired positive effects? Would 
thousands, dazzled by the gleaming example of restored British liberty in one of the most 
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important colonies, have flocked to join them? Would thousands of Loyalist volunteers have 
arisen to garrison regions, thus freeing up the British and Hessian regular troops to “liberate” 
more territory from the “Usurpers”?  Would areas or counties or entire provinces have 
clamored to return to British rule? Could this restoration have led to British victory over the 
Americans, or at the very least to southern New York and perhaps other areas remaining within 
the Empire when peace was declared? 
It is highly probable that in 1780, such an outcome was extremely unlikely. Restoration 
may very well have made southern New York’s occupation far pleasanter for southern New 
Yorkers, but it is unlikely it would have had any of the beneficial effects the British wished it 
would have had.  The time was just too late.  
Consider the following.  Two years earlier, in 1778, the Carlisle Commission had 
presented extremely generous peace terms to the Americans, granting virtually every American 
demand except independence. In the summer of 1778, the Americans had a powerful new ally, 
France, and the Carlisle Commission arrived just in time to see the British evacuate 
Philadelphia. British fortunes were at perhaps their lowest point of the war. The peace 
proposals of the Carlisle Commission were, under these circumstances, met with contempt. In 
many respects, in 1778 the Americans held the upper hand, and under such circumstances they 
would not give up independence for even the highly favorable terms offered by the British. 
In 1780 and much of 1781, while the British situation was slightly improved from 1778, 
not much had truly changed. The British, having consolidated their forces, had re-launched 
offensive operations by seeking to “liberate” the South, and nearly succeeded in taking West 
Point through Benedict Arnold’s treachery.  For a few months in 1781, it seemed the British 
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were on the verge of conquering the entire Deep South. A royal government operated in 
Georgia, and had one also operated in New York, it may have had a strong effect on the war-
weary and waiverers.   At the same time, however, bitter partisan warfare in both the north 
and the south continued, showing the resolve of many to not return to British rule. If the British 
had managed to hold onto the South and had crushed the American army, then perhaps 
returning to the Empire may have seemed an option to some. But, the Americans in 1780 and 
1781 were still allies of France. This reduced the size of the force Britain could devote to the 
war in America, as they had to divert forces to other theatres, and also gave the Americans 
naval support.     In short, while the American situation in 1780 and 1781 may not have been as 
good as in 1778, it had not changed enough to alter the fundamental situation. Short of 
crushing defeat, the Americans would not return to their former loyalties. A restored civilian 
administration in New York may have had propaganda value, but probably not enough to have 
materially changed things.  
After Yorktown, of course, the possibility of military defeat of the Americans seemed 
remote. While raids and bitter partisan actions continued, the war was winding down. The 1782 
attempt to restore civilian government seemed senseless even to many who had earlier pushed 
for civilian government. Had a civilian government been restored in 1782, it would only have 
lasted a few months before the region was abandoned to American control. Had civilian 
government been restored in 1782, it would not have changed anything; the restored 
government would have been at best an historical curiosity.  
It seems clear in hindsight that by the 1780s, the attempt to restore civilian government 
was just too late. This is not to argue that it should not have been tried; it was an enlightened 
420 
 
policy well-worth the effort. Not only would it have provided better government for those in 
the British zone, but it would have had some propaganda value, and perhaps drawn a few 
Americans to the British side. If the British had achieved military success, the example of New 
York may have helped a sullen Patriot population reconcile themselves to their defeat. And 
there are plausible scenarios where the United States achieved independence, but where lower 
New York and possibly other areas (such as Georgia) remained British.   In such a case, a 
functioning civilian-run Royal New York, complete with an assembly, may have helped Britain 
retain the area (perhaps even formally petitioning to remain). So, there were many upsides to 
the effort, and the British were right to attempt it. If not a tragedy, it was still unfortunate from 
the British point of view that the attempt was aborted. 
If the 1780s were too late, would an earlier time have been better? The short answer is 
no. In the American Revolution, as in many wars and revolutions, a point was reached where 
proposals that might previously have been acceptable and have defused the crisis (or ended the 
war) were no longer acceptable. Changing circumstances may foreclose options previously 
acceptable. At a certain point, certain options, once reasonable, become out of the question. 
This point for America was independence. Before that, proposals such as the British offered in 
1778 might have been acceptable. After that, they were the proverbial “day late and a dollar 
short.” After independence was declared, anything short of independence was unacceptable to 
many Americans. Restored civilian government in a major province would have done nothing to 
change that.   
In brief review, in 1763, the overwhelming majority of Americans were satisfied with 
British rule. The Stamp Act shook this satisfaction, but the desire to remain connected with 
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Britain seems to have been strong. What was desired was some form of “taxation with 
representation”. Rather than come to some kind of accommodation, such as American 
representatives in Parliament or a Continental assembly, Britain insisted that its Parliament had 
the right to tax Americans; some even insisted that the American colonies were “virtually 
represented” in Parliament. Years of frustration with this impasse resulted in the Boston Tea 
Party. The British reaction to this, the Intolerable Acts, was seen as tyrannical, and many joined 
in the protests. By the spring of 1775, the situation had resulted in open fighting between 
Americans and Britain. But even at this point, many longed for reconciliation, and pinned their 
hopes on the king. In July—a month after the bloody Battle of Bunker Hill—the Olive Branch 
petition was sent to the king in the hopes of negotiating a peaceful sentiment. 
In late December 1775, many Americans still clung to their loyalty to the King, despite 
the fact that American blood had been shed by the British in such battles as Lexington-Concord 
and Bunker Hill. But reconciliation was still possible. Many longed for it. A hint of compromise, 
any gesture of reconciliation, of a desire to find a compromise that gave America a place at the 
table, might have averted full-scale war and independence. Instead, news arrived in January, 
1776 that the king rejected their professions of loyalty and considered them rebels seeking 
independence. He would crush them, and was willing to hire foreign troops to do so. 
Americans felt betrayed. The king who was supposed to guarantee their liberty was 
seeking instead to extinguish it, and was even hiring foreign troops to do so. The fig-leaf had 
fallen; they were at war not with the King’s ministers but with the King himself. Love and bonds 
of loyalty to the king began to turn to hate. At this moment, Tom Paine’s pamphlet Common 
Sense was released, mocking and ridiculing the very notion of monarchy.  Paine even argued 
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that God Himself was opposed to monarchy. Many Americans began to cross the psychological 
“Rubicon” of independence, as their love and loyalty for the king became hatred and ridicule. A 
few months later, the country as a whole crossed the political Rubicon of independence. When 
this happened, the King was symbolically decapitated, hung, burned in effigy, and otherwise 
executed throughout the newly-independent states. And not just the king was attacked; for in 
the months preceding independence, those who still clung to their loyalty, the Loyalists, were 
harassed, arrested, and otherwise affronted and endangered. To Patriots, they were the king’s 
proxies—and the hate they now held for the king was expressed against the Loyalists. As the 
war continued, and even after, the hatred for the King, the hatred for the Loyalists, would 
result in savage fighting and ill-treatment of Loyalists. 
6
  
The final months of 1775, therefore, were probably the last chance for a peaceful 
reconciliation between the two sides. Once the King’s rejection of the Americans became 
known, once Tom Paine’s words fell upon the now receptive soil of American minds and 
poisoned many Americans against the very concept of monarchy, reconciliation was almost 
impossible, even if the British had been inclined to offer it. Love and loyalty for the king were 
replaced by hatred and ridicule. And something else was happening. The Americans, as South 
Carolina historian David Ramsey noted in 1789, were no longer subjects, but becoming citizens, 
and  
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…the difference is immense. Subject is derived from the latin words, sub and 
jacio, and means one who is under the power of another: but a citizen is a unit of 
a mass of free people, who, collectively, possess sovereignty. Subjects look up to 
a master, but citizens are so far equal, that none have hereditary rights superior 
to others.
7
     
 
 
 
In short, a subject is subjected to the rule of another, while a citizen rules himself—
though this sovereignty is shared with the other free citizens of his polity. The Americans during 
the Revolution had at the very least begun this internal transition from subjects to citizens, and 
some had completed it. John Adams was astonished at the suddenness of the change, as 
“Idolatry to Monarchs, and servility to Aristocratical Pride” was swiftly eliminated.
8
    Once an 
American had become a citizen, could he willingly go back to being a subject? Once he had 
been a free citizen, could he return to being subjected to the rule of another? The answer 
became apparent that for many Americans, the answer was no. Even if they had to “trim”, even 
if they signed loyalty oaths to the king, many switched back to the American side as soon as 
possible. Hence, nothing short of crushing military victory could have induced free, 
independent, self-ruling American citizens to become subjects to the rule of a king they felt had 
betrayed their trust and love. Even then, such a rule would have been tentative at best. Many 
Britons and Loyalists came to the conclusion that such rule would last only a few short years, 
and that rebellion would re-occur at some point. Such a victory would have required many 
soldiers and sailors to enforce, would have likely ended in another revolt, and the “peace” 
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would perhaps have been punctuated by violent episodes. Such a victory would not have been 
worth the cost. 
9
   
Compromise solutions acceptable to both sides may have been possible. The Galloway 
Plan and many other plans that would have preserved British rule and given the American 
colonies a voice in their own affairs were proposed before and during the war. Britain 
eventually developed a dominion system which accomplished the same thing for other 
colonies. While the dominions are in the early twenty-first century functionally independent 
(and have been for decades), this process was gradual and for the most part “paper-strewn”, 
not violent. To this day the Queen is the ultimate head of state of the dominions, and Canadian 
coins and stamps, for example, bear the Queen’s image. Such reconciliation could have 
occurred in America. But timing is everything. Solutions acceptable in 1765 or 1770 or 1774 or 
1775 would not have been acceptable after July 4, 1776—indeed, it is unlikely that the 
Americans would have accepted such a plan in April or May, 1776. They hated the king, and 
were becoming self-ruling citizens, not subjects. As John Adams said many years later, “The 
Revolution was effected before the War commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and 
hearts of the people…”
10
 
Thus, it was unlikely—no, impossible—that the British after July 4, 1776 could have 
devised any acceptable plan to peacefully re-unite the colonies with the Empire, or for that 
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matter to turn large amounts of Patriots and non-aligned into Loyalists. Only crushing military 
defeat might have brought the Americans to the table. Such a defeat of the Americans never 
occurred. Instead, the British lost two armies, one at Saratoga and one at Yorktown, and the 
war. 
 
 
IV 
 
 
British policy towards their rebellious colonists, including the restoration of civilian 
government in New York, was in many ways based on mistaken assumptions. British 
misassumptions made the restoration policy seem more promising than it was.  If one’s 
assumptions are wrong, actions based on those assumptions may very well turn out to be 
wrong as well. The most important misassumption was their misassumption as to the loyalty of 
the local population. The British received a constant stream of questionable information, all of 
which reinforced their erroneous preconceptions concerning the loyalties of the people. 
The British did not realize the extent of dissatisfaction with Britain. While there were 
many Loyalists in America, they were not the majority. Indeed, one scholar put the number at 
no more than 20 percent. In the mid-seventies, there was broad dissatisfaction with British 
policies, even among those who would soon be known as Loyalists. As discussed above, 
disputes between the Loyalists and Patriots groups were at first mainly over methods and tone. 
Loyalists were opposed to the use of committees and meetings, and were appalled at the 
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language that many resolutions contained, such as calling British actions tyrannical.  In many 
towns they issued their own documents, finding the meetings unconstitutional and the 
congresses an insult to the lawful, Constitutional government. Many seemed to want to be on 
record as opposing all of these actions. Perhaps fearful of a British crackdown, they registered 
their protests, so that it would be clear that they had nothing to do with their neighbors’ 
actions, and had in fact opposed them.  Oyster Bay even declared at one point that they 
“wanted nothing to do with congresses and committees”.  It is also probable that the Loyalists 
feared that the disruption of dissent and revolution would threaten their property and destroy 
civil order. But the Patriot movement began to move in a direction that could—and did—lead 
to armed resistance. This expanded the Loyalist ranks, as some, appalled at this, left the Patriot 
movement.  It was from the Loyalists that the British got much of their information about 
colonial attitudes.  As the war continued, they received information from Loyalists such as 
Galloway and others, British officials considered American experts such as Robertson, and the 
reports of spies. All argued that most Americans were Loyalists.  They may very well have 
believed this, but it must be noted that such an argument was very much in their own self-
interest. 
The information the British received reinforced their preconceptions. They expected 
most Americans to be loyal, and the information they received from their sources all indicated 
that most Americans were. Reports of war-weariness were misinterpreted to match these 
preconceptions. The evident fact that a sizable number of Americans opposed them enough to 
go to war was discounted by considering the rebellion to be by a small group of “Usurpers” who 
had gained power in the colonies.  Perhaps an expansion of their information sources, or a 
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more skeptical attitude towards at least some of them, might have helped to give them a better 
picture of the number of Loyalists and Patriots. But as it was, the British were in a vast echo 
chamber, only hearing what they wanted and expected to hear. 
Loyalists such as Galloway and Smith seemed incapable of realizing the extent of 
hostility to the British. Confined for much of the war to British-controlled areas, they lost 
whatever “feel” they might once have had for public opinion in the unoccupied areas.  Spies like 
Mr. Heron mistook war-weariness for Loyalism. And the British did not seem to understand the 
phenomenon of “trimming”.   In New Jersey, on Long Island, in Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, 
many signed loyalty oaths. Many of these were no doubt trimmers, trying to protect their 
families and property by declaring loyalty to the occupiers. Many of these would renounce 
these oaths as soon as they felt safe to do so. Some Britons, such as Carlisle and Serle, began to 
sense the truth. Carlisle saw how those who had recently signed oaths of loyalty to the king had 
returned to fighting him as the tide turned in Pennsylvania. He realized that for many, declaring 
loyalty to the Crown was merely expediency. Carlisle in private wrote that “the common people 
hate us in their heart”.  He kept this opinion private, and joined in arguments for a policy that 
would help win hearts and minds. Whether he thought that would work is questionable, but 
perhaps he thought the effort was worthwhile.   
If the British assumptions as to the numbers of Loyalists were wrong, their estimates as 
to the numbers of Patriots were also wrong. Many British believed small groups of “Usurpers” 
were leading the colonists. Every colony had its “ins” and “outs”, groups of families and 
individuals, who would fight for power in the colonial assemblies and governments. It was 
believed that a “cabal” of some of the “out” factions had used the dispute to curry favor with 
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the common people and gain control of power in the colonies. They had disarmed their foes, 
and declared independence. This belief explains some of the “reforms” of the colonies 
suggested by Serle and Robertson among others. It was thought that by multiplying offices and 
places of honor, by granting titles, by increasing patronage opportunities in the colonies, the 
hunger for office, power, and distinction that had led to the armed conflict could be satisfied. 
The Revolution was thus reduced to a coup by a cabal of disappointed office seekers.  The 
solution to this, it was argued, was to replicate the patronage-based system of Britain as much 
as possible in the colonies.  
Needless to say, this view of the causes of the Revolution ignores the many ideals and 
beliefs in rights that helped animate the Revolutionaries. While the Revolutionaries were not 
immune to the desire for honors and distinction, there was more to the Revolution than a 
desire for office. And even on that level, the Revolution greatly increased offices and brought 
new men into politics. For example, offices usually held by British officers, such as 
governorships, were now held by Americans. People from lower down the economic or social 
scale were in government. It is unlikely that George Clinton, while he may have achieved some 
local distinction, would ever have become governor of a royal New York. Mordecai Sheftall and 
the carpenters and other workers of Savannah would probably never have held the power they 
did in a non-revolutionary situation. 
 The British believed there were more Loyalists than there actually were, and fewer 
Patriots. They misunderstood the motives that animated the Patriots, reducing what the 
Patriots believed was a struggle for freedom into a struggle for office and distinction.   Thus 
they proposed increasing offices and patronage as a partial solution for the Revolution. In their 
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overestimation of the number of Loyalists and gross underestimation of the number of Patriots, 
and of their motives, the British displayed an appalling misunderstanding of the Revolution and 
what was animating the rebellious Americans.  
There were more Patriots than Loyalists, but many in the colonies could be considered 
non-aligned. The Quakers, for example, accepted the rule of the British as accepted authority 
and acquiesced to their rule when Quaker-dominated regions such as the island of Rhode Island 
were conquered, but they were in general non-aligned (with obvious exceptions such as “The 
Fighting Quaker”, Nathaniel Greene).  And in regions such as Westchester, many probably 
escaped into what historian Sung Bok Kim calls “privatism”, a political apathy and non-concern 
about the war and Revolution.  But the Americans were able to put much larger armies and 
militias in the field than the Loyalists, and that a sizable number of Americans supported the 
Revolution cannot be doubted. This was not an uprising by a cabal of “Usurpers” overthrowing 
their governments so that they could rule; the Revolution was a broad-based movement 
supported by, if not a majority, a substantial part of the population.   
Their misconceptions greatly harmed the British cause. The British were slow to 
recognize the need to win back the loyalty and love, the hearts and minds, of the Americans; 
the British thought they already had them, for the most part. Hence measures which could 
arguably have brought more people back into the British fold, such as the restoration of civilian 
government in a region, were not tried in the early part of the war. The counterinsurgency 
strategy of the later war was also based in part on the idea that the conquest of part of the 
Hudson Valley region and the restoration of civilian government in southern New York would 
produce many Loyalist militiamen who could hold the area while the field army conquered new 
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territory. In the event, neither the conquest nor the restoration occurred, but it is doubtful that 
it would have produced enough Loyalist militiamen to fulfill the role intended for them. Hence, 
the counterinsurgency strategy would have failed or been not as successful as hoped.  
These misunderstandings of the number of Loyalists in the colony, and for that matter 
of the very nature of the Revolution and the Revolutionaries, had a strong negative impact on 
British actions. Their intelligence sources supported their false beliefs. Their misconceptions 
made the new strategy of which restoration was part seem more promising than it actually was. 
Those who saw things differently seem to have kept quiet about their opinions. The plans and 
strategies of the British were based on false assumptions about the loyalties of the Americans 
and the motivations of the American leadership.  It is not surprising that the British failed. 
 
The personnel and the personalities of the British helped influence the sad result for the 
British.  Had different persons been in charge, different decisions might have been made and 
different results ensued. This begins at the very top: the King. Americans felt loyalty to the king; 
it was Parliament’s right to tax them that they disputed. Had the King been willing to “bend” a 
little, if he had given some indication that a compromise was possible, war and independence 
could have been avoided. The “Olive Branch” Petition of July 1775 was a clear indication that 
even after fighting had occurred between British and colonial troops, many Americans desired 
reconciliation. Instead, the petition was rejected and the king soon declared the Americans to 
be in rebellion. A king more willing to compromise might have resolved the Anglo-American 
dispute. 
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Lord Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies and the de facto minister of war 
during the American Revolution, had been under a cloud ever since the Battle of Minden in 
1759, suspected of cowardice and even declared unfit to command British troops by George II. 
He had been somewhat rehabilitated since then and even risen to a very high position in His 
Majesty’s government, but suspicions remained. As the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he 
had to coordinate the actions of generals such as Howe and Burgoyne, and lay down the 
policies they would follow. Whatever their other faults, Howe, Burgoyne, Clinton, and the other 
commanders had distinguished war records and were considered brave. It is not surprising that 
Germain, a man suspected of cowardice, may have felt some compunction in trying to 
command these men. Hence, the disastrous operations of 1777 were executed with Germain’s 
blessing (or at least acquiescence). Thus, Howe sailed to Philadelphia and his forces were 
unable to give aid to Burgoyne when his army got into trouble at Saratoga.  Similarly, Germain 
did not push Clinton to give his consent to civilian government, even though the British 
government desired it. Germain, while he had many virtues, may not have been the best man 
for his job.  
Perhaps the most important personality for the question of New York was of course 
Clinton.   There is much evidence that Clinton had difficulty sharing authority and working well 
with others. He had difficulty working with Arbuthnot, his fellow peace commissioner, with 
Robertson, and there is evidence that sound plans he created were rejected because he was 
the source. His biographer, with the assistance of a trained psychologist, believed that this was 
more than just a personality defect; it was actually a neurosis.
11
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explanation or not, that Clinton had difficulty sharing authority is evident.  Restoring civilian 
government to New York would have forced him to share his authority and work with a civilian 
government. A more affable general who had no difficulty with sharing authority would 
probably have been more amenable to restoring civilian government.  
 There were reasons, legitimate or otherwise, for what seems like an abuse of Clinton’s 
discretion, as restoring civilian government was the clear desire of the British government. 
These have been discussed above. But the overriding factor seems to have been Clinton’s 
difficulties with authority. This made him highly resistant to the desire of the British 
government to restore civilian authority.  Because of the limitations of eighteenth-century 
communications technology, much discretion had to be left to the commanders on the spot by 
the authorities in London. Thus, Clinton could reject the policy of the government for highly 
questionable reasons and get away with it.  Robertson, for his part, had spent his entire career 
as a staff officer, and had no martial glory, while Clinton had shown bravery under fire and led 
men into battle. Robertson could only push Clinton so much. It is possible that Robertson tried 
to force Clinton’s hand with his proclamation of the imminence of civilian government, but this 
may merely have been a sign of his eagerness to get to work. In the event, Robertson decided 
to compromise and accept what Clinton offered rather than engage in a power struggle with 
him. 
 Thus, “a perfect storm” of personality defects combined to doom civilian government 
restoration. Clinton’s difficulties with authority combined with Germain’s reluctance to press 
brave officers to do what they did not want to do. Robertson was unable to exert too much 
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pressure on Clinton. The result was Clinton avoided sharing authority at the expense of 
Germain’s policy. A more forceful war minister might have been able to compel his views on a 
reluctant general. Germain, with the cloud of Minden over him, was unable or unwilling to 
force the issue.  Clinton made his decision and it was accepted. A promising British policy was 
thereby doomed, and the personalities involved were a large part of the reason for this.  Had 
Germain’s position been held by another man, had Robertson been more forceful with a more 
martial military record, had another general held Clinton’s position, it is possible the outcome 
might have been different.  
 
V 
 
 
An occupation by its very nature is often a dreadful, miserable situation for the 
occupied.  Even the mildest occupation will have requisitions of needed supplies, martial law, 
and often petty vandalism or theft—or worse—by the troops. Even where the occupying troops 
are hailed as liberators, there can be tensions between the occupiers and the occupied.  Where 
the occupying power is seeking to win the loyalty (or win back the loyalty) of the region, 
appalling or dreadful acts can have the additional effect of making this task harder, as it 
increases tensions.  As discussed above, there were numerous appalling actions by the British 
and their allies, ranging from petty theft to home invasions to rape.  Churches and burial 
grounds were desecrated or disrespected. Staten Island, Long Island and Westchester were 
particularly susceptible to raids by small parties of raiders, thieves, and kidnappers. While some 
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of these raids were legitimate acts of war under the standards of the time, many of these 
actions were basically piracy or brigandage, with politics providing but a bare fig leaf of 
justification for crime. Many of these raiders, no matter their alleged side, attacked Loyalists or 
Patriots indiscriminately. The British, stretched on all sides particularly after French intervention 
in 1778, were unable to provide the needed ships or troops to stop the raiders. To make 
matters worse, of the three regiments of militia raised on Long Island to protect the island, two 
of them were sent to Georgia.  The British were not protecting their subjects; indeed, their 
troops were stealing from them, vandalizing them, and even raping them. 
Being a known Loyalist was not a guarantee of better treatment. Loyalists were as likely 
as Patriots to have property taken with the only payment a chit that might not be honored, or 
to have property requisitioned. It was a fateful irony (or perhaps a fatal irony) of the Revolution 
that at the level of policy planning, the British believed and acted as if the vast majority of 
Americans were Loyalists, or at the least not actively with the rebels, while at the level of policy 
implementation, the troops and local commanders acted as if everyone was a rebel. 
There was often a lack of discipline, leading to numerous appalling acts. That these acts 
put Britain in a bad light and were harmful to the British cause was recognized several times. 
For example, in Germain’s plans for 1783, he suggested an invasion of the “Delmarva” 
Peninsula, but urged that the troops be better disciplined.  While some incidents, such as the 
Pudding Hill incident, were rather amusing (at least in retrospect), some were most decidedly 
not. It all added up to a picture of a region where life and property were not safe, even for 
those who loyally supported the King.  
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There were many opportunities for corruption, and many British officials and soldiers 
found ways to make some money on the side. Even the Police Courts, set up to allow a means 
by which claims could be processed, also provided opportunities for corruption.  Rather than 
the blessings of good government, the residents of the British zone received corruption. In 
addition, as detailed in prior chapters, churches were often disrespected and dismantled, 
especially Presbyterian churches. None of this was calculated to win hearts and minds.    
High-handed or insensitive actions could alienate even Loyalists. The entertainment 
center and promenade at the ruins of Trinity Church disquieted many, especially when 
gravestones were removed to accommodate the wide dresses of the time. The newspaper 
publisher Rivington was so annoyed by high-handed British treatment that he became a spy for 
the Americans. In Westchester, many escaped into privatism, and many on Long Island seem to 
have become Patriots, if not actively so, or at the very least neutral. Some Staten Islanders 
followed Rivington into acts of espionage.  
The occupation of southern New York gave the British a superb opportunity to win back 
the hearts and minds of New Yorkers. But the numerous appalling, atrocious, or corrupt actions 
of the British and their auxiliaries helped poison these chances.  
 
VI 
 
The British of the eighteenth century were basically a free and decent people. But they 
made many mistakes in their occupation and their conduct of the war. Basically free and decent 
countries to this day will sometimes find themselves having to conduct an occupation. They 
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sometimes find themselves tasked with having to win “hearts and minds,”
12
  the loyalty and 
even love of the occupied. While eighteenth century New York has many differences from the 
world of the twenty first century, there are some broadly applicable lessons that can be learned 
from the occupation and the war that it was part of.  While not exhaustive, here are some 
lessons that may be gleaned from the war, the occupation, and the peace effort.  
The first lesson is the vital need for cooperation between civilian and military 
authorities.  Especially in a situation where the objective is to restore civilian government in a 
war-zone or an area just behind a war zone, then the military and civilian authorities must 
cooperate.  In New York, Clinton refused to allow civilian government, even though it was the 
clear desire of the British government to do this. By contrast, in Georgia the military and civilian 
leaders worked closely together. Realizing that a major purpose of the invasion of Georgia was 
the restoration of civilian government, the military handed control over Georgia’s government 
of Governor Wright within four months of the invasion.  Restoring or establishing civilian 
government show that an occupying government and its army intend to restore or establish 
liberty, and be liberators, not occupiers. So, a second lesson is that this should be done 
whenever possible.  
A third lesson is the need to understand one’s opponents, and the nature of the war. 
For example,   the British commonly believed that the Revolution was largely by a group of 
conspirators or usurpers. This was manifestly wrong. This showed a terrible misunderstanding 
                                                           
12
 The phrase “hearts and minds” dates back at least as far as John Adams, who in a letter to Hezekiah Niles dated 
Feb. 13, 1818, said “The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and 
hearts of the people.”It was later used by the British in referring to their anti-insurgency program in post-World 
War II Malaysia, and was often used by President Johnson in discussing America’s task in Vietnam, where he often 
spoke of needing to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. The ultimate source of the phrase may be the 
King James Bible: “And the peace of God, which surpasseth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds 
through Christ Jesus.” Philippians 4:7.   
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of the war and the motives of the opponents. The fourth and fifth lessons are closely related. 
They are the need to gather information from a broad number of people, and the need to be 
prepared to change one’s preconceptions concerning the loyalty or political views of the 
people. British policy was based on the erroneous belief that there were many more Loyalists 
than there actually were. The sources of information the British listened to for the most part 
argued this, and it fit with their preconceived notions. The British needed to listen to a much 
broader range or so than a few upper class Americans or British generals, and needed to base 
their opinions and actions on how reality was, not how they wanted to be. 
 A sixth lesson is the need to negotiate from strength. The Carlisle Commission was sent 
to negotiate peace at a time when Britain was in retreat, abandoning conquests in the face of 
French entry into the war. They were met with contempt. If their proposals had come on the 
heels of a major victory, then perhaps things would have been different. The seventh and 
eighth lessons are that, in counterinsurgency operations, areas should be secured before one 
attempts to expand the area under control, and that allies should not be abandoned. While 
retreats are an inevitable part of war, a careful policy of expanding the area under one’s control 
will minimize the possibility of retreat. Part of the occupier’s job is to win, or win back, hearts 
and minds, and to reintegrate the region back into one’s empire (or for a modern power, to 
integrate the country into a country that is friendly to yours). Retreat means abandoning those 
who cast their lot with you—or turning them into refugees. In New Jersey and in Philadelphia 
the retreat of the British swelled the refugee population of New York City. Cornwallis’s failure 
to secure his Carolina gains caused great harm to Loyalist Carolinians. 
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The ninth lesson seems rather obvious. You should have enough troops, supplemented 
with local militias. However, generals rarely get enough soldiers. They must use them wisely in 
a way that maximizes the ability of the limited amount of troops you have. The proposed use of 
the British and Hessian forces as a field army attacking rebel armies and areas, while Loyalist 
militias held the newly-seized areas, would have maximized the forces the British had.  The 
many atrocious incidents committed by the British and Hessian troops shows the need to keep 
control of one’s forces (the tenth lesson). Occupiers should also leave receipts for what they 
take, and pay for the items eventually. It is difficult to win loyalty from people who are angry 
with you. Indeed, not only did these acts fail to win hearts and minds, but probably helped lose 
the loyalty of some. Indeed, the eleventh lesson is the need to treat one’s friends well—they 
should not be treated like enemies. 
The twelfth lesson is the fact that a country may actually be several different entities 
loosely connected—one may have to fight the equivalent of several wars. The revolting colonies 
were highly decentralized, thinking of themselves as thirteen (or fourteen, if Vermont is 
included) independent states united in a “firm league of friendship” as the Articles of 
Confederation described it. Thirteen or fourteen separate but interconnected revolutions took 
place in these colonies. There was no political “head” whose elimination would bring swift 
victory at either the Continental or state levels. The British finally began to recognize the 
decentralized nature of America and began to support a strategy based on taking the colonies 
back county by county, state by state. Similarly, many areas where wars and occupations may 
occur are groupings of different political entities that may be considered a country by courtesy 
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only. If that is the case, then it must be factored into strategies for fighting the war and 
occupying the region.  
 
 
 
VII  
 
 Several specific contributions are made by this work to the study of the American 
Revolution in general and in New York.  First, this work has tried a more global approach which 
integrates events in the counties that surrounded New York City with events there. This work 
has tried to examine events in all the rural counties and integrate the story of the “suburbs” 
with the story of the City.  While New York City was the capital of the province and much of the 
“action” occurred there, important events occurred in the rural regions. Declarations of rights, 
denunciations of British actions as tyrannical, and statements of opposition to the committees 
and their pronouncements all occurred in the rural counties surrounding New York City. Indeed, 
despite some local differences, a clear pattern of similar actions can be seen when one looks at 
all the surrounding counties. One thing that emerges is how, in Staten Island, in Queens, even 
in Brookhaven (in Suffolk County), Loyalists were subjected to similar treatment by the Patriots: 
suspicious observation and eventually an attempt to disarm. Loyalist Staten Island was 
subjected to economic pressure.  And in many areas, such as the towns of Queens and 
Westchester, formal statements denouncing and rejecting Patriot statements and actions were 
made by Loyalists. 
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 Secondly, this work highlights the effects of what I have called “The Evaporation of New 
York”.  New York City’s population disappeared as British invasion came closer. When the 
British arrived, there were only a few hundred New Yorker’s left, virtually all of them Loyalists. 
The Sons of Liberty, the mechanics, all were scattered. The state government was in a small 
town on the Hudson, trying to run a war and write a constitution. The government was freed 
from the pressure to write a democratic (as opposed to a republican) constitution that would 
have been exerted by the Sons of Liberty, the mechanics, and others if New York City’s 
population had never fled and New York City remained the capital.  The constitution that was 
produced, while it had some democratic elements, for the most part was a republican 
document full of checks and balances, and was not submitted to the people for ratification as 
the Committee of Mechanics had requested. This constitution was in effect from 1777 until the 
1820s, when it was finally replaced. Had the population of New York City not “evaporated”, had 
the mechanics, Sons of Liberty, and other democratic elements not been scattered throughout 
New York and America, it is possible that the pressure exerted by the mechanics and other 
democratic elements would have produced a more democratic constitution, and that it would 
then have been submitted to the people for ratification. Hence the basically classical republican 
John Jay and the other framers of New York’s constitution were able to work and ratify the 
constitution they wrote without such pressure. Thus, the British attack and occupation of New 
York City and the surrounding region had a long-lasting effect on the government of New York 
State. 
 This work has examined from both the perspective of the British and Loyalist leadership 
and the ordinary person the British occupation, with especial attention to the attempt to 
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restore civilian government to New York. This is an important story for an understanding of the 
Revolution, New York history, and indeed the entire question of military occupations. It traces 
the genesis of the idea, and the failed attempt to restore civilian government, and the reasons 
for that failure. It thus takes a good look at the Carlisle Commission, whose mission was one of 
the catalysts for the policy of restoring civilian government.  It highlights the rather fascinating 
character of the Earl of Carlisle. His early wastrel days and obvious sense of humor concealed 
an insightful mind. As did Ambrose Serle, Lord Howe’s secretary, he saw that the love and 
loyalty of the average American was lost. Perhaps because of (or despite) this insight, he helped 
push for a new strategy that would hopefully win back these loyalties. Besides the Commission 
members, several were thinking in the same way, and the restoration strategy was adopted. 
  This work highlights an oft-neglected figure, General James Robertson, the man selected 
to implement the restoration strategy. Despite the publication in the 1980s of Robertson’s 
gubernatorial letterbook, little has been written about him since. His attempt to restore civilian 
government, its failure (mainly because of the opposition of General Clinton), and Robertson’s 
actions as governor, are a fascinating and important story that needs to be told but which has 
been largely neglected. Robertson, if somewhat flawed, was an excellent staff officer and 
suffered great personal loss fighting the 1776 fire. He was one of the few from his relatively low 
social station to rise to general ranks in the British Army of the Georgian era. Arguably, he tried 
to alleviate the miseries of southern New Yorkers with his Police Courts and other actions.  He 
may have prevented with his advice to General Howe a deadly frontal assault. Unfortunately for 
the British, he was unable to persuade Clinton to permit the full restoration of civilian 
government in New York. Robertson, his governorship, and his battles with Clinton, are all 
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worth studying. This work at the very least begins the work of studying him, or of building on 
the work of the 1980s.  
 The occupation of southern New York was compared and contrasted with events in 
Georgia by this work. This is an instructive comparison, as it shows the differences in 
approaches, and helps show what could have been. In Georgia, there was good cooperation 
between the civilian government and the military. Civilian government was restored, complete 
with an assembly. This assembly formed new parishes and courts, attainted rebels, and perhaps 
most significantly, voted the King a revenue. All this was achieved despite a shortage of troops 
and a fluid military situation.  This contrasts with New York, where civilian government was not 
restored despite a stable and relatively secure military situation, and helps highlight what could 
have been achieved in New York—an achievement which would have been far more visible to 
the other colonies and perhaps more fruitful. 
 But the most basic question of the work is whether the beneficial results the British 
hoped for would have occurred if the “experiment” was tried and civilian government restored. 
Could it have won over a significant number of colonials back to the British? Could it have 
materially affected the war enough to have improved British chances, or even helped win the 
war for the Crown? At the very least, could it have resulted in a substantial portion of a major 
province desiring, perhaps even proclaiming through an Assembly resolution, their desire to 
remain in the empire even after independence was acknowledged by Britain? The short answer 
is most likely no.
13
  The love and loyalty for Britain and the king built up over generations had 
been lost. A decade of protest had resulted in war and revolution. Even before independence, 
                                                           
13
 Since this a counterfactual situation, what follows is speculation, but informed speculation, based on my 
research and many years of thinking of the problem. 
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many began, in their hearts and minds, to become self-governing citizens, not subjects. Having 
taken this step, it was difficult to step back from it. By July 4, 1776, the nation as a whole took 
this step. 
 Once the nation crossed these psychological and political Rubicons, nothing short of 
crushing military defeat could have made them return to their old allegiance (and even then, it 
would merely have been bowing to expediency, not heartfelt). In the summer of independence, 
the King was symbolically executed numerous times. As the war continued, people under 
British occupation took oaths of loyalty to the monarch only to drop their allegiance at the first 
opportunity. The very generous offers of the Carlisle Commission (which gave in on virtually 
everything except independence) were met with contempt.  
 While there were many Loyalists, there were not enough. The Patriots were a sizable 
minority of the population, and seemed to gained more adherents from the non-aligned and 
even Loyalists as the war dragged on, while the British seemed to lose adherents. Indeed, in 
those areas occupied by the British, there is evidence that their presence actually turned 
Loyalists into Patriots. 
 For numerous reasons, the experiment should have been tried. It was promising, it 
would have at the very least made the occupation less onerous, and there are plausible 
counterfactual scenarios where it would have eased the reintegration of the region into the 
empire after a peace treaty or British military victory. But would it have brought the great 
benefits the British hoped from it? Would the restoration of civilian government in New York 
have helped the British win the war and ease the way to the willing return of many Americans 
to their old allegiance?   The short answer is No. 
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VIII 
 
 As part of a new strategy following French intervention in 1778, the restoration of 
civilian government  in occupied New York was proposed, but was not instituted, mainly 
because of the opposition of the military commander, General Sir Henry Clinton.  It had been 
hoped that there would have been great propaganda value to such a restoration, and that it 
could have led many individuals, regions, and even states back into the British fold. While in 
many ways not a bad policy, it would have not succeeded in its goals. After independence was 
declared, little short of overwhelming victory by the British would have restored the colonies to 
London. 
So, therefore, was the British occupation of New York a failure? Could wiser occupation 
policies, particularly the restoration of civilian government, have led to greater success—to 
victory in the war, to retention of at least part of New York for the Empire, or at least a 
pleasanter occupation for the denizens of down-state (and produced perhaps a few more 
Loyalist troops)?  
 Wiser occupation policies, such as decreasing theft and plunder, protecting people from 
rebel raids, paying for requisitions, and restoring civilian government so that a court system 
could properly protect the people of the region from British and Hessian actions would all have 
made the occupation a better experience.  More Loyalist troops (though probably less than 
desired), a pleasanter occupation for southern New Yorkers, and even (under some scenarios) 
retention of the area might have followed. But the biggest problem for the Empire was that 
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everything the British did in America after July 4, 1776, was too late. Once independence was 
declared, the war was lost. Even crushing military victory by Britain would probably only have 
delayed independence by a few decades. 
Americans in general, and New Yorkers in particular, for a long time wanted to remain in 
the Empire. While they rejected Parliament’s right to tax them, they respected the King as their 
ruler and gave him their loyalty and even love, and considered him the protector of their 
liberties, even putting his name on their liberty poles But their love turned to hatred when they 
found he had (in their eyes, at least) betrayed them. They began to reject monarchy as a 
concept and embrace republicanism and even democracy. From subjects, who, despite their 
assemblies and town meetings, were ultimately subjected to the rule of another, they were 
becoming and thinking of themselves as self-ruling citizens. Even if their armies had been 
crushed, their surrender would merely have been bowing to military reality, and their oaths of 
loyalty would not have been heart-felt. There were numerous incidents during the Revolution 
where loyalty oaths were taken by Americans, only to be thrown off at the earliest opportunity.    
 The Revolutionary War was, in addition to a war of armies and generals, fleets and 
admirals, a battle for the hearts and minds, the love and loyalty of the American people. There 
were many instances before July 4, 1776, when the British could have offered a solution to the 
Imperial Question that would have satisfied American aspirations for a place at the table and 
retained their membership in the Empire. Even after the Battle of Lexington-Concord, there was 
still a slim chance for reconciliation. But what the Americans saw as the King’s betrayal, and the 
independence that followed, shut that door. By the time General Robertson arrived in New 
York, it was far too late. Even if he had been permitted by Sir Henry Clinton to restore civilian 
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government to New York, such an action would only have ameliorated life in the occupied area. 
While it may have had many beneficial effects, it would not have changed the fundamental fact 
that, outside of the Loyalists (more and more of whom were being gathered in New York), the 
“common people”, as Lord Carlisle wrote, hated the British “in their hearts.” 
 Certainly, the British occupation could have been better. The property and persons of 
southern New Yorkers could have been protected more. The rule of law and even an assembly 
could have been created. So, in this respect, it was a failure. But even if the occupation had 
been a model one, even if civil government had been restored, it would not have mattered. 
Even the scenario discussed above, where the United States became independent but the New 
York City region remained in the Empire, was unlikely, and if it had occurred, it may not have 
lasted long.  America was independent. Even New York’s reluctant revolutionaries had crossed 
the Rubicon of independence. Nothing the British could have done, including military victory, 
would have changed the fact that in their hearts and minds, the Americans had achieved 
independence. Even military victory would only have delayed political independence for a time. 
 In conclusion, the occupation was a failure. It could have been much less harsh 
for those in the occupied territory. Wiser policies, such as civilian government, could have been 
instituted. Better cooperation between civilian and military leaders would have helped to 
institute civilian government. But it would not have mattered. British New York, even under 
civilian rule, would not have been a shining example to the other colonies that they should 
return to British rule—at least, not an effective one. Few individuals, much less colonies or 
regions, would have returned to British rule because of its example. Even restoring civilian 
government would thus have been a failure, and not have helped the British win the war. The 
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occupation was a failure—indeed it would not be too much to say that it failed before it even 
began. 
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